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Abstract 
The six dockyards in England were engaged in "r 
building, repairing and refitting the fleet. Hitherto the word 
of the sea service has been taken in judging their performance; 
since the sea officers were themselves involved, and could often 
be faulted, in servicing the ships, this unfavourable evidence 
should be treated with some reservation. 
Nevertheless, there were many weaknesses in the yards. 
The first among their organisational defects was the split in 
executive control between the Admiralty and Navy Boards, which 
led to inefficiency and delay. Instructions had been 
formulated in the previous century, and subsequent orders were 
confused; in an organisation where respect for precedent was 
decisive, much was left in doubt. The yard officers were thus 
allowed a damaging amount of independence, and this in turn 
caused mistrust and a lack of understanding of yard problems 
between these officers and the boards in London. The first 
difficulty lay in the inadequate pay structure and consequent 
lack of incentive of the shipwrights. It also proved impossible 
to administer the huge amount of naval stores without a large 
degree of waste. Other problems included navigational 
3 
troubles and inadequate facilities, particularly at the all- 
important western yards. These problems led to delay, 
particularly in the refitting which was vital in wartime. 
The application of copper sheathing went some way to lighten 
this burden. 
Inefficiency was primarily caused by the fact that 
the yards were overstretched by the increased size and number 
of the ships in this war, and by the failure to utilize 
inadequate resources more effectively. The system was at 
fault. Individuals, such as Lord Sandwich and Charles 
Middleton, worked hard to keep it going, while trying at the 
same time to improve it. Fortunately, defeat in the war 
encouraged the start of this reform in the 1780's. 
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Introduction 
The six royal dockyards formed the largest industrial 
organisation in England during the eighteenth century. They were 
engaged in the largest technological task of the time, which was 
the building, maintaining and equipping of the British fleet. 
Until recently the fighting navy has had first call on the attentions 
of naval historians, but an increasing awareness of the importance of 
the administration supporting the fighting effort has brought less 
famous men with more mundane tasks into greater prominence. The 
effect of this neglect has been to give the civil administration 
of the navy an unfavourable reputation. For instance, we are told 
that in this period, "mismanagement, bare-faced rogu. ery, confusion, 
and disorganisation were rampant at all the dockyards", 
i 
and the 
general picture that has been handed down is of a sleepy and in- 
efficient organisation, staffed by officials and workmen whose only 
aim was to relieve the Crown of its property under their charge. 
Although there is some truth in this picture, little 
account has been taken of the difficulties of administering the 
dockyards, The idea of a lack of urgency has certainly been 
over-emphasized. Byam Martin was taken by his father to 
Portsmouth in 1780; later he wrote: "The busy, bustling scene 
often comes to my recollection like the renewal of a pleasant 
dream,.. everything seemed to be in motion... all this was going 
1, Edward Fraser, The Londons of the British Fleet. (London, 1908), p. 258, 
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on at a period of the war which called for great exertions. "1 
In fact, there were not many periods of this war when great 
exertions were not called for. The American War of Independence 
was the only war in the century which was a clear defeat for the 
British navy. It was the only war in which the Bourbon powers 
did not have to divert their efforts into major campaigns on 
the continent. However, this study is not an attempt to explain 
that defeat in terms of the defects or otherwise of the organisation 
of the navy, but rather, in the words of a distinguished study of 
an earlier period of naval administration, "to illuminate pertain 
aspeots of the nature and development of British government". 
2 
Defeat in the war gave the impetus to reform what had 
hitherto been a successful navy. The organisation of the dock.. 
yards had outgrown the principles and procedures that had been 
established in the previous century, and by which they were 
still governed. While the functions of the yards had remained 
the same, the complexity of the work had increased on a large 
scale. Every class of ship had grown in size and number, and 
building and equipping them demanded more plant and labour; but 
it was easier to build larger ships than to refashion the 
1. Journals and Letters of Sir T am Martin, (ed) R. Vesey 
Hamilton NILS, 1903)v 1,5. 
2. Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of 
Walpole# (Princeton, 1995)9 preface. 
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attitudes and interests involved in change. Change involved 
looking to the future, but the whole concept of the government 
of the yards looked to the past. Precedent and custom governed 
day-to-day affairs as much as they governed the growth of the 
system, 
Despite this pervading attitude, these were years of 
change for the dockyards. Two men were largely responsible 
for this. The first was Lord Sandwich, appointed First Lord 
of the Admiralty in 1771, who saw the war nearly to its 
conclusion before falling with North's government. The 
opprobium which fell on that administration unjustly overflowed 
upon Sandwich's performance as First Lord. The second was 
Charles Middleton, later Lord Barham, who was appointed to the 
other key post in the civil administration of the navy, the 
Comptrollership of the Navy Board. These two men were the 
architects of reform. In spite of contrasting backgrounds, 
outlook and temperament, they formed an ideal working relation- 
ship. Although their wartime partnership resulted in a period 
of particularly effective administration, they did not coincide 
in office in peacetime, and therefore had no opportunity for a 
joint effort for reform; however, the First Lord prepared the 
way for the changes which Middleton made after the war. Im- 
provement, however, progressed neither as far nor as fast as 
either man hoped. There was little chance of fundamentally 
improving the system until there was a change in social and 
_ __.. __ --ý---- -- . ý... __. _ _. ,. W 12ý 
administrative attitudes throughout the dockyard organisation. 
The taking of fees, inadequate concepts of responsibility and 
the lack of concern with speed and accuracy could not be 
counteracted by the stroke of a pen. It was this factor 
that led to the frustration of Sandwich's plans before the 
war, and Middleton's disappointments in the 1780's. 
The six yards were of varying size and importance. 
Henry VIII had established Deptford and Woolwich on the Thames; 
comparatively small yards now because of their inaccessibility 
and the shallowness of the River, 
1 they nevertheless were very 
busy in wartime. Deptford handled a greater part of the stores 
sent out to the yards at Antigua, Jamaica, Halifax, Gibraltar 
and Port Mahon, while Woolwich, apart from sharing in this 
task, had very large rope works, which provided most of the 
rope sent to the foreign yards. Twelve miles up the river 
Medway was Chatham, established in Elizabeth's reign. Once 
the major yard to meet the Dutch threat, it now languished 
because of silting problems in the Medway and because the 
enemy was now France, and the Channel and the Western Approaches 
the main centre of operations. It was still, however, a large 
yard, and was used for building and major repairs to ships. 
Partly to compensate for the intricacies of the Medway, a 
small yard had been built at Sheerness in 1665 on an un- 
hospitable site at the mouth of the river. This served as a 
1. The Thames was invariably known as 'The River'. 
J 
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refitting yard of limited capacity. In this war, the two 
western yards, because of their strategic position, were of 
most importance. Although established in 1689, Plymouth's 
rise and expansion had been comparatively recent, and in 
several ways it was beginning to rival Portsmouth, which had 
been founded at the same time as the River yards. These two 
yards served as both the main refitting bases and as rendezvous 
for the fleet. Most of the major problems in the administration 
centred on these two yards. 
Mention must also be made of the minor refitting bases 
at Harwich and Leith, which were set up in 1781 when the North 
Sea became strategically important. They were dismantled on 
the peace. 
1 Kinsale served the same purpose in the Irish sea, 
while Dealt although some naval stores were kept there, was 
really no more than a communications post for the ships 
sheltering in the Downs. Since these bases were largely 
concerned with storing and watering ships, and since they 
undertook only minimum repairs and refits on the smallest 
vessels, they hardly, intrude upon this study. 
one historian has recently written that, "the long- 
established impression (it cannot be termed more than that) 
1" V M# ADM A/2759,2,24 Jan 1781; BP/29 1 Jan 1781; 
BP/4,4 Feb 1783; A/2784,26 Feb 1783. 
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of eighteenth-century administration as generally corrupt, 
inefficient and inactive needs considerable revision". 
1 
The purpose of this study is to examine this impression in 
relation to the administration and performance of the six 
royal dockyards in England. 
1. Norman Baker, 
1971), vii. 
1 
Chapter One. The Central Administration. 
i) The Admiralty and Navy Boards. 
For most of the eighteenth century there were 
invariably months of delay between a Cabinet decision 
calling for the mobilisation of ships and the day that 
those ships sailed as a fleet or squadron from their 
rendezvous at Spithead or Torbay. In this time the 
administration was not idle, although orders, memoranda 
and decisions filtered through the network of boards and 
offices at a slow pace by modern standards. After the 
King's command, the first step in the administrative process 
was for one of the Secretaries of State to inform the 
Treasury, the Admiralty and the Ordnance of the decision 
At this point it was the First Lord of the Admiralty who was 
at the centre of the stage, for it was from him, acting as the 
"executive servant" of "the collective wisdom of all His 
Majesty's confidential ministers", 
2 that the ripples of 
I. For a full analysis of the workings of the higher reaches 
of the administration see Piers Mackesy, The War for 
America 177-1783, (London, 1964), pp. 12-24; David Syrett, 
Shipping and the American War. 1775-83, (London, 1970), pp. 1-6; 
R. G. Usher, "The Civil Administration of the British Navy during 
the American Revolution; ' (unpub. Ph. D. thesis, Michigan, 1942), 
pp. 1-14. 
2. SaP, II, 255, undated. 
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activity slowly spread through the civil administration of 
the navy. At the same time as he and his board appointed 
officers and drew up lists of ships, he directed subordinate 
boards to put in hand the fitting out, storing and victualling 
of the ships and the gathering of the crews. 
1 
Thus the duties of the Admiralty were for the most 
part executive, conducting the military administration of the 
fleet under the guidelines of a higher authority, although, 
compared with other departments it was "wayward and indepenn :2 
Just as it was the duty of the Secretary of State to co-ordinate 
the whole war machine, it was the task of the Admiralty to 
co-ordinate the services within the civil administration of the 
navy. Liaison had to be maintained with the Board of Ordnance, 
while the departments within the civil administration had to be 
overseen. Of these, the Navy Board was by far the most import- 
ant. It provided the link with the Victualling and Sick and 
Hurt Boards, while it also had charge of most of the financing 
3 
1. The Admiralty Board was usually about seven strong, of which 
two were generally sea officers. For a list of the members 
of the Board see SaP, I, xv-xvi. For an explanation of the 
domination of the Board by the Pirst Lord see R. Middleton, 
"Pitt, Anson and the Admiralty, 1756-61", Hi sto_tr, 55,1970, P. 191. 
2. Mackesy, p. 19. 
3. These smaller boards, and the Treasurer of the Navy, had been 
part of the Navy Board, but had broken away from it under 
pressure of business early in the century. 
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of the navy, the buying of naval stores and the organisation 
of transports; but above all, it had the responsibility of 
the building, equipping, repairing and refitting of the fleet 
in the dockyards. 
The chief feature, therefore, of the administration 
of the dockyards was that executive power was divided between 
-I 
the Admiralty and Navy Boards. Their relationship was the 
familiar one of the politicians over the professionals; the 
Navy Board was, according to Monson, writing at the beginning 
of the previous century, 
the conduit pipes to whom the Lord 
Admiral properly directs all his 
commands for His Majesty's service, 
and from whom it descends to all other 
inferior officers and ministers under 
them whatsoever. 1 
The relationship was, however, more subtle than this by the 
eighteenth century, for the two boards were interdependent. 
The Navy and its works exercised a mystique over the 
eighteenth-century mind; the vagaries of terms and methods 
were felt to be comprehensible only to those in the service. 
The Admiralty's wide political and appointive powers were 
sufficient to ensure its primacy, but the senior board was 
1. The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, (ed) M. Oppenheim, 
NRS, 1913)9 111,398, written between 1605 and 1618. 
unusually dependent on the professional advice of the 
Commissioners at the Navy Board. 
In this respect, Sandwich was something of an 
exception to the typical First Lord; his long association 
with the civil administration gave him more of an insight 
into its ways than even the sea officers who occupied the 
post. Traditionally Sandwich has been cast as "that lord 
of misrule"; the same historian contends that hei "probably 
did more damage to the navy entrusted to his care than any 
hostile French admiral haddone". 
1 In the context of this 
war this is perhaps not a very damaging assertion; neverthe- 
less, in recent years his reputation has taken a turn very 
much for the better. The publication of his papers was 
responsible for the start of this process; 
2 thus, a more 
recent view is that "Sandwich was one of the most able and 
conscientious First Lords that the Navy has had; a worthy 
colleague and successor to Anson". 
3 More recently still it 
has been written of him thatt "Whatever office he held, he 
1. R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power, 
1926), p. 282. 
(Cambridges Mass 
2. The Private Papers of John Earl of Sandwich, (ed) 
G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owens NRS, 1932-8 . See 
especially, I, xiv. 
3. M. J. Williams, "The Naval Administration of the Fourth 
Earl of Sandwich, 1771-82; (unpub. D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 
2962), p. 570. 
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'aught to it the inquiring mind and tremendous, restless energy 
that made him an extremely effective administrator". 
' 
These judgements form a much truer picture of Sandwich 
than those of the earlier Whig historians, although there has 
been a tendency recently to judge his performance as First Lord 
uncritically. For instance, some of his strategic decisions 
were questionable, and there were signs that he grew tired 
towards the end of his administration, especially after the 
death of his mistress. If there was fatigue and loss of 
interest it would hardly be surprising, for running the nary 
was a discouraging affair in this war, and especially so for 
the First Lord, after the effort he had put into the civil 
administration before hostilities began. There is no gain- 
saying his energy and intense interest during the early 1770's, 
when every summer he completed an arduous tour of the dockyards. 
2 
Nor is there any doubt that he effected many improvements during 
this time, although his effectiveness as a reformer was limited 
by the fact that the civil administration's complacency had yet 
to be shaken by defeat in a war. From the evidence of the 
length and quality of his papers and letters, the legend of 
administrative laziness seems to be belied, although it is true 
1. J. M. Haas, "The Pursuit of Political Success in 
Eighteenth-Century England; Sandwich, 1740-71"t 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 
XLIIT, 1970, p"57" 
2. Admiralty visitations took place from 1771-1778 and in 1784. 
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that letters were delayed because'the Secretary to the 
Admiralty Board had little initiative. Although it was only 
through this office that the Board could correspond, the 
Secretary was unable to take any independent action; the 
result was that the office of First Lord was heavily over- 
centralised. However, even Lord Howe, who was no friend of 
Sandwich, confessed that, "to give him his due, he is seldom 
baokwaxd... in answering letters". 
1 
His greatest administrative talent, however, was his 
adroit handling of people. It was true that the navy was badly 
split for most of the American war by politics and personalities, 
but this stemmed from the complicated party situation and 
unpopularity of the war rather than immediately from the 
First Lord, although he was dogged by a reputation of untrust- 
worthiness which stemmed from his earlier betrayal of Wilkes, 
In his first stay at the Admiralty, Sandwich had found the 
need for tact in handling Bedford, and he found that something 
of these gifts were still needed. He improved the capacity of 
an overworked navy by building up a following of able men, 
most of whom were politically "nonentities by eighteenth- 
century standards". 
2 Hugh Palliser and Lord Mutgrave were 
1. Quoted in Mackesy, p. 162. 
2. J. H. Broomfield, "Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty Board; 
Politics and the Navy, 1771-1778", Mariner's Mirror, 51, 
1965, P. 9. 
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talented and hardworking, and gave Sandwich valuable support 
at the Admiralty and Mutgrave, especially, in the Commons. How- 
ever, of all the new men who rose to prominence during Sandwich's 
administration, it was the Comptroller of the Navy, Charles 
Middleton, who was the most able; he also needed the most 
tactful handling. 
The Navy Board has long held the reputation of having 
substantial independence. A. T. Mahan noted that the Admiralty 
was only "nominally superior"' and a recent view is that the 
Admiralty found it "difficult if not impossible" to control the 
Navy Board during this period. 
Z The power of the professional 
board was clear; it could withdraw its technical expertise, and 
use it to attempt to extend its influence. If it came to an issue, 
the Navy Board could withdraw the support and co-operation which 
was essential to the smooth running of the administration. It 
was therefore essential that relations between the First Lord 
and the Comptroller of the Navy Board were healthy. In spite 
of the First Lord's knowledge of the civil administration, and 
the sea-going experience of Palliser and Mul, grave, this Admiralty 
Board needed, like all its predecessors, information from 
the professional board, and in spite of two disagreements 
which have tended to be seen as typical of the relationship 
1. A. T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare. (Boston, 1908), 
pp. 13,26; Syrett, pp, 18-20; Usher, pp. 82-99, 
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between the two boards, this period was marked by good 
relations. This was due in no small part to Sandwich's 
handling of Middleton. 
This co-operation was needed to fulfil the main 
principle of naval administration laid down by Mahan, which 
was, 
to attain and preserve substantial 
unity of executive action, while at 
the same time providing for the dis- 
tribution among several individuals 
of a mass of detailed duties, beyond 
the power of any one man to discharge. 1 
The two boards were situated at different ends of London; not 
only was executive action not unified, but it was not even under 
one roof. In the administration of the dockyards, the general 
pattern was that the Admiralty initiated policy, and sanctioned 
and issued the more important orderst acting on the professional 
advice of the Navy Board. These orders were then distributed 
to the yards by the junior board. The theory was simple, but 
in detail it was far from clear. 
The chief difficulty was that there was no clear 
administrative principle which split the responsibilities for 
the dockyards between the two boards; as a result there were 
large areas of potential disagreement. The supervision of the 
1. Mahan, p. 18. 
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yard personnel illustrated this weakness, While the Admiralty 
kept the promotion of most of the dockyard officers firmly in 
its hands, the professional board, for no other reason than 
custom, appointed the two most junior ranks of officers. It 
is significant that this question caused the only important 
disagreement between Sandwich and Middleton in the four years 
that their periods of office coincided*1 The particular point 
at issue was over the acceptance of Navy Board advice. Other 
areas were less contentious. While routine pay questions, 
appeals for sick pay and the administration of the payment of 
the yards were the concern of the professional board, super- 
annuation of both officers and men was awarded by the Admiralty - 
this time acting on information from the Navy Board. Discipline 
was handled in the main by the professional board, although the 
commissioners were hampered in their dealings with the yard 
officers by the principle that only the appointive board could 
discipline or even reprimand its appointees. 
The greatest clog to efficiency, however, lay in the 
confusion and delay caused by the division of the two boards in 
the considerable task of the management of the fleet. The 
difficulties stemmed from a lack of co-ordination, and from 
1. See R. J. B. Knight, "Sandwich, Middleton and Dockyard Appoint- 
ments", Mariner's Mirror, 1971,57, PP. 175-192. Sandwich 
and Middleton overlapped in office between August 1778 and 
March 1782. 
the Admiralty's failure to appreciate the technical problems 
facing the Navy Board and the dockyards. The Admiralty 
decided when a ship was to be built, but the professional 
board had to be consulted, since it alone was competent to 
judge when and where the facilities and materials were 
available. Orders to repair,, lay up "in Ordinary",, 
' break 
up or sell a ship also came from the Admiralty, but advice 
from the Navy Board, which in turn used information from the 
surveys of the yard officers, was automatically accepted; 
the politicians could hardly do otherwise. Routine main- 
tenance, or "Triennial Trimmings", was the responsibility of 
the yard officers and not directed in detail from London; 
this ceased once the war had started because of pressure of 
other work. 
2 
Fitting and refitting the fleet, especially at a 
general mobilisation, posed greater problems. The procedure 
took the following form. The Admiralty issued an order to the 
Navy Board to fit a ship for "Channel" or "Foreign" service, 
1. This was the term for a ship laid up out of commission; 
the cost of its upkeep was borne on the "Ordinary" 
Estimate of the navy. 
2. If in the course of inspection more than routine repairs 
were found to be needed, a report and estimate had to go 
all the way up to the Admiralty before work could proceed 
(e. g. N? YI, ADM B/189,23 May 1775; PRO, ADM 106/2592, 
26 May 1775). 
24 
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The order also specified the number of men needed to man the 
ship, and the amount of victuals, beer, spirits and stores to 
be carried. At the same time, the Navy Board was requested 
to inform the Admiralty when the ship would be ready to receive 
seamen. The Navy Board then sent a warrant to the yard con- 
cerned and informed the Commissioners of Victualling of the 
needs of the ship. The yard officers replied, as soon as it 
was possible, with an estimate of the date of the ship's 
readiness, which in turn was transmitted to the Admiralty by 
the Navy Board. On or near the estimated day, the Admiralty 
ordered the professional board to put the ship into "Sea 
Victualling", by which time the ship's officers should have 
been on board and have assumed responsibility for the ship. 
l 
The trouble was that, while the Admiralty decided on 
which ships were to serve, it was more often than not unguided 
by the professional board, which had a much more accurate 
picture of the state of ships in the yards. This trouble was 
not new; in the 1739-45 war, 
it was absolutely essential that those 
ships which could best prepare themselves 
for sea after docking should be taken in 
hand first. The Lords of the Admiralty 
fully embraced this policy, and yet again 
and again, while absorbed in each new 
strategic necessity, they allowed it to be 
undermined by their own orders. 2 
1. "Sea Victualling" merely signified that the ship was in 
commission; it might still be many months before it 
actually was at sea. 
2" Baugh, p. 339" 
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It was as much a case of the Admiralty not appreciating the 
difficulties of fitting out the fleet. Although the senior 
board had some direct contact with the yards, it was scant 
compared to the amount of information which the Navy Board 
obtained. Every movement in and out of dock was transmitted 
through weekly reports, and problems of tides labour and the 
difficulties of estimating the extent of damage and decay was 
understood by the technical officers of the junior board. As 
a rule,, the sea officers at the Admiralty knew little of this, 
and the politicians even less. 
The second weakness was the lack of co-ordination 
between the two boards. The effects of this could be seen 
most clearly at yard level. The main problem was that neither 
the sea service nor the civil administration could officially 
make a move without orders from their respective boards. The 
Port Admirals, based on flagships at the Nore, Spithead and 
Plymouth, were the executive arms of the Admiralty. Their main 
concerns were manning, victualling, cour-6 martial., and ensuring 
that the ships sailed as quickly as possible, but they came up 
against the civil administration very frequently. The 
correspondence of Richard Roddam, who was, "Commander-in-Chief 
of His Majesty's ships and vessels in the River Medway and at 
the buoy of the Nore" for most of the American War, abounds 
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with irritation and frustration; a conscientious man, he found 
the ways of the civil administration strange after years of life 
on a quarter deck. "I am... greatly hurt when I see anything 
retard the general good", he wrote on one occasion, and on 
another he observed to the Admiralty, "how necessary it is for 
the officers here to have a latitude for furthering the service". 
l 
Much in fact depended upon good relations between the 
Port Admiral and the Resident Commissioner, who was the 
representative of the Navy Board at the nearby yards of Chatham, 
Portsmouth and Plymouth. An informal arrangement between them 
could save days of delay, although any arrangement had to be 
confirmed later by application to the boards in London. The 
division of authority affected the simplest of situations; for 
instance, in March 1775 the captain of the Martin sloop wrote 
to the Admiralty, requesting that it give an order to hasten 
the fitting of his ship at Chatham. Philip Stephens, secretary 
to the Admiralty Board, wrote to the Navy Board on a Saturday. 
The letter was not read until the Board met on Monday, and 
the order did not reach Chatham until Wednesday. 
2 The whole 
process took nearly a week, for there was no official machinery 
1. I)1M, Roddam Papers, unoatalogued, Roddam to the Admiralty, 
14 Aug 1778,6 Jun 1779. 
i 
2. NNII, A]M A/2689,18 Max 1775; PRO, ADM 106/2592,20 Mar 
1775" 
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to bridge the gap between the civil and military sides of the 
service at a local level, 
The Admiralty also initiated orders for the movement of 
ships from yard to yard, and therefore directed ships coming home 
from a commission to a particular yard for paying off or re- 
fitting. The Navy Board, responsible for both these tasks, had 
to propose to the Admiralty where this should be. The general 
rule was that each ship had a permanent base, usually the one 
where she was first built or fitted out. This often had to be 
changed; another yard might have a suitable dock clear at that 
moment, or a ship might not be seaworthy enough to reach the 
designated yard. The placing of ships after a cruise was not 
a great problem, although there was no great system about it. 
The Admiralty took Navy Board advice without any difficulty, 
although the division of authority sometimes led to problems in 
this respeot. 
l 
The system, as it was, was not suited to emergencies, 
and consequently had to adapt itself in wartime. With the 
confidence that Sandwich placed in Middleton during the major 
part of the American war the situation improved. Contact and 
co-operation between the two boards in London increased; Navy 
1. e. g. NM, ADM B/188,26 oat 1773; ADM A/2688,4 Feb 1775; 
ADM B/189,7 Feb 1775; ADM A/2692,15 Jun 1775. 
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Board advice was given and taken more freely. The Admiralty 
began to give advance notice of its ship requirements' The 
Navy Board kept a close eye on the works of the yards, especially 
at Portsmouth and Plymouth. 
2 At the same time, more and more 
decisions had to be taken on the spot, especially when the 
fleet came in. Unguided by official precedent, it was on 
these occasions when the relationship between the Port Admiral 
and the Resident Commissioner wasp most tested. 
It is Mahan's contention that the existence of two 
boards led to the further evil of epitomising the split between 
the military and civil sides of the service, although, as he 
observes, "the opposition between civil and military ... may be 
said to be original, of the nature of things". 
3 There is no 
doubt that the military officer found administration dis- 
tasteful, and considered the officers in the civil line his 
social and professional inferiors. Thus senior or influential 
officers would use the Admiralty to overrule the Navy Board 
when it suited them. The time that this was most often likely 
to happen was in the fitting of ships, for clear rules were laid 
1. e. g. Nm r ADM B/197,3 Nov 1778. 
2.6-9- P. RO, ADM 174/116,28 Mar 1779; 174/117,10 Nov 1780; 
11M, POR/F/17,19 Ap 1780. 
3. Mahan, p. 8. 
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down of how much and how many stores were given to each class 
of ship. For instance, Lord William Campbell, embarking on a 
sloop to take up the Governership of South Carolina, did not 
hesitate to apply to the Admiralty for, among other things, an 
extra mizen sail, which the Navy Board was ordered to supply. 
A similar request from a less well-placed sloop captain in the 
same month to the Navy Board elicited the reply that. -only, "one 
mizen(is)allowed by the establishment". 
1 There were many 
examples of this additional burden on the Navy Board and the 
yard s. 
2 
The attempts by sea officers to obtain more stores 
than were allowed was a permanent feature of the eighteenth- 
century navy. A potential source of friction was therefore 
always at hand. The Resident Commissioner of the yard, who 
had sea-going experience, was supposed to settle these demands, 
but, since the previous century, "he either submitted to them 
(i. e. the commanders) or quarrelled with them so long as they 
remained in harbour". 
3 By the time of the American warp the 
1. tai, ADM A/26899 29 Max 1775; A/2690,1 Ap 1775; PRO, 
ADM 106/2592,6,8 Max 1775» Lord Campbell was the 
brother of the Duke of Argyyll, an ex-M. P. and naval 
captain, 
2. e. g. NMM, ADM A/26899 22 Mar 1775; PRO, ADM 106/25979 
24 Ap 1778; AM 95/95,17 Nov 1778. These examples 
concern Duff and Malgrave - both personal friends of 
Sandwich. 
3. John Fhrman The Navy in the war of William III, 
1669_1697, tCambr dge, 1953)t P" i also Ba'4h#PP- 337-8" 
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situation was such that the professional board was flooded 
with appeals at every refit, and little attempt was made to 
delegate authority. 
1 Senior officers tended to think that 
dealing with the Navy Board was beneath their dignity, but as 
the pressure of war increased the burden on the administration, 
the Navy Board's technical advice was more often followed, and 
was less often overruled for other than professional reasons. 
Friction between the two sides of the service was a 
constant factor at this time; in this war the bitter divisions 
in the fighting navy, and especially the Channel Fleet, affected 
and increased it. At every level this led to tension and in- 
efficiency. 
2 Yet it was inevitable that the Admiralty gave the 
fighting officers their heads, for the end of naval administration 
is the equipping of the fighting officer. While the strategic 
and the military were the prime concerns of the Admiralty Board, 
its interest in the dockyards was constant. In some aspects of 
1. One exception to this was the order (SO(a), 686, a Jan 
1776) to allow automatically "an extra bulkhead for the 
security of spirits" to any captain who requested it. 
Maxey did, for the long journey to America demanded a 
less bulky- form of drink than beer. 
2. For the sort of bickering that went on at the highest 
level see Duke Crofton, An Account of the Pre arations 
made for the Kin at Portsmouth in June 1 7719 London, 
1887)q pp. 28-34. This pamphlet was made up from minutes 
made by George Marsh, a member of the Navy Board, and is 
subtitled: "Also of the Disgrace that the Navy Board met 
with on that occasion". 
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the administration, the Admiralty had little interest. 
1 The 
material condition of the fleet, however, was too important to 
leave entirely to the professional board, and it was essential 
that good relations between the boards ensured that this concern 
was not deemed interference by the Navy Board, and that this 
board had the confidence of the Admiralty. 
ii) The Navy Office 
Between 1770 and 1790 the navy was fortunate in 
having able and energetic men as Comptrollers of the Navy 
Board. Although the post was "only named first among those 
who have equal authority"'2 the occupant set the tone of the 
whole Board and Office. In spite of being preceeded by two 
Comptrollers of some worth, 
3 Charles Middleton dominates this 
period of naval administration. His appointment in August 1778, 
1. For instance, the Admiralty took almost no interest in 
the transport service, merely redrafting orders from the 
Secretary of State, and sending them to the Navy Board. 
See Syrett, pp. 9-10. 
2. NMM, MS66/086, Observations on the Navy Board Department, 
memorandum by Middleton, Dec 1786. 
3" Hugh Palliser and Maurice Suckling. See Appendix I. 
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after a worthy but unexciting career at sea, turned out to be 
one of Sandwich's more inspired decisions. 
I It was not, however, 
uninfluenced; James Gambier, Middleton's brother-in-law and on 
close terms with the First Lord, appears to have figured in the 
appointment. At the time, Middleton wrote to Sandwich to say 
that the post wasp, "superior to any pretensions on my part". 
2 
This was the last time that Middleton displayed any 
degree of modesty concerning the civil administration - or indeed 
any part of the navy - for the remaining part of his career of 
nearly thirty years. He remained at the Comptrollership until 
virtually forced out of office in March 1790, but was eventually 
rewarded with a peerage and the Admiralty at the time of 
Trafalgar, It was a turn of events which would have seemed 
ironic to many of his colleagues two decades before. Extremely 
hardworking, and censorious of those who did not conform to his 
high standards, he did not fit in easily to a system which 
3 
1. Middleton had a Scottish legal and administrative back- 
ground, and he was related to the Dundas family through 
his mother. He was made a lieutenant in 1745, and a post 
captain in 1758. He was on half-pay until 1775, when he 
was appointed to the command of a guardship, and then to 
a ship building; from here he went to the Navy Board. He 
was knighted in 1781. See Mackesy, p. 164; Syrett, pp. 22-4; 
P. K. Crimmin, "Admiralty Administration, 1783-1806, (unpub. 
M. Phil. thesis, London, 1967), PP. 42-3; Paul Webb, "The Navy 
and British Diplomacy, 1783-17931 (unpub. M. Litt. thesis, 
Cambridge, 1971), PP-73-6. 
2. NNM, SAN/T/8,8 Mar 1778- 
3* See ShP, 151, no. 87,2 Sep 1782, Gregson to Shelburne. 
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depended largely upon good personal relations to make it run 
smoothly. To one historian he appears to have been, "one of 
those men who, in such a system, will do the work of others 
merely to have it done better and faster". 
l His lack of humour, 
his evangelical earnestness and his unrelenting advertisement of 
the purity of his motives (especially in view of his obvious 
ambition) make him an unattractive figure. Historians still 
react to his intolerance and petulance as manyof his con- 
temporaries did; the most extreme comment is that he was a, 
"prig and bore of the first water". 
2 
Even if this was soy the debt that the navy owed the 
Comptroller during the war was very considerable, for the 
administrative pressure on the Board in general, and Middleton 
in particular, was enormous. In addition to the administration 
of the dockyards, the Board contracted for all naval stores, 
except for Ordnance, food and medicine. It also contracted 
for the shipping needed to carry troops and stores to America, 
and after 1779, army victuals as well. It prepared naval 
estimates for Parliament, audited all naval accounts, and 
organised the payment of both seamen and yard workers. It 
1. Usher, p. 72. 
2. O. A. R. Murray, "The Admiralty", Mariner's Mirror, 24, 
2938, p. 335. 
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also administered certain sea-going petty officers. 
The Navy Office was one of the few departments of 
state with over a hundred clerks on its establishment. At 
the end of the war there were ten Commissioners on the Board, ' 
each responsible for his own department, although they spent 
most of their time at the office in meetings of the Board which 
went on for the best part of the day. Half the departments 
within the office dealt with accounts and returns, but such 
were the arrears that during the American War these departments 
were dealing with matters which had nothing to do with the con- 
duct of the war. 
2 Those departments concerned with the dockyards 
included the Comptroller, who, apart from his general super- 
intendence of business at the Board, had his own office of 
Bills and Accounts, which was responsible for the administration 
of pay in the yards, and especially at Deptford and Woolwich. 
1. This figure does not include the Commissioners resident 
at the yards. See Appendix I. For descriptions of the 
workings of the Navy Office, see ShP, 151, no. 40,9 Sep 
1782, Middleton to Shelburne. His ideas are also 
contained in NNM, MS66/086, Observations on the Navy 
Board Department, which is a fair draft of the 
memorandum printed in BL, IT, 235-249. See also 
Baugh, PP"35-48; Nackesy, p. 16; Syrett, pp. 20-36; 
Usher, pp. 50-80. 
2. These included the Comptrollers of the Treasurer's, 
Storekeeper's and Victualler's accounts. Those concerned 
with current business but not the dockyards were the Clerk 
of the Acts (secretary to the Board) and the non-seagoing 
Extra Commissioner. See Appendix I. 
36 
The member of the Board most concerned with the dock- 
yards, and the person next in line after the Comptroller at the 
Board, was the Surveyor of the Navy. His charge, and that of 
his two Assistants, was of every part of the ships building in 
the yards, as well as the supervision of the buildings and docks 
and technical side of the contracting for stores. From late 
1777 two men filled this position. Sir John Williams was fax 
too old to fulfil the obligations of this strenuous post, and 
Edward Hunt was appointed to assist him. This potentially 
awkward arrangement was fortunately facilitated by the "good- 
natured disposition" of Williams, although Hunt, who was 
evidently quite able, being promoted over the heads of more 
senior men, was away at the yards, and therefore from the 
possibility of friction, for long periods during the war. ' 
Williams's age precluded any travelling on his part; he thus 
attended the Board and supervised the handful of shipwrights 
in the Surveyor's office who were employed in drawing the plans 
for the ships to be built. The two Assistants' main task was 
the superintendence of the ships building in merchant yards: 
the responsibility of the First Assistant was for those ships 
building in the West Country, and his colleague had charge of 
those ships building on the east and, south coasts. Southampton 
marked the division of responsibility. 
1. BL, IT, 179,16 Nov 1784, Middleton to Howe; See also 
ShP, 151, no. 87,2 Sep 1782, Gregson to Shelburne. 
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The Board suffered very considerable disadvantages 
in keeping abreast of - its 1, work. The first was an over- 
crowded building at Crutched Friars. The transfer to Somerset 
House did not take place until 1786, although the Admiralty 
received complaints about the slowness of the move as early 
as 1781.1 Secondly, there was a poorly-distributed work load 
which, because of precedent, was difficult to adjust. Some 
clerks and some departments worked very hard, while some led 
easy lives. All this was exacerbated by the badly-conducted 
meetings of the Board. There was no attempt to organise 
business before the Board met so that matters were discussed 
in a logical order, Some Commissioners were desperately over- 
loaded with work, while others, if Gregson can be believed, 
hardly ever came to the Board. In both cases this led to an 
excessive dependence upon the clerks. Lastly, there was a 
certain amount of friction within the Board itself. This 
can be explained by Middleton's domineering attitude. 
1. NMMq ADM BP/2,2 May 1782. The clerks worked in bad 
conditions; one complained of a "close and smoky 
office" (ShP, 151, no. 87,2 Sep 1782). This was 
Robert Gregson, who, between 1777 and 1787, sent 
nearly 150 letters to Shelburne for money, the 
occasional gift and eventually, he hoped, preferment. 
The supply of information (which today would be 
"classified") to the opposition was fairly common. 
Gregson certainly did not consider it unpatriotic, 
although when another clerk was discovered, he feared 
for the "ruin of himself and l*M family" (Add MSS 
24135, fo. t12, undated; also fo. 61,15 Feb 1779). 
As chief clerk to the Clerk of the Acts, Gregson 
sometimes attended Board meetings, but unfortunately his comments are so embittered as to be untrustworthy. 
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Evidence of this is difficult to discern, although Gregson 
records that Timothy Brett, who was Comptroller of Treasurer's 
Accounts, "quilttithe Navy Board on a contest for power between 
him and Sir Charles". 
l The basic reason for this friction is 
less difficult to define; Middleton thought that more seamen 
should have been on the Board, and that the civilians on the 
Board did no work. Friction emerged more it the peace, when 
Howe replaced Sandwich, and was anything but friendly to the 
Comptroller. 
Nevertheless, a vast amount of business was despatched 
each day. The help of the Extra Sea Commissioners, Edward 
Lecras and Samuel Wallis, who joined in 1778 and 1780, was 
2 
undoubtedly responsible for an improvement in efficiency. 
The Comptroller also managed to reorganise some of the Board's 
business and accounting at the beginning of 1780.3 However, 
the greatest factor was undoubtedly the energy of the Comp- 
troller himself. He was the lynchpin; while he often 
1. Add MSS 24135, to. 76,4 Jan 1786. Brett left the Board 
in September 1782. 
2, See NNM, MS66/086, Observations on the Navy Board Depart- 
ment. For Wallia! s eventual removal from the Board, see 
Webb, pp. 171-2. 
3. See NPM, MS66/086, Observations on the Navy Board Depart- 
ment; also BL, II, 238, (? )Dec 1786. For instance, some 
of the Surveyor's technical business was taken away from 
the full Board (PRO, ADM 106/2790-94, Surveyor's Office 
Minutes, 1780-85). Some accounting methods were also 
reor gnised; e. g. the warrants to the yards (PRO, ADM 
95/96) were divided into individual sections for each yard, 
instead of being recorded haphazardly. 
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complained of this, it must not be forgotten that this 
situation was largely of his own making. _ 
Yet in spite of 
this, Middleton was continually pressing for more re- 
sponsibility for the Navy Board, and while the war was still 
being fought he was thinking ahead to the peace and the 
improvements which could be. made to the system. Taken all 
in all, his achievement was remarkable; the transport business, 
"never fell hopelessly into arrears", 
l 
and the business of the 
yards was carried out with a speed that was exceptional for the 
age. 
iii) Orders and Instruotions 
The control of the yards was in the hands of the Navy 
Board. For all routine purposes, the Admiralty worked through 
the professional board, although the visitations provided the 
First Lord with his only direct method of control. These 
visits were brief and superficial, since the yards received a 
warning of the Board's arrival, and inspection consisted only 
of a perambulation of the yard. The Navy Board's method of 
1. Syrett, p. 36. 
control was through warrants (orders signed by at least three 
members of the Board), of which there were two types. The 
Standing Orders, or General Warrants, were issued to provide 
precedent; ordinary warrants, on the other hand, contained 
only specific orders. The Board's authority was also taken to 
the yards themselves through the office of the Outport Commissioners, 
members of the Board, who were resident at Chatham, Portsmouth and 
Plymouth. 
The structure of the organisation which controlled the 
yards was overcentralised and under-regulated. Since the 
Instructions were obsolete and vague, the Navy Board had to 
give guidance in far too many situations to yard officers who 
were not sure of their position. Yet the Board was unwilling 
to allow any degree of authority to the yards themselves. The 
Commissioners resident at the yards had no power to initiate 
orders, except in ill-defined cases of emergency. 
1 Nothing 
could be done without submitting a proposal (and where necessary, 
an estimate) to the Board, and only from the ensuing warrant were 
the yard officers empowered to undertake any task. The result 
of this unwillingness to devolute authority was an overworked 
1. PRO, IND 9315,15 Mar 1669. "Commissioners to the 
Outports... have power, in cases of Exigency, to do 
whatever might or ought to have been done by the 
::: Board". 
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Board; Middleton recalled that: 
The correspondence, from the great 
increase of the fleet, was very 
voluminous, and the business, from 
its variety, inexpressibly intricate 
... If to this be added a corres- 
pondence with upwards of 2,000 
correspondents, the surprise will not 
be that things were hastily done. I 
In 1778, the year that Middleton joined the Board, 
just under a thousand warrants were issued to the yards, three 
times more than in peacetime. With the other business of the 
Board, and the innumerable letters to the yards, it is not 
surprising that Middleton was concerned about "hasty 
decisions". 2 Moreover, a communication took from three to 
four days to reach Plymouth, and one or two days to reach 
Chatham and Portsmouth. At a minimum, therefore, the Plymouth 
Officers had to wait a week for an answer to a request. This 
problem did not arise with the Thames yards, but the dis- 
advantage in this case was that the Board had to deal with the 
day-to-day trivia of the two yards, which, from the evidence of 
the Board minutes, took up an amount of time disproportionate 
with its importance. 
Much of this enormous bulk of correspondence can be 
1. BL, II, 236-7, (? )Deo 1786, idemorandwn to Baring. 
2. ibid. In 1774 there were 317 warrants to the yards; in 
1778 there were 946 (PRO, ADM 95/95)" For every warrant 
sent by the Board, it sent approximately eight letters on 
yard matters. 
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ascribed to the lack of regulation in the yards. Any business 
that was not covered by precedent or the regulations was auto- 
matically referred to the Board. Not only did the yard 
organisation have little initiative, but the system was not 
sufficiently organised for the officers to understand what 
they had to do in enough given situations. This was the result 
of the confusion over the Standing Orders and Instructions; in 
an organisation guided only by precedent, even the precedent was 
disorganised. The theory was simple. Each officer in the 
yards had his orders laid down. From time to time these in- 
structions would be changed by Standing Orders from the Navy 
Board. In practice this had all but broken down. The 
Instructions extant at the time of the American War had been 
issued in 1662. Since that time Standing Orders had been 1 
issued with little plan, and the modifications had been piece- 
meal and contradictory. 
2 
The Standing Orders covered all aspects of yard 
administration. Orders concerning personnel included 
regulations laid down to combat abuses, standards for entry 
and discharge, pay and allowances, and, in this period especially, 
1. These instructions dated originally from 1640, and had 
been revised, not formulated, by pepye. See J. R. Tanner, 
(ß, 19o3), I. 20. 
2. One exception was the partial codification which had taken 
place after the 1749 visitation. 
i 
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for task work. There were technical orders introducing new 
techniques, economy measures and orders concerning the pre- 
servation of ships and stores; a large number contained 
establishments of stores and instructions on work methods. 
These orders were the only official means of modifying the 
system. Until Middleton used them after the war, they were 
issued only, "to meet each present difficulty as it arose, 
perhaps without having the least reference to the general 
principle on which they had been at first established". 
' 
Frequently they were used only to reiterate former orders 
which had been abused; often the issue of an order involved 
the changing of an earlier one, but the Board did not concern 
itself with seeing that this was done. There were, as a 
consequence, many contradictions. 
Not only were the Standing Orders inefficiently 
issued, but there seemed to be a large amount of confusion 
over what exactly constituted precedence. Between 1774 and 
1783 at least thirty of these orders were issued which could 
not possibly have set any precedent at all. An illustration 
of this confusion is provided by the existence of the Plymouth 
Commissioner's Precedent Book, which records all communications 
from the Board which could be used for future guidance. 
2 
lo BL, II, 225,18 Sep 1786, Middleton to Pitt. 
i 
2. PRO, ADM 174/283 Abstract of Orders in the nature of a 
Precedent Book, 1697_1807. 
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Successive Commissioners not only omitted those Standing Orders 
which failed to do this, but also entered extracts from ordinary 
warrants from the Board, and even from their informal letters. 
It is evident that the precedent considered valid by the 
Commissioners at Plymouth was different from that issued by 
the Board. 
The 1662 Instructions were the only regulations issued 
to the officers of the civil administration until the Commission 
of Naval Revision issued a set of printed instructions in 1806.1 
The original instructions laid down the general principles and 
duties of the Commissioners of the Navy Board and the Principal 
Officers of the yards. The boatswain, porter and officers of 
the ordinary were also included, but there were no instructions 
for the Master Shipwright's Assistants or for any of the officers 
below them - they had to rely on word of mouth; those for the 
Resident Commissioners were also omitted. It must be presumed 
that these instructions were circulated, for they were printed 
in 1717 and 1757; 
2 but by the end of the century they were 
ignored, for by this time they were not only incomplete but, 
in most of the areas that they covered, they were obsolete, 
1. PP-CR, The Commission of Naval Revision, 1805-69 First and 
Second Reports. 
2. The Oeconomy of His Majesty's Navy Office (London, 1717) 
and John IIitick, A Complete View of the British Marine, 
(London, 1757). The instructions printed in these 
volumes (both unofficially published) are identical. By 
contrast, the instructions issued to sea officers were in 
constant use, and by 1772 had reached the eleventh edition. 
The individual statements to the Commission of Naval Enquiry 
in 1803-4 indicate that they had ceased to be issued. 
I 
The fact that the original instructions were outdated 
might not have been significant had the subsequent Standing Orders 
been revised and systematised. The evidence of the Clerk of the 
Cheque at Plymouth to the Commission of Naval Enquiry can be con- 
sidered as typical of the second half of the eighteenth century: 
Questions Can you collect, readily and 
distinctly, by reference to the 
books and papers in your office, 
the instructions and intentions 
of the Navy Board on every 
particular branch of your duty? 
Answers It is very difficult to be done, 
owing to the multiplicity of orders, 
and the succeeding warrants contra- 
dicting the former ones sometimes in 
part, sometimes in whole. 2 
The need to revise the enormous number of Standing Orders was 
first recognised in June 1764, during Egmont's administration, 
and the Admiralty ordered the Navy Board to remedy the situation. 
Three months later the Admiralty received all the Standing Orders 
that the professional Board could find, and by April 1766 the 
Navy Office had prepared a chronological collection. By June 
1. PP-CE, Appendices Nos. 1,5,12,13,75,169 and others. 
2. PP-CE, p. 154. 
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1767, the Admiralty, now under Hawke, ordered the Navy Board to 
proceed immediately to arrange 
and digest the said orders under 
proper heads, so as to compose one 
uniform body and system out of the 
whole... (and)... to transmit the 
same.. to us for our approbation, it 
being our intention that the orders 
and instructions, so arranged and 
digested, shall, be printed, and 
thereby rºnde more generally known. 1 
In spite of Middleton's efforts after the American War, 
the dockyards did not receive these printed instructions until 
1806. The early failure to proceed with the Admiralty's orders 
was due to Navy Board lethargy. Middleton himself was unable 
to do anything until after the war, by which time the need for 
a radical reorganisation of the orders had become only too 
apparent. Between 1774 and 1784 the Navy Board apparently 
issued more than half as many orders again than in the hundred 
and twelve years since the original instructions. 
2 In the 
two years after the war, when Middleton put most of his efforts 
into reform, the Board issued over three hundred and fifty. 
Not only were there more orders, but they were longer and more 
1. PRO, ADM 106/2507, Introductory letter in the compilation 
of the Standing orders, 1660-1756. The suggestion, according 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Philip Stephens, had 
originally come from Charles Jenkinson when he was on the 
Board. See PRO, 30/8/365, fos. 163-4, (undated 1788Y), 
Middleton to Lord Chatham. 
2. PRO, ADM 106/2507-9. From 1658-1773 650 orders were issued; 
from 1774-1784,931. Due allowance must, of course, be 
made for early orders lost in the later compilations. 
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complicated; certainly they were more skilfully and accurately 
drawn up. Middleton realised that what was needed to bring 
order out of this chaos was a comprehensive digest of the 
orders combined with the original instructions, which would 
render obsolete all collections made to that date. In 1786 he 
wrote to Pitt: 
At present we have no fixed rule of 
government in our dockyards. Length 
of time and change of circumstances 
have occasioned such an accumulation 
of contradictory orders that the 
officers if inclined to do well are 
not furnished with t proper in- 
fcbruration#, and if otherwise - they 
find so many holes to creep out at 
that it is beyond the powers of office 
to counteract them. 1 
The Comptroller therefore made out a comprehensive 
abstract under five heads. This was a considerable undertaking, 
as he did not fail to point out to Pitt: "This abstract has not 
only occupied all my leisure hours since the commencement of the 
peace, but engaged much of my attention in preparing materials 
for it in the war". 
2 Not only had Middleton to digest all the 
Standing Orders and Instructions issued until the 1780'sß but 
he also had to find out the duties of the"inferior officers"for 
1. PRO, 30/8/111 (part 2), fos. 151-2,24 Aug 1786; see also 
BL, II, 225-8,18 Sep 1786, Middleton to Pitt. 
2. BL, IT, 224,23 Sep 1786. 
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whom there had never been any instruotions. 
1 
According to 
Commissioner Proby, the "lowest classes of officers" were "to 
let the Board know what they themselves thought to be their re- 
spective duties". However, "they had no other conception of 
their duty than to follow the directions of their respective 
officers", and that, as Proby thought, "put an end to the plan ". 
2 
The difficulty of compiling a central body of instructions, for 
the inferior officers especially, is shown by the enormous 
amount of work undertaken by the Commission of Naval Revision 
in 1806. Using Middleton's abstract of the 1780'sß it sent each 
officer "a deduction of what they supposed their duty to be", but, 
those officers had formed very different 
conceptions of their duties... Indeed, it 
has been observed by some of themselves, 
that an officer who had served half his 
life in one dockyard, if removed to another 
would find himself nearly as much at a loss 
to know his precise duty as if he had never 
been in the service. 3 
After a great deal of trouble and much consultation, the 
Commission made the final draft, and the yards received their 
1. Evidence of Middleton's industry, and that of his clerk, Mr. 
Harding (see PRO, 30/8/365, fos. 163-4,1788 (? ), Middleton 
to Lord Chatham) is provided by the existence of a large, 
very rough volume (PRO, Art 49/54) which contains all the 
orders and instructions from 1660-1784, and the draft of his 
abstract. In a letter to Pitt of 23rd September 1786 (PRO, 
30/8/III (part 2), fog. 160-1; also BL, II9 224) Middleton 
refers to having only one legible copy of his abstract. It 
is reasonable to assume that this volume is the illegible copy. 
See also Add MSS 41079, fog. 119-20,21 Feb 1805, Middleton to 
Dundas. 
2. NMM, CLU (8), 17 Aug 1794, Proby to Locker; also Add MSS 41079, 
fos. 107-8,12 Nov 1804, Thomson to Melville. See also Middleton's 
comment on the Navy Board visitation (PRO, Am 106/3222,18 Jul 1785), 
3" PP-CR, Second Report, p. 4. z:; 
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printed orders forty-two years after the original Admiralty 
order. 
Middleton failed in the 1780's where the Commission 
of Naval Revision succeeded because he could not obtain political 
support. Since the driginal instructions had been issued by 
Order-in-Council, a reissue would require the same procedure. 
He submitted his Abstract to Howe, but due to his impossible 
relations with the Pirst Lord, it languished there for two years 
without the Comptroller being able to do anything about it. Pitt, 
embarrassed in turn by the Commission on Fees and the Regency 
Crisis, would do nothing to help him. 
l All that he was able to 
do was to send to the yards a chronological abstract of the 
Standing Orders, with a promise that the "General Collection" 
was in preparation. 
2 Eventually, however, his efforts were 
rewarded, for in 1805 he headed the Commission of Naval Revision 
and, using his abstract, was able to remedy what he saw as being 
3 the great weakness. In the centralised structure of the civil 
administration, the Navy Board could not be expected to know the 
1. For a detailed account of the Comptroller's pressure on 
Pitt, see Webb, pp. 183-188. 
2. so(b), 364,29 Mar 1785. 
3" That Middleton dominated the Commission is proved by the fact 
that the final format of the printed instructions corresponds 
almost exactly to his rough abstract of the 1780's (PRO, ALM 
49/54)" See also Add MSS 41079, fos. 107-89 12 Nov 1804, 
Thomson to Melville. The Commission of Naval Ehquiry had 
also drawn attention to the lack of orders (PP-CE, p. 6. ). 
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idiosyncracies of each yard, and the result of this was a lack 
of Navy Board control. Middleton had always striven for this 
control; the aim of the Commission, in its on words, was "to 
make each dockyard serve as a part only of one great machine". 
1 
iv) The Resident Commissioners. 
The final agencies for controlling the yards were the 
Resident Commissioners at Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth in 
their roles as supervisors and as correspondents with the 
Board. 2 Even if the orders and instructions had been put on 
an efficient footing, the Navy Board warrants would still have 
had to have been complemented by communication between the 
Board in London and the members of the Board resident in the 
yards. These three Commissioners were the only offioial 
channel of communication between these yards and London, and 
1. PP-CRS Second Report, p. 4. 
2. Sheerness was under the supervision of the Chatham 
Commissioner, while Deptford and Woolwich were directly 
administered by the Navy Board. For a list of these 
Commissioners see Appendix I. 
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all letters and warrants passed through their offices. 
1 
Orders were not given to them, but through them. The 
Commissioners, in turne replied to the Board with confirmatory 
letters, and passed on the day-to-day proceedings of the yards. 
2 
Their responsibilities, however, extended beyond mere 
communication, for they exercised theoretical Navy Board 
control as supervisors of the yard. 
The post of Outport Commissioner could never have 
been an easy one, for the position in the naval hierarchy had 
never been clearly defined. The combination of vague orders 
3 
and the difficulty of taking the initiative failed to make 
the post an effective branch of the Navy Board. The first 
problem was an equivocal social position in the Navy. The 
Commissioner held a captain's rank, having risen through the 
military side of the service, and had given up a life at sea 
through ill-health or because he no longer anticipated further 
1. These officers did in fact correspond directly with the 
Admiralty, but their letters concerned only minor matters, 
such as acknowledgements for packets received for commanders, 
warrant officers and occasional information on railings and 
dockings. See NMM, POR/H/10-12,1774-17881 CHA/X/2, 
1774-1791; PRO, ADM 174/173,1776-1784; also NM, CLU (8), 
17 Aug 1794, Proby to Locker. 
2. This correspondence reached very large proportions, although 
it varied from yard to yard, and from peacetime to wartime. 
In peacetime, the Portsmouth Commissioner sent an average of 
one letter a day. Chatham averaged twenty a mouth, and 
Plymouth fifteen. By contrast, in September 1778 the 
Plymouth Commissioner received sixty letters and warrants (PRO, AMM 174/17)- 
3- See Ehzman, p. 101; Baugh, pp. 289-291. 
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promotion. In the . American War there were some exceptions 
to this rule. Samuel Hood saw the Commissionership at 
Portsmouth as a step to promotion because of the complicated 
political situation. He justified his acceptance of the 
post by his "accomodation" of Sandwich's arrangements, while 
there was the additional excuse of his "well-known bodily in- 
firmities". 1 When Gambier wanted to leave the Commissionership 
at Portsmouth in 1778 he showed the fighting officers' distaste 
for the non-combatant posts 
I cannot but wish to emerge from 
this 
temporary state of servility 
so notoriously humiliating to an 
officer of liberal sensibilities 
and to be restored to my natural 
line from which I had the very 
hard fate to be superseded. 2 
It was this attitude that made the task of the 
Commissioner particularly difficult,, for the sea officers were 
his concern. As the representative of the Navy Board, he was 
responsible for co-ordination between sea and dockyard officers. 
1. G, IV, 185,9 Aug 1778, Hood to the King; see also NMM, 
SAN/T/8,8 Mar 1780, Hood to Sandwich. For a detailed 
examination of Hood's motives in taking the Commissioner- 
shi and his hesitation in giving it up, see G. A. Billias (ed), George Washington's Opponents, (New York, 1969), 
pp* 297-300,321; essay by D. A. Baugh, "Sir Samuel Hood". 
2. NM, SAN/T/8,20 Jan 1778. 
There was a similar situation in his relations with the offioers 
below him in the yard. They were the technical and clerical 
experts; in the matter of producing ships, he was an amateur 
in charge of professionals. His knowledge of seamanship was 
designed to complement the skill of the yard officers but it 
often led to clashes, especially with the Master Shipwright. 
' 
These difficulties were minor, however, compared to 
his professional problems. The powers of a Resident 
Commissioner had always been vague; as he was not included 
in the 1662 Instructions, there was almost nothing to guide 
him. When Commissioner Martin was questioned at Portsmouth 
by the Commission on Fees he stated that his duties could only 
"in some measure be understood from the books of the office". 
2 
Proby wrote in 1794: 
I have been here twenty-three years and 
have never seen my instructions yet. 
When Sir Charles Middleton was Comp- 
troller I applied for them; the reply 
I received was to search the records of 
my office as far back as I could. 3 
1. See Albion, p. 71. However, this system avoided the 
extreme ill-feeling between the administrative and 
fighting officers of the French Navy; see A. Temple 
Patterson, The Other Armada, (Manchester, 1960), pp. 22-30. 
2. PP-CF, P-408- 
3- NNl, CLU (8), 17 Aug 1794, Proby to Locker. 
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I 
The vagueness had been a matter of concern from the seventeenth 
century, and the question came up in the three Commissions into 
naval affairs between 1788 and 1806.1 That this situation was 
the concern of the highest authority is proved by a letter to 
Martin frone Middleton in 1781: "I had the pleasure of 
answering the KingIs many questions yesterday relative to 
Portsmouth yard and particularly on the subject of a 
Commissioner's duty" 402 When a Commissioner wished to receive 
some guidance, his only source was the mass of confused and 
unindexed Standing Orders, few of which had any direct bearing 
on his position. 
3 
Much of the ineffectiveness of the Commissioner can 
be attributed to imprecise orders, as well as an accumulation 
of extra duties in the yaxd, but his position was made even 
less effective by his lack of initiative. It is difficult to 
see where the power of the Commissioner lay. He was a member 
1. PP-CF, p. 306; PP-CES p. 4; PP-CR, First Report, p. 17. 
2. Add MSS 41364,29 Mar 1781. 
3" When Middleton attempted to systematise the Standing 
Orders, he could find only two definitions of the 
Commissioner's duties. One was a short Standing 
Order of 1669; the other a commission to Phineas 
Pett, dated 1686 (PRO, ADM 49/54)" The orders from 
this source correspond in broad outline to the duties 
recorded in the Commission on Fees. 
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of the Navy Board, but, perhaps naturally, the rest of the Board 
in London were inclined to consider him as inferior. 
l In 
Baugh's opinion the function of the office was "more nearly 
advisory than executive", 
2 but in theory, at least, he was to 
advise the Navy Board, at the same time be responsible for 
seeing that its orders were carried out. The paradox of 
the situation was that, while the orders were not given to 
him, he was responsible for them to a Board which was equal 
to him in seniority, and of which he was a member. Mulgrave 
wrote to Sandwich in 1781: 
I wish... that the Commissioner residing 
here had in many instances more power 
left in his hands, and that the whole 
was not so entirely engrossed by the 
Navy Board, as the necessity of writing 
up for directions from thence upon every 
trivial circumstance occasions great 
delay. 3 
Mutgrave pointed in this instance to one of the gravest 
weaknesses in the authority structure of the yards. Although 
there were occasions when a Commissioner had to act first and 
1. See Baugh# p. 290; aLa 
2. ibid, p. 293; see below p. 72. 
3. SaP, IV, 381,23 Feb 1781. For the clearest statement of 
the Commissioner's position see PP-CR, First Report, 
PP- 17-18. 
ý, 
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consult later, (especially at Plymouth), the rule was for the 
Board in London to decide on the most trivial matters, and as an 
executive arm of the Navy Board a Commissioner resident at the 
yard was less effective than it could and should have been. His 
position was also weakened by lack of seniority; in relation to 
many commanders, he was a junior officer and he could hardly be 
expected to judge a request for extra stores from a senior officer; 
the combined weight of the Board was needed in these cases, 
The main reason for his lack of power, however, was 
that it was in the Navy Board's interest to keep the system 
informal, and to have an equal as representative as the yards. 
Proby understood that "the several Comptrollers have objected 
to let the Commissioners at the Outports have the said In- 
structions". 
I This reluctance to delegate authority can be 
explained by a history of bad relations between the Board and 
the Resident Commissioners. Middleton wished that the 
Commissioners to serve on the Board for one year, so that, 
"they would enter on their office properly instructed in their 
duty, and be ready to co-operate with the navy board, which 
2 
under the present arrangement has not always been the case". 
1. NMM, CLU (8), 17 Aug 17949 Eby to Looker. 
2. BL, II9 181,17 Nov 1784, Middleton to Howe. 
i 
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A Commissioner with more initiative might have lessened the 
Board's influence, and it was a risk that the Commissioners of 
the Navy Board in London were not prepared to take. 
Fortunately, during the war years, there was only one 
exception to the general rule of a healthy relationship between 
the Navy Board and the Commissioners resident at the yards. In 
spite of the tactlessness of Middleton, there was little of the 
friction of previous years. 
1 With the exception of Hood, the 
Commissioners were not officers of the highest calibre. Most 
of them had difficulties with their health. Gambier complained 
at different times of a "violent bilious" attack' , and a "violent 
fit of the gout", while Hood and Martin both had similar problems. 
2 
Ourry at Plymouth was the worst afflicted. Already well into his 
sixties when the war started, his health grew progressively worse. 
3 
There were long periods when he was unable to sign letters because 
of gout in both his hands. Whenever it was possible, which was 
not often, he took himself off to his house in nearby Plympton. 
By the end of 1782, he was very ill indeed and Edward Leeras, one 
of the ESctra Sea Commissioners at the Board, went to relieve him. 
1. See Baugh, pp. 289-91. 
2. NNM, POR/P/15,15 Sep 1774,7 Mar 1775; SaP, IV, 380, 
23 Feb 1781, Mutgrave to Sandwich. 
3. In a letter of 21 Aug 1779 he stated that he had been 
51 years in the service (PRO, ADM 174/116). 
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Ourry died within five weeks, 
1 
These serious limitations apart, the Navy can be said 
to have been well served by its Outport Commissioners. The one 
exception was James Gambier, who served in the Portsmouth post 
before (fortunately) the war began in earnest. It would not be 
unfair to. say that Gambier went out of his way to find trouble, 
and that from the beginning he was out of sympathy with, as he 
pointedly called them, his "brethren at the Board", because he 
considered them socially and professionally inferior. The 
Commissioner's house, "without a single room to dwell in with any... 
comfort", remained a bone of contention throughout his Commissioner- 
ship. 
2 While he professed to, "avoid as much as possible every- 
thing which may have the remotest tendency to produce a difference 
of opinion" with the Board, the smallest issue became part of a 
constant fight to maintain his conception of his dignity not only 
in relation to the Board but also to the yard officers. "In 
what unbecoming, humiliating light must the Commissioner appear 
to the subordinate officers here;!,, he wrote in 1776, "the 
Commissionerpwes too much to his own character and dignity 
ever to be himself accessary, to the dimunition of either"; the 
I. PRO, 174/117,16 Jan 1780. In 1782 he asked the Board to 
have the frames of his window lowered, "that I may look 
over the lower part of them, as I cannot stand upright, to 
see the workmen come into and go out of the yard". bid, 
7 Ap 1782). He died on 31 Jan 1783. See L. Namier and 
J. Brooke, The House of Commons, `1754-1790, (London, 1964), 
III, 240- 
2, N 1M, POR/F/15,31 Jan, 5 May, 10 July 1774" 
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issue in question was the water supply to the Commissioner's 
house, which can hardly be considered to have been of central 
importance. ' What would have happened under the real pressures 
of war is difficult to foretell, although one can be sure that 
Gambier's many periods of leave, "for private business in Town", 
would have been stopped by the Admiralty. After the disastrous 
fire in the ropehouse of late 1776, for whose security the 
Commissioner was responsible, relations became almost impossible. 
It was fortunate for Middleton that Gambier, with whom he was 
connected by marriage, was gone to a sea command before he took 
up the Comptrollership. 
2 
The navy was more fortunate in Gambier's two successors, 
Samuel Hood and Henry Martin. Hood took over at the beginning 
of 1778, a vitally important time. Helped by a strong political 
base in the town, 3 and a firm friendship with Middleton, he 
immediately gained the respeot of the officers and the Board; 
1. NNM, POR/F/16,15 Feb, 12 Sep 1776. Other issues inoluded 
the unauthorised issue of iron ballast ibid, 15 Feb, 1 Mar 
1776), the appointment of the Deputy Purveyor (ibid, 3,6 
Nov 1776), and writing direst to the Admiralty ibid, 31 Deo 
1776; POR/G/I, 31 Dec 1776). There were many more, 
2. Gambier's performanoe at New York soon afterwards demonstrated 
that his feeble posturing was not confined to the civil arm of 
the service, See the collection of scathing professional and 
loyalist opinion gathered in G. A. Billias (edý, George 
Washington's Opponents, pp. 264-266, essay by William Be Willcox, "Arbuthnot, Gambier and Graves". 
3" Edward Linzee, nine times Mayor of Portsmouth and Hoodrs father- 
in-law, informed Sandwich that Hood's appointment had "caused 
no small pleasure to all our political friends" (NMK9 SAN/T/8, 
25 Jan 1778). 
z 
J 
he was also firm in his dealings with IThd s. Pye, the Port 
Admiral. It was fortunate that he was the Resident Commissioner 
at the height of the faction in the Channel Pleet, for Hood's non-- 
political stance was well known in the service. He brought to the 
dockyard the energy and singleness of purpose which marked his 
fighting career. "Hood's attitude was thoroughly professional; 
in his day it was admired by many, but adopted by few". 
l In- 
dicative of this professional approach, and in contrast with his 
predecessor, Hood had no leave from the yard during his stay of 
nearly three years. When he gained his flag, the post was 
occupied by Henry Martin, an efficient, if somewhat colourless, 
man, who eventually followed Middleton as Comptroller. Only 
occasionally were these two goaded into protests by the Board, 
usually prompted by the latter's impractical suggestions, 
2 
The other two Commissionerships were filled throughout 
the war by one occupant. Charles Proby, out of the limelight 
at Chatham, went solidly on through the period and beyond, but 
a clear impression of him is difficult to gain because of lack 
of evidence. At Plymouth Paul Ourry lacked confidence, and 
tended to be excitable, but he was almost ingratiating in his 
1. G. A. Billias (ed), George Washingtonlo Opponents, p. 319; 
essay by D. A. Baugh, "Sir Samuel Hood". 
2. e. g. Nhmt POR/F/17,15 M= 1779,28 Deo 1779; POR/F/1$, 
13 Jan 1783. 
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efforts to be on good terms with the Board. The few differenoes 
which occured usually brought from Ourry no more than a reaction 
of pained indignation, 
' Further from London than the other two 
Commissionerships, he had more responsibility and had to take 
more initiative. Although his performance during the Plymouth 
Panic of 1779 has given him a bad name: his lack of instructions 
and the vagueness of his position has not been sufficiently 
emphasized. 
2 It has also been forgotten that he handled the 
particularly violent strike of 1775 with a good degree of 
common sense. Both these men went through the war with much 
hard work under considerable pressure - and with little thanks. 
As with the rest of the administration, the role of good 
personal relations in keeping the administrative machinery running 
smoothly was of pre-eminent importance. While it was true that 
the interest, skill and enthusiasm of the Commissioners were 
still the most important factors in their effectiveness, it 
became increasingly more inefficient to have them in office 
without instructions and greater authority within the service. 
1. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/116,23 Jun, 9 Aug 1776,22 Jun 1779; 
174/18,19 Jun 1779" 
2. See PRO, ADM 174/116,20,23 Jul, 21 Aug 1779. See A. Temple 
Patterson, pp. 182-183,186-189. It might also be said in 
extenuation that Ourry's gout got progressively worse, and 
it may have led to irritability and over-exoitement. 
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The increased power and responsibility needed to administer a 
larger navy had not been evenly spread, and the dockyards had 
become more and more pressed. Not the least of this pressure 
was pinpointed upon the Commissioner's office; he gained more and 
more responsibility, without a corresponding increase in power. 
It was thus up to the Commissioners resident to make themselves 
effective as an executive arm of the Navy Board in spite of their 
position rather than because of it. Ironically, when they did, 
they tended to identify themselves with the yard for which they 
were responsible instead of with the Board of which they were 
members. Overworked, largely unappreciated, indirectly they 
set the tone of their yard; the three Resident Commissioners 
were vital in the dockyard administration. 
v) The Effectiveness of the Central Administration 
It was a curious feature of the civil. administration 
during this period that while the Admiralty and the Navy Boards 
were overoentralised and often overpressed by the weight of work 
in supervising the dockyards, at the same time the two boards 
lacked real authority in the yards themselves. Of course, the 
slowness of eighteenth-century communications precluded complete 
. rý,,.,,,,, r,..... ý .,. _., _......... ý_ . _... ý_.. __.... _, _... _, _.. ý 
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control of all the works in the yards. The system was over- 
centralised because only the London boards could initiate orders; 
there was virtually no executive responsibility taken below the 
level of the Navy Board. The result of this was that an 
extraordinary amount of trivia reached the boards, when their 
collective minds should have been on more important things. 
For instance, one one occasion the Admiralty Board had to decide 
whether or not a domestic servant of Sir Henry Clinton, the army 
commander in North America, should receive victuals on board a 
transport going to America; or there was the example of the 
Navy Board having to decide whether or not to allow a , ship 
"double hen coops" because she was carrying army officers to 
America. 1 
The reason for such decisions needing the highest 
authority was that they were not covered by a precedent. Yet, 
because it was virtually impossible to remove those in authority 
at the yards for incompetence, or even senility, it was very 
difficult to allow them personal responsibility for such 
decisions. In an age when the sanctity of office was almost 
total, it was perhaps necessary to have a situation where every- 
thing had to be approved in London. Only by an almost complete 
lack of a diffusion of executive power could the Navy Board insure 
Mt AIM A/2753,26 Jul 1780; PRO, AIN 106/2592,24 Feb 
1775. See also Mackesy, p. 165; Williams, pp. 19-20. 
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against irresponsibility and incompetence. In wartime, however, 
some decisions had to be taken at the yards, and there were 
"exigency" powers invested in the Resident Commissioner, 
although they were kept vague. Even then, the central ad- 
ministration shed very little peripheral power. To take an 
unimportant example, the Admiralty would name the ship which 
was to take the quarterly money for Plymouth yard from Ports- 
mouth, but once the war had started, it ordered the Port Admiral 
and the Navy Board to put it on the "first ship to leave for 
that port". After the war the Admiralty resumed the task of 
naming the ships. On the same principle, a representative from 
one of the two boards was often down at the western yards during 
the war to speed decisions. There was a reluctance to delegate 
a substantial amount of power even to the Resident Commissioners. 
Yet it would be true to say that the Navy Board lacked 
anything more than formal control over the yards. The things 
that really mattered were beyond its real 4uthority. Over 
large parts of the operations, especially the administration of 
stores, it lacked accurate information; it rarely knew, because 
of the lack of instructions, which officers did which tasks. 
Control over the yard officers was based only on mutual confidence, 
for it needed Admiralty sanction to do so much as to reprimand 
them, All this was partly the result of not giving the Resident 
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Commissioner more initiative, but it was also likely to be the 
situation, 
so long as dockyard officers were 
thought of as irremovable... The 
ancient method by which work in the 
dockyards was regulated had the 
advantage of flexibility and 
simplicity. It had the dis- 
advantage of being utterly 
dependent on the diligence of the 
Master Shipwright, Master Attendants 
and their assistants. 1 
This was a description of the situation in the 1740's; by the 
American war the difficulties had been compounded by the greater 
size of the navy. 
The lack of administrative control was paralleled by the 
weakness of Parliamentary and financial control through the annual 
Estimates. These were prepared by the Navy Board, and then sent, 
after revision, by the Admiralty to the Treasury. This was for 
information rather than for any control; the Treasury had no 
power to interfere with the Admiralty's finances, "merely acting 
as book-keeper to that Board". 
2 
1. Baugh, PP- 331-2. 
The "Ordinary" estimate catered 
2. P. K. Crimmin, "Admiralty Relations with the Treasury, 
1783-1806", Mariner'sMirror, 53,1967, p. 65. See also J. E. D. Binney, British Public Pinance and Administration, 
1774-1792, (Oxford, 1958 , p. 140,. 
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for the seamen and ships "in Ordinary"t the salaries of the 
yard officers and repairs to docks, wharves and buildings. 
The "Extraordinary"(or "Extra")estimate provided for the 
building and repairing of ships and the wages of the dockyard 
worlQnen. 
The Estimates fell far short of being an effective 
instrument of financial control. Very little idea of the 
intentions of the Admiralty could be gained from them. 
Estimated completion dates in the "Extra" estimate for ships 
building or repairing were extremely inaccurate; only when 
the ships were within a year of completion were the Estimates 
anything like correct. In a sample of all seventy-four gun 
ships for a period of ten years, the accuracy of the Estimates 
in regard to time was far less than 10%. Two ships were 
provided for, but were never built. Between 1778 and 1783 
¬37,600 was granted for building the ear; at the end there 
was no ship. Between 1774 and 1783 there were sixty-six 
seventy-fours on the navy list, thirty-nine of whioh reoeived 
repairs. 
' In the "Extra" estimate for the same years there 
were fifty-two repair estimates for twenty-seven of these 
ships. Eleven were repaired - but never appeared on the 
1. Abstract of Progresses, 5, part 1. 
- --- 
Estimate, while there were five that appeared on the Estimate 
for which nothing was done. Of these, the worst case was of 
the Dragon, for which between 1771 and 1775 036,972 was granted; 
but she was never repaired, and in 1780 became a receiving ship 
in Portsmouth harbour. 1 
It is not perhaps surprising that the Estimates should 
be so wide of the mark. It was notoriously difficult for the 
yard officers, upon whom the Navy Board relied when drawing up 
the Estimates, to be accurate in estimating anything concerned 
with wooden shipbuilding on a large scale. Nevertheless, the 
situation demonstrated the independence of the yard officers. 
Middleton blamed the "vague, uncertain manner" in which they 
calculated the Estimates; "and if they find they have made 
them too small in one year, they swell them to an extravagant 
amount in the next". 
2 They can, however, hardly be blamed for 
there was little pressure on them to be accurate; and it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Admiralty and Navy 
Boards were not much troubled that the Estimates bore so little 
relation to reality. Similarly, the E4 per man per lunar month 
had seen the "Sea Service" estimate through from the previous 
century, and was by now hopelessly inadequate. 
1. PRO, ALM 7/171. 
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2. BL, II, 214, undated, to Pitt. 
This situation in no way hindered operations, for Navy 
Bills to pay for labour and materials were issued regardless of 
the amount of money approved by Parliament for the service of: the 
navy in the Estimates. More important to those at the top of the 
administration, the Estimates were rarely, if ever, questioned in 
the Commons, and if they were, never in detail. 
1 There was the 
beginning of a change in attitude at this time, although the reply 
given by Mutgrave to an Opposition attack on the inaccuracy of 
the Estimates sums up a century or lethargy; "if it was a crime, 
it was one which had often been practised ever since the re, fin 
of James II". 2 Fed with such information, it is hardly surprising 
that, although the navy was discussed in Parliament frequently 
and with much heat, criticism of its more technical aspects was 
i11-informed. 
However, the most constant limitation of the effective- 
nass of the central administration was the split in control between 
the two boards. Daring this period there was an extension of 
Admiralty interest in the dockyards, reversing a trend which had 
expanded Navy Board influence through the century as the navy 
had become bigger and more difficult to administer. Although 
their effectiveness is hard to gauge, Sandwich's Visitations 
gave the Admiralty some measure of control over the professional 
1o See Binney, p. 249. As a result the Navy Debt was nearly 13 
millions in 1783 ibid, pp. 140-3; also Add MSS 33741, 
tabulated sums granted to the Navy, 1775»1807). 
2. Parliamentary History, XIX, ool. 729. 
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board. Nevertheless, his interest and knowledge did not eliminate 
the inherent difficulties of having two boards administer six yards. 
This can be simply illustrated by the question of the size of the 
fleet. There was very little planning, except that there was an 
idea that the fleet should exceed, if possible, the united 
strength of the Bourbon powers. 
l Both boards kept a list of 
ships in their care - the Admiralty of those in commission, and 
the Navy Board of those building and "in Ordinary"; these lists 
were then added, but, because of the separation of the two boards, 
never compared. It was not until 1805 that it was discovered 
that during the previous fifty years a "very considerable" number 
of ships had been entered in both lists. The reasons for this 
were simple; while in port the ships had been counted by both 
the civil and military authorities. The number of ships in the 
navy were therefore overestimated throughout the period by a 
considerable amount; nor were they just small ships. 
2 The 
actual results of this constant error was probably waaall. in 
1o See R. Middleton, "The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt; 
the Departments of State and the conduct of the war, 1754- 
1760p with particular reference to the campaign in North 
America", (unpub. Ph. D. thesis, Exeter, 1968), pp. 65-66. 
Middleton points out that "since reliable information 
about these navies was usually lacking, planning started in 
a vacuum" (p. 65). 
2. PRO, ADM 7/567. In 1775 the total number of ships was over. 
estimated by 18, in 1779 by 58 and in 1783 by 90. Of this 
last figure 28 miscalculations concerned 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
rates. The figures were computed from January 1$t each year, 
which may have overemphasised the error, but it was still 
significant. The error was magnified in the Revolutionary 
war. 
.. I- -1-1 -1 - 
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strategic terms, but this error illustrated the lack of co- 
ordination which could take place in the civil administration 
of the navy. 
The other constant factor in the split of executive 
control was the tradition of friction which affected the dock- 
yards to a great extent. The pre-eminent importancecf good 
relations between the First Lord and Comptroller is clearly 
evinced by the occasions when this was lacking. Howe and 
Middleton were scarcely on speaking terms; the result was the 
blocking of dockyard reform, and both officers' eventual 
resignation. During St. Vincent's administration, communication 
virtually ceased; the result was a Parliamentary enquiry. The 
marked social difference of the boards and the difficulties of 
appreciating each other's problems meant that good relations 
were dependent upon a bond of professional confidence within 
the vague and antiquated machinery of the civil administration. 
Without a healthy relationship, nothing could be done which was 
not established or routine. 
It is within this context that the relationship of 
the professional board with the six dockyards must be seen. 
To this time it was dominated by two opposing ideas, d 
reluctance to delegate authority conflicted with a need to 
increase the control of the Board over the yards. Yet without 
I 
P 
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a clear idea of the workings of the yards, which could only 
come through a systematically-enforced body of regulations, 
the Board never had the confidence to allow authority away from 
London. It was only this solution which could reconcile these 
two factors, and which could solve the problems of the overwork 
of the Board and the ineffectiveness of the Resident Commissioners. 
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Chapter Two. The Internal Administration of the Yards. 
i) The Resident Commissioner and the Principal Officers. 
The internal affairs of the yards were conducted by the 
Resident Commissioner, who had a loosely-defined authority over 
the five principal officers; these officers controlled day-to-day 
administration Sri the yards. The Master Shipwright and the 
Master Attendant controlled the workforce and represented the 
technical expertise, while the Clerk of the Cheque, the Store- 
keeper and the Clerk of the Survey were the clerical officers 
responsible for mustering, accounting and the issue and reception 
of stores. 
l 
It was the responsibility of the Commissioner to see that 
the orders from the Navy Board were given to the officers. He was 
to see that a record of the orders was kept, and that the officers 
carried them out. Every communication was to go through his 
office, so that, "he may have full knowledge thereof, as he is to 
be responsible for all affairs under his superintendence and 
management at the yards". 
2 Discipline and general efficiency 
1. Soo Appendix II for a list of these officers between 1774-1783- 
2. PP-CF, p. 306. The purpose of this was "so that no-one may 
plead ignorance" (PP-CR, First Report, p. 19). See also PRO, 
ADM 174/214, Entry Book of... Instructions to the Respective 
Officers, 1803-4. In this volume the issue of orders had been 
formalised; each entry is signed by both the Commissioner and 
the officers. This was not done at the time of the American 
War, although Proby issued 'warrants' to the Chatham officers 
(see NMM, CHAS/1). 
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were under his charge. An early order stated that the Commissioner 
was to keep the officers to their duty and punish neglect and mis- 
demeanours by "mulct or suspension", 
I 
and he was to report to the 
Navy Board on their behaviour, and approve of all appointments 
that they might make. 
2 At the same time a strict eye was to be 
kept on the workmen. He was also reoponsible for the security of 
the yards and of the ships in Ordinary. 
3 
While the broad fvnotions of the Resident Commissioner 
had maintained continuity through the century, pressure of events 
had diverted his attention away from his essential role as a cog 
in the administrative machine. There was a great deal of work 
involved in negotiating local contracts. Although this duty had 
been long established, the increase of business by the second half 
of the century had made this a major task. The Ch4tham 
Commissioner spent more time than he could afford in the 
administration of the Chatham Chest, while his counterpart at 
Portsmouth had duties at the Naval Academy. At Chatham and 
Plymouth the Commissioners had to visit the seamen's hospitals, 
and all three were responsible for the distribution of pensions to 
seamen, and were in charge of those coming off decommissioned ships. 
lo PRO, t 49/54, commission to Phineas Pott, dated 1686. 
2. PRO, um 10665(36o), 31 Max 1705. 
3. PRO, IND 9315,21 Dec 1686,30 Dec 1730,5 Nov 1764. 
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The most time-consuming extra duty that they had 
acquired, however, was the overseeing, or "comptrolling", of the 
payment of seamen from the ships that were at Spithead, Plymouth 
Sound and the Nore. There was an allowance of two pounds a day 
for this onerous task, and a simple calculation from the Commission 
on Fees proves that each Commissioner spent long periods absent from 
his yard. 
l "1 must confess", wrote Ourry, "that payments are the 
most disagreeable part of my duty", 
2 
while Martin observed to the 
Commission on Fees that, 
the duties of his eits tion in time of 
war are very arduous; this port being 
the general rendezvous of the-fleet, 
occasioned almost a daily attendance 
at Spithead, for paying the several 
ships companies... ofton occupied the 
whole day, and consequently impeded 
the execution of tho other essential 
parts of his duty. 3 
To add to the Commiseioners'discomfort, lack of cash created delays 
which in turn resulted in a fatiguing rush of work; on several 
1. In 1784 Martin spent 25 days at Spithead, but averaged "in former 
years" over 100; Laforey at Plymouth "averaged" 50, while Proby 
was away from Chatham for a total of 75 days during 1784 (PP-CPS 
pp. 408,446,364). This allowance had to cover expenses. Ourry 
reported that at yard payments, "I give the clerks constantly two 
dinners sometimes three at my house" (PRO, ADM 174/116,21 Jul 
1778; also NNM, POR/G/l, 2 Sep 1778)- 
2, PRO, ADM 174/116,21 Jul 1778. 
3. PP-CF, p. 408; Martina solution was that someone else should do this task. See also SaP, IV, 380,23 Feb 1781, Mutgrave to 
Sandwich. 
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occasions the Navy Board had to send one of its number down to 
Portsmouth to help. ' 
In response to requests from Proby and Hood, the 
Admiralty gave the three Commissioners authority to send the 
yard officers to comptrol the pay when they themselves were i11.2 
The Navy Board gave only reluctant consent to this measures for it 
feared that employing the yard officers, "frequently upon this duty 
would be attended with much prejudice to the service of the yards". 
3 
There was, almost inevitably, a minor outburst of ill-feeling 
eighteen months later when the Admiralty discovered that Gilbert, 
one of the Master Attendants at Portsmouth, had been comptrolling 
the pay when Commissioner Martin was'on the spot". 
4 The Navy 
Board passed on the Admiralty's order forbidding this to Martin, 
to which Malgrave, who was at Portsmouth in his capacity of 
captain of the Courageux (74) rather than as a Lord of the 
Admiralty, took great exception. He thought that this "kind of 
reprimand" was unjustified, put forward proof of Martin's diligence, 
and suspected, as he wrote to Sandwich, that the order was "some 
Navy Board trick"; he did not know that it was the Admiralty which 
1. e. g. 14M P POR/F/17,9 May, 11 Dec 1779,29 May 1780; POR/F/18, 7 Jan 1783; POR/G/1,7 Sep 1781; PRO, ADM 174/115,5 Jul 1774; 
174/116,21 Mar 1779- 
2. NNM, Amt B/199,6 M Y, 30 Aug 1779; A/2742,25 Aug 1779; A/2743, 
1 Sep 1779. One of the Master Attendants at Plymouth oomptrolled 
the pay for the ailing Ourry from the middle of 1781 until Deoember 
1782. 
3- NNM, A34 B/199,7 1779- 
4. NM, ADM A/2760,14 Feb 1782. 
_. 
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had brought the matter up in the first place. 
' Although this 
incident was of little consequence, it illustrated the reluctance 
of the central administration to allow the spread of authority 
below Navy Board level, and demonstrated how little both boards 
appreciated the problems of the hard-pressed Commissioners. 
In these circumstances, the Resident Commissioner did 
not have adequate time to supervise the yard officers in their 
task of the day-to-day administration of the yards. Like the 
members of the Navy Board, each officer had his own area of re- 
sponsibility (and was responsible to the relevant Commissioner on 
the Board), but reached general decisions on such matters as 
allocation of labour, discipline, entry and discharge 
collectively. 
2 All accounts and returns to the Navy Board had 
to be signed by all the officers; likewise all general orders 
from the Board were addressed to "the Respective Officers" of 
the yard. The accounting system followed similar lines; the 
system of multiple ledgers, "or compter books". in the ad- 
ministration of stores, was such that each officer had to check 
on each other. 
1. ibid, 19 Feb 1781; SaP, IV9 380-1,23 Feb 1781. 
2. The Master Shipwright, Master Attendant and Clerk of the Survey 
were responsible to the Surveyor, the Clerk of the Cheque to 
the Comptroller, and the Storekeeper to the Comptroller of 
Storekeeper's Accounts. 
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This enforced co-operation and co-ordination was 
essential to the smooth running of the yards, for the principle of 
collective responsibility spread duties among them so that no one 
task was performed by one officer. The smallest piece of business 
could not be completed if co-operation was not forthcoming. Only 
occasionally was there friction. In 1775, disagreement among the 
Woolwich officers resulted in a Navy Board enquiry. The complaint 
was that a contractor's bill for payment could not be made out 
because the Clerk of the Cheque would not send the bill to the 
other officers for confirmation and signature, in spite of Standing 
Orders and verbal instructions from the Comptroller. These orders, 
the Clerk of the Cheque stated, he had thought, "not sufficient, that he 
kv& : kw" 
was not safe in following them, andJan in lAgement on his office". 
1 
In spite of the arguments of both parties, and the Clerk of the 
Cheque's case was very weak, the quarrel was clearly the result of 
some personal antagonism. Daniel Baugh's findings in the war of 
1739-48 corroborate this judgement; "these rare instances suggest 
that personalities, rather than policies, were likely to be in- 
volved". 
2 
The social and professional backgrounds of the five 
officers were varied. Only the Master Shipwright rose through the 
1. PRO, ADM 106/2592,28 Ap 1775. The Clerk of the Cheque was 
"severely admonished". 
2. Baugh, p. 294. 
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yard organisation. Earlier in the century, the way up through 
the service for the ambitious shipwright had been as a ship's 
carpenter, but by now shipwrights rose entirely within the yard 
service. Each shipwright officer worked his way up from the 
position of apprentice. Although there was no officer class, 
only the favoured reached the rank of officer. 
l By contrast, 
the Master Attendants, who were responsible for Chiphandling and 
rigging, came straight from service at sea. 
2 Joseph Gilbert, who 
filled one of the positions at Portsmouth during the American war, 
was an example of a master of a ship who, having caught the eye 
of his superiors, moved to the comparatively affluent and com- 
fortable life ashore. From 1764 he was master in turn of the 
Gum sever (32), Pearl (32) and Asia (64), engaged on surveying work. 
In 1772 he was appointed Master of the Resolution on Cook's second 
voyage, and on his return was made Master Attendant at Sheerness, 
and then at Woolwich. He stayed for less than a year at both 
these yards before moving to the more favoured yards of Portsmouth 
(1776-1791) and Deptford (1791-1802). Gilbert came to the notice 
of Sandwich through his connection with Cook, and he was undoubtedly 
an able man. Merit was important in deciding appointments to 
3 
1. See Baugh, p. 296; also Knight, Pp. 178-182. 
2. Only Benjamin Hunter' the Master Attendant at Deptford (1783-1791) 
had come to the post in a different manner. From being a boat- 
swain of a ship he was made Boatswain of a yard, and thence to 
Master Attendant. 
3. I am grateful to Mr. Richard Gilbert for some interesting details 
on Joseph Gilberts life. 
this post; shiphandling in confined waters demanded the highest 
skill. 
On the other hand, political or social, connections were 
! thee-''Im st important considerations for an appointment to the three 
clerical posts in the yards. These officers came from a number 
of backgrounds, but rarely from within the yard organisation. 
Jacob Pownoll, the Storekeeper at Plymouth from 1782, was an ex- 
ception. Son of Israel Pownoll, a Master Shipwright of consider- 
able seniority by the time of the American war, he was entered as 
a clerk in the Storekeeper's office at Plymouth in 1746. In 1773 
Sandwich appointed him Naval Officer in Gibraltar before Pownoll 
came back to his old office at Plymouth as principal officer in 
1782. He was exceptional because of his connections within the 
service, for in addition to the advantage offered by his father, 
his brother was a captain in the sea service, while his brother- 
in-law was the Resident Commissioner at Chatham, Charles Proby. 
1 
It must be presumed that Pownoll brought unusual expertise 
to his office at Plymouth. The Commission on Fees regarded the 
1. PP-CF, P. 463; 1ThM, SAN I, fo. 357,23 May 1771. The necessity 
of providing sureties of up to ¬4,000 further ensured that the 
clerical officers had some influence and property. Pownollos 
guarantors for the position of Storekeeper were9 reported 
Ourry, "gentlemen of such character and fortune that I am 
perfectly satisfied of their sufficiency" (PRO, ADM 174/117, 
12 Ap 1782). Only two officers, apart from the Resident 
Commissioners, were addressed as "Esq" by the Commission on 
Fees; both were Storekeepers. 
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generally low level of expertise which the clerical officers brought 
to their posts as a considerable weakness. It recommended that: 
None but those conversant in the 
business should be chosen, and that 
it would tend much to the good of 
the service, if upon a vacancy the 
chief or most intelligent clerks in 
those offices were preferred, as a 
reward for having discharged their 
duty with attention and integrity. 1 
However, at least most of the officers had spent most of their lives 
in the civil administration of the navy, either as clerks in the 
Navy or Victualling Offices or as officers at foreign yards. 
2 In 
1; this period only Peter Butt, the Clerk of the Survey at Deptford, i, 
came to his office by way of being a ship's purser. 
This disparate collection of men came together regularly 
for collective decision-making, in which, theoretically, each 
officer had equal voice; in practice, there was a distinct 
unofficial hierarchy among the officers. The Master Shipwright 
controlled the largest number of men, and occupied the longest- 
established position; he was therefore likely to wield most 
power. One authority states that the Master Attendant was the 
"Commissioner's right hand man and his deputy in his absenoe from 
1. PP-CF, p. 308. 
2. There was a considerable amount of movement from the smaller 
yards to the more favoured. See Appendix II. 
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the yard", 
l but of the technical officers the Master Shipwright 
was undoubtedly the most formidable; certainly he was in a 
position to reward the larger number of people. 
At the other end of the scale, the Clerk of the Survey 
was considered the most junior. The lack of esteem and seniority 
of this officer was criticised by the Commission on Fees, 
particularly because an important part of his duty was to act as 
a check on the other officers' expenditure. Investigating a 
complaint by the Plymouth officer that he had been expected by 
the Master Shipwright to sign accounts of contractors' works 
without due examination of the expenditure, the Commissioners 
commented: 
The consequence of this officer in 
your Majesty's . 
dotlcyards does not 
appear to have been sufficiently 
attended to... not only on the receipt 
and issue of stores, but in every other 
branch of expenditure in or belonging 
to the yards. 2 
Peter Butt noted that the Clerk of the Survey, "cautiously avoided 
intermeddling with any expense arising from ... ships either building 
1. Sir Henry Kitson, "The Early History of Portsmouth Dockyard", 
Mariner's Mirror, 34,1948, p. 92. It is possible that this 
judgement was the result of the Commissioner and the Master 
Attendant sharing the same background and some of the same 
duties, and that the powerful position of the Master Shipwright 
led them to close co-operation. There was, however, no official 
seniority. See also Baugh, p. 295n. 
2. PP-CF, p. 311. 
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orIrepairing", 
1 but his duty of inspecting the other officers' 
accounts, the Commission pointed out, "must not be deemed officious 
interference, but part of the duty required of himl'. 
2 Part of the 
trouble was that the clerkship had not been long established as a 
principal office; in the 1662 Instructions the Clerk of the Survey 
was not mentioned as a principal officer, but merely included in 
the instructions to the other officers as agent to the Surveyor. 
Thus he was in the difficult position of being considered the most 
Junior at the same time as having to inspect his colleagues' 
accounts. 
In spite of these imbalances, the general rule was one 
of co-operation; in co-ordinating work there may have been faults, 
but the lack of faction among yard officers was notable. Yet it 
is probable that this unity was achieved at the cost of a certain 
amount of efficiency. Co-operation was forced on them by the 
system; it was either this or continua]. suspicion, yet, as Baugh 
points out, "no-one was qualified to cast the first stone". 
3 Nor 
was it, of course, in any officer's interest to appeal to the Navy 
Board or its representative, the Resident Commissioner. His 
1. no, At 106/3404,7 Dec 1778. 
2" ? P-CP, P"312. One indication of the Clerk of the Survey's 
position is that at the western yards he received less than 
half the income of the Clerk of the Cheque. 
3. Baugh, p. 294. 
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authority over the officers was largely of his own making, for 
his position was not a strong one. The Commission of Enquiry 
noted that the Resident Commissioner, "although the Principal, 
appears to have less influence over the workmen than any other 
officer". 
' This situation stemmed largely from his lack of 
initiative in making yard appointments. Nevertheless, aided by 
a strong local political base, as, for instance, Hood and Ourry 
possessed, it could be an effective position; a forceful 
personality could also be an asset. When a Commissioner resident 
had neither of these advantages (and Gambier at Portsmouth springs 
immediately to mind), then the efficiency of the yards suffered. 
Nevertheless, however strong the Commissioner was 
personally, his diverse responsibilities left him with little 
chance to really carry the Navy Board's authority to the yards. 
Martin gave a picture of an ordinary working morning: 
When comptrolling at the Pay Office... 
"he)... is many times in a morning called 
to go aff to his office or house and attend 
to the requisitions of commanders of 
squadrons, besides being frequently obliged 
to wait upon the Commanding Officer of the 
port and confer with himon the exigencies 
of the fleet. 2 
1. PP-CES p. 3. 
2. MD19 POR/F/18,13 Jan 1783. 
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There was little chance of supervising the yard officers, even 
when he was not afloat comptrolling the payment of the ships. The 
general supervisory nature of the Commissioner's role meant that 
he was the first to be imposed upon when any new task was to be 
undertaken, and through the century the Commissioner's duties had 
increased. The central administration also considered it difficult 
to find men of trust and therefore was reluctant to allow the 
spread of responsibility below him. The process was self- 
defeating. An overworked Commissioner could not do everything; 
in addition, all of them were sickly men when they came to their 
posts, and not surprisingly they were frequently absent. Their 
three clerks examined most of the returns sent to the Navy Board, 
made and passed bills to the contractors, and, especially in war- 
time, assumed more and more responsibility. 
The only check on the yard officers which remained was 
the vigilance of one officer upon another; this too was in- 
effective. It is significant that the two activities which had 
the reputation of bring the most liable to inefficiency and abuse, 
that of mustering the yard workmen and the reception of stores 
from contractors, all the officers were more or less involved. 
Compromise between the officers was the rule, and checking, beyond 
seeing that the books and accounts were in order, the exception. 
Above them was a board which had little power in disciplining 
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them; if any official reprimands were to be made, then the 
Admiralty was needed, and traditionally the Navy Board was always 
reluctant to involve its political masters. The result was a 
large degree of independence for the yard officers, and this made 
for unity amongst them. It was not in the officers' interest to 
report any discrepancies in their colleagues' business; the 
relationship among the five principal officers was too delicate 
and too critical to be upset in this way. 
ii) The Technical Departments. 
Although the Master Attendant and the Master Shipwright 
had the charge of separate departments and different workmen, they 
shared responsibility for many of the larger operations in the 
yards. Thus, while the launching, docking or undocking of a 
large ship was the concern of the Master Attendant in his role as 
shiphandler, such an operation demanded the assistance of the 
shipwright officer because of the size of the task and the number 
of men that had to be controlled in performing it. There were 
other reasons for co-operation at a technical level. Both 
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officers combined to inspect, measure and value the transports 
which had been tendered for hire to the Navy Board, 
I 
and they 
would "proportion" the amount of stores in the charge of the 
boatswain and carpenter of ships fitting out, inspect them when 
they returned from a commission and examine and pass these officers' 
accounts. They also had parallel responsibilities in the reception 
of stores from contractors in inspecting items which were "relative 
to their province". 
In contrast to the shipwright officer, the Master 
Attendants spent most of their time afloat. At the yards of 
Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth there were two of these officers, 
equal in rank and responsibility. Apart from the fact that their 
duties often involved at least one of them in lengthy periods of 
absence from the yard, the reason for this duplication was that 
the nature of their job was such that it involved a large degree 
of personal supervision; its importance allowed little chance to 
delegate authority. Although the maintenance of the ships in 
Ordinary has been attributed as the primary function of the 
Master Attendants, 2 it is clear from both the 1662 Instructions 
and the Commission on Fees that their main contribution to the 
1. The officers at Deptford undertook the bulk of this task. 
For a full account see Syrett, pp. 106-120. 
2. See Baugh, p. 297. 
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service of the yard was the seamanship needed in launching, 
docking, wasting and rigging the ships. When ships were moved 
from mooring to mooring, or, those which were decommissioned, 
from yard to yard, it was one of the Master Attendant3- who was 
in command. They also appointed pilots, why:.. -, were particularly 
needed in the difficult waters of the Thames and its approaches, 
while the occupants of the post at the upriver yards of Deptford, 
Woolwich and Chatham were responsible for transporting ships to 
and from the seal The masters of the small transports belonging 
to the yards also came under their orders, while, at the River 
yards, they supervised the transports loading stores for foreign 
yards. The usual reason for the absence of these officers was 
their responsibility for the launching of a ship from d merchant 
yard, and then bringing it to one of the royal yards to be fitted. 
This usually took about a month, but on one occasion William 
Nicholson, one of the Master Attendants at Portsmouth, was away 
at Bucklers Hard for seventy-four days. 
2 
In peacetime, however, the Master Attendant, and the 
seamen of the Ordinary over which he had charge, were mostly 
engaged in the maintenance and security of the ships in Ordinary. 
3 
1. From Chatham the ships had to get to the area known as Blackstakes, 
just above Sheerness, while the ships piloted down the Thames had 
to reach Long Reach. 
2. I1M, POR/C/22,20 Feb 1778; also e. g. P0R/D/21,31 Jan 1779; 
POR/D/22,8 Jun 1780. 
3. As in the case of the ships, the seamen who maintained de- 
commissioned ships were borne on the "Ordinary" estimate; as a body of men they were known simply as "the Ordinary". 
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The 1662 Instructions required the Master Attendant to -lodge on 
board a ship every night: -9 but this was not obeyed to the letter, 
even at the larger yards where there were two officers, sharing 
the duty on an alternating weekly basis. The general weakness 
of security through the century resulted in the increasing in- 
volvement of the Resident Commissioner, and by the time of the 
American wax he and the Master Attendants shared the re- 
sponsibility of the security of ships often some miles from the 
centre of the yard. It was an almost hopeless task. ' 
The main reason for this, and, incidentally, for the 
poor quality of maintenance of, the ships throughout the century, 
was the poor calibre of the seamen appointed to look after the 
ships while they were laid up. On each ship, there was a 
boatswain, carpenter, purser and gunner and a number of seamen. 
These were unpopular jobs. The purser's post was invariably 
filled by a deputy, because of the combination of lack of 
comfort and the money that could be made out of the position, 
while the boatswains and carpenters were old men, frequently 
verging on senility. 
2 Although the purser was the most senior 
1. The Master Attendant was also responsible for the safety of the 
ships, and was required to check the chain, bridles and tackles 
of the moorings, and to lift and inspect them every summer. 
2. If the ship was commissioned, these boatswains had to apply to 
the Admiralty to change places with a younger man. In an effort 
to attract better men, the Navy Board allowed two servants to 
boatswains and gunners (S0(a), 606,31 Jul 1772) and lowered the 
entry age to only thirteen (SO(a), 544,8 Jun 1769). 
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man on board a ship in Ordinary, it was the boatswain who, under 
the immediate charge of the Master Attendants' was in charge of 
maintenance and of keeping the ship constantly pumped. After the 
American war Middleton instituted the first change in the depart- 
ment for over a century by creating a new post of "Superintending 
Master". This officer, recruited from the senior masters in the 
sea service, was to be responsible for a "division" of ships in 
the harbour. 2 This was an attempt to take some of the burden off 
the Master Attendants, and to enable the officers to deal with the 
increased number of ships laid up at the end of the war. At the 
same time the number of seamen on board was increased, and a system 
of having half the men ashore, and half aboard the ship, changing 
3 
every Monday morning, was instituted. Instructions to the sea- 
men were drawn up, printed and hung in every ship .4 In spite 
of the difficulty of attracting enough seamen to the Ordinary, 
even after the demobilisation, there is little doubt that the 
ships which were laid up were better maintained after the war. 
5 
1. PP-cP, pp. 412,449. 
2. so(b), 209,30 Sep; 211,7 Oct 1783. 
3. SO(b), 193,27 Aug 1783; 261,7 Jan 1784. Even after the 
demobilisation there was difficulty in maiming the ships at 
the eastern yards. 
4. so(b), 195,3 Sep 1783. 
5, See PRO, ADM 174/115,26 Nov 1774; 1, POR/D/22,24 Jun 1777; 
POR/F/18,9,28 Max 1783; PRO, ADM 106/3320,13 Feb 1783; 
174/118,11 Mar 1783; 174/19,6 Feb 1783; 10IM, ADM BP/4, 
24 Nov 1783; A/2793,28 Nov 1783; S0(b), 224,13 Nov 1783. 
The Master Shipwright, or "Builder", as he was informally 
called, directed the rest of the operations, and it was around him 
that the working of the yard revolved. He was in charge of 
building, fitting, repairing and surveying of all ships in and out 
of commission. The ships in Ordinary, although under the general 
charge of the Master Attendant, were also his concern when repairs 
and surveys on the main fabric of the ship were needed. Although 
most of the supervision of the work had now devolved onto his two 
Assistants, much depended on the Master Shipwrights energy and 
skill. It was on his word that the Admiralty ordered ships to be 
repaired, refitted or broken up. He was also responsible for a 
workforce numbering, at the larger yards, over two thousand. 
To control these men there was a large number of inferior officers 
under his command, and to assist him in the routine paper work, 
there were two clerks in his office at the eastern yards, and 
three at Portsmouth and Plymouth. 
1 They recorded the proceedings, 
prepared the weekly reports which were sent to the Navy Board, and 
kept records of orders, issues, returns and letters to and from 
the Board and the other offices in the yard. 
Since there were no instructions for the inferior officers, 
not surprisingly their duties varied from yard to yard. The 
position of the Builder's two Assistants provides an example. At 
9o 
1 
At Sheerness the Master Shipwright possessed only one Assistant 
and one clerk. 
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Portsmouth, for instance, the duties of the two officers alternated 
weekly, while at Deptford the first Assistant was considered the 
senior; he thus had more responsibility. ' At Plymouth, their 
duties were the same, but they reported that "they take the ships 
alternately".? Whatever the variations, the main task of the 
Assistants was the supervision of the shipwrights and other work- 
men under the Master Shipwright; they gave, "constant attendance 
to people coming to their work, in order that they shall make the 
most advantage of their time", and took "care that the Foremen and 
quarterznen bring up works committed to their trust in a workmanlike 
manner". 
3 Each yard had two or three Foremen, who in turn provided 
the link with the quartermen in charge of the gangs of artificers. 
4 
There were two other officers under the Master Shipwright 
who were almost but not quite of equal authority with his two 
Assistants. The first was the Master Caulker; 
5 he was re- 
sponsible for the breaming and graving of ships, and inspecting 
the quality of the ochain, with which the caulkers worked. It was 
1. PP-CP9 pp. 415,322-323. 
2. PP-CF, p. 453- 
3. PP-OF, PP. 322-323. 
4. See S0(a), 609,26 Aug 1772. The quarterznen, who were shipwrights 
promoted from the ranks, also had "pro-quartermen" and "sub-quarter- 
men" under them. The former were shipwrights appointed in place of 
quartermen who were absent from the yard in order to oversee the 
building of a ship in a merchant yard; the latter took the place 
of sick or disabled quarterznen. See NA12, CIA/E/33,18 Jun 1778. 
'I 
5. At Deptford and Woolwich the post of second Assistant was combined 
with that of the Master Caulker. 
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his duty to attend the Builder at regular intervals, receive his 
instructions, and "acquaint his Foreman and quarterznen where to 
employ the caulkers to the best advantage: 
l The Boatswain of the 
yard occupied a similar position over the unskilled labourers; he 
was to, "dispose of them in gangs to carry on the different services 
the Master Shipwright gives directions to be done. "2 One of his 
jobs which was particularly vital was to be in charge of the men 
working the tackle when ships were heaved in and out of dock, while 
his responsibility also extended over the cranes used for lifting 
timber from the barges and hoys into the yard. He, too, had a 
Foreman, and several assistant Foremen under him. 
3 
The last links in the chain of authority were the 
measurers. At the three large yards the Master Shipwright had 
a painter's measurer, a sawyer's measurer and a timber measurer. 
4 
These were promoted shipwrights, "on the same footing as a quarter- 
man", who were entrusted with measuring and supervising the work 
of those artificers who worked "by the piece", or on a piece rate; 
the timber measurer was the exception, in that his main job was to 
1. PP-CF, pp. 419,457. 
2. PP-CF, PP. 338,358. 
3. These posts were created in 1772 (S0(a), 609,26 Aug 1772). 
I 
4" At Sheerness there was a measurer to perform all three tasks, 
and the River yards had no painter's measurer. 
measure timber received from contractors. 
1 Those other trades 
which required measurement were shared arbitrarily between the 
measurers. 
2 Most of these duties were performed in conjunction 
with clerks from the clerical offices. 
Finally, the yard Purveyor must be mentioned at this 
point, although he was not strictly in the Master Shipwright's 
department. Each yard, except Sheerness, had its own Purveyor, 
whose main job was to survey stores tendered locally; it was on 
his report, for instance, that the Navy Board would base a 
decision to buy timber. He was also enabled to buy small stores 
on his own initiative (known as "petty emptions"), for which 
purpose he would attend the Master Shipwright to see if any item 
was wanted quickly. However, authorisation for this would have 
to come from the Resident Commissioner. The main tasks of the 
Purveyors at the River yards was to buy small items or amounts of 
stores in the London market, for which it was not worth drawing 
out a contract. However, at the outports, the Purveyor and his 
1. See SO(a), 593,31 Dec 1771. The Navy Board ordered that 
someone other than a shipwright should fill the post of sawyer's 
measurer to the Clerk of the Cheque, although the shipwright 
officers resisted, claiming that the measurer's effectiveness 
"depends greatly on his professional knowledge" (PRO, ADM 106 
3320,6 May 1703; rTh1M, POR/D/23,8 May 1783; SO(b), 105,21 
May 1783). 
2. e. g. the timber measurer at Woolwich also inspected the work of 
the paviours, masons, scavelmen, lacquerers, oarmakers, house 
carpenters, bricklayers, glaziers and painters and "ascertained 
their wages for the same" (P -CF9 p. 346). 
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deputy were usually more concerned with the surveying of timber, 
and were often away from the yard for long periods. 
1 
The workmen and artificers under the Master Shipwright 
can be divided into two groups. The larger of the two consisted 
of those men who were directly concerned with the building, re- 
pairing and refitting of the ships. The largest section of 
skilled men in this group was the shipwrights; the majority of 
these men worked in gangs of twenty, under the charge of a quarter- 
man, 'and moved around the yard to wherever they were needed. These 
gangs would be "shoaled", or picked in the manner of an "informal 
sporting match" so that the best men were spread through the 
gangs. 
2 However, shipwrights were also employed on permanently- 
located jobs in the mast shed (under the Master Mast Maker) or 
in the boat shed (under the Master Boat Builder); they would 
tend to be the older, more skilful men. Working in close con- 
junction with the shipwrights were the caulkers; many of these 
men had trained as shipwrights, and were qualified for both trades. 
They were known as "double-handed men". The caulkers, who also 
worked in gangs, were assisted by ocham boys, who sorted and 
picked the material which the caulkers used. There were various 
ý. See PP-CF, PP- 386,438-9,471" 
2. See Baugh, pP. 314-5. The gangs were shoaled each year at the 
end of the Lady quarter, but this was changed in 1771 to the 
end of December to avoid confusion at payments (S0(a), 591,18 
Dec 1771). 
94 
i 
other workers. The smiths were engaged in making ironwork of 
all descriptions, including anchors, for the ships. Joiners 
were responsible for the woodwork inside the ship. Blockmakers, 
wheelwrights, locksmiths and occasionally a brazier made up the 
variety of trades under the Master Shipwright. Finally, there 
were the sawyers, who worked in pairs. Working a saw vertically 
over a saw pit, they "converted" rough logs into timber and plank. 
The remainder of the workforce was only indirectly 
concerned with working on the ships. There was a large number of 
unskilled labourers necessary in an unmechanical age. Many of 
these men had "stations", especially in the storehouses, 
1 but 
they too mostly worked in gangs. Although teams of horses were 
hired on a contract basis, much of the heavy work had to be done 
by hand, "particularly the taking of timber, plank and all other 
stores, and depositing them in piles, or other proper places for 
their reception". 
2 Scavelmen cleared the filth of the yard and 
the mud which acc=ulated in the docks and the yard. Finally, 
for the maintenance of the buildings and docks there were house 
1. e. g. PRO, 106/3318, (? )Jul 1776, an account of "stationed 
labourers" in Deptford yard produced for the Visitation. 
There were 69 of these men spread around the yard, but 
Deptford had always had a high proportion of labourers 
because of the large amount of stores which had to be 
handled there. 
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2. PP-CFA p. 338. 
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carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers, masons and paviours. 
1 
Although it was neither specified in the 1662 Instructions, 
nor authorised by a subsequent Standing Order, the Master Shipwright 
had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of yard facilities 
and of minor building undertakings. Eiren though projects of any 
size were put out to contract, the shipwright officer was still 
concerned, for it was he who dealt with the contractor. It was 
a situation which the Commission on Fees criticised; "We allow 
the shipwright officers every merit for their ability in their 
professional line, but we conceive that to be naval, not civil 
architecture". 
2 This statement was the final result of a 
controversy which produced friction between the yard officers 
and the Navy Board, within the Board itself and between the Board 
and the Admiralty. The centre of the controversy was one John 
Marquand, who had been introduced in 1777 as a civil architect 
to supervise the building of the Marine Barracks at Chatham. 
3 
After this he was retained to survey and inspect the contracts 
for any major building project. 
4 
1. Paviours were responsible for the paving in the yard; house 
carpenters were ordinary carpenters called so to distinguish 
them from the other wood workers. 
2. PP-CF, p. 314. At the beginning of the century most of the yard 
buildings had been built of wood, and the difference between ship- 
building and the substantial brick building common by this period 
had not been so marked. 
3. NM M, ADM B/194,7 May 1777. The Board proposed that he should be 
paid two hundred pounds a year. 
4. e. . iNM, ADM A/2736 1 Feb 1779; PRO, ADM 95/96 8 May 1779; SOtb), tos, 26 Sep li83; NM M# ADM BP/79 30 Jan 1187. 
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Marquand, however,, was given little co-operation. 
Middleton complained that the yard officers, "finding themselves 
very much restrained by his skilful superintendence, endeavoured 
by every means in their power to lessen his consequences, and to 
make his situation unpleasant". 
I Nevertheless, in spite of the 
wishes of the Surveyors, Marquand was retained; he--: corrected 
valuations, and reported on and supervised works being carried out. 
The Comptroller found him an "honest man, intelligent and attentive 
to his business", and had no doubt of his value: 
The advantages derived from his 
exertions have been of the utmost 
consequence to the public, both in 
respect to the goodness of the work 
and the reduction of the prices; of 
which I shall give one instance. The 
yard officers had made an estimate, 
by which the contractor was to be 
allowed at the rate of four pounds 
for certain work which Mr. Maaxquand 
reduced to 7s. 6d. 2 
However, when Howe discovered Marquand's existence during 
the 1784 Visitation, the architect's job was immediately in jeopardy. 
Partly because the First Lord considered him a needless expense, and 
partly because the post received Middleton's enthusiastic sponsor- 
ship, the Navy Board was soon asked, "for what time longer it may 
be necessary to continue him in employment? "3 Although the Navy 
1. NNßyr, M266/o86, Observations on the Estimates. 
2. BL, II, 246, (? ) Dea 1786; also IThI, Ms66/086, Observations on 
the Navy Board. 
3. NNIl''I, ADM A/2808,18 Feb 1785. 
_. 
ý 
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Boaxd managed to delay a year, the Admiralty directed Marquand'a 
discharge in March 1786; in their Lordship§' opinion, "the yard 
officers... are, or ought to be, competent". 
1 In spite of Navy 
Board protests, the Admiralty insisted on dismissing Marquand, 
although permission was given to call upon him or others for 
occasional advice on contract prices. Middleton managed to 
retain him on a temporary basis into 1787, but a year or so later 
he was still of the opinion that Marquand "cannot be too soon 
replaced". 2 
Marquand's expertise was resisted by the shipwright 
officers for the obvious reason that it reflected upon their skill; 
while it is impossible to judge if there was consistent corruption 
in the administration of yard building contracts, it is likely that 
for years the contractors had gained from the shipwright officer's 
lack of knowledge. Marquand was originally brought in by the Navy 
Board because it thought that, "nothing is more likely to con- 
tribute to the well performance of the building... (by)... a: pexsay 
properly qualified". Middleton thought the officers "totally 
3 
1. NNM, ADM A/2813,9 Mar 1786. 
2. NMMI ADM'BP/6b, 20 Max 1786; BP/7,30 Jan, 20 Feb, 24 Ap 1787; 
ADM A/2817t 23 Mar 1787; N266/086, Observations on the Estimates. 
See Webb, pp. 214-5. 
30 B/194,7 May 1777" 
I 
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ignorant"; the Navy Board as a whole confined themselves to, 
"not, 'ully competent", 
' Their lack of competence was proved by 
the investigation carried out by the Navy Board and the Commission 
on Fees on contractor's work at Plymouth, carried out after 
Marquand had been discharged. 2 Money had undoubtedly been 
wasted, although it is unclear whether this was the result of 
corruption or lack of expertise. Middleton described it as 
"great ignorance and partialities in favour of (the) contractors". 
3 
What is clear is that the shipwright officers made a bad job of 
their building responsibilities in the yard, and that they re- 
garded Marquand as a threat to their considerable independence over 
these affairs. 
Viewed in the most charitable light it could be said 
that the shipwright officers probably had little time to attend 
to the building contracts. In effect, the Builder had three 
main groups of workmen under him - the shipwrights, the caulkers 
and the unskilled labourers, apart from the large number in the 
1. BL, II0 247; `1, ADM BP/6b, 20 Mar 1786. 
2. See below p. 309. 
3. NMM, NIS66/086,. Observations on the Navy Board Department. 
4. The Commission on Fees recommended, upon Middleton's instigation 
that a Surveyor of Civil Architecture be appointed (PP-CF, p. 3145. 
This did not happen until 1796, although Samuel Bentham as 
Inspector-General of Naval Works was not quite what the Commission 
had in mind. See Bernard Pool, Navy Board Contracts, 1660-1832, 
(London, 1966), pp. 116-7. 
J 
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minor trades. 
I While it was natural that he should predominate, 
by this time the roles of the two "equal" technical officers had 
become unequal. The Master Attendant controlled an insignificant 
number of men in relation to the Master Shipwright; in addition, 
in wartime they would decrease, for as ships were commissioned 
the number of seamen in Ordinary would naturally decline. Yet 
the Master Attendant's job was every bit as vital, especially in 
the hectic time when ships were fitting for sea. The only men 
under his command whose numbers actually increased during the 
war were the sailmakers and the riggers, and there were never 
enough of these men,, especially dt the western yards. Through- 
out the war there were significant delays because the Master 
Attendant's department was unable to keep up with the men 
under the Master Shipwright, and this in turn was the cause of 
friction with the Navy Board. 
iii) The Clerical Departments. 
Of the three principal clerical officers, the Clerk of 
1. The ropeyard workers worked under the Clerk of the Ropeyard and 
the Master Ropemaker. Although the ropeyards were "administratively 
isolated", the two principal technical officers had to work in close 
liaison with the Clerk of the Ropeyard (see Baugh, p. 299; PP-CF9 
pp. 361,443). For a detailed description of the process and of the functions of the different trades in the ropeyard see J. G. Coad, "Chatham Ropeyard", Post-Medieval Archeology, IT2,1963, pp. 147.156. 
. _... _. _. __. _ _. _ý,.. .., _. _, .... . __ _. .3 
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the Cheque was considered the most senior and trustworthy. He 
was concerned with mustering and payment of the men. The Store- 
keeper was responsible for the reception and issue of stores; in 
this he was "checked" by the Clerk of the Survey. 
l The only duty 
that the three officers shared was attending the reception of 
stores from the contractors, for although the Clerk of the Cheque 
had little to do with stores, he checked his brother officers 
because it was the clerks in his office who made out the navy bills 
by which the contractors were paid. 
2 Each officer was assisted 
by a number of clerks; at the time of the Commission on Fees 
there were ninety-eight clerks belonging to the clerical officers 
in the six yards. Portsmouth had twenty-two, while Sheerness 
possessed half that number. The largest department was the 
Storekeeper's office at Portsmouth with a total of nine, while 
the three clerks in the Clerk of the Survey's office at both 
Woolwich and Sheerness represented the sraallest. 
3 The establish- 
ment at every office, except the Clerk of the Cheque's at Chatham, 
was increased by one clerk during the war. In all, twenty-one 
extra clerks were taken on, every one the result of persuasive 
1. The duties of these two officers and their departments are 
more fully described in Chapter Four. 
2. As a customary extension of their duties the Storekeeper 
appointed watchmen for the storehousesl and the Clerk of the 
Cheque appointed 'warders' to guard the gate of the yard. 
3. At the time of the Commission on Fees there were 38 storekeeper's 
clerks, 35 clerks to the Clerk of the Cheque and 25 belonging to 
the Clerks of the Survey. 
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letters from the officer concerned to the Navy Board. 
1 
The duty of the Clerk of the Cheque's department was 
considerable. Not only did the workmen borne on the "Extra" 
estimate and seamen of the Ordinary have to be mustered, but the 
responsibility extended to the crews of commissioned ships which 
were within his "cheque". 
2 In addition, it was also this 
officer's task to hold the yard contingency account, for which he 
received imprests from the Treasurer of the Navy; from this he 
paid the seamen's bounty and conduct money. He also handled 
the money gained from the sale of old naval stores. In his 
capacity of senior clerical officer it was also his duty to re- 
cord all Navy Board orders at those yards where there was no 
Resident Commissioner, and at Sheerness it was his special function 
to pass on orders and correspondence to the Commissioner at Chatham 
which came down the River from London. 
3 
In addition to the daily mustering of the yard workers, 
the Clerk of the Cheque's office kept account of all entries, 
1. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/18,9 Feb 1779; NMM, POR/D/21,1 Max 1779; 
POR, /D/22,23 Dec 1779, The Storekeeper and the Clerk of the 
Survey at the western yards were allowed two each (NAHM, ADM 
BP/49 8 Dec 1783). 
2. A "cheque" was a somewhat vaguely defined area of estuary or sea 
for which a particular yard would be responsible; e. g. Spithead 
was "in the cheque" of Portsmouth yard. 
3. None of these minor duties were included in the original in- 
structions, but the Clerk of the Cheque acquired them (in the 
same fashion as the Resident Commissioner) as the yards grew in 
size. 
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discharges, absences, deaths and "runs". 
' 
Apprentices' in- 
dentures were kept here, and it was to this office that the 
surgeon sent notes of those who were sick or hurt. The work- 
men attended musters or "calls" at least two or three times a 
day, 2 although the system varied between the yards. At Deptford 
the men were mustered five times a day in summer, and four in 
winter. At Sheerness, from November to January, there were 
three musters, and an additional one during the remaining months. 
At Portsmouth the men were called, "at work, before and after the 
usual working hours and early and late when working extra"; the 
call clerk noted that, "as some of the workmen come in and go out 
at all hours of the day and night, he is obliged to attend them 
accordingly at such hours; also on Sundays to muster the watchmen 
and warders". 
3 His counterpart at Sheerness complained of his 
duty of mustering the smiths, "who come to work at four o'clock 
in the morning constantly". 
4 Towards the end of the war the Navy 
Board enquired whether it would be possible to shorten the time 
taken to take the musters, but the opinion of the yard officers 
was that omitting any of this lengthy procedure "will be attended 
wk-K great disorder and irregularity". 
5 
1. See 1717 Oeconomy', pp. 99-102,111. "Runs" or "mulcts" on a 
muster book against a workman's name deprived him of his wages 
as a punishment (see Baugh, pp. 311-2). The Clerk of the Rope- 
yard mustered the ropeyard workers. 
2. The musters were also attended by the Master Attendant's and 
Master Shipwright's clerk, who kept a record of those absent 
in their departments. 
3. PP-CF, p. 422. 
4. PP-CF, p. 396. 
5. PRO, ADM 17tß/19,2 Jan 1783; ADM 106/3320,4 Jan 1783; also 
ADM 174/189 22 Feb 1780. 
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The seamen of the Ordinary were the next to be mustered. 
Every month a "general muster" was held, attended by the Resident 
Commissioner, "where all accusations, complaints and irregularities" 
were heard. Those seamen which were employed on shore were 
mustered; every morning by the Master Attendant and his clerk, but 
this was less a check on attendance than the allotment of the day's 
work. There was also a weekly check "at uncertain times" after 
the watch had been set. 
l 
There were three tasks which the Clerk of the Cheque had 
assumed during the century. The first was the mustering of the 
crews of ships in commission. 
2 Even when the commander of the 
ship had taken over the supervision of fitting out, the yard officer 
still had charge of the mustering. When the ship sailed "from his 
district", the Clerk of the Cheque was to supply the commander with 
a "perfect muster book of men's names, with entries and checks 
against the absent". 
3 This muster had to take place at least 
once a week9 although at the River yards it was done daily. At a 
refitting base this was a heavy burden. The second clerk to the 
Clerk of the Cheque at Sheerness noted that he spent four days a 
1. The watch was set at 9 p. m* in the summer and 8 p. m. in the 
winter (PP-CF, P-328)- 
2. PRO, urn 9315,15 Jul 1731,21 Jun 17390 
3. Regulations-and Instructions relating to His Majesty's Service 
at Sea, established by His Majesty in Council, (London, 1772 , 
pp. 22-3. 
i 
4 
i 
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week on this duty, mustering the ships either at Sheerness, Black- 
stakes or the Nore, "on which occasions he is detained the greatest 
part of the day or night... and is employed on the business of his 
department ashore at such intervals as he is at liberty for that 
purposet'. 
1 This onerous task was performed by a junior clerk, the 
Commission on Fees noted that it was "aware of the difficulties which 
young men are exposed to when they endeavour to be strict in the 
execution of this part of their duty". 
2 Secondly, the three large 
yards were embarking and disembarking points for marines. They had 
to be mustered every month, and at any time on arrival, or departure 
from the "cheque" of the yard. When the divisions went abroad, a 
complex accounting system was involved. Finally, the large number 
3 
of hired transports and tenders had to be mustered daily. The River 
yards were most concerned with this task. Weekly accounts had to be 
sent to the two boards. 
4 
The musters were used in three principal ways. After 
being made up into monthly "cal" books, the lists of yard workmen 
were sent quarterly to the Navy Board. Musters for the seamen went 
1. PP-CF9 pp. 397-8. One clerk complained that "attending this,,,, 
service was both dangerous and prejudicial to his health'; fNNM, 
CHA/M/3,27 Feb 1771;. 
2. PP-CF, p. 309- 
3. PP-OF9 pp. 375,420,457. 
4. PP-CF9 p. 326. 
J 
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weekly to both boards, and on occasions more frequently. The 
second purpose was for the Clerk of the Cheque to make out warrants 
to the Commissioners of Victualling to issue rations to the seamen 
both for sea and harbour service. Before the Admiralty ordered a 
ship to be put into "Sea Victualling" the seamen of ships that were 
about to go to sea were given the same-rations as those men in the 
Ordinary. These rations were ordered by "petty warrant", which was 
rather smaller than the ration issued for sea service. 
1 
Thirdly, the musters formed the basis of the payment of 
the yard workmen and the seamen of the Ordinary. The quarterly 
payment was undertaken by clerks from the Pay Branch of the 
Treasurer of the Navy's department. The method of payment was 
the same as for the paying of seamen, although the Clerk of the 
Cheque's office was responsible for "casting" the workmen's monthly 
call books in quarterly pay books, which, in the case of the sea- 
men, was done by the Treasurer's clerks. At the three large yards 
there were six of these clerks, supervised by an outport "Conductor"; 
it was he who counted out the money, placed it in parcels on the pay 
table and replaced what remained in bags and chests. If the money 
was short, the chief Conductor in London was responsible. The 
1. The regulations were changed in 1771 for ships coming home from 
foreign service so that they were allowed to remain in sea 
victualling; this allowed them seamen fresh meat (SO(a), 592, 
27 Dec 1771). 
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River yards were served by clerks from the Pay office in London. 
1 
During the war these clerks were worked very hard, At both the 
western yards extra sets of clerks had to be sent; during 1779 
Hood described those at Portsmouth as being "jaded exceedingly". 
2 
It was the opinion of one of the officials in the Treasurer's office 
that: "The office of a pay clerk at the outporte is, in time of war, 
3 
very laborious. In time of peace, they have not full employment". 
Those workers who worked on a "piece" or "task" basis were 
the exception to this method of payment from the muster books. In 
addition to the measurers of the Master Shipwright, each clerical 
officer had a clerk who checked upon each other in the measurement 
of work done "by the piece". The sawyers, for instance, had long 
been paid "by the hundred foot"; the measurer from each department 
inspected what had been done twice a day, and on other occasions 
when special work was wanted. They entered the work of each pair 
of sawyers into their pocket books, and from thence into the "sawyer's 
book". A weekly account was then given to the Clerk of the Cheque's 
office. Every three months the measurers made an account for the 
Clerk of the Cheque, so that it could be transmitted to the Navy 
1. PP-CF, Fourth Report, pp. 134,136. 
2. IM, POR/F/17,1 Oct 1779; also PRO, ALM 174/117,15 Sep, 21 
Nov, 29 Dee 1780. 
3. PP-CF, Fourth Report, p. 146. 
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Board, and divided the earnings between the top and pit man, 
1 
It is difficult to assess how efficient and honest the 
clerks in the Clerk of the Cheque's office were when they mustered 
the men. Gregson's opinion was that the musters were "very 
dilatory, and not over-exact", 
2 
while Sandwich wrote that the 
clerks were "guilty of a variety of malpractices ... taking fees 
from the men for winking at their absence and mustering them when 
they do not really go to their work". 
3 
There is little doubt that 
the mustering of the seamen was slack; on one occasion the Navy 
Board remarked that, "His Majesty does suffezs great loss by 
victualling absent persons". 
4 
The most exact evidence comes from 
Middletonts anonymous infoinant from Sheerness: 
Always at the pay table I saw a great 
many men that I never saw at work, 
especially blacksmiths, for they have 
not been mustered of a morning this two 
years. " . Al]. of them bribes the call 
clerk and he has a book at the end of 
his desk and he keeps account of all 
that he gets in... It is a quarto book 
with a blue cover. 5 
1. e. g. PP-CF, pp. 330,425. The top man received a greater share. 
2. Add MSS 24135, fo. 77, undated, to Shelburne. 
3. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 60. 
4. S0(a), 797,16 Jan 1779" 
5. ShP, 151, no. 57, undated. 
lag 
Another source of income for the mustering clerks was the 
fixed fee levied for making out "assignment notes" for the workmen. 
2 
Sixpence per note was the most common rate, and because of the 
number of men who needed the notes, the custom realised a considerable 
amount of money. The usual system was for the clerk who made out 
the note to share the fee with his officer, who signed it. In 
1784, for instance, the Woolwich officer received ¬66.7.3 from 
this source, out of which he paid his clerk £5.13. o. 
2 The men 
at Plymouth complained to the Admiralty about this customs but 
Ourry enquired and found that, "no money is taken from them by Mr. 
Robert Tom, the call clerk". The Commissioner, however, seems to 
3 
have taken only the clerk's word for evidence. It was also the 
custom of the clerks to level down all wages to the nearest six- 
pence. 
4 In 1775 the Plymouth artificers voiced a general grievance; 
they asked to 'have "our wages without... dimunitio3l. iso).. that no clerk... 
can justly claim a right to the minutest part of lehnt wages wo have 
-es laboriously earned". 
5 
There is no doubt that mustering was subject to in- 
efficiency and abuse, although some of the clerks' actions might 
1. These notes, which had to be signed and stamped, were given to 
the workmen+s creditors. 
2. PP-CF, P" 348; also pp. 359,421. 
3. PRO, ADM 174/117,19 Feb 1782. 
4. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 37. 
5. PRO, ANA 174/115,25 Jul 1775. 
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be said to have been justified. It was understandable that they 
charged for making out assignment notes; it was an unestablished 
duty, and the navy was not going to pay them for their trouble. 
l 
Moreover, there was little incentive to work well, since there 
was no promotion by merit. The general rule, in all clerical 
departments, was that the most unpleasant tasks, which were 
invariably the most responsible, were given to the most junior 
clerks, although there was no discernible pattern over the six 
yards over which clerk did which duties. For instance, in the 
case of mustering, at the larger yards, the workmen were divided 
arbitrarily between two clerks, and the Ordinary was "called" by 
a third. There was little supervision; the principal officer 
himself attended musters only occasionally. 
2 Almost all the 
work had now devolved onto the clerks, and while the number of 
men in the yards had increased, there had been little increase 
in the number of clerks to do the work. The result was that 
in most of the clerical departments, and especially the Clerk 
of the Cheques', there was lack of incentive, overwork and 
inefficiency. 
1. Again, the Commission on Fees was critical; "the men should 
be relieved from any part of the charge whatsoever (PP-CFA 
p. 309)" 
2. ibid. 
t 
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iv) The Labour Force. 
The labour force of the dockyards increased steadily 
throughout the eighteenth century in spite of the fluctuations 
caused by the additions and reductions at the beginning and end 
of each wax. Thus, according to Charles Derrick, at the high 
peak of each wax there were more shipwrights in the yards than 
there had been at any time in the previous war. However, the 
American war was exceptional in this respect, ' and there were 
important shortages of men, and of shipwrights in particular. 
At the end of Sandwich's administration this was seen as a 
major weakness. In the Commons one of the more informed 
members thought that the British weakness at sea did not arise, 
"from neglect in the particular officers, but it was owing to a 
want of shipwrights". 
2 Sandwich admitted the shortage, but saw 
the remedy as beyond the power of his administration: 
The answer to this is that there is 
a line beyond which the exertions of 
every country cannot go. We cannot, 
nor ever could do more than employ 
all the shipwrights that this country 
affords; the law does not allow com- 
pulsion upon any race of men but 
common sailors. 3 
1. Charles Derrick, Memoirs of the Rise and Pro ess of the Navy, 
(London, 1806), p. 235-6; also Baugh, p. 264. 
2. Parliamentary Register, V, 254,23 Jan 1782: The speaker was 
Thomas Pitzherbert, who represented Arundel and was a, minor 
contractor to Portsmouth dockyard; see Namier and Brooke, 
II9 428. 
3" Gg V9 351, Jan 1782. 
ý" 
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In spite of Sandwichts assertion to the contrary, ship- 
wrights had been pressed at the beginning of the century; but by 
the time of the 1739-48 war the navy "managed, on the whole, to 
attract the number it required". 
' In the Seven Years War, "the 
labour force sufficed", but, as in this wax, there were shortages 
of different workmen, particularly in the western yards. 
2 
The 
shipwright situation at Portsmouth, especially after 1781, was 
particularly grave, while at critical times the Master Shipwright 
at Plymouth unsuccessfully -requested extra gangs to be sent from 
Deptford. 3 In spite of considerable efforts by the administration, 
the number of shipwrights varied little throughout the period. 
From just over three thousand after the strike of 1775, it rose to 
the more usual level of between 3250 and 3350. The peak was not 
reached until March 1781.4 However, it was disturbing that while 
total numbers rose slightly, the number of working shipwrights fell 
slowly but steadily throughout the war. The difference can be 
accounted for by the number of shipwrights who went to merchant 
1. Baugh, p. 323; also Ehrman, pp. 78P 96; R. D. Merriman een 
Anne's Navy, (NRS, 1961), p. 105- 
2. R. Middleton, "The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt", pp. 138,142. 
3. PRO, ADM 174/17,11 Nov 1778; ADM 106/3472,3 Oct 1781. If it was 
possible workmen were sent from one yard to another to relieve 
pressure. After the 1776 fire at Portsmouth, the ropemakers were 
dispersed to the other three ropeyards, and sailmakers were sent 
to the western yards from Deptford (ADM 106/3404,29 Oct 1778)- 
See also R. Middleton, "The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt", 
p. 142. 
4. See Appendix III. There was also the difficulty of attracting 
sufficient seamen to man the Ordinary. Only occasionally were 
returns of these men called for; numbers were dependent upon the 
ships laid up; e. g. an account of 1 Oct 1778 (MM, FOR/D/21) notes 
that there were 372 officers and men in 16 ships and 7 sailing 
vessels. 
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yards as overseers, and by an increase in the number of petty 
officers. However, this trend increased sharply after March 1781 
by a drift away to merchant yards, possibly in anticipation of the 
customary wholesale reduction of the labour force after hostilities 
had ceased. 
l 
Although lack of shipwrights was the main problem, the 
yards experienced shortages of other wor1nen at different times. 
Again the difficulties were centred on the western yards. The 
number of smiths at Portsmouth and of sailmakers at Plymouth were 
the most critical problems; in spite of extensive advertising and 
offers of conduct money, the latter were particularly scarce for 
most of the war. 
2 Smiths and caulkers were also in short supply 
at the eastern yards; for instance, in 1777 Proby placed "an 
advertisement in the Kentish papers", but it produced little re- 
sponse. 
3 After the war Middleton commented that there was, 
"inconvenience and delays... from U*want of... artioles of iron work 
and the exorbitancy of the prices that the public was obliged in 
consequence to pay for them has been very great". 
4 At other times 
1. See NM, BP/3,4 Mar 1782. They fell from 2410 in 1775 to 1707 
in 1782. 
2. For shortages of smiths, see NMM, PO. R/D/22,25 Nov 1779; POR/D/23, 
12,18 Oct 1782; PRO, ADM 174/18,1 Aug 1780; for sailmakers, 
ADM 174/116,10 Nov 1776,16 Jan, 31 Mar, 19 Aug 1778- 
3- NM, CHA/E/33,9 Jun 1777- 
4- NMM, ADM BP/4,8 Dec 1783, 
1141 
there were shortages of joiners, riggers and roperaakers. 
1 The 
exceptional category of workmen in this respect were the unskilled 
labourers, for there was little difficulty, (except possibly in the 
River), in finding the necessary numbers. 
2 For instance, at 
Portsmouth in the early part of the war, vacancies for scavelmen, 
rigger's labourers and watchmen were filled on the day of the 
reception of the Navy Board warrant ordering a general entry of 
these men. 
3 By, contrast, the same source shows clearly the 
difficulty of attracting shipwrights, for they entered the yard 
only in one's and twoos. 
The labour force was assisted by a curious assortment of 
people. At Portsmouth sick men from Haslar hospital, known as 
"harbour duty men"t were brought in to assist in the fitting out 
of ships. This procedure brought forth a strong complaint from 
Hood; it was, 
productive of great inconvenience as well 
as great distress for the poor men... and I 
have not seen a captain who has had harbour 
duty men to fit his ships out, that has not 
complained of them as a nuisance. 4 
1. For shortages of joiners, see NNM, POR, /D/20,1 Nov 1776; POR/D/21, 
I May 1778; for riggers, POR/F/16, I Nov 1776; POR/D/21,18 Mar 
1778; POR/D/23,20 Max 1783; for ropemakers, P0R/F/16,24 Oot 
1776; PRO, ADM 174/116,27 Sep 1778. 
2. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/3319,17 Aug 1779; NMM, CHA/E/33,7 Oct 17790 
3. e. g. ITIN, POR/C/21,22 Mar, 22 Aug 1774; I'OR/C/22,22 Mar, 21 
May 1778. These lists also show a high turnover of unskilled labour. 
4. M 414t POR/P/17,18 Jun 1780; F109 /Q/1,6 J, &n +780 , r 
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The River yards had a much more efficient reserve of labour which 
was used from 1778, and much more frequently from 1780. The 
pensioners at Greenwich Hospital assisted in loading and rigging 
ships, and would frequently man them for the short voyage from the 
River yards to the Nore. They were also occasionally employed at 
Chatham. From the beginning of 1780 to the end of the war the 
pensioners assisted sixty-six ships, and as late as February 1784 
the officers at the River yards wished them to be retained "until the 
present hurry is a little over") Another addition to the labour 
force consisted of some thirty-five soldiers of the garrison at 
Sheerness who acted as labourers in the yard there. When there 
was a question of removing them in the middle of the war, the Navy 
Board claimed that "the business thereof cannot be carried on% 
2 
Finally there were the "parish poor' at each of the yards, who were 
employed to pick ocham. This custom had been long established, 
and it was found, as in previous wars, that "the honest poor not 
in the workhouse" had to be employed, for the parish poor, "in 
times of large equipments... could never furnish enough". 
3 
1. NMM, ADM BP/59 3 May 1784, enclosures of 12,18 Feb 1784; also 
ADM A/2747-2784,1780-1783; GEA/E/33,3 Ap 1778. Since they 
were seamen, the Admiralty had, to give the order for them to 
be used on specific ships. 
2. NMM, ADM BP/29 3 Oct 1781; A/2768,10 Oct 17f1. 
3. NMM, POR/D/22,8 Oct 1779,19 Feb 1780; see also PRO, IND 
9315,8 Mar 1660; so(b), 132,23 Jun; 137,30 Jun 1783. 
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The administration started off the war from a position 
of weakness which was due to a combination of bad luck and of bad 
judgement. The task work strike of 1775 had resulted in the 
discharge of 129 shipwrights and apprentices in September of that 
year. ' Not long afterwards a considerable number of shipwrights 
and caulkers had to be encouraged to go abroad to the foreign yards. 
These men-came mostly from the western yards. 
2 Finally, Sandwich 
was forced to economise; by a warrant of Narch 1774 the yards were 
ordered to reduce their workforce to a fixed establishment. 
3 At 
Portsmouth, for instance, this resulted in the discharge of nine 
shipwrights, fourteen joiners, twenty-three house carpenters, twenty- 
three bricklayers, one blockmaker, fourteen scavelmen, thirteen 
labourers, eleven sawyers and two teams. 
4 The yards were ordered 
to keep their workers to this establishment, but about a year later, 
in May 1775, they were ordered not to take any more shipwrights at 
5 
all., 
Less than two months later this order was reversed; at 
every yard except Chatham and Sheerness shipwrights were to be 
1. PRO, AIM 7/662, fo. 67. See Chapter Three. 
2. See NMM, ADM A/2703,5 May 1776; A/2709,18 Nov 1776; also 
ADM B/195,26 Sep 1777. 
3. PRO, ADM 95/95,16 Max 1774. See Appendix IV. 
4. NMM, POR/C/21,21 Mar 1774. 
5" So(a)p 677,5 May 1775. 
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taken on to fill the establishment, although it was made clear that 
only those under thirty-five would be employed. 
1 In late 1776 the 
Admiralty gave the Navy Board a free hand to take on as much labour 
as it thought necessary. 
2 However, it was not until 1778 that the 
administration really began to exert itself; by then there was a 
considerable shortagep which evidently took it by surprise. Even 
then its measures were half-hearted. On 9th January the yards 
were ordered to relax the entry restrictions by raising the maximum age 
to forty-five. A month later it gave a similar order for unskilled 
labour. An entry in the Board minutes notes that the officers were 
3 
ordered, "not to be too st npulous in entering... good workmen at this 
4 time when they are scarce". However, it was only in April that 
the yards were ordered to enter as many shipwrights as possible. 
5 
Throughout the war the Board's response to urgent demands 
from the yard officers for more labour was hesitant and inadequate. 
The problem of the riggers at Portsmouth illustrated the short- 
comings of the Navy Board's attitude. There had always been 
1. PRO, ADM 95/95,29 Jun, 5. ßu1,7 Jul 1775; also 29 Aug 1775" The restriction had been in force for shipwrights since the 
previous year, and for the labourers since 1772 (SO(a), 617, 
20 Nov 1772; 665,22 Jul 1774). 
2. NMM, ADM A/2708,29 Oct 1776. 
3. SO(a), 732,9 Jan 1778; 735,9 Feb 1775; see also N M, ADM 
B/195,4 Feb 1778. The Board could be inflexible over the ages 
of newly-entered shipwrights. In 1780 it ordered 7 to be dis- 
charged for being over 45 (PRO, ADM 174/18,14 Jan 1780; see 
also 174/17,12 Jan 1778; 174/116,11 Dec 1778). 
4. PRO, ADM 106/2597,12 Jan 1778- 
5. ]1I, ADM B/196, I Ap 1778; SO(a), 740,2 AP 1778. 
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pressure on this section of workmen, so there was little excuse for 
failing to anticipate any shortage of these men. 
i As early as 1776 
Gambier wrote to the Board to say that since forty-four riggers 
had been discharged recently, "the service could not be carried 
on with the necessary dispatch"; the Board therefore brought the 
number up to seventy riggers and the same number of labourers. 
2 
By the beginning of 1778 the Commissioner and the Master Attendants 
wrote to say that the number of riggers was considerably short of 
the establishment in 1770 when they were less busy. They asked 
for 120 riggers and eighty labourers, but were allowed to hire 
only 180 in all. A year later this was not sufficient; every 
spring tide there was difficulty, and "ships had several times 
waited for blocks". This time the Board authorised an extra forty, 
but no more were allowed during the war. 
3 
At the same time the Board was hiring contract riggers, 
which it had done in the previous war in the eastern and the 
River yards; 
4 by 1780 Hood noted that at Portsmouth, "ships are 
now in general rigged by contract". 
5 
The officers had complained 
1. See Baugh, PP- 336-7. 
2. NMM, POR/F/16,1 Nov 1776; PRO, ADM 95/95,5 Nov 1776. 
3.1IM, POR/P/16,18 Max 1778; POR/D/21,18 Mar 1778; PRO, ADtß 
95/95,20 Mar 1778; NMM, POR/D/21,8 Ap 1779; PRO, ADM 95/95, 
9 Ap 1779; also P0R/D/23,20 Mar 1783- 
4, Baugh, p. 337- 
5. NMM, POR/F/17,18 Jun 1780. 
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in 1778 that, "i_t often happens thatthe rigging house people are 
for the greater part of their time employed afloat". which resulted 
in a shortage of blocks; 
1 
now the yard riggers could be kept in 
the rigging house preparing blocks. By the end of the war, there 
were riggers working by contract at every yard. 
2 
This was a 
logical extension of the necessity of employing contractors to 
build ships and to make sails; nevertheless, it did not hide the 
piecemeal and inefficient way in which the Board provided labour 
for the yards. 
Yet even if the administration had been skilful in 
anticipating shortages, there were no short-term remedies to the 
labour problem. Sandwich himself pointed out that recruiting 
drives and measures such as the offer of conduct money to new 
shipwrights were comparatively ineffectual; "all this goes a 
very little way towards procuring the number for whom we could 
find full employment'". 
3 
There were much more deeply-rooted 
reasons for the failure to attract an adequate workforce. The 
first was the constant disadvantage with which the yards competed 
with private shipbuilders, Sandwich was of the opinion that the 
1. NAM, POR/D/21,18 Mar 1778. 
2. e. g. PRO, ADM 95/95,9 Feb 1776; NMM, ADM B/193,26 Nov 1777; 
BP/3,28 Nov 1782. Mr. Huffarn was the main contractor. 
3. G, V, 348, Jan 1782. 
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merchants, with fewer overheads than the yards, would always pay 
better wages: 
If the trade of this country is to go on, 
the merchants will, and always must give 
more money for shipbuilding than the 
Crown. The increase of wages without the 
increase of work in the dockyards would be 
exactly so much money thrown away, as the 
merchants' would rise in proportion. 1 
Working in a private yard appealed to the younger shipwrights 
particularly, who benefited by the wages the merchants offered for 
a high daily output. Against this, the dockyards could only offer 
security; but it would have been possible, with greater forethought 
2 
and planning, to have ensured that an adequate workforce was on hand 
when it was needed. 
There had been an attempt at organising the number of men 
working in the yards. Although the warrant of March 1774 had had 
the unfortunate effect of reducing the yard workforce just before 
the war started, it at least went some way to establishing a 
principle that a fixed establishment of each trade was necessary. 
'Unfortunately, it was not compiled with a great deal of logic, nor 
was there any real idea of the total number of men needed. There 
1. G, V, 351, Jan 1782. In late 1782 the Board had, to issue an order 
to the contract builders to release men who looked as though they 
had come from the dockyards. It had no effect (NM, ADM BP/3, 
15 Oct 1782; SO(a), 1203,23 Oct 1782). 
2. See Chapter Three. 
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was a wide variation in the proportion of each trade to the total 
workforce of each yard. For instance, while there were to be 
fourteen shipwrights to every caulker at Deptford, there were 
only six at Sheerness, and ten at the western yards. Middleton 
claimed after the war that the 1774 establishment of caulkers, "was 
never found adequate to the demands in that tine even with the 
assistance of double-handed men in time of peace, but in time of war 
occasioned the most disagreeable delays". 
l Although the rule of 
three shipwrights to every labourer was consistent at every yard 
except Deptford, there were considerable variations in the 
proportions of the other trades to the shipwrights. At both the 
western yards the warrant of 1774 established twenty-two shipwrights 
to every sailmaker. This ratio was more than halved during the war, 
but even then these two yards were always short of sailmakers. 
2 
The warrant of 1774 failed in many other respects as a 
realistic assessment of the labour situation, 
3 The main reason 
for this was that it was based, like most other things, upon 
precedent. The same respect for what had gone before hindered 
shorter-term planning. Since there was always the difficulty of 
1. NMM, SLUM BP/4,8 Deo 1784. 
2. PRO, ADM 95/95,16 Mar 1774. See Appendix IV. 
3. For instance, it laid down that Portsmouth was to have 860 ship- 
wrights. This level was never reached even at the height of the 
war. 
1 
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dismantling even temporary posts, the Board displayed a marked 
reluctance to create new ones. In 1778 Hood asked the Board for 
an allowance so that a labourer could be added to the staff of the 
pay office at Portsmouth. The Board replied that, 
although this matter may appear trivial, 
the*allowances should be restrained as 
far as possible, as we find they are 
constantly increasing by small degrees, 
and when complied with are made precedents 
on occasions of more importance. 1 
It was this attitude which lay behind the Board's failure to 
anticipate shortages. For each increase in the workforce, the yard 
officer concerned had to prove that there already was an urgent need 
for more men, and the success of an application seemed largely to 
rest on the officer's skill in pleading his case. 
The administration also failed lamentably in the one other 
method of attracting labour. The only way in which the skilled 
labour force could be augmented permanently was by increasing the 
number of apprentices. This, of course, needed time; as Sandwich 
remarked in 1782, increasing the number of servants, "does not 
promise any great addition of strength upon a sudden emergenoy". 
2 
Yet it was not until the end of 1778 that the administration woke 
1. NMM, P0R/G/1,1 Ap 1778. See It. Middleton, "The Administration 
of Newcastle and Pitt", p. 139. 
2. G, V, 349, Jan 1782, 
.. . -ý' 
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up to the fact that it had done little to encourage the entry of 
servants. In reply to an Admiralty request for information the 
Navy Board stated that an increase in servants was the "most 
probable means of supplying the yards with able and steady work- 
men"; it claimed that it had increased numbers, but it was clear 
that it had only just done so, 
I 
and that the old-established 
proportion of one apprentice to every six shipwrights, and one to 
every five caulkers, had not been exceeded for long. 
2 Few 
apprentices had been added in the first years of the war; in 
17769 for instance, there were four less than there had been the 
previous year. 
3 When the First Lord claimed in 1782 that there 
were 324 additional apprentices, he stated the truth, but he 
concealed the fact that most of these apprentices had only just 
been taken on. 
4 
The provision of apprentices was more important than 
merely adding to the workforce. Certainly, the only way to become 
a shipwright was by serving an apprenticeship of seven years; any- 
one who tried to work in the yards without proper indentures was 
1. NTIM, ADM B/197,30 Oct 1779; also A/2732,21 Oct 1778; A/2736, 
11 Feb 1779; B/198,24 Feb 1779- 
2. See PRO, IND 9315,13 Jul 1711,21 Jun 1732. 
3. The number of entries were as follows; 1775,44: 1776,70; 
1777,66: 1778,69: 1779,111: 1780,172: 1781,221; 'Mar 
1782,385 (NNM, ADM BP/39 4 Mar 1782). At Portsmouth none were 
added between 1775 and 1777 and in 1781 (POR/D/23,17 Feb 1782). 
4. G, V, 349, Jan 1782; the figure differs slightly in SaP, IV9 
289,31 Dec 1781. 
- -, d 
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soon ejected by the worlmen. However, apart from providing the 
yards with trained men, apprentices were looked upon as far more 
use in supplementing the income of their masters. Unfortunately, 
and for this reason, the officers held the indentures, and there- 
fore the wages, of most of them, and consequently the chance of a 
worlcnan obtaining an apprentice was far too slim to act as a factor 
in encouraging craftsmen to join or stay in the yards as it had 
done in previous years. In early 1779 the Navy Board reported 
that out of the 703 apprentices of all trades in the yards, 121 
belonged to officers, 282 to petty officers and quarterznen, 165 to 
carpenters of ships and that only 135 out of several thousand 
ordinary artificers had the benefit of a servant. 
l "Had 
apprentices been given to the most deserving shipwrights", remaxked 
Thomas Fitzherbert in the Commons, "... it would not only have re- 
warded the old, but encouraged the young; and we might have then 
had double the number of shipwrights we had at this time". 
2 
The Commission on Fees reserved its most harsh criticism 
for the method of training apprentices. It recommended that no 
officer with a salary should have a servant, and that the system 
was expensive9 "discouraging to able and deserving artificers, 
1o ]NM, ADM B/198,5 Jan 1779; See Baugh, p. 323. In Jan 1782 
the Navy Board estimated that the number of apprentices be- 
longing to officers came to between 600 and 700 (NNM, BP/3, 
4 Mar 1782)o 
2. Parliamentary Register, V, 255,23 Jan 1782. 
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detrimental to the public service, and subject to many incon- 
veniences". 
1 The Master Shipwright was allowed five apprentices, 
and his Assistants three; junior or petty officers were allowed 
at least one. 
2 In 1780 sixty per cent of the apprentices at 
Deptford belonged to officers, and this figure underestimated the 
extent of the problem, because Sandwich had personally awarded 
nineteen apprentices to the ordinary shipwrights there as a 
reward for their loyal behaviour during the strike of 1775.3 
Over the years the proportion of officers' servants seems to have 
been increased. At Deptford in the 1740's there were only twenty- 
one apprentices belonging to officers, and 115 belonged to "deserving 
artificers". 
4 It is difficult to account for this change. The 
growth in the number of petty officers, and the number of over- 
seers to merchant yards (drawn from the ranks of the quartermen) 
which had increased during the war, would have contributed to the 
increase; but'the main reason would seem to have been that successive 
administrations failed to keep the number of apprentices up to a 
realistic proportion. There is no doubt that this was overlooked 
during the first years of Sandwich's period of office. 
1. PP-CF, p. 307. 
2. These had been allowed for a long time; see Ehrman, p. 97; 
PRO. IM 9315,16 Sep 1675,24 Jan, 9 Dec 1700,13 May 1718. 
3. PRO, Aim 106/3319,18 Jan 1780; there was a total of 154 
apprentices in the yard. The shipwright gangs drew lots for 
the extra apprentices (PRO, 106/3385,1 Aug 1775). See also 
PRO, ADM 49/36,30 Jul 1787, List of Sheerness officers and 
servants. 
4" Quoted in Bau. ghp p. 320. 
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However, there was one abuse which the Navy Board was 
able to correct. Those apprentices entered to the carpenters of 
ships had "long been considered and complained of as an evil". 
Since the previous century these carpenters had been allowed to 
bear one of their two servants on the "Extra" Estimate while ships 
were building, repairing or laid up in ordinary. Thus the Navy 
Board reported that the servants, "have seldom opportunity of 
working at their trade above half the time of their apprenticeship, 
and serve the remainder either in Ordinary or at sea". 
l At the 
same time they were taking up valuable places in the number of 
servants that were allowed in the yard. In 1779 the Admiralty 
agreed to the Navy Board's suggestion to commute the carpenter', 
privilege for a pound a month. 
2 
Almost as great a weakness was the way in which the 
principle of instruction by the master of the servant had become 
secondary to the fact that the indenture had become a piece of 
property to be exploited. 
3 The relationship had originally been 
designed to be personal. Master and servant were placed next to 
each other on the muster rolls, and the master was accountable for 
1. MZTj AM 3/198,5 Jan 1779. 
2. ibid; SO(a), 811,15 Feb 1779; PRO, ADM 174/17,24 Feb 1779; 
So b, 242,9 Deo 1783. 
3. See Baugh, P. 318" 
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the servant's actions. 
1 If an apprentice was discharged for a 
misdemeanour, then it was held to be the master's fault; only a 
petition to the Navy Board, with the yard officers' blessing, 
would enable him to be awarded another servant as a replacement. 
2 
If, on the other hand, a master was discharged, then his 
apprentice was discharged with him. In 1777 Gambier discharged 
a caulker on suspicion of theft, and he wrote to the Navy Board, 
"I could wish that (the servant would'serve out the remainder of 
his time to some other caulker, provided the master will give up 
the indentures, that a good young man might not be lost to the 
service". 3 
The most obvious way in which instruction was impaired 
by the overriding idea of the indenture as a piece of property was 
the number of apprentices in the yards without a master at all, 
The first reason for this was the frequent transfer of senior 
shipwright officers from yard to yard. Often they would take 
their apprentices with them, but it was not always possible. 
John Jenner, Master Shipwright's Assistant at Plymouth, was appointed 
as full Master Shipwright at Sheerness in 1778. He wrote to the 
1. PRO, IND 9315,22 Mar 1669,21 Ap 1664- 
2. e. g. ME, POR/D/23,1 Ap 1782; PRO, ADM 174/18,14 Aug 1780- 
3. MM, POR/F/16,18 Jun 1777; also PRO, ADM 174/116,26 Feb 
1779; 174/19,30 Aug 1782; NIIM, OHA/E/32,9 Jan 1776. 
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Navy Board to ask if, in order to complete his allotment of five 
apprentices, two could be entered at Plymouth, as it was difficult 
to get servants at Sheerness. He did at least add that he had a 
brother who was a quarterman, and that he, and the Foreman to the 
shipwrights, would instruct his new apprentices. The Navy Board 
granted this request, as it did to many others. 
' 
Again, this 
situation received sharp criticism from the Commission on Fees: 
"Upon no account should an apprentice be in a different yard from 
his master". 
2 Of the seventeen shipwright apprentices without 
masters at Deptford in 1778, three belonged to officers who had 
gone to the Navy Office, seven were indentured to the widows of 
shipwrights, and four to those who had been superannuated, Two 
were bound to carpenters of ships, and one to a shipwright who had 
gone to serve at Halifax. 
3 Just over a year later, the position 
had changed slightly. Of a total of twenty-three servants, none 
were apprenticed to shipwrights who had died, but the number bound 
to carpenters of ships had risen to nine, and there were six who 
had masters who had gone from the yard as overseers to merchant 
yaxds. 
4 The Commission on Fees recommended that, "the indentures 
of all apprentices run so as that they may not become the property 
1. PRO, ADM 174/17,11 Nay 1778; also 174/116,15 Nov 1777; 174/18,31 May 1779,9 Mar 1780. Two were also entered at 
Plymouth for the newly-created Master Shipwright at Harwich 
(174/117,11 Feb 1781). 
2. PP-CF, p. 308. 
3. PRO, . mot 106/3385,30 Nov 1778. 
4. PRO, Aw 106/3319,18 Jan 1780. However, these figures represent 
a considerable decline of those who were masterless in the 1740's (see Baugh, P. 320). 
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of the person to whom they are indented or their heirs, but to be 
turned over to their successor in the yard". 
l 
Over this chaotic system the Navy Board struggled to 
gain a hold. As it authorised the increase of apprentices, as 
the war continued it was able to tighten the procedure for re- 
commendations for the awarding of servants. It first instituted 
a rule that apprentices should have a six week`, trial before they 
signed indentures. 
2 In early 1780 detailed instructions were 
issued ordering regular accounts of those recommended for servants 
to be sent in; they should possess, "sobriety, honesty, diligence 
and good abilities, good morals, of quiet deportment and not likely 
to join in disturbances in the yard". 
3 Immediately after the ware 
the Board announced that servants were to be awarded, strictly on 
merit; applications from artificers who, up to this point, would 
automatically expect a replacement for a servant whose servitude 
had expired would not be granted, unless the shipwright was on 
the list of "good men". This list was to be the responsibility 
4 
of the officers, and the Navy Board had told them that, "we shall 
look upon you as answerable for the behaviour of those you report 
deserving". 5 This scheme, however, was subject to the same 
1. PP-CF, p. 308. 
2. SO(a), 836,26 Ap 1779- 
3. SO(a), 1056,27 Jan 1780; 
19 Jan 1782. 
4. CAA/E/34,24 Feb 1783. 
also 80(a), 933,8 Dec 1779; 1231, 
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5. CHA/E/33,17 Mar 1779. 
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weakness as Middleton's attempt to regulate promotions; it was 
too much to expect the officers to recommend men fairly and by 
merit. The Deptford officers rationalised their view by the 
assertion that, "we cannot be answerable for any person for so 
great a trust, but those brought up under our tuition". 
1 
The result of taking on so many apprentices at the end 
of the war was that skilled labour was more plentiful during the 
next decade. The period after the American war was remarkable 
for the fact that there was no reduction of the workforce: "all 
the artificers were retained... instead of great numbers being dis- 
charged... as had been the case after former wars". 
2 In spite of 
Howe's efforts at economy, Middleton managed to resist any re- 
duction. In a long letter to the Admiralty in December 1783 the 
Comptroller put forward his case; trade by trade, he justified 
their being kept up to the wartime level, c,. -. The numbers in the 
yards gradually dropped away by natural wastage. In December 1783 
he reckoned that, 
On the whole every officer and every 
workman except those in the Ropeyards, 
who decrease daily, are kept fully 
employed; and it is our wish... to 
employ the present means to bring 
forward every part of the service in 
such a manner as may prevent that 
exorbitant imposition on the public. 3 
I. 106/3319,20 Ap 1779; see Knight, pp. 191-192. 
2. Derrick, p. 181, 
3. fit, A"2 BP/4,8 Dec 1783. 
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With considerable skill, Middleton avoided committing himself to 
a specific number of men needed in the yards. 
I For every other 
aspect of the administration during this period a highly-organised 
establishment was laid down; but since the Comptroller wanted to 
keep as many men as possible in the yards, it seemed easier, in 
view of the hostility of Howe, to neglect to state how many would 
be ideal. 
In spite of its considerable difficulties, the civil 
administration can be taken to task for its lack of success in 
providing an adequate amount of labour for the yards. Sandwich's 
excuse may have been correct in broad terms; there may not have 
been enough shipwrights in the country for all the work which the 
yards could have provided, but intelligent anticipation could have 
improved the situation. The Navy Board failed to break the 
eighteenth-century mould in its regard for economy; yet in its 
regard for precedent it did not take the labour shortages of 
previous wars into account. Nevertheless, it was difficult to 
force anything on the unwieldy and wayward organisation of the yards. 
The apprentice system was typical; as a means of providing a supply 
of trained men it was hopelessly outmoded for an organisation of the 
size and importance of the yards. However, the greatest hindrance 
1. The caulkers were eventually put upon a much increased 
establishment late in 1784 (SO(b), 343-59 28 Oct 1784). 
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to improvement was the independence of the yard officers, whose 
interests were threatened by any one of the recommendations of 
the Commission on Fees. Of all aspects of administration at 
this time, the management of personnel produced the most dis- 
trust between the Navy Board and the officers; but it was the 
system rather than the individuals in it which was at fault. 
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Chapter Three. Pay and Working Conditions. 
i) Pay and Allowances: Officers and Clerks. 
Salaries and wages fully reflected the state of 
stagnation of the dockyard organisation, for they had remained 
unchanged since the previous century. The result, of this 
failure to keep up with the slow inflation of the eighteenth 
century meant that officers, clerks and men received inadequate 
basic pay. This in turn was responsible for the growth of an 
intricate system of official allowances, while at the same time 
unofficial fees and gratuities had developed (as in other govern- 
ment departments) to the point where public disquiet finally 
demanded a ]parliamentary investigation. The Commission of 
1786-8, "appointed to enquire into the Fees, Gratuities.. e 
received into the several Public Offices", uncovered a situation 
of extreme complexity in the dockyards; its major finding was 
that almost exactly a third of the income of the officers and 
clerks came from contractors and not from the government. This 
figure was taken from the accounts of 1784 -a year of "profound 
peace" - which had the effect of underestimating these incomes 
from private sources by an indeterminate but very large amount. 
I 
1. The salaries and income from all sources during 1784 
of the 3 Resident Commissioners, 33 principal officers, 
66 'inferior" officers and 131 clerks can be found in 
the appendices of the Sixth Report of the Commission. 
k 
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Inadequate and badly-administered pay played a large part in 
creating a lack of responsibility, inefficiency and downright 
dishonesty from the principal officers to the humblest workman. 
The Resident Commissioners received five hundred pounds 
a year, with a coal and sta, tione. ry allowance of twelve pounds a 
year. An unfurnished house was provided, for which only the 
Chatham Commissioner was provided with coal and candies. 
' Two 
pounds a day was allowed for comptroliing the pay of the fleet. 
In addition the Commissioner at Chatham received extra money for 
the supervision of the Chatham Chest, 
2 
and his counterpart at 
Portsmouth received a hundred pounds a year as Governor of the 
Naval Academy. All were allowed their half-pay as captains, 
thus bringing their incomes up to a comfortable level. 
3 In 
1764 Proby earned ¬623.1.0., the highest figure of the three 
commissioners; his basio pay of five hundred pounds was subject 
to a duty of ¬37.10.0. on the civil list, but this salary was 
1. The Navy Board frustrated an attempt by Gambier to extend 
this privilege to Portsmouth (NM9 ADM B/189,20 Mar 1775). 
This basic remuneration had not changed since 1684; see 
Enrman, p. 104. 
2. The Chatham Cheat was a fund founded in the sixteenth 
century, financed by prize money and by seamen's con- 
tributions, for the provision of yearly pensions for 
wounded or disabled seamen. For greater detail, see 
man, pp. 130 - 1. 
3. The only Resident Commissioner to complain of financial 
hardship was Laforey at the time of his enforced hospitality 
to Prince William (BL, I2,135,17 Feb 1786, Laforey to 
Middleton). 
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supplemented by ¬149.9.0, for comptrolling the pay of ships 
and by his half-pay of £178. In that year he received no money 
from the Chatham Chest. 1 
The salaries of the principal officers had undergone 
a few minor changes since the previous century, but the basic 
pay of two hundred pounds had remained the same since 1696.2 
At Sheerness and Woolwich the salary of the officers was £150, 
but in 1781 the Admiralty complied with a request from the 
Woolwich officers to bring their salaries to the level of the 
larger yards. 
3 Acceptance of liquor from contractors was the 
general rule; the only gratuity admitted to the Commission on 
Fees was the five guineas accepted by the Master Attendant at 
Plymouth. The officers' income, therefore, was supplemented by 
official rather than unofficial allowances. The shipwright 
officers received the earnings of their apprentices, 
4 
while the 
senior clerical officers had accumulated a number of tasks 
through the oentury which were separately remunerated. The Clerks 
1. PP-CFA pp. 362-4, 
2. See Eh=an, P-599- 
3. N11M, ADM A/2768j 26 Oct; A/2769,20 Nov; A/2770,21 Dec 
1781; 80(a), 1128,4 Jan 1782. 
4. At the launching of a ship the Master Shipwright was 
presented by the navy with a piece of plate. This was 
sometimes commuted for money (e. g. PRO, 106/2592,3 Mar 
1775). The dhipwright officer at Chatham had received 
¬100 from this source in seven years, at a set rate of 
¬30 for a first rate to ¬10 for a fifth rate and below 
(PP-CF, p. 370). 
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of the Cheque received twopence in the pound for administering 
bounty and conduct money and the sale of old stores, and those 
officers at the larger yards received more money for mustering 
the marines. Sixteen pence in the pound was allowed to the 
Storekeepers for distributing money to the poor who picked oakum, 
fourpence for every thousand yards of canvas measured, and sub- 
stantial amounts were received for issuing marine clothing and 
slops. 
1 
The salaries of the officers were affected by minor 
duties and taxes. The land tax assessed on the Resident 
Commissioners and the yard officers was paid by the navy, 
2 
while 
the Commissioner at Portsmouth had his parish rates defrayed by 
the yard contingency account. 
3 However, these advantages were 
offset by the five pounds which had to be paid to the Sixpenny 
Civil List, and the ten pounds to the Shilling Pension Duty, as 
was usual on civil salaries over a hundred pounds a year. The 
1. For income levels in 1784 see Appendix V; also PP-CF, pp. 
330-1,4279 463; S0(a) 829,27 Mar 1779" Before 1778 the 
Storekeepers had been allowed five shillings a bale, but 
this had been unsatisfaotory owing to cheating by the pursers. 
Yearly payments were substituted ranging from £100 at Ports- 
mouth to ¬40 at Woolwich (NM, ADM B/197,4 Aug 1778). 
Allowances of coal for officers were increased during the war 
(PRO, A] 106/2592,1,10,22 Mar 1775; SO(a), 1143,23 M=; 
1151,8 Ap 1782). 
2, e. g. NMM, ADM A/2702,11 A 1776; A/2705,18 May 17761 
A/2777,27 Jul 1782; S0(a , 789,6 Jan 1779. The Resident Commissioners' exemption from the Land Tax appears to date 
from 26 Ap 1720 (PRO, IND 10665 (36c) ). 
3. e. g. NNIlK, POR/C/22,31 Dec 1777" 
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anomolous position of the Resident Commissioners was reflected 
in their tax situation, for while they reoeived their half-pay 
as commissioned officers, they were still subject to these two 
duties, from which serving officers were normally exempt, 
1 
The officers were allowed various expenses. Each had a 
stationary allowance of between three and ten pounds and was 
provided with an unfurnished house. The principal officers 
were allowed ten shillings a day for travel, and lesser officers 
6/8d. 2 Although the surveying of transports sometimes took the 
3 
shipwright officers away from the yard, the Master Attendants 
were the most frequent claimants under this head. The most 
regular accounts submitted were for the officers at Sheerness and 
Chatham for navigating ships up and down the Medway, 
4 but the main 
reason for more lengthy periods of absence was for launching ships 
from merchant yards. There were other claims. For instance, 
William Nicholson of Portsmouth presented a yearly account for 
1. See Binney, pp. 73-4. The Commissioners were allowed their 
half-pay by "the usual oath being dispensed with by virtue of 
His Majesty's Sign Manual" (PP-CF, p. 364). 
2. e. g. 11'1M, POR/F/16,31 Max 1778. Purveyors were away for 
particularly long periods surveying timber (e. g. 1I1M, POR/D/21, 
29 Dec 1778; PRO, Art 174/117,15 Sept 1780). 
3. e. g. RMM, POR/D/23,25 Nov, 20 Deo 1782; PRO, ADM 114/18, 
13 Jul 1779. 
4. This allowance was submitted to the Board which then had to have 
banfirth'ätiori from the yard (e. g. PRO, ADM 106/2592) 10 Jan, 
28 Mar 1775). 
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1 
checking the position of buoys at ten shillings each, 
1 
and was 
careful to claim his ten shillings to which he was entitled for 
going to the rescue of a ship on a sandbank. 
2 However, in many 
cases travelling expenses (in the words of one officer) were 
"barely equal to the expense incurred"03 
The salaries of the ', inferior' officers formed only a 
small part of their total inoomes. The Assistants to the Master 
Shipwright were each provided with a house, with a salary of a 
hundred pounds a year, and they doubled this from the earnings of 
their apprentices. In the cases of the more junior officers, fees 
and gratuities realised an increasing proportion of their income. 
The Boatswain and the Porter of the yard were each provided with 
a house, and gained from minor payments in a number of ways. 
The Measurers to the Clerks of the Cheque and the Storekeeper, 
paid at the basic rate of 2/6d. per day, averaged about two-thirds 
of their total earnings from their apprentices and from the 
gratuities of the contractors whose goods they measured. The 
most junior officers, the quartermen, gained only from the 
ý,, rya rtA 
A'm- 
1. e. g. NPMi, POR/C/22,11 Jan 1777,31 Deo. 1778= POR/D/21, 
26 Sep 1778- 
2, NM, POR/C/22,29 Sep 1775. 
3. PP-CF, p"355. 
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possession of an apprentice. Although the sum realised would 
vary according to the amount of time served by the apprentice, 
it would usually average well over a third of. the quarterman&s 
total income. 1 
While the Commission on Fees found that the principal 
officers took little in the way of fees and gratuities, it 
criticised the_fact. that they gained substantially, if irregularly, 
from selling the positions of their clerkships. The method of 
entry for the clerks was by a personal recommendation from the 
officer to the Clerk of the Cheque; the applicant would then be 
examined for suitability by the commissioner of the yard. 
2 
After the discovery of embezzlement in the Storekeeper's office 
at Portsmouth in 1773, the Storekeepers of each yard had to 
obtain Navy Board approval for their applicants. 
3 In this 
attempt to bring the entry of olerks under control, the Navy 
Board was trying to break the long tradition of the master and 
servant relationship of officer to clerk. The abuse of 
entering young boys into the offices so that the officers could 
pocket the salary (apart from a subsistence payment) had largely 
1. e. g. In 1781 and 1782 the apprentices to the Sheerness 
quartermen earned an average of ¬46 out of the quartermenV 
average income of £116. See PRROt Atzt 49/36,30 Jul 1787. 
2. e. g. NMM, POI/F/16,24 Mar 1778: PRO, ABM 174/117,15 Oct 
1780,3 Mar 1789. 
3" SO(a), 633,8 May 1773" in this order Sandwich took the 
unusual step of nominating a clerk to this office, and the 
clerks in the Storekeeper's office at every yard ware-re- 
quired to pay on entry a bond of five times their salary. 
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died out, 
1 but the idea of the clerk as an indentured servant 
still survived in the fora of a large payment on entry to the 
officer known as a "premium". The Navy Board tried to prevent 
these payments in 1773, but a reissue of the order ten years 
later and the evidence given to the Commission on Fees, demon- 
strated that the custom remained unbroken. 
2 
The yard officers produced an elaborate justification 
of the taking of premiums. The "ancient custom" of taking on 
apprentices, apart from iimplying"a benefit3 was, according to 
Peter Butt, the Clerk of the Survey at Deptford, the only way in 
which an officer could be personally answerable for his clerks. 
Referring to the 1662 Instructions, which expressly forbade 
the Storekeeper to trust his business to a deputy, he continued: 
We presume these deputies or servantshmean no 
other than the clerks, whom to bring up regularly 
in office, they formerly took as servants by in- 
denturet and board-ithem, for which"jis usual in 
cases of taking servants by indenture they had a 
stipulated allowance from their friends, but from 
some family inconveniences that mode was changed 
for a consideration in money and the salary was 
paid to the individual. 4 
1. See Baugh, p. 300. John Greenway, the Storekeeper at Ports- 
mouth, stated in 1773 that the last two clerks he had entered 
had been 18 and 23 years old, and that there had been an order 
of 1766 fixing the minimum age at 15. The youngest taken 
during the period appears to have been 16 (N1M, POR/F/15,9 AP 
1773; POR/D/21,30 Nov 1778). 
2. S0(a), 633,8 May 1773; so(b), 2,7 Jan 1783; The Commission 
on Fees recommended that premiums should be "totally abolished" (PP-CF, p"305)" 
3. N M# POR/F/15,9 Ap 1773- 
4- PRO, ADM 106/3402,12 Ap 1773" 
141 
Further, the premium was a reward to the officer to train his 
clerks carefully; it prevented "improper solicitations", and 
the money could be considered as a security for good behaviour. 
Most important, it made, 'the"officers easy and happy,,. by having 
such persons about them as they can confide in; without which 
it will be impossible for them to maintain any kind of authority 
over their clerks". 
' 
The evidence given to the Commission on Fees showed 
that only Greenway, in whose office the embezzlement of 1773 
had been discovered, had given up the taking of premiums. 
2 Lip 
service had been paid to the orders elsewhere; the Storekeeper 
at Woolwich stated that, "although no premium is now bargained 
for... he has received the usual compliment of two hundred 
guineas from their friends, 
3 The amount of the payment, 
according to the Clerk of the Survey at Portsmouth, varied 
according to circumstances, although two hundred to two hundred 
and fifty guineas was average for the period. 
4 Immediate 
relatives, of course, paid nothing. 
5 The determining factor 
1. ibid. 
2. PP-CF, p. 427. Pownoll at Plymouth had had no opportunity to 
receive a premium, although he claimed that he would have 
conformed to the order (PP-CF, pa. 463)- 
3* PP-CF p. 352; also p. 399. 
4. e. g. PP-CF, p. 434" 
5. e. g. PP-CF9 PP-352v 382. 
would be how much the clerk could amass from the office, but 
this could not be foreseen, since the income of the clerks 
depended almost entirely on the fees which could be gained, 
rather than the established salary. This sum was dependent 
in turn on the amount of business in the yard, which was 
further affected by the advent of a war. 
An equally important factor would be the retirement 
prospects of the clerks already in the office, for this would 
affect the rise of a junior clerk until he reached the more 
lucrative positions. This difficulty could lead to additional 
expense, for occasionally the reluctance of senior clerks to 
apply for superannuation could be overcome by a consideration 
from those clerks who were to gain from their retirement. A 
further determinant of the amount of a premium was the likelihood 
of those clerks taken on as "extra" (or "unestablished") during 
a war being discharged, unless some means could be found to put 
them on the establishment. In these cases the family of the 
clerk would cover the risk by agreeing to pay the premium by 
instalments, or a relatively small premium would be paid on the 
understanding that it would not be recoverable if the clerk was 
discharged. l 
1. e. g. PP-CP, PP- 336,384-5. It was undoubtedly a risk; 
one clerk was discharged in 1785 by which time the salary 
and emoluments he had received were less than the premium 
which he had paid to his officer (PP-CF, p. 417). 
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Once the premium had been paid, and the clerk put on 
the establishment, he could regard himself as being relatively 
secure, for the premium came to be regarded as payment for the 
position, which was then considered as the clerk's own property. 
1 
Only those taken on as "unestablished" clerks could be discharged. 
A clerk at Woolwich told the Commission on Fees that because he 
was taken on as an extra clerk in 1762, he "was liable to be 
discharged... if the principal (officer) had quitted the office 
prior to the expiration of three years after this examinant was 
appointed". 
2 In general, the premium secured the right to. rise 
through the office, and no further payment was needed, but there 
were exceptions. When a vacancy arose in 1779 for the first 
clerkship to Commissioner Curry at Plymouth, the second clerk 
expected automatic promotion, but Curry claimed that he had been 
offered £800 for the post, and demanded £500 from the second 
clerk for the promotion; "upon intercession", however, the 
Commissioner was induced to accept £350.3 A change of office 
could also involve complicated payments; although there was no 
conception of seniority among the offices, the amount of fees 
taken varied, and this sometimes acted as an inducement to the 
1. There seems to be no evidence to support Baugh's contention 
that the position of the dockyard clerks was not secure 
(Baugh, p. 299). For a comparison see R. R. Nelson, The Home 
Office, 1782-1801, (Duke University Press, 1969), p. 48" 
2. PP-CF, p. 348; also pp. 335,355- 
3* PP-CF, p. 447. The Navy Board attempted further control in 
1783 after the discovery of major negligence at Plymouth; it 
was to be informed of those clerks deserving promotion, and 
that they were not to ýýrise in rotation" without the Board's 
permission (PRO, AIM 174 19,28 Jun 1783). 
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clerks to sell one office and buy another, although there was 
little movement between the offices and none at all between the 
yards, 
I 
The amounts paid as premiums rose steadily during the 
second half of the century. One of the most frequently used 
formulas for arriving at a figure was to multiply the initial 
yearly salary of thirty pounds by seven, which was the 
traditional number of years of an apprenticeship, but from the 
1760's the premiums became increasingly negotiable. 
2 The 
average sum of all the premiums paid by the clerks who gave 
evidence to the Commission on Fees was £230, but the incidence 
of inflated amounts increased in the 1770's and 1780's. 
The Commission on Fees investigated the system of 
payment in great detail, but only for the year 1784; consequently 
the incomes of the clerks during wartime remain doubtful. How 
different these incomes were between war and peace is indicated 
by the amounts paid for the premiums. 
3 Peace affected some 
1. e. g. PP-CFA p. 324. 
2. The high figure mentioned in the case of Commissioner Curry's 
clerk was probably due to the fact that a house went with the 
position. This was exceptional. 
3. There was talk of a fivefold increase in fees received by 
Navy Board clerks in wartime. See John Norris, Shelburne 
and Reform, (London, 1963), p. 209. 
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clerks more than others; those who received stores from the 
contractors suffered the most. In 1784 the second clerk to the 
Clerk of the Cheque at Deptford, who presided at the reception of 
stores from contractors, earned only £180.0. Od., while the 
clerk under him, who was engaged in mustering the men, had an 
income of ¬256,2. Od. 
l Mustering was the steadier source of 
income, but the earnings of the more senior clerk would have 
risen very sharply indeed when the stores needed for war were 
delivered. 2 The falseness of the picture given by the peace- 
time figures of 1784 is demonstrated by the premiums paid by the 
Plymouth clerks. These averaged £268, the highest of the six 
yards, yet in 1784 the earnings of the clerks at Plymouth were 
the lowest of all. At Deptford the average was £2390 at 
Chatham ¬236, at Portsmouth £232; Sheerness and Woolwich re- 
presented the lowest totals, at £211 and £207 respectively. 
These figures indicate a truer relation with wartime incomes. 
A truer impression of the connection between the premium and 
total income is given by the premiums charged by the different 
officers. The Clerks of the Cheque at all the yards charged 
the greatest sums for their premiums, and the Clerks of the 
1. PP-OF, PP. 327,328. See Appendix V for a sample of the 
salaries and total incomes of dockyard clerks for 1784. 
2. Greater detail of the methods by which the clerks gained 
their fees and gratuities will be found in the appropriate 
chapters; i. e. for mustering, Chapter Two, and for the 
reception of stores, Chapter Four. 
_..... w ý, _. _.. __.. _.. ___. .. ._-.. 
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1 
Survey the least; and the incomes of their respective clerks 
were in the same relation to these amounts. 
The clerk's family paid the premium.: as an investment 
for life, for the rewards did not come for a considerable time. 
The salaries paid to the junior clerks were hardly enough for 
subsistence; the fees to be gained with seniority were the only 
i inducement to enter and stay in the service. In 1779 one 
officer commented that the salary of the junior clerks was, 
"only a pittance which they must at least pay with present ad- 
vanced price of every necessary of life, even to board with a 
reputable quarterman's family". 
2 The Navy Board recognised 
that the salaries were low, and used this as an argument against 
premiums; a junior clerk could be very tempted to make up the 
money and to "betray the trust and confidence reposed in him". 
The reaction of Sandwich to the embezzlement at Portsmouth was 
to raise the salaries of all the olerks in the Storekeepers' 
offices. by ten pounds a year. 
3 
I* The Plymouth Commissioner's junior clerk nlio- , notod 
that 
he was "obliged to employ an agent in town for receiving 
his own salary tot whom he pays thereout-3d. in the pound, 
the Commissioner being considered one of the Navy Board, 
and his olerk'b'salaries enheequently paid in London" (PP-CF, 
p"449)" 
2. NNM, POR/D/21, I Mar -1779. An enquiry 
by the Navy Board in 
1778 found that clerks were not paid for extra hours worked, 
but the Board was as reluctant to allow this as it was to 
allow more clerks to be taken on (e. g. NNM, CHA/M/3,21 Nov 
1770; CHA/E/33,5 Mar 1778; PRA, ADM 174/116,8 Mar 1778). 
3. SO(a), 633,8 Nay 1773. 
14.71 
The initial salary of thirty pounds a year was not 
generally improved upon until a clerk reached second or third 
positions in the office; but once there, they gained well over 
two-thirds of their income from fees and gratuities, and had 
been doing so for most of the century, 
1 
although denials that 
the clerks had established fees were technically correct. In 
1773 Butt found that, although the clerks had never demanded 
fees, "sometimes they inform us the merchants,, for dispatch and 
extra attendance, make them a compliment; which annually may 
amounibdto ¬40-¬50 for the first clerk, ¬30-¬40 for the second 
fw., h 
2 
and ¬]. 5-20 for the third; the third to the seventh haAa no hii9? 
In January 1783 Shelburne proposed to double the clerk". 
salaries and abolish fees in the Navy Office, and it is here that 
first reaction can be found and resistance measured. Curiously, 
Middletonts first reaction was to say that abolition of the fee 
system was impossible, in spite of his known views on the subject, 
and he outlined the practical administrative objections. Apart 
from the fact that it would be unfair on the clerks at the Navy 
1. PRO, IND 9315,7 Nov 1739,16 Sep 1730,12 Sep 1731,14 Mar 
1760. The most highly-paid clerk was the first clerk to 
the Clerk of the Cheque at Portsmouth. His salary was ¬45; 
in 1784 he received ¬360. In five cases clerks earned more 
than their officers (see Appendix V). The average proportion 
of salary to total income of the three senior clerks in the 
Clerk of the Cheque offices of all the yards was approximately 
a fifth, of the Storekeepers' (with the higher salary of ¬55) 
well under half, and of the Clerk of the Surveys' offices 
well under a third. 
2. PRO, ADM 106/3402,12 Ap 1773; also 1M, POR/F/15,9 Ap 1773. 
i 
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Office to be singled out as a "mark of reform", it was also 
unjustified because even junior clerks who, as yet, received no 
fees, had worked on a low salary in expectation of eventually 
receiving them. He also argued that raising salaries would 
start a round of increases in government offices which could 
not be afforded. 
1 However, he proposed a "fee fund" for the 
office, but this scheme was taken up by neither Shelburne nor 
the Commission on Fees. 
2 Middleton's volte-face demonstrated 
that he was not prepared to face the practical consequences of 
criticisms which he had been making for years. 
3 The same 
could be said for Gregson, who had pointed out to Shelburne in 
1777 that contractors added five per cent to tenders which they 
submitted to the Navy Board to allow for fees. Yet when 
Shelburne's proposals became generally known, he scribbled off 
a series of letters to his patron saying that the whole system 
of fees had been "magnified and misrepresented", and he outlined 
at length the difficulties of change. His mast interesting 
criticism was that, since the Navy Board commissioners had the 
right of "selling the desks at the Navy Office", they ought not 
4 
to know how much the clerks received. 
1" See Norris, pp. 208-10. 
2. ShP, 151, no. 40,9 Sep 1782, Middleton to Shelburne; BL, II, 
153,18 July 1783, Middleton to Keppel. 
3. Middleton's change of view may have stemmed from the fact that 
he "had nearly lost his head clerks Mr. Davies.. in consequence 
of demanding an account of his fees" (Add, MSS 24135,26 Sep 
1782, to Shelburne). 
4. ShP, 146, no. 105,30 AP 1777; Add MSS 241359 foe. 64-66, 
13,22,27 Sept 3 Oct 1762. 
-. x. ý -- -- --- 
The Commission on Fees found the system inefficient 
and confusing, yet its criticism was moderate. Its re- 
commendation that fees be abolished was accompanied by proposals 
for a radical revision of the olerkb'_ salaries; in other words, 
the Commissioners accepted that fee-taking was inevitable unless 
there was a substantial increase in salaries. Middleton had 
pointed out to Shelburne in 1782 that the smallness of the 
salaries, "greatly exposed the clerks to bribery"; and Pitt's 
failure to implement the findings of the Commission exaoerbated. 
the situations 
Certain ... it is that the clerks and dockyard 
instruments knowing or supposing their fees 
to be authorised by the Commissioner: en- 
quiry, have become more exorbitant than ever 
in their demands, their attendance has become 
loose and uncertain and the discipline totally 
relaxed. 2 
By the premium the clerk had bought the office, and by 
the office he had not only to recoup the initial outlay and 
compensate for early years of poverty, but he had also a right 
to exploit that office. This was, perhaps, the only compensation, 
for the life of the clerks in the yard offices was hardly very 
interesting. Little in the way of qualifications was needed, 
for they were engaged in nothing more than copying accounts and 
1. snr, 151, no. 40,9 Sep 1782. 
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2. NMM, }SS 66/086, Observations on the Estimates of 21 Mar 
1786. This memorandum by Middleton was probably written in the early 1790's. 
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letters; recommendations of "an expeditious hand" or good 
!I character and morals" were considered adequate. 
l Although 
there is evidence of peacetime slackness 
2, the hours of attendance 
during the war were long, especially in the western yards. One 
junior clerk at Portsmouthq noted that his attendance was, "from 
about size or sometimes not before eight in the morning, till six 
o'clock or later in the evening, two or three hours for meals 
excepted; but in wartime his attendance was much earlier and 
till a later hour at night". Another stated that he worked 
I 
"until late at night", and another, that dinners often had to be 
missed. As early in the war as 17.78, the Portsmouth Storekeeper 
3 
reported that his olerks had worked on Sundays for the previous 
two years. 
4 
Peter Butt argued that the double burden of a sub- 
stantial premium and years of a low salary ensured that the clerks 
were, 
sons or relations of people in its neighbourhood 
who have acquired some fortune in trade or by 
family conneotions... without which in the junior 
clerkships from the small salary allowed by 
government it would be impossible to subsist, 
much more appear decent., 5 
1. NMM, POR/D/21,22,30 Nov 1778. 
2. e. g. Nr 1M, CEA/E/32,24 Jan 1776. 
3. PP-CP, PP- 423,448,429. 
4. NIIM, POR/D/21,26 Oct 1778,1 Max 1779. 
5. PRO, ADM 106/3402,12 AP 1773" 
i1 
John Greenway recommended, "the son. of a grocer, and a very 
reputable inhabitant of Portsmouth", and another was the son of 
a captain in the navy; a third was the son of a "very responsible 
farmer". 1 However, there was also a tendency in the offices of 
the Master Shipwrights to have ex-shipwrights as clerks, resulting 
from the fact that many were employed at one time or another as 
clerks to cope with extra work. 
2 
There was concern that the clerks were not of good 
enough quality. Middleton saw that lack of opportunity to rise 
beyond a clerkship as great a weakness as the paucity of the 
salary, 
3 
and the Commission on Fees recommended that those whaD 
were good enough should be given the opportunity to rise to the 
position of principal clerical officer. 'this, the Commissioners 
added, might "attract young men of good education into the service". 
4 
At this time, however, only three rose above the position of 
clerk. Digory Tonkin, the Commissioner's first clerk at Plymouth, 
was made Agent Victualler at that port. 
5 Antony Munton, a clerk 
in the Storekeeper's office at Portsmouth, was appointed Storekeeper 
1. NNM, POR/D/21,8 Mar, 22,30 Nov 1778. 
2. e. g. PP-CF9 pp. 324,345,349,416; see Baugh, p. 300, 
3. ShP, 151, no. 40,9 Sep 1782. 
4. PP-CF, P-308- 
5. PRO, ADM 174/116,8 Jun 1779. 
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at Jamaica, 
1 
while the well-connected Jacob Pownoll, who started 
as a clerk in the Storekeeper's office at Plymouth, returned as 
head of the same office some years later. 
2 
This last example was exceptional, for the life of a 
clerk had no incentive to efficiency or effort other than that 
of gaining as much money as he could from his position. His 
duties had developed in the usual piecemeal fashion of the 
yards, and were in need of reform. The complex system of 
payment involved timewasting, and presented an open door to 
dishonesty; secure in his position, the living standard of 
s 
? the clerk depended directly on the advent of war and the health 
of the clerks above him. It is hardly surprising that personal 
responsibility and urgency were not characteristics which were 
often found in the dockyard offices. 
ii) Pay and Allowances: Artificers and Labourers. 
As in the case of the officers, the pay of the workaaen 
had remained unchanged since the previous century; similarly, 
1. MMM, POR/D/21,8 Max 1778. 
2. See above Pe 79. 
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the basic wage was only part of a complex system of remuneration. 
Shipwrights received 2/id a day, and the other skilled trades 
slightly less. The semi-skilled - those without an apprentice- 
ship, such as riggers and sawyers - were paid 1/6d, while the 
value of unskilled labour was set at one or two pence over or 
under a shilling. 
1 This immutable wage rate had always been 
supplemented by privileges or allowances, the two most important 
of which were the right of "extra" (or overtime) and the custom 
of taking "chips" - those pieces of wood which fell from the axe 
or the adze - out of the yard. 
The double evil of chips has received a good deal of 
attention from historians. 
3 It was an extremely expensive 
method of supplementing the men's wages, for it was easy to out 
good timber into almost worthless chips, while at the same time 
the custom made it easy for the men to conceal embezzled goods 
as they left the yard, Attempts to control it to manageable 
1. See Appendix VI. For the entire period this never approached 
the level of wages in merchant yards; in 1770 the basic wage 
of a shipwright in these yards was put at 3/6d a day. See 
W. S. (William Shrubsole), A Plea ... in Favour of the Shii- 
wri tai (Rochester, 1770), p. 13" 
2. The other two allowances were the wages of apprentices (see 
Chapter Two) and Lodging Money, allowed at the rate of 2*d 
per week by an order of 5 Ap 1699 (PP-CE, p. 17). 
3. See Eh=an, pp, 92-3; Baugh, pp* 321-21 Albion, p. 87; 
Williams, pp. 395-396: D. Hannay, Shine and Men, (London, 
1910), p. 300. 
7 
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limits completely failed, 
land 
after the war, the Navy Board, 
not for the first time, suggested to the Admiralty that the 
custom be commuted for a money allowance. It reported that 
the men left off work half an hour early to cut up good timber, 
and that the bundles were often sold for a shilling, while 
costing the public twice that amount. The Board suggested 
that the allowance was worth fourpence a day for the shipwrights, 
and twopence to house carpenters and servants. The shipwrights 
themselves petitioned the Admiralty for this measure, but, as 
with most of the Navy Board recommendations to Howe at the 
Admiralty, the idea went the way of all previous attempts to 
curtail the custom, and nothing was done until 1801.2 
The money which the men made from chips is impossible 
to calculate, but of the other major allowance, "extra", there is 
ample evidence. The basic unit of overtime was a "tide" of one 
and a half hours, for which the men received just under a third 
of a day's pay. In particularly busy periods a "night" could be 
worked; this period of five hours earned a full day's pay. 
1. e. g. PRO, IND 9315, ij. ir. "Chips", 10 May, 28 Jun 1662, 
16 May 1667t 28 Oct 1669,31 Aug 1739,4 MAY 1753,9 Jan 
1759; SO(b1,172,4 Aug; 196,4 Sep ; 202,9 Sep 1783. 
2. NMM, ADM BP/49 1 Oct 1783 (e=losures of 25 oat, 4,14 Nov 
1783). In 1770 Shrubsole had stated that for 2/6d a day 
the men would "cheerfully give up their right to the chips" 
(see William Shrubsole, A Plea, pp. 22-3). In 1801 the 
shipwrights were allowed sixpence a day in lieu of the 
privilege, and lesser workmen between 4d and 3d (PP-CE, 
pp. 191,193)" 
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"atra" was administered with care by the Navy Board, although 
in emergencies it could be authorised by the Resident Commissioner; 
as the war developed, control by the Board lessened, for pressure 
of events forced it to issue a general order to the effect that 
all workmen were to work. as much as would be useful. 
1 In 
slacker periods, however, the officers had to apply to the Board 
for permission to work the men extra to complete a particular 
task which had fallen behind schedule, or, more often, it was 
awarded to one section of workers to keep pace with the ship- 
wrights. The exception to this central control was the general 
order in peacetime to give all the men permission to work one 
tide extra during the summer months to supplement the basic wage. 
The Commission of Naval Fhquiry commented that this was, "rather 
to add to their daily wages, than on any account of any extra 
exertion being required". 
2 
As a result there was considerable variation in the 
income of the men between peace and war, and summer and winter. 
An examination of the yard pay books for 1774 shows that the 
shipwrights were working a single tide extra for the two 
middle quarters of the year, but the necessity to employ the 
men for long hours in wartime dramatically increased their 
i. e. g. PRO, ADM 95/95,30 Cot 1776; so(a)p 1131,8 Feb 17821 
so(b), 79,14 Ap 1783. 
2, PP-CE, p. 17. Every year, usually in April, the Navy Board 
sought the Admiralty's permission for this general order. 
°ý 
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earnings. Shipwrights who earned about thirty-five pounds 
a year in 1774, were earning fifty-five pounds three or four 
years later, and in the western yards, where emergencies were 
frequent, many were earning considerably more. In general, 
the Commission of Naval Raquiry noted, the shipwrights were 
employed two tides and a night during the war. However, during 
1783 wages gradually dropped back to pre-war levels. 
1 
It was this costly and troublesome system that led 
Sandwich, in 1775, to introduce a payment system for the ship- 
wrights based on incentive. With Navy Board support, he went 
against traditional prejudice in the yards which looked upon 
"piece" or "task" work as productive of inferior workmanship, 
and he hoped to bring wages to a level with those of the merchant 
yards, which paid their workers by task. Some yard workers, such 
as sawyers, ropemakers and labourers had long been paid on a task 
rather than a day basis, and between 1772 and 1774 labourers, 
scavelmen, joiners, bricklayers and house carpenters were all 
1. See Appendix VII for examples of this seasonal variations; 
also B. MoL. Ranft, "Labour Relations in the Royal Dock- 
yards in 1739", Mariners Mirror, 47,1961, pp. 283-4. The 
drop in wages at the end of the Seven Years War is con- 
firmed by William Shrubsole, A Plea, p. 2, also PP-CE, P-17- 
A full analysis of the yard pay books, which are complete 
for the Extras Ordinary and Ropeyards for all years through- 
out this period (PROS ADM 42), was not possible. These 
figures are based on a representative sample of the time 
worked, In addition there was the lodging allowance for 
skilled men, which was dependent upon attendanceo This 
amounted to about 2/8d a quarter. ' Twopence a month was 
deducted for the surgeon's services, and in some yards 
the same amount was given to the chaplain. 
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put on comprehensive schemes of incentive payments' To the 
First Lord, the advantages of task work for the shipwrights were 
obvious. At a stroke, the men would be made more productive, 
the "general clamour" for the increase of wages would be stopped 
and corruption would be eliminated by the spreading of incentive 
to all classes of workmen. 
2 Unfortunatelytp the scheme, although 
bold and imaginative in conception, was implemented in a olumsy 
and overhasty fashion, and it resulted in widespread stoppages 
between May and August 1775.3 
The task work strike of 1775 has recently been chronicled 
and analysised, and it is therefore unnecessary to do more than 
outline the dispute. 
4 By June, ninety-five task gangs had 
I. PRO, IND 9315,3 AP 1758; So(a), 604,11 Jun; 619,23 Dec 
1772; 662,2 Jun; 668,31 Aug; 669,16 Sep 1774; 675, 
26 Ap 1775; 692,1 AP 1776; P110, ADM 106/3551,2 Sep 1772; 
PP-CE, pp. 447-451. Ships had been broken up by task since 
1749 (PRO, IND 9315,24 Aug, 13 Dec 1749; e. g. ADM 95/95, 
14 Jan 1774,1 Mar 1775)" 
2. There had been attempts to petition the throne for an in- 
crease in payc. i in 1765,1769 and 1772; an Order-in-Council 
was needed to alter the wages. See William Shrubsole, A Plea, 
p. 2; also his, Christian Memoirs with a life of the Author, 
(London, 1807,3rd ed. , xliii; J. M. Haas, "The Introduction 
of Task Work into the Royal Dockyards, 1775", Journal of 
British Studies, VIII, 2,1969, p. 60. 
3. Sandwich's claims for task work remained over-optimistic to 
the end. See SaP, IV, 288,31 Dec 1781; 310 (undated), 
Palliser's critique. 
4. See Haas, Task Work, pp. 44-68. Haas bases his account on 
Sandwich's notes of the Visitation of 1775 (PRO, ADM 7/662). 
For a detailed but less accurate account see Williams, pp. 392- 
417. See also the s ccinot account in the Commission of Ehgwiry, 
pp. 18-21; NMM, POR/F/15, and PRO, ADM 174/115, April-Aug 17'(5" 
been formed in the yards, representing 62% of the shipwrighta. 
1 
Sandwich was beginning to congratulate himself, when on his 
Visitation to Portsmouth on 14th June he was faced with an angry 
crowd of shipwrights. Dissatisfaction soon spread to the other 
yards. Only Deptford remained outside the dispute and"embraced 
the new way"; Sheerness continued working, but the shipwrights 
there remained "as ill-disposed as the rest". 
2 Although the 
Admiralty Board was firm with the strikers, it soon withdrew any 
compulsion to work in the new way. Nevertheless, the strike 
was not over until troops had been called in at Woolwich, and 
twelve men had been indicted for conspiracy at Maidstone Assizes; 
there was an intensity of feeling which prolonged the strike 
dangerously. 
The scheme failed because it was difficult to administer 
and because too many people felt their interests to be threatened. 
The theory was simple; each gang was to be paid a set amount for 
a particular task irrespective of the time taken to do it. In 
practice this was difficult to calculate; the Master Shipwrights 
all submitted widely varying estimates of what the men should be 
paid for a particular task. The plan devised by Sir John Williams 
1. Haas, Task Work, p. 51. 
2. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 63. Nearly half the shipwrights struck, 
but they represented the better half, for task gangs were 
ordered to be formed of only the strongest and best men. 
Only a few day gangs struck. 
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in March 1775 was twice completely revised within nearly a year, 
and there were frequent minor amendments. 
1 To combat skimping 
and bad workmanship a rigorous system of checks was introduced; 
this could be another source of trouble. 
2 The application of 
the system to repairs (called "job" work) threw the responsibility 
of assessment of the men's wages to the officers on the spot, and 
the men also feared favouritism in the alloting of particular 
gangs to easier tasks. 
3 There was a further difficulty of 
keeping those gangs still working "by the day" at the same pace 
as the taskworkers, and there was some doubt over how the men should 
be paid if they were taken off a task onto another in an emergency. 
4 
Finally, the quality of the material was uncertain and could in- 
terrupt the work; the first sign of trouble arose from a piece 
of timber which split at Chatham, and this remained a source of 
discontent. 5 
1. SO(a), 673,23 ; 674,11 Ap; 684,22 Aug 1775; 693, 3 May; 694,1 Ap 1776; PP-CE, p. 352 ff. 
2. e. g. 1MM, P0R/F/16,30 Apt 10,11 May 1776. 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/3319,26 Feb 1779; ABM 106/3472,29 Oct 
1782. The Commission of Enquiry found the men's earnings 
"very disproportionate", and that the prices fixed for 
large ships too high, and for small ships too low (PP-CE, 
p. 19). For the officers' difficulties in assessing job 
work see PP-CE, p"396" 
4. SO(a), 739,21. Mex 1778; also SO(a), 696,20 Jul; 697, 
22 Jul 1776; NNM, CHA/E/33,21 Mar 1778- 
5. PRO, ADM 7/662, fos. 13-15; art 106/2592,19 May 1775. 
The Master Shipwright at Deptford reported that the ship- 
wrights, did.: not risk using "straight pieces, as there is 
no allowance" if they broke. " (PRO, ADM 106/3319,7 Oct 1780). 
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The scheme quickly gathered formidable forces against 
it. Any eventual success depended upon overcoming the prejudices 
of the officers, who were against anything which would interrupt 
the smooth running of the yards and which would involve them in 
extra work. The clerks, too, were likely to oppose any scheme 
which would take away existing opportunities of exacting money' 
from the men. Sandwich feared the influence of the merchant 
builders, who, he claimed, were apprehensive that wages in the 
royal yards would eventually rival their own; the men who had 
been, "bred up in the merchant yards, are now under the influence 
of their former employers, and have thro' their insinuations been 
active in prejudicing the men against the plan". 
l Blame was also 
attached to the influence of American agents, but although they 
may have had some effect in prolonging the strike at Woolwich, 
there is no evidence that they intended to do anything more than 
to attract shipwrights to America. 
2 Nevertheless the ship- 
wrights' petitions had the ring of the American cause in them. 
%AS 
At P'ymouth the petition began: "To avoid slavery brings the 
determination of an oppressed people... "3 
1. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 61. 
2. ibid, fo. 65. See H. B. van Tyne, "A British Strike in 1775", 
The Michi Alumnus arterl Re dew, XLV, 1938-9, pp. 157- 
1 4, for an interesting account of these activities based on 
the Wedderburn papers in the William L. Clemdnts Library, 
Michigan. 
3. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 26. At Plymouth the strike was particularly 
bitter, and there is little doubt that the issue here came to 
be nothing less than a demand for a basic wage of 2/6d per day. 
See Trewman's Exeter Plying Post, 16-23 June, 7-14 Jul 1775. 
I am grateful to Mr. John A. Woods for this reference. 
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Finally, what has been called the "irrational" fears 
of the men themselves must be examined. 
l No effort was made 
to inform the men of the exact intentions of the administration, 
since there was no idea of cultivating healthy labour relations. 
If the scheme had been anything like as successful as Sandwich 
hoped, it would have resulted in reductions in the labour force. 
The First Lord was wisely against this, but it remained a potent 
fear amongst the men. There was considerable apprehension of 
the effect of the short daylight hours of winter and bad weather 
on the men's output. In addition there was also a peripheral 
I 
misunderstanding on regulations for sick pay, which Sandwich 
managed to clear up. Over all these points he took consider- 
2 
able care in refuting criticism; yet the shipwrights stayed out 
for a long time after his answers had been made known. It is 
evident that the struggle was more deep-seated than a threat 
to a way of working. 
In spite of the shipwrights' suoceesful resistance to 
the wholesale introduction of task work in 1775, more and more 
work was being done in this way throughout the war. There was 
no trouble from the rest of the workers, and the caulkers were 
1. Haa. s$ Task Work, p. 61; Williams, p. 422. 
2. PRO, ADM 7/662, fos. 37-8" 
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admitted into the scheme on their own request. 
' The number of 
shipwrights "working task" grew in the eastern yards; by 1781 
there were six gangs at Chatham. 
2 In late 1779 the Navy Board 
again exerted pressure on the western yards, but with little 
success; at Plymouth especially, in the words of flurry, the 
shipwrights remained with a "sullen, determined resolution". 
3 
Here the Board encouraged shipwrights to work in the new way by 
awarding servants to any men who would do so; the answer of 
the majority was to run them out of the yard. 
4 In a last. 
effort before the end of the war, Ourry reported optimistically 
that, "I hope we shall soon have a majority in favour of job 
work", but by March the following year Lecras wrote that, "not 
a man has offered to work either by the Job or New work and that 
the spirit of obstinacy still remains amongst them". However, 
5 
an order of January 1783 to the effect that all "extra" was 
cancelled, except to those shipwrights working by job or task, 
16 Caulkers were ordered to work by the day because work had 
been skimped (S0(a), -561,12 Dec 1770), but on a petition 
were allowed to work task on new work in 1775 (PRO, ADM 
106/2592,21 Ap 1775) and eventually on all work (IIM, POR/ 
D/22,11 Jul 1780; PRO, 106/3320,20 Ap 1782; SO(a), 1153, 
19 Ap; 1208,1 Nov; 1217,27 Nov 1782; 80(b), 236,3 Dec; 
238,5 Dec 1783). 
2. I M, CHA/E/33,23 Jan 1781. 
3. NMM, POR/G/l, 29 Sep 1779; also POR/A/29i 3 Nov 1779; PRO, ADM 
174/116,3 Oct 1779; 174/117,25 Oot, 3 Nov 1779; 174/18,3, 
7 Nov 1779; N}IM, P0R/D/23,27 Mar, 23 Ap 1782; PRO, At 174/19, 
6 Nov 1782. 
4. PRO, ADM 174/117,7 AP, 5 May 1780. 
5. ibid, 18 Oct 1782; ADM 174/118,25 Peb, 11 Mar 1783. 
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induced all the other yards to submit, and by the end of 1783 
five of the yards were "working task". Plymouth, however, 
resisted until 1788.1 
The inadequacy of wages and the payment system in the 
period of the American war goes a long way in explaining the 
dissatisfaction and lethargy of the men in general, and of their 
resistance to Sandwich's measures in particular. Although 
promptness of payment had improved considerably from the early 
part of the century, the quarterly pay was always late, especially 
at Plymouth. The consequence was a heavy dependence upon "'dealers'', 
to whom the men sold their wages at a discount. In 1770 Shrabsole 
reported that: "Every shipwright that takes up his money on usury 
or by assignment (and it is almost impossible to avoid it) suffers 
a loss of almost forty shillings a year, which is upward of three 
R 
weeks pay". 
2 In 1775 the Plymouth shipwrights asked for a limit 
of six weeks delay. Sandwich was surprised at this complaint, 
and could only point to the improvements that had taken place since 
1772. This demand has been seen as "an indication of the irrational 
nature of the strike", but the Christmas wages of 1774, ready for 
transport by the middle of March 1775, were delayed by a not unusual 
1. SO(b), 16,27 Jan 1783. Job work on repairs was restrioted 
after the war (SO(b), 76,12 Ap; 100,15 MY; 236,3 Dec 
1783; 291,5 Ap 1784; see also PP-CE, pp. 20,298-300). 
2. William Shrubsole, A Plea, p. 19. When the wages were again 
late in 1778, Ourry reported that, ", theiroreditors have raised 
3d in ¬ discount" and money was "so scarce here(that)they 
cannot get it at any rate to subsist their families (PRO, ADM 
174/116,28 Jul 1778). 
164 
piece of maladministration concerning shipping between the two 
boards in London. By 8th April the wages were still at 
Portsmouth, and there was a further delay while the Admiralty 
ordered another ship. It could hardly have reached Plymouth 
until May. 
1 
However, the basic weakness was the low daily wage which 
left the men dependent upon chips and extra work, in addition to 
their income, for a living wage. Although perquisites often 
went to make up real wages in the eighteenth century02 they seldom 
reached the importance of those in the dockyards. The dependence 
of the men on these extra allowances is reflected in Ourry's 
report to. the Navy Board in late 1782 that many shipwrights had 
left Plymouth yard, 
and I have great reason to suppose that several 
more will follow the same plan. It is reported 
they are going to work in the River. I am in- 
formed the reason they give for leaving the yard 
is that every article of provisionj s so dear that 
they cannot subsist on a single day's pay. 3 
1, See ]Th1M, ADM. B/189,22 Max 1775; A/2690,10 Ap 1775; 
PR. O, AIM 106/2592, -8 AP 1775; Haas, Task Work,, p. 61. 
Haas's argument that wages had increased indirectly 
through prompter payments is therefore inacourate. 
2. See E. W. Gilboy, Wages in Ei hteenth Cent land. 
(Cambridge, Maser 1934) p. 20. 
3. PRO, ADM 174/117,11 Oat 1782. As a result of the Navy 
Board's order cancelling all extra except to those shipwrights 
working by task, the wages at Plymouth dropped very rapidly (see PRO, ADM 42/894). However, pressure to work task was 
resisted by the Plymouth shipwrights. 
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Thus the extra allowances had become a vital part of 
the real wage, and as might be expected, the men were very quick 
to the defence of these privileges, and very suspicious of any- 
thing which appeared to threaten them. For example, when the 
shipwrights at Portsmouth were read the Navy Board order on the 
control of chips in 1783, "they in a body refused complying with 
it... and their determination seemsi preconcerted as the officers 
could not discover any individual more active than the rest". 
1 
Disputes over pay therefore became disputes over privileges, of 
which the task work episode was the most disruptive. 
2 
In addition, it was not apparent at the time of the 
strike that the new scheme would benefit the men. In 1778 the 
Plymouth shipwrights were still earning more by day pay and 
"extra" than were the Deptford taskworkers, although, it is true, 
taskworkers at the western yards eventually earned six shillings 
a day. 
3 Viewed in this light, the reaction of the men in 1775 
seems more understandable, especially an, at the obstinate 
western yards, their earnings from "extra" was very much more 
than in the eastern yards. The men were in fast defending their 
1. N MP AD? BP/49 11 Sep 1783- 
2, See also PRO, AIM 106/3320,17,20 Aug 1782. 
3. e. g., NM t POR/D/23,2 Ma`yr, 11 Sep 1782; Pao, AIIM 42/568. 
Even at the height of the war these wages could not match 
those paid in merchant yards, which, the Navy Board commented, 
"has inclined many shipwrights to leave the King's Yards" 
(Nr1t, ADM BP/3,15 Oct 1782). 
----_-ý 
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real wages, for while they accepted that they would get extra 
money for task work, they rightly saw that it would be not 
enough to compensate for the greater effort, or, as they put 
its they were not prepared to commit, "progressive suicide on 
our bodies". 
1 
The Commission of Naval Enquiry slunmarised their 
findings by saying that the scheme of 1775 was hastily im-- 
plennented. That the implications of task work not fully 
worked out was proved by the difficulties which became apparent 
as the war progressed. 
2 It was unfortunate for Sandwich that 
the scheme came at a time when the men were convinced that they 
held the whiphand because of the mobilisation, and when, according 
to one view, the shipwrights were finding some difficulty in main- 
taming, "their well-marked, though humble, position in society". 
3 
Since the basic wage was subject to no market force, it was to 
their allowances that the men looked to for compensating for the 
1. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo, 36. 
2. See PP-CE, pp. I8-19. Sandwich did not see the full 
implications of an incentive system, for not only was 
a limit set on total earnings, but the men were not 
allowed out of the yard when they had finished their 
task; for which, the Commission of Inquiry commented, 
"we can see no good reason" (PP-CE, p. 19). 
3. H. E. Richardson, "Wages of Shipwrights in g. M. Dockyards, 
1496-1788", Mariners Mirror, 33,1947, p. 273. 
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increased cost of living. 
' When they were threatened, the 
opposition of the men was predictable. The scheme of task 
work was too frail and too carelessly implemented to over- 
come the prejudices which had been moulded by an entrenched 
but inadequate and illogical. payment system. It has since 
been learnt that in this country any comprehensive incentive 
system is difficult to administer successfully; in an 
organisation lacking essential central control over a craft 
which involved working with an unpredictable material, any- 
more complicated than payment by the day was almost thing 
bound to fail. It is not surprising that in the 1790's task 
work became liable to more abuse than was ever experienced 
under the old system. 
iii) Minor and Occasional Benefits. 
Although the basic pay and salaries remained unchanged 
throughout the century, some improvement was made in 'fringe' 
1. Gilboy finds a consistent increase in craftsmen's wages in 
or by the 1770's (Gilboy, pp. 10,12,23,95,104-9). See 
also Phylis Deane, The First Industrial Revolution, 
Cambridge, 1965), pp. 9 AA-5; M. D. George, London Life in 
the Eighteenth Cent= London, 1925), pp"1 0-170. 
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benefits. The most important was the superannuation of both 
workmen and clerks, which was first introduced in the 1760's 
and 17700s. Started for the workmen by Egmont in 1764, the 
scheme was limited to quarterznen, shipwrights and caulkers of 
thirty years'service in the yards, although those who had been 
disabled were exempt from this rule. 
l In 1771 the scheme was 
extended by Sandwich to include one in forty rather than one in 
fifty of the workmen, "being very necessary at this time to 
prevent them leaving the King's yards". 
2 The pensioners were 
divided into three classes, with the higher-paid workmen 
receiving a correspondingly higher pension. All the pensions 
were approximately two-thirds of their basic pay. 
3 
Yard labourers, ropeworkers and sawyers were admitted 
into the scheme on their own application, but a petition from 
the smiths was refused, and a number of workers in the unskilled 
categories remained outside the scheme throughout the period. 
4 
1. PRO, IND 9315,14 Jun 1765. See J. M. Haas, "The Royal 
Doclcyardst the Earliest Visitations and Reform 1749-1778", 
Historical Journal, XIII, 2,1970,200-1; also 
Williams, pp. 398-399" 
2. PRO t ADM 7/659 v fo. 20. 
3. SO(a), 580.4 Oct 1771" 
4. NNII1, ADM B/185i 1 Oots 11 Dec 1771; B/186p 1 Jan, 18 Feb, 
25 Aug 1772; also ADM A/2784j 25 Feb 1783; A/2785s 179 
27 Mar 1783; P0R/G/1 r 10 May 1782. 
4 
169 
In 1783 seamen of the ordinary were allowed a pension at the 
labourers' rate of sevenpence a day -a measure which was 
particnlaxly needed. 
1 The clerks from the yard offices were 
allowed pensions from 1773, in most cases on their full official 
salary. 
2 
The Admiralty kept the awarding of pensions firmly in 
its hands. The Navy Board received quarterly lists of those 
workmen, "who were considered proper objects for superannuation" 
from the yard officers, which it sent on to the senior board. 
The list was then marked by the Admiralty and returned to the 
Navy Office. The Clerk of the Cheque at each yard would then 
be informed of the successful applicants, for which he would 
apply for an imprest to pay them. 
3 Officers and clerks 
received more individual attention, for they were required to 
petition the Admiralty directly. This board would then apply 
to the King-in-Council for the pension, having been advised in 
turn by the Navy Board, the Resident Commissioner and Surgeon 
1. Nt, ADM 82/4,23 Sept 1783. 
2. ibid, 27 Jan 1783; this had come about almost accidentally 
as a result of the precedent set by the measures that 
Sandwich had taken after the discovery of embezzlement in 
the Storekeeper's office at Portsmouth in 1773 (SO(a), 633, 
8 May 1773. 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/2592,3-7 Jan 1775" By an order of 1784 
the pensions were to be paid out of contingency money 
instead of special imprests (SO(b), 294,14 AP 1704). 
70 
of the relevant yard that the applicant was suitably qualified. 
Pensions were invariably granted (although the process usually 
took some months) by Order-in-Council on the "Ordinary" 
Estimate, 1 
Although superannuation went some way to eliminating 
senility from the yards, its effect was limited by several 
factors. Any idea of forcing an officer or clerk to'retire 
was alien to contemporary notions of office and property, and 
there was an understandable reluctance, particularly in the 
case of the clerks, to apply for a pension based on their 
official salary when this constituted only a small part of 
their income. Some of the officers were of a great age. The 
Storekeeper at Portsmouth at the time of the Commission on Fees 
had been in the service for sixty years. 
2 Sir John Williams, 
the Surveyor, should have applied for a pension long before he 
did. 3 Eight officers applied for superannuation between 1775 
and 1783, of which only one was a clerical officer. The 
1. Leake Grimes, the chief clerk to the Master Shipwright at 
Chatham, was granted superannuation between April and June 
1775. The following references demonstrate the complexity 
of the procedure: N 4M, ALM A/2690,27 Ap; A/2691,22 May; 
NMM, B/189,5 May; PRO, AIM 106/2592,5,26 May, 7 Jun; 
AI 3/81,8 May. 
2. PP-CF, p. 426. 
3. NNM, ADM PP/59 15 Nov 1784; see also ShP, v01.151, no. 87, 
2 Sep 1782, for Gregson's opinion. The shakiness of 
Williams's signature throughout the period indicates general 
debility; he had been 68 years in the service. 
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principal officers received ¬100 for a pension (half their salary), 
and junior officers £80.1 
The incidence of retirement among the clerks was even 
less, even though they retired on their full salary. Only five 
clerks retired on a pension between 1775 and 1783, out of a 
complement of about a hundred and twenty. 
2 When they did, it 
was often far too late; one clerk at Portsmouth had, "inveterate 
1 
asthma" and rheumatism'", and had been in the office for fifty 
years. 
3 Their reluctance to leave office is demonstrated by a 
case at Plymouth where three junior clerks contributed a hundred 
pounds to induce a senior clerk to retire. 
4 In the same yard 
there was a clerk who told the Commission on Pees that, "since 
he has been second clerk he has not been employed in any part of 
the duties of this office, having been absent for six years, with 
the Storekeeper's leave, on account of the ill state of his 
health". 5 
1. e. g. NMM, A/2694,9 Aug 1775; AM A/2700,29 Feb 1776; 
A/2704,19 Jun 1776; A/2748,3 Feb 1780. It is possible 
that the attraction of Deptford yard for the senior 
technical officers was that much less physical work was 
needed than at the busier yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth, 
and that it was used to pension off senior men. At the 
same time their experience was accessible to the Navy Board. 
2. e. g. NMK, ADM A/2690,27 AP 1775; A/2691,2 May 1775; 
A/2712,1 Feb 1777. 
3. NMM, POR/G/I, `ý 22 Jun 1776. 
4. PP-CF, PP- 463-5; also pp. 435-7- 
5. PP-CF9 p. 464. 
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The effectiveness of superannuation for workmen was 
limited by the failure to provide for all who were eligible, and 
by a reluctance of the officers to enforce, and the men to accept, 
the scheme. Sandwich improved the ratio of men allowed a pension 
from one in fifty to one in forty, for during his first visitation 
in 1771 he found many men kept on in the yards "out of compassion". 
1 
In fact, even Egmont's scheme had not been fully used; at Ports- 
mouth in 1771, for example, there were only seventeen on the 
superannuation list at a cost of ¬88.3.9d a quarter. After 
Sandwich's efforts the number rose to forty-three by the next 
year, and by 1773 the cost had risen to £687.16.6d a year.? 
Nevertheless, although the ages of the oldest men who applied 
for superannuation during the 1770'a did decrease, this increased 
expenditure was found inadequate. Men applied unsuccessfully 
for years. In 1783 a shipwright was still seeking a pension 
after, "a fall into the well of the Modeste about 1768... (and) 
... was so much hurt in the back and loins as to be incapable of 
duty". 3 By limiting the number of pensions to a fixed proportion 
of the workforce, the number of men who received pensions each 
1. PRO, ADM 7/659, fos. 36,75,95. 
2. PRO, AIM 42/1474, Superannuation liste, Portsmouth, 1765-1803. 
For the other yards see ADM 42/363,623,1041,1474,1721, 
2059. 
3. ]SNM, POR/x/23,12 Oct 1783. 
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year was dependent upon the death rate of those who already 
received them. Thus Samuel Allira, a retired quarterman from 
Portsmouth, received six pounds a quarter from August 1772 to 
December 1798, in which time he effectively kept others from 
receiving pensions' In the Visitation of 1784 the officers 
at Portsmouth complained to the Admiralty Board that, "super- 
annuation in this yard does not bear a proportion to the 
number of men in it by the establishment being one in forty", 
and the Board found, 
several old men... who hark been represented 
as objects of superannuation, several of 
whom ',, are mustered for their day's pay with- 
out appearing at the Clerk of the Cheque's 
office, and others who do attend, but are 
past doing any work equal to their wages. 2 
This complaint was similar to the one made by Sandwich 
in 1771, and it would thus appear that his scheme had been in- 
effective. In facto in the early years of his administration, 
and under his olose supervision during the Visitations, con- 
siderable progress was made, and in 1773 he observed that, "the 
late extension of the superannuation will shortly ease us of all 
the useless hands". 
3 
1. PRO, AIM 42/1474. 
As the war progressed, however, the scheme 
2. PRA, ADM 2/261, fo. 99,110= 00e also PRO, ADM 106/3222, 
8 Aug 1785; PP-CES p. 196. 
3. PRO, ADM 7/660, fos. 10-11. 
-1 "1 
174 
began to lose its effectiveness. While the total number of 
workmen rose sharply, the number superannuated, instead of in- 
creasing in proportion, fell substantially. For example, by 
1783 the number of pensions to workmen at Portsmouth totalled 
only twenty-seven, but at the proportion of one in forty, fifty- 
eight should have been on the list. 
1 
The system by which worsen were selected for super- 
annuation was for the yard officers to submit a quarterly list 
to the Navy Board, which passed it on to the Admiralty. During 
this period these lists usually contained between ninety and a 
hundred and forty names, and of these, the senior board, keeping 
within the proportion, chose between five and thirteen names. 
The basis upon which the Admiralty made its choice is not 
apparent. 
2 Age was insufficient as a criterion, for there were 
injuries to younger men to be considered, as work in the yards 
was both wearing and dangerous. Those engaged in close work, 
such as sai. lmakers, often had their "eyesight much impaired", and 
the constant exposure to the weather resulted in many cases of 
1. PRO, AIt 42/1474. 
2. I1M, AI A/2675-2806, B/189-BP/4. In 1778 the Navy Board 
complained that the Admiralty had awarded a pension to a 
workman who was capable of being a cabin keeper und had 
been one for seventeen years, The Admiralty retorted 
that the junior board should not put anyone on the lists 
who was not eligible (1*IM, ADM B/197,21 Oot 1778; PRO, 
IND 10704 (18), 2 Nov 1778). 
175 
3 
I 
rheumatism and asthma, Many were listed as "worn out" or "very 
debilitated'. There was constant danger in working in the yards, 
and accidents took their toll; "lost a leg launching a mast" and 
"lame by a scald by falling into the boiler" were two of many 
examples. 
1 One apprentice had, 
several escapes from sudden and violent death. 
Once, he fell from the side of a ship, then on 
the stocks, and was preserved by a scaffold, at 
some distance from the ground. At another time, 
he fell headlong. from the side of a wharf into 
a dock, among several boats and lighters. Had 
he struck against any of them, he must have been 
instantly killed; but he fell between them into 
the water. 2 
The real weakness of the superannuation scheme was at the 
yards themselves. It was impractical to order the yard officers 
to be firm, as the Navy Board did in 1772: "we must leave this 
matter in some degree to your disoretion... sc soon as you aeo, them 
p 
upon the decline.. you are to discharge them". 
3 There was a natural 
reluctance for the officers to discharge men who had spent a life- 
time in the yards, for even if a pension. was awarded, it was only 
two-thirds of their wage - and the odds against being chosen by 
the Admiralty were large. The increased demand for labour during 
hostilities, as well as the substantial amount of extra work avail- 
able, also acted as inducements to stay on in the service. 
1. W NM, POR/D/21,14 Ap 1778; POR/D/22,4 Aug 1780. 
2. William Shrubsole, Memoirs, xx. 
3.60(a), 609,26 Aug 1772. 
Some- 
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times a compromise was reached by employing old men on tasks 
which required little physical effort, but of these there were, 
a limited supply. The Navy Board was aware of the problem; it 
ordered the Plymouth officers in 1783 to employ those who were 
"incapable'', "in the best manner they can, so as to be of the 
most use their health will admit". 
l In effect this was 
admitting that superannuation had not answered, for the number 
of men superannuated dropped slowly away after the Visitations, 
and although the extension of the scheme to the Ordinary caused 
a rise in, 1783, it was clear that Sandwich's plans had not been 
fully carried into effect. 
Although the scheme had some success, the central 
administration failed to appreciate the advantages in cost and 
efficiency of unlimited superannuation. For instance, in 1775 
the officers at Portsmouth wrote to the Hoard requesting a 
pension for one of the two blockmakers of the yard, and that 
another be entered, "in order to enable us to keep pace in this 
branch". A year and two letters later, both of which complained 
that the service was "greatly distressed", the Navy Board had 
done nothing. 
2 The reluctance of the Board to hire more workers 
1. PRO, ADM 174/118,21 Mar 1783; see also Baugh, p. 320. 
They were mostly given light work in the form of "mooting 
treenails"; this was the manufacture of cylindrical wooden 
pins by means of an adapted plane called a "moot". Tree- 
nails, or "trunnels", fulfilled the same purpose as a bolt. 
See William Falconer, AUniyersal Dictionery of the Marine... 
(London, 1780), p. 298. 
2. NMMj POR/D/20,31 Aug 1775,1 Nov 1776. 
than the Estimates allowed, together with the proapeot of the 
immediate cost, deterred the central administration from taking 
the full step of unlimited superannuation. Nevertheless, there 
was by now an awareness of the effects of senility and absence of 
both workmen and clerks. "The public", the Clerk of the Cheque 
at Plymouth was informed by the Board, "cannot be at the expense 
of retaining clerks who cannot do their duty". 
1 Sandwich was 
only too well aware of the workmen who were "an incumbrance upon 
the public". 
2 But it was unlikely that the problem of senility 
in the yards would have been solved by a limited scheme, which 
in any aase was unenthusiastically administered. What was needed 
was unlimited superannuation, but this was not introduced until 
the Napoleonic wars, while the idea of a specific age for re- 
tirement did not arise until the nineteenth century. 
3 
It was during this period that some regulation was 
applied to the granting of leave of absence from the yards, although 
there was still a good deal of disoretion allowed, for there was 
no distinction made between absence for reasons of health and 
1. PRO, ADM 174/117,25 Nov 1781. 
2. SO(a), 609,26 Aug 1772. 
3. I am grateful for these two points respeotively to 
Professor J. M. Haas and Mr. J. A. Saintey. 
177 
I 
178 
absence for personal or business affairs. The Resident 
Commissioners were required to obtain permission from the 
Admiralty, which invariably agreed to such requests. Gambier 
was regularly absent attending business in town, and Martin and 
Ourry had frequent periods of leave owing to their health. The 
pressure of business during wartime reduced these applications, 
and the Commissioners were forced to use the privilege sparingly, 
for prolonged absence could bring every sort of business to a 
halt. 1 As it was, every time the Commissioners went from their 
yard, the Admiralty had to order the Navy Board to empower the 
yard officers to comptrol the payment of ship= companies. 
Much the same rules applied to the officers, although 
leave was granted for them by either the Commissioner or the 
Navy Board. The Commissioner was empowered to grant a fort- 
night's leave if he felt that the officer's absence would not 
cause undue inconvenience; permission for an extension after 
two weeks had to be obtained from the Navy Board. 
2 There were 
frequently long absences on account of sickness. The Clerk of 
the Survey at Chatham was continually ill; he was granted leave 
A Commissioner from the Navy Board substituted for Ourry 
and Proby when it was known that they would be absent for 
some time. 
2. See S0(b), 167,1 Aug 1783; also PRO, ADM 174/116,15 Aug 
17770 28 Jun 1779. In the first six months of 1775i thirteen 
officers successfully applied for leave (PRO, t 106/2592). 
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in June 1775 by the Board, but the reply was minuted, evidently 
with some irritation, 
acquaint him that he should have made his 
request personally, being "<. 5'dtreated to Eo do by Commissioner Proby, and that we 
cannot in future oomply with his 
applications to be so frequently absent 
from his duty. 1 
However, when the Admiralty Board visited Chatham the next year 
it discovered that the clerk of the Survey had been absent for 
six weeks. 
2 
By a Standing Order of 1774 the Navy Board limited the 
workmen to a week's absence, or in the case of siclazess, a month; 
otherwise they were to be discharged. Any exceptions to this were 
to be submitted to the Board. By the same order it also regulated 
the procedure for the granting of sick pay for those who were absent 
through "hurts" received in the yard,, Petitions were to be sent 
to the Board; "we reserve to ourselves to determine in what cases 
they shall be allowed any part of their absent time upon. " . being 
properly certified:.. by the surgeon'°. 
3 
cases were allowed this privilege. 
4 
1. PRo, A Dm 106/2592,27 Jun 1775. 
Only the most deserving 
2. NM p M»1 A/2705p 26 Jul 1776; see also NISI, ADM B/193, 
30 Jul 1776. 
3. SO(a), 665,22 Jul 1774; e. g. PRO, ADM 106/1230,24 Jun 1775; 
. mot 106/1226,2 May 1775; Ai 174/17,13 MAY 17771 Nf, POR/F/17 13 Aug 1778. 
4. e. g. only four ut of six cases were allowed in the first six 
months of 1775 
(PRO, 
ADM 106/2592,10 Jan, 15,22 Feb, 14,28 
Mar, 17 AP 1775). 
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Another form of security was the issue of "protections" 
against impressment to the artificers. These were issued by the 
Clerk of the Cheque and either the Master Attendant or the Master 
Shipwright; the Hoard had, on more than one occasion, to warn 
the officers not to be too free with issuing these protections. 
1 
A similar privilege was exemption from the militia. In a 
complicated case in 1778 one of the contracting sailmakers who 
worked in Portsmouth yard had been balloted for and elected to 
serve in the militia. According to the Militia Act, those 
artificers who were, "mustered, trained and doing duty in any 
of His Majesty's docks" were exempt from service; this case 
hinged on the interpretation of the word "trained". The militia 
had their way, but the case caused such a stir in the yard that 
the Deputy Admiralty Solicitor at Portsmouth had to go to London 
to see that a clause of exemption was added onto the next militia 
Bill. Hood was fearful of the precedent; the men were grumbling, 
"and they look an every person in the dockyard to be liable to 
serve". 
2 The reaction of the men demonstrates the importance 
which they attached to these privileges. 
1. The dispute over protections in 1782 between the two boards 
in London concerned the protection given to contractors' men 
on timber vessels and in building yards; the dockyard 
officers' authority was not disputed. See Usher, pp. 93-8. 
2. NMM, POR/D/21,11-24 Ap, 14 Aug 1778; see also PRO, ADM 
174/19,18 Oct 1782. 
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Finally, small rewards for particularly good service 
could be gained, although, as these had to be granted by the 
Navy Board, which was always fearful of precedent, they tended 
to be few. Nevertheless, those men who helped to dowse the 
fire at Portsmouth in 1776 and distinguished themselves in 
other emergencies were granted small sums of money. 
I The 
dockyards did not offer great rewards to its workforce, but 
the security of employment was exceptional for the eighteenth 
century. Measures auch as superannuation, sick pay and 
protections, although limited in extent and effectiveness, 
represented the efforts of the authorities to attract and 
maintain a stable labour force. 
iv) Embezzlement. 
The reputation of the yards for large-saale embezzlement 
hao. been long established. thrnnan, writing of the previous century, 
1, e. g. PRO, ADM 95/95,9 Jan, 16 Dee 1776,3 Feb 1780. The 
men who conetruoted the modele of the dockyards in 1774, 
which are now in the National Maritime and Science Museums, 
were each paid five guineas "for their ingenuity" (PRO, 
ADM 95/95,6,20,25 May 1774). 
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has, "no doubt that embezzlement of stores ... was practised on a 
large scale"; and Albion reflects eighteenth-century opinion 
when he writes: "Among the officers at sea, a generally high 
code of honor prevailed, but-ashore, corruption often permeated 
the entire service". 
' However, little attempt has been made to 
understand how the problems of discipline and security were faced, 
why, - the authorities had little success in stamping out embezzle- 
ment, and also why the workmen reacted in this way to their 
conditions of employment. 
The custom of 'chips" was the first major problem. An 
arcoratisupd by the Navy Board in 1783 ran thus: 
You are to suffer no person to pass out 
of the dock gates with great coats, large 
trousers of any other dress that can con- 
ceal stores of any kind... No trousers are 
to be used by the labourers employed in 
the storehouses and if anyone persists in 
such a custom he will be discharged the 
yard. 2 
Among the recommendations which the Navy Board put forward was 
that the stopping of chips would prevent the secreting of other 
and more valuable stores out of the yards, and that as a con- 
sequence "discipline in the yards would be to a large measure 
lo Fhrnan9 p. 92; Albion, p. 47. 
2. SO(b), 172,4 Au& 1783. 
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restored". 
' Samuel Bentham pointed out that the only way to 
stop embezzlement was to stop chips. 
2 
Other customs exacerbated the problems of security. At 
Plymouth the men were fed by their womenfolk in the yard, and 
Ourry reported that they were, 'detected daily..; in carrying out 
with chips in their baskets pieces of iron and nails. To prevent 
such evil practices as much as possible, I have ordered-the Porter 
to suffer no chips to be carried out of the yard in baskets... " 
Ideally, the women should have been prevented from coming into the 
yard, but Ourry confessed that, "I don't know how to get at a mode 
of effecting it", When Leoras succeeded Ourry at Plymouth, he 
found that the "number of women and idle persons admitted into 
the yards from long practice is incredible". Custom also allowed 
the whole neighbourhood into the yards at the-launching of a new 
ship, while on pay days, "persons of all descriptiorg, -who on use 
pretence of coming to the pay office for wages, have it in their 
power to parade all over the yard, which is often attended with 
disturbances". 3 
1. x221, At BP/4,1 oat 1783. 
2. Maria Bentham, Life of,. Sir Samuel Bentham (London, 1862), 
P. 143. 
3. PRO, ALM 174/115,31 Oot 1775; 174/116,16 Mar 1777,23 Feb 
1779; 174/118,14,23 Jan 1783; 174/116,21 Cot 1777; 1P24, 
CHA/E/33,20 Aug 17771 PRO, ADM 174/1189 25 May 1783. 
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There were also physical and administrative difficulties 
in making the yards secure. against theft. Each yard had a long 
water front which was difficult to police, and the use of boats 
in taking away stores, especially those of any weight, was frequent 
and difficult to detect. 
1 Much was taken from ships in dock, and 
there were always many types of stores lying around, which could 
prove a "temptation for idle people to purloin,. 'til they can be 
weighed, separated and charged". 
2 Ships in Ordinary were often 
some miles away from the centre of the yards, and security was 
never strict, affording ample opportunity for those intent on 
mischief. 
3 Perhaps the most insoluble problem was the nature 
of the work itself, for the gangs of shipwrights and labourers 
worked in no fixed place, (except for those in the mast and boat 
houses), and this situation afforded every opportunity for 
picking up small stores. The stores most susceptible to embezzle- 
ment were coal, cordage - old and new - and various types of timber, 
but the particular trouble was metal in the foam of nails and screws. 
With the widespread use of copper from 1779 came a rewarding source 
of remuneration; the price of manufactured metal, with its 
relatively higher cost before mass production, could be a very 
1. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/3405,24 Jun 1783; 106/3320,12 Sep 1781; 
ADM 174/115,22 Ap 1774,24 Oct 1775; 174/116,30 Sep 1777; 
174/118,2 Mar 1783- 
2, PRO, am 106/3319,19 Dec 1778; Bee also tThIM, POR/D/22,17 Aug 1779; CHA/E/34,3 Mar 1783; PRO, ALM 174/116,5,11 Mar 1779; 174/117,9,16 Jul 1782; 174/118,27 Feb, 26 Max 1783- 
3.1NM, ' P0R/F/16,13 Feb 1776; POR/C/22,15 Apr 3 Jul 17751 
POR/G/1 12 Dec 1783 PRO, ADM 174/115, Feb 1774; 
1174/116, 23 Aug 
1776; 106/3320,14 Dec 1782; 174/19,5 May 1783. 
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useful supplement to the income of a low-paid worker. One price 
quoted at Portsmouth from a receiver was 1/3d for five pounds of 
used copper nails - more than a day's wages for a labourer. 
l 
Peter Butt proposed the use of# 
a chest, more if necessary, constructed to 
run upon wheels for its more easy conveyance 
from and to the cabins, where it should be 
deposited every night for : 6U safety ... for 
the reception of.,, several species of nails... 
in lieu of the present mode of every man 
breaking off almost when and for what he 
pleases. 2 
It was undoubtedly the lower-paid, unskilled workers who 
were the chief offenders as petty pilferers. Apprentices were 
thought to be among the most frequent offenders, "owing to lack 
of attention from their masters". t2crzW po, +xA in 1783 that there 
were, "frequent depredations"done at the jetty heads and the docks, 
"which we apprehend is done by the idle and depraved amongst the 
1 youths". In the one case during the period in which an officer - 
the Master Smith at Woolwich - was dismissed, it was shown that he 
had been using his apprentices to take wood from the yard. 
3 It 
does not appear, however, that many apprentices were dismissed; 
labourers seem to have been the chief offenders. Butt's scheme 
of the moveable chest was aimed at, "the gleaning of the labourers, 
who, like most others, avail themselves of every opportunity to 
1. Nrhmt, POR/D/23,21 oat 1783. 
2. PROq iä6/3404,28 Oct 1778. 
3. PNRot 
ADAlm M 
106 3706 10z7 g 17i7j9. ADM 174/118,27 Feb 1783; 
Mar A, J8, 
186`. 
secret whatever they find scattered about the yard". 
' Of the 
362 yard workers dismissed for all misdemeanours in 1784,135 
were labourers and 56 were rigger's labourers, which represents 
8% and 21% respectively of their number at the beginning of the 
year; only 30 out of a total of 3000 shipwrights were discharged 
for these reasons. 
2 It is difficult to know exactly what to infer 
from these figures; to say that shipwrights were comparatively 
blameless would no doubt be wide of the mark. The labourers 
were at a disadvantage in that they were not allowed chips, and 
were therefore more easily detected, but it can be reasonably 
surmised that the shipwrights had less motive for embezzling 
stores, and the comparative security of their employment meant 
that they had a great deal more to lose. 
While the petty pilferer often acted on impulse, the 
planned theft bought greater rewards. Particular offenders in 
this category were the men from the transports bringing con- 
tractors' stores to the yards, for they were given ample 
opportunity to get to the centre of a yard. On one occasion 
over fifty pounds worth of the King's cordage was found on a 
3 
Sunderland coal brig at Portsmouth. Often the stores which the 
1. PRo, ADM 106/3404,28 oat 1778. 
2. PRO, ADM 10613006, Dismissals Book of Artifioers. 
3. trat, POR/D%23,27 Sep 1782. 
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transport was delivering never reached the storehouses intact, 
and orders went out during the war that the master and crew were 
to pay for any missing stores, although, as the Portsmouth Store- 
keeper pointed out, it was difficult to tell who was responsible 
for a theft when the transports were unloaded by gangs of 
labourers. I 
The example of Sam Wyatt showed what 'could be achieved 
by persistent villainy. In 1774 he was caught stealing ash' 
rafters from the deal yard at Deptford, where he worked as a 
shipwright. In spite of strong evidence against him, he was 
acquitted at Maidstone Assizes, much to the disgust of the Navy 
Board. He then managed to get into Woolwich yard (having un- 
successfully petitioned to retu 'rv:. y -. ýtto Deptford)$ and he is 
next heard of in an anonymous complaint sent to the Admiralty in 
early 1777.2 By bribing the call clerk, he evidently had acquired 
an original if somewhat macabre hold over his fellow shipwrights. 
He was, according to the letter, 
making such property in the undertaking 
business in charging, auch excess rate that 
we are not able to stand against it... That 
if we poor do not enpýdy him in the under- 
taking ... he tells us he will get us discharged 
out of the yard.. . land) if that any of our wives 
or family dies and we poor men let Mr. Wyatt 
have it to do he will give us five or six days 
call at a time for which, Gentlemen, it is 
very underminding work. 3 
lo NMKf POR/D/22,11 Jun, 21 Jul 1780; also $0(a), 633,8 May 1773" 
2. PRO, A 3)M/106 3385,2,6 Dec 1774; 106/2592,18 Jan 1775, 
3. NNM ADM A/2713,14 Max 1777 (enclosure). 
I88 
Not only this, but the elm for Wyatt's coffins came out of 
Woolwich yard. The letter appeared to have some effect, for 
he was discharged three months later. 
I 
The offenders whd. ". '-, gave the yard authorities the most 
trouble were, however, the receivers of stolen goods. Some of 
this activity appears to have been on a small scale. Ourry 
received information (which he ignored) of Mrs. Southwell at 
Plymouth, who bought old nails, "at a farthing per pound picked 
up by girls from the dockyard rubbish, p4-d a man a farthing a 
pound for straightening them and aels them for lid at her shop'. 
G 
The Navy Board was convinced that the receiving trade went hand 
in hand with the keeping of public houses, and ordered that work- 
, men who 
kept them should be discharged. 
2 However, there were 
receivers who operated on a very large scale, with a regular 
organisation and well-organised outlets to the London market. 
Edward Brine of Portsmouth was evidently such a man. 
As a result of information, Hood searched Brine's house at the 
owner's request, found nothing, and confidently reported to the 
Board that the information was "malioious". However, the 
1. PRO, ABM 42/1924,20 Jun 1777. 
2. PRO, ADM 174/116,18 Jun, 26 July 1779; NNt, ADM A/2736, 
8 Feb 1779; AM B/198,9 Feb 1779" 
189 
following March a deposition on oath from one of Brine's servants, 
Robert Martin, "of amastonishing and alarming nature", proved to 
be correct, and a quantity of copper was found at Brine's house. 
Thomas Binstead, the Deputy Admiralty Solicitor at Portsmouth, 
managed to get an indictment at the Winchester Assizes, and was 
convinced that Brine was, "by-far the most capital receiver in 
this country having sent melted down copper in the course of a 
few months to the London markets to the value of near ¬1400, be- 
sides what he used himself". 
1 
The receivers were well known to the yard officers. 
The Master Shipwright at Deptford reported to the Board that, "the 
port is,.. situated with receiving houses on every side". At Ports- 
mouth they were usually at Gosport aoross the harbours on one 
occasion, for instance, Thomas Hobbes, "a publican and a noted 
receiver" was convicted. 
2 The difficulty was to catch the 
receivers with stolen goods in their possession. Although the 
Commissioner had considerable powers within the yard, and he was 
empowered to act as a Justice and therefore grant search warrants, 
this process was slow and cumbersome, and could not be attempted 
1. NMM, POR/F/17,8 Jun 1779,15 Mar 1780; POR/D/22,3 Aug 
1780; see also ALM BP/5,15 Oct 1784; ADM A/2804,26 
Oct 1784" 
2. PRO, ADM 106/3320,14 Dec 1782; N1M, POR/F/16,22 Jul 1776; 
also POR/F/15,15 Oct 17741 POR/D/23,21 Oct 1782. 
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unless the information could be verified in some way. In 1780, 
the Navy Board sent information to Ourry at Plymouth, which it 
had received concerning embezzled copper sheets, but since the 
information was anonymous it was decided not to grant a search 
warrant. For this a deposition on oath was needed, although 
Ourry observed to the Board, "I cnakaco doubt that your informations 
aM Is oo oot". 
1 
The yard authorities were, however, unlikely to receive 
much information on oath, for it is clear that any individual who 
attempted to bring offenders to justice took on not only the 
offenders but also the community. Such was the feeling that 
considerable courage or malicious intent was needed to "lay an 
information". Robert Martin, who informed on Brine, seemed to 
have had a combination of the two. Life was not easy for him 
afterwards. He complained to Hood that, "in consequence of mg 
exposing my late master... the trades people and merchants of 
this and adjacent places treat me with a great degree of coolness 
and indifference; I may with propriety be. n it contempt". 
2 
His application for employment in the yard could not be granted 
by Hood for fear of disturbance, "because ''there are so many people 
1. PR. O, ADM 1? 4/117i 18 Jun 1780; see also NM, FOR/G/19 28 Aug 
1775; W. Nelson, The Office and Authority of a Justice of Peace 
(London, 1718), P. 535" 
2. NMMO POR/G/l, 21 Max 1780. 
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who have been checked in their notorious embezzlements". The 
Navy Board, on Hood's recommendation, paid Martin 2/6d a day 
subsistence money, after being told that he had been obliged to 
pawn his clothes. 
I Martin's troubles had, however, not ended 
here, for more than a year later the Admiralty received a letter 
from him; he was now in Winchester Gaol as a result of a counter 
charge of Brine's, who accused him of having planted the goods 
in Brine's house. "I presume he thought"9 wrote Martin, "fit 
"there was but one chance - which was to blacken me as much as 
possible in order to weaken my evidence. In this (by deceptions, 
money flying, etc. ) he has obtained his desire, to my misfortune". 
Martin, like Binstead, saw this'as a test case, for if Brine was 
not convicted, embezzlement would, Martin pointed out, "undoubtedly 
go on with more spirit than ever, not apprehending any danger of 
being informed against as the consequence of informing has proved 
so fatal to me". 
2 Three weeks after this letter Brine was found 
not guilty at Winchester Assizes, and he won his civil case 
against Martin, with damages of five hundred pounds. 
3 In a 
similar case, Middleton's informer at Sheerness, John Cleversal, 
whose letters the Comptroller passed on to Shelburne, was dismissed 
1. rir1t, POR/P/17,27,31 Max 1780. 
2. NEM, ADM A/2762,19 Ap 1781 (enclosure). 
3. PRO, ASS/22/3, ASS/23/8, Southampton, Lent Circuit, 1781. 
One junior officer at Deptford had to seek employment else- 
where because he informed the Navy Board of "irregularities"; 
see Yeoman Lott, Account of pro osals made for the Benefit 
of His Males Ii Sere ce kLondong , P* 3- 
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in 1785 for what was considered a "totally malicious"representation". 
1 
In both cases, the evidence presented by the informers was too strong 
and detailed to be completely disbelieved. - There was, however, little 
the authorities could do; it was the informers' word against many. 
Even when information was used, the receivers were far 
too quick for the authorities. Proby reported that a rope had been 
found at a receiver's warehouse which had been made the same 
morning. 
2 According to Martin, Brine received word that a search 
was to be made, and all the stolen goods were carefully hidden; 
while arrangements were made with the shipwrights to "keep their 
metal . 
for a few days Itil matters (were) a little quiet", 
3 The 
next difficulty was to prove that the stores were in fact the 
King's, and also that they had not been legally bought at a dock- 
yard sale of old stores. 
4 Cordage made for the King was to have 
a white thread, "laid the contrary way", and rope of less than 
three inches was to have twine instead of this thread. Canvas 
had a "blue streak", and all metal goods had the broad arrow 
1. NNM, CHA/X/2,9,11 Mar 17851 CKA/A/4,10,19 Mar 1785. 
2. NMV ADM BP/49 5 Max 1783. 
3. NIII, ADM A/2762,19 Ap 1781 (enclos=e); also POR/F/15,12 
Dec 1774; POB, /F/17,11 Jun 1779; POR/D/23,21 Oct 1782. 
4. The Commission on Fees recommended that the dealers in 
old stores should be forced to take out an annual 
licence (PP-CP9 p. 315). 
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stamped onto them. 
1 However, these marks could easily be removed; 
according to Martin, Brine employed a copper smith in pickling and 
cleaning copper sheets, two blacksmiths in beating out the broad 
arrow mark from bolts and the yard founder for filing the mark 
from brass pieces. 
2 
There were also difficulties in securing convictions 
against petty embezzlers, for more than circumstantial evidence 
was required. Cases often had to be abandoned before proceedings 
were started because of '..: < insufficient evidence; only when an 
offender was found with the stores upon his person was a pro- 
secution initiated. In spite of highly incriminating evidence, 
Wyatt was acquitted on these grounds in 1775.3 In 1778 Binstead 
presented his expenses for the previous five years; there were 
five cases when the offender was discharged because there was no 
mark, eight of detection but insufficient evidence, seven of 
unsuccessfully searching a receiver's house and seven when 
information proved false. There was only one successful con- 
viotion. 
4 In some cases it was not thought worth the time and 
expense of the courts, for often officers had to spend valuable 
1.9 and 10 Will o. 41; see also PRO, ADM 174/117,18 Jun 1780; 
174/19,16 May 1782. 
2. * MMM, ADM A/2762,19 Ap 1781 (enclosure). See also PRO, ADM 
174/117,9,16 Jul 1782; 174/118,26 Mar 1783; Q1M, ADM BP/4, 
31 Mar 1783- 
3- PRO, ADM 106/3385,6 Dec 1774; also POR/F/15,14 Feb, 26 Jul 
1774. 
4. NMM, POR/D/21,16 May 1778. 
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time away from the yards to appear as witnesses. 
l From 1769 any 
case of embezzlement could be prosecuted at the discretion of the 
Commissioner, but in October 1783 the Navy Board ordered that, in 
cases of small embezzlements, the offender should be discharged 
the yard and fined three times the value of the article. 
2 This 
was no more than recognising an already existing situation; in 
order to save money and time, the Board hoped that the post-war 
employment situation would act as a deterrent rather than the 
threat of proceedings at law. Neither was very effective. 
Even when a conviction was secured, the law was, by the 
standards of the day, comparatively lenient. Smaller offences 
were treated as petty larceny; for instance, a shipwright found 
stealing iron bolts at Portsmouth, and found guilty at the Borough 
sessions, was "ordered to be"publicly whipt at the dock gates"'. 
3 
Under statute law the penalty for making stores with the King's 
mark, without being a contractor, was a fine of two hundred pounds# 
4 
and imprisonment until the fine was paid. This provided a loop- 
hole, which was exploited in 1775 by one Armado Limbery at 
Maidstone Assizes. He was found with "new nails, ropes and boat 
1. e. g. NMM, CAA/M/3,23 Nov 1768. 
2.9 Geo III, o. 30; S0(b), 221,24 Oot 1783. See also PRO, 
I 9315,6 Max 1729. 
3. NNM, POR/D/239 7 Ap 1783; also PRO, ADM 174/116,24 Mar 1778- 
4- 9 and 10 Will o. 41. 
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sails", and was convicted of being in possession of naval stores, 
"not being a contractor", but he was found not guilty of unlawfully 
concealing them. Although the prosecution attempted to prove a 
felonious offence, he was only found guilty of misdemeanour, 
fined forty pounds and imprisoned until the fine was paid. 
' 
Juries were unwilling to see these crimes, unlike the stealing 
of personal property, as a felony. 
2 
Im the face of these difficulties, more effort could 
have been made to tighten and enforce the regulations. Much 
depended upon the Commissioner, who had a special responsibility 
for the ships in Ordinary. Gambier made an effort at Portsmouth, 
but with the outbreak of hostilities other claims upon his time 
prevented an effective overseeing of security. 
3 The officers, 
who had to take turns as officer of the night watch, were over- 
worked, and were slack in their performance of this duty. Proby 
found that the Clerk of the Survey at Chath i, who was continually 
ill, had been charged with the watch, and he reprimanded the 
officers because no one had taken his place. Nearly two years 
1. PRO, ADM 106/2592,10,15,17 Mar 1775; ASS31/11,35/215, 
Kent Lent Assizes, 1775; see also NI1M, POR, /F/15,15 Oct 1774; 
PRO, ASS 21/7, Western Circuit Minute Books 1775. 
2. There was an apparent contradiction on this point, for the 
right of search (for dockyard stores), established by 19 Car 2. 
c. 12, implied a felony. 
3. See the careful, formalised letters sent by Gambier to the 
yard officers on his frequent absences from the yard which transferred responsibility and enjoined care. Thi custom 
was initiated by Hughes by an order of 26 Mar 1757 
(NMH, 
POR/C/22,1775-77). 
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later he had to make exactly the same complaint. 
' 
The second problem was the inadequacy of the people 
employed to watch the yard. It was not difficult to induce a 
warder or watchman to turn the other way when a theft was to be 
committed, 
2 The job of warder could, also be unpleasant; some 
courage was needed to stop a section of a crowd of several hundred 
workmen who left the yard on the ringing of the bell; ill-feeling 
could very easily break out. 
3 Gambier had to warn the warders to 
"behave with civility and good language" after an incident in- 
volving blows. 
4 There were more subtle methods of rendering 
warders at the gate ineffective; Leoras discovered that one 
warder had to go to the Exeter Quarter Sessions on a warrant 
served by a Justice named Mitchell. The warder had tried to 
stop three women who wanted to come into the yard, and they. had, 
"behaved- so cutrag6ousl-i- that he was obliged to give one of them 
a shove with 4 broom by which she. feli down"; and, he reported 
to the Navy Board, "I underatand(thatlMr. Mitchell has too 
frequently countenanced the practice of receiving such informations 
so that the men are afraid to do their duty". 
5 
1. NNM, CHA/E/33,11 Feb 1777,4 Nov 1778. 
2. e. g. PRO, AM 106/3319,29 Nar 1781; also At 174/115,24 Oot 1775; NNM, POR/F/15,27 Mar 1775- 
3- e. g. PRO, ADM 174/118,5 Jan 1783- 
S 
4. UM, POR/C/22,34 Jul 1774: see also PRO, ADM 174/118,14 
Jan 1782. 
5. PRO, ADM 174/1189 14 Jan 1783. 
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Lecras attempted to improve the effectiveness of the 
watchmen by obtaining Navy Board approval for taking on. some more 
men, including four who were to roam the yard picking up stragglers. 
1 
There were continuing complaints throughout 1779 and 1780 of in- 
sufficient numbers of watchmen, and the Board approved increases 
at. every yard, 
2 The main difficulty, however, was to improve 
their quality. Early in the wart Ourry complained that many were 
old and incapable, and that it was customary to take them from the 
common. labourers, and that "a more respectable person" would be 
desirable. He attempted to get the quartermen to perform the 
duty, but they refused, and he had to be content with shipwrights. 
An-attempt was made to improve, conditions in 1779 by increasing 
the pay of the warders at the gate from 1/6d to two shillings a 
day, but it had little effect. When Lecras came to Plymouth he 
still. found labourers at the gate, many of them, "from whose ages 
cannot, possibly go through the duties required. 
3 The watchmen 
U%mL 
exasperated Hood; he "wi 
rtes-"--,, e=ss tý! s may 
bý ieve 
esteh 
other in a. military way, instead of. " . being detached from the main 
guard., pnd returning to it alone,.,. n an irregular straggling manner"04 
1. SO(b), 12,17 Jan 1783. 
2. S0(a), 818,27 Feb; 896,13 Seei 904,30 Sep; 911,26 Oct 
1779; 1001,6 Jul 1780- 
3- PRO, ADM 174/116,17 Dec 1776; 174/17,5 Jan 1777; SO(a), 
849,27 Nay 1779; ADM 174/118,23 May 1783- 
4. R Ml POR/D/21,25 Feb 1779" 
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The final shortcoming was the fault of the central 
administration. It was only too easy for a workman who had been 
dismissed from one yard to make his way to one of the other five 
and enter again; the Navy Board was aware of this frequently 
happening. Gambier informed the Board that he had discharged 
several smiths for insulting the Master Smith; "several of the 
smiths", he reported, "having on late occasions, told the Master 
that they did not regard being discharged; as they could go and 
enter at Chatham". 
l The Clerk of the Cheque of each yard was 
to inform his counterparts at the other yards of ay dismissals, 
as well as the Navy Board, but it was a system which did not 
stand the strain of the extra work caused by the war, and these 
notifications fell away to virtually nothing. This is hardly 
surprising, because there was a high turnover, particularly of 
unskilled labour, and accurate accounting was extremely difficult. 
There were even cases of workmen re-entering the same yard, having 
waited a few months for their record to be forgotten or lost. 
2 
Middleton tackled this problem after the war; each yard was to 
compile an alphabetical index of each man discharged, with the 
reason, and returns were to be made to centralise the information. 
3 
1. NMM, POR/F/16,1 Jun 1777. 
2. NNM, POR/C/21-2. Lists of entries and discharges, e. g., 
26 Feb 1774,29 Sep 1774. 
3. so(b), 133,24 Jun 1783. 
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Ehbezzlement of the King's stores was never less than 
a habit, especially among the less well-paid of the yard workmen. 
Apart from an analysis of Midäleton's central record of the 1780's, 
which, since it records only those misdemeanours which were dis- 
covered, reflects only the surface of these activities, it is 
difficult to gauge the total loss to the navy. In 1782 the Clerk 
of the Cheque at Portsmouth thought it wo=thy of remark to"the Navy 
Board that seven men were dismissed in one day, and Gambier was 
astonished at the extent of the problem; "it increases every 
day to an enormous degree". 
1 Ourry remarked that it was "so 
frequent that we might fill bceter Gaol": 
2 These were the judge- 
ments of men who were used to the simple relationship between 
authority and subservience in a warship. While it was part of 
the general weakness of the civil administration, it is difficult 
to say whether it was financially as damaging as, say, the inaccurate 
accounting of stores, the loss of money to contractors or inaccurate 
estimates. Millions were written off to the navy during the 
American war; a few thousand a year in lost stores perhaps did not 
make all that difference. What was more damaging was the loss of 
timber or stores that could not be quickly replaced, the loss of 
the time of the workmen who directed their energies to outwitting 
the authorities or the engaging of the Commissioner's attention. 
In short, it was the efficiency of the yard which suffered most 
from embezzlement. 
1. NMM, FOR/D/23,3 Jul 1782; POR/P/16,16 Jul 1776. 
2. PRO, ADM 174/116,16 Mar 1777. 
200 
v) Morale and Discipline. 
Although the navy depended upon the yard workmen as 
much as the seamen for the effectiveness of the fleet, neither 
the artificers nor the labourers were subject to the harsh naval 
discipline of the time; a more subtle relationship was required 
to bring this labour force into efft'ctettt use. By the time of 
the American war, there had been a long tradition of friction in 
the yards, and their reputation for trouble and corruption gave 
rise to much concern. In 1781 Middleton wrote to Sandwich 
complaining that, "we dare not contest a single point of duty 
with either shipwrights, caulkers or ropemakers at this time", 
while in the same year Commodore Stewart commented: "the artificers 
... are so sensible of their own consequence at this time that it 
with the utmost difficulty they are kept in any kind of order"'. 
1 
The incidence of disturbances and indiscipline during 
the-century rose very sharply during wartime. In the 1739-45 
{ war, there was a rash of strikes in the first year, and, they 
continued sporadically thereafter. 
2 In the Seven Years war 
there were riots in 1756,1757 and 1759.3 Hostilities had 
started by the time of the task strike of 1775. The reason for 
1. BL, 11,29, Feb 1781 MI SaP, IV, 409,29 Sep 1781, to Sandwich. 
2. See Baugh, PP. 323-332; also Ranft, pp. 281-291. 
3. It, Middleton, pp. 140-1; Williams, p. 395. 
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this incidence lay partly in the greater problem of controlling 
larger numbers of men by officers who were under heavy pressure 
during hostilities, but more directly it was a simple case of 
supply and demand; only during wartime were the workmen in a 
position to question the authority of the Navy and Admiralty 
Boards. Faced with a recalcitrant labour force in peacetime, 
the authorities were under no haste or compulsion to listen to 
demands. During the American war there-was a shortage of 
skilled labour, particularly of shipwrights; it was no 
coincidence that the strike of 1775 came just at the time when 
the yards were trying to increase their labour force. On the 
signing of the peace, the situation changed, for although there 
was no "General Reduction". of the labour force as after previous 
wars, the initiative passed immediately to the Navy Board. The 
change of tone in its dealings is clear. In February 1783 the 
Board reacted to a petition for better allowances from the 
riggers at Deptford by ordering the discharge of "those who were 
not content". A similar petition from Plymouth was met by a 
blunt refusal; the Commissioners added: "nor is it(their)wish 
to confine rho to the yard whtc;: i are dissatisfied with their,.. 
p, ý, ý, awwnc4 
csendi-boas" -a remark which would have been foolhardy at the 
height of the war. 
1 
1. SO(b), 26,3 Feb 1783; PRO, ADM 174/117s 14 May 1782. 
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It was only in the years after the war that regular 
information on dismissals came to the Navy Board, in spite of 
an order of 1719 that the Board was to be kept fully informed. " 
Some incomplete information in the Portsmouth Commissioner's 
papers of the early war period still exists. The number of 
discharges was comparatively small; the most frequent reason 
was "a request to leave"p and the number discharged for mis- 
demeanours was very small. 
2 The alphabetical lists produced 
after the war through Middleton's efforts show a marked change 
of pattern. During 1783 and 1784 there was a large increase 
of dismissals, although the figures declined in subsequent years 
by at least half. In 1784, the first complete year, 610 workmen 
and seamen of the ordinary were discharged, of which 416 were 
yard workers. Of the total figure, 103 requested their dis- 
charge, while the rest were dismissed for misdemeanours of one 
sort or another: 218 for embezzlement (proven, suspected or 
attempted), 166 for neglect of duty, 63 for absenting themselves 
without leave, 28 for various degrees of insubordination or 
drunkenness and 32 for offences which are difficult to 
categoriae. 
3 
1. PRO, IND 9315,8 Dec 1719. 
2. NNII, POR/C/21-2t 1766-1780. 
3. PRO, ADM 106/3006, Dismissals Book of , Artificers. Unfortunately, these figures slightly underestimate the ". totaI~ because this 
alphabetical compilation has the letters "F" and "Y" missing. 
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There is no evidence to suggest that this large number 
of dismissals was the result of conscious Navy Board policy to 
reduce the workforce; rather, it reflects the increased willing- 
ness of the officers to punish by discharging the men. In war- 
time, when there were other jobs to be had without much effort, 
the threat of dismissal was not much of a deterrent, although, as 
the figures suggest, the threat of unemployment alone could not 
break the habit of embezzlement and indiscipline. It can be 
reasonably assumed that the advent of peace increased the 
authority of the officers with the men. It bolstered the 
fragile relationship of the quartermen and their gangs, for 
their effectiveness was based on little more than personal 
authority. Although they would have the backing of the yard 
officers, it was the sort of discipline that was difficult to 
enforce. A small but steady amount of men were discharged 
for insubordination, but the evidence is scarce and incidental 
because these matters were settled by the Commissioner and the 
officers without the help of the Board. 
I 
The exception to this rule was the anonymous letters 
sent to the Board, a practice which the Commissioners in London 
encouraged. The effects of this were almost wholly injurious, 
1. e. g. Nmm, POR/F/16,8 Oct 17751 also POR/C/22,15 Aug 1775, 
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because nothing undermined the morale of those who commanded 
the workmen more effectively than these letters. A lack of 
understanding characterised the Board's dealings with junior 
officers; it was, for instance, aware that the quartermen were 
not as effective as they might have been, being, "frequently 
absent from their gangs and connive at the idleness of the men". 
The officers were therefore ordered to threaten them with dis- 
charge, which, according to the Board, "will have a better 
effect in promoting diligence amongst them than any other we can 
point out". 
1 
This sort of attitude, together with the reliance 
on anonymous letters, tended to neutralise the Board's influence. 
The letters which reached the Board concerned not only the 
quarterznen, but the principal officers; in most cases they were 
found by the Commissioner"'A investigation to be malicious. In 
1780 the Master Smith at Portsmouth was accused by one of the men 
under him of embezzling the stores under his care, but the in- 
vestigation by Hood found that the accusation arose "from pique 
and resentment", and that the informer himself had been caught 
the previous week adding stolen bolts to his day's work to raise 
his earnings. 
2 Ourry warned the Board on a later occasion that 
1. PRO, ADM 174/18,3 Nov 1779. 
2. NNM, POR/F/17,26 Jul 1780; See also PRO, AIM 174/117, 
11 Sep 1781; John Cleversal's letters to Middleton, ShP, 
151, nos. 56-7, and to Stephens, NY1M, CHA/X/2,9 Mar 1785. 
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a too-ready reception of anonymous information was dangerous; 
Permit me to say that if the workmen of 
this yard find that anonymous letters are 
paid attention to it will be impossible to 
carry on(the)service. It is come to such a 
head at present that if an officer speaks 
smartly to a man he is immediately threatened 
to be wrote against. 1 
He requested that in future all unsigned letters should be ignored. 
The shipwrights could act with imposing solidarity when 
aroused, and were particularly conscious of their status. "As 
to the right of any other artificers in the dockyards", wrote 
William Shrubsole, "which can pretend to be of that importance 
to the nation as the shipwright?... They set the great wheels of 
commerce and war in motion* .. without which the pulse of our civil 
policy would stand still". 
2 This consciousness quickly trans- 
formed itself into action when their interests were seen to be 
threatened. At Plymouth, when the discontent over the 
introduction of task work spread there from the other yards in 
July 1775, handbills and advertisements appeared at the first 
sign of trouble. Shipwrights who defied the majority had their 
tools thrown into the dock and treenails thrown at them. Ourry 
himself had to avoid a rain of "atones, cabbage stumps, etc. ", 
and he took a threat to tar and feather him seriously. He 
1. PRO, ADM 174/117,23 Aug 1782. 
2. William Shrubsole, A Plea, p. 15. Shrubsole was a junior ship- 
wright officer at Sheerness and an articulate evangelical 
minister; he was "accounted a phoenomenom, there never having 
been, I believe, a preaching Master Mast Maker before". When 
two deputies from each yard went to London in 1769 to petition for 
a wage increase, he was elected their chairman Shrubsole, Mom irs, 
xl xlüi v" r, 
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described an incident when some newly-entered men were "horsed"p 
a traditional way of ejecting unsuitably qualified men. , The A "'eb 
dad collected, outside the gates and seized two of the new(Ly}. entered 
s aw&4b, put them on poles"aa the men came out of the gate" and were 
earned them to a field they called the Field of Liberty". 
Evenntuallyp with the help of the officers, he managed to dis- 
perse the crowd, making himself heard above "the constant noise 
of liberty". Later he reported that they had avoided riots, 
and that he felt more confident, for the strikers were, "now so 
cautious to change their committee men every two days to prevent 
the ringleaders being discovered: 
l This effective solidarity, 
which forced Sandwich to drop his plans for task work, did not 
die away with the end of the strike. Further attempts to 
introduce task work at Plymouth throughout the war failed, and 
those shipwrights who had been awarded servants for working in 
the new way complained that their lives were in danger, and they 
were forced to transfer to another yard. When they returned at 
the end of the war, their lives were again made so unbearable 
that they were unable to stay. 
2 
The shipwrights also showed their strength over minor 
differences. At Sheerness at the time of the Falklands Islands 
1. PRO, ABM 174/115,18,28 July 1775. 
2. P110, ADM 174/117,21 Ap 1780; 174/19,5 Aug, 3 Oat 1782; 
see also NMM, POR/F/15,23 Jul 1775. 
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crisis, the shipwrights "Basle three huzzas and refused to--go- to 
their duty", because the day before some artificers were mulcted 
(fined) for "quitting their work and purchasing mackeral at the 
pierhead: In duly 1781, there was a stoppage at Plymouth 
over the dismissal of a shipwright for "not sawing a rider 
correctly". "Handbills were about the town that night", reported 
Ourry, and the next day, "upwards of seven hundred, had been called, 
but had not answered to their names... aaying to the Master Ship- 
wright and officers that they were aggrieved and that unless they 
had redress they would not go to call", It transpired, when 
Ourry had persuaded the shipwrights to return to work, that the 
incident had been the culmination of longstanding bad feeling 
between the shipwright concerned and his quarterman. Ourry 
managed a happy settlement and established that in future, "if 
any dispute or animosity should arise amongst them, they would 
fixrtwo or three men to wait on me for redress, and never more... 
come in a body... "2 
Traditional hostility with seamen often led to tension. 
The authorities tried as much as possible to keep them apart. 
Ourry warned the Navy Board that a project to bring piped water 
1. N? M, CHA/M/3,24 Jun 1771. 
2. PRO, AM 174/117,6 Jul 1781. 
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to the yard might, if the water was brought to the centre of the 
yard, "occasion frequent disputes between the seamen and the yard 
workmen", and he objected to a military guard house in the yard 
for fear of "constant broils". 
l An instance of the difficulties 
that could occur is provided when the shipwrights at Plymouth 
were repairing the Diomede (44) in Plymouth Sound in 1782. A 
petty dispute between a sea officer and a workman had been settled,, 
but the next day, as Ourry reported, an apprentice, "by stepping 
backwards unfortunately stepped on a young gentleman's foot who 
immediately made the commanding officer acquainted therewith. 
The apprentice was taken to the gangway and threatened to be 
flogged". Whereupon, "the shipwrights immediately left their 
work, took the boy and brought him on shore, which alarmed me 
exceedingly". Ourry had to act very fast, together with the 
commanding officer of the port, to stop disaffection spreading 
through the yard, and each gang was read a memorandum which 
succeeded in mollifying them. 
2 
The lack of discipline and efficiency can be said to 
have affected the output of the yards more that the dishonesty 
of the workforce; but the state of labour relations and the 
incidence of embezzlement were related. When Leoras went to 
1. PRO, ADM 174/116,9 Feb 1779; 174/117,16 Feb 1781. 
2. PRO, ADM 174/117t 19 Ap 1782. 
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Plymouth in late 1782 to relieve Ourry, he found that embezzle- 
ment and indiscipline flourished together, for Ourry was by this 
time a sick man, and this was reflected by the state of the yard. 
The new Commissioner made a few examples by discharging some 
labourers and then delivering them to the press gang. He found 
great quantities of spun yarn and old rope on the riggers, 
labourers, who, after they had been relieved of their spoils, 
"had the assurance after they got out of the gate to heave a number 
of large stones and dirt at the men who had the watch". 
1 The 
atmosphere in the yard at that time was affected by the prospect 
of peace, and it would be misleading to give the impression that 
this had always been the situation; several times during the war 
Ourry made a special point of informing the Navy Board of great 
exertions. 
2 However, large-scale reforms in the payment system, 
a thorough revision of custom and something of an attitude of 
personal responsibility were all needed before the dockyards 
could in any way consistently attain, as Gambier had once 
occasion to remark, "that order, decency and subordination so 
essentially necessary in the King's dockyards". 
3 
1. PRO, ADM 174/118,5,14 Jan 1783- 
2. e. g., PRO, £DM 174/117,21 Ap 1780,7 Sep 1781. The work- 
men were good in emergencies. One fire was put out, "tho' 
it was late and of a Sunday"; the men were "very active 
and ready to give assistance", and "dressed in their best 
clothes they all came to the yard much sooner than could be 
expected" (PRO, AM 174/116,8 Sep 1778)- 
3- NMM, POR/C/22, i. Jul 1774". 
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Chapter Four. The Administration of Stores. 
i) The Problem of Supply 
Of all aspects of the civil administration at this time, 
the supply, distribution and delivery of naval stores to the six 
dockyards demanded the most planning and organisation. In no 
other aspect, however, was organisation more lacking, and it was 
to this that Middleton directed much of his attention after the 
wax. The main commodities, such as timber, hemp, tar, pitch 
and canvas, and manufactured goods, such as pumps, blocks and 
compasses, were contracted for by the Navy Board. The Resident 
Commissioners also made local contracts under orders from the 
Board. 1 Important questions, however, were referred to the 
Admiralty for a decision, and it was always informed of contracts 
that had been made. Sandwich, however, left his Comptrollers 
with a free hand, and the disputes which marked former years 
over contracting matters did not, on the whole, occur. 
While the Navy Board controlled the major contracts, 
many were made by the Resident Commissioners. These contracts 
l., For an outline of the system of contracting see Pool, 
especially pp. 87-119. Another source of supply was the 
cargoes of captured and, from 1779, neutral ships, Al- 
though a valuable addition to the stores, it added an 
administrative burden to the Navy Board and the yards 
disproportionate to the returns. Negotiations with the 
Court of Admiralty could be lengthy, while the delays 
experienced in dealings with the customs at a local level 
led to much irritation. 
. _,... ý.. _-_ýr - . --ý. ý. ---ý -. -ý ,.. ý.... ý... ý ý. w, _, ,.. 
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usually concerned bulk goods, such as bricks, lime, candles, 
which of necessity were purchased locally. 
1 The usual method 
of purchase was through standing contracts, which enabled the 
yard Purveyor, under the orders of the Commissioner, to draw 
stores from the contractor without going through the motions of 
advertisment and tendering on every occasion. In general, how- 
ever, these contracts were badly administered, 
2 for they were 
customarily handed down from generation to generation without 
being put out to tender. 
3 At Deptford in 1782 there were two 
contracts of over seventy years standing. 
4 The Navy Board also 
discovered in late 1778 that many items were not purchased by 
contract when they could have been, but were bought by the yard 
Purveyor under the direction of the Commissioner on an ad hoc 
basis. This situation was regularised, for as the Board 
pointed out, "it was never intended the Purveyor should buy, any 
other than trifling articles, or such as could not be provided 
by contract". 
5 
1. e. g. at Portsmouth there were 85 contractors delivering 31 items 
to the yard; 41 of these contracts had been made by the Resident 
Commissioner (N! M, POR/D/23,18 Ap 1783''; also PRO, ADM 106/3320, 
15 AP 1782). For overall details see PRO, ADM 49/34, Contracts in 
the Yards, 1762-1796. 
2. See Pool, pp. 101-3,120-121. 
3. e. g. NMM, POR/F/16,18 Nov 1775; PRO, Alit 174/116,19 May 1776; 
174/18,10 Dec 1779- 
4. PRO, ADM 106/3320,15 Ap 1782- 
5. PRO, ADM 174/17,25 Nov 1778,23 Jan 1779; also NNM, POR/D/21, 
14 Dec 1778; POR/G/I, 24 Ap 1779. In the war the Purveyors were buying thousands of pounds worth of stores; see Th1M, POR/C/22, 
30 Dee 1774, ff- 
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Local contracts involved the Resident Commissioners in 
a good deal of time and trouble. Occasionally they had to ad- 
judicate upon long cases of dubious practises and local jealousies. 
Ourry had particular problems over the bidding for the shingle 
ballast contract at Plymouth, and finally he left the Navy Board 
to sort out the confusion; "this has been so intricate a piece of 
business that I wish with the officers for you to determine it'". 
l 
Local labour problems could also be troublesome, 
2 but the most 
{ frequent difficulty involved the small merchant who found himself 
in financial trouble over fixed-price contracts. This was more 
likely to happen in those places away from the London market where 
the war had the greatest effect upon scarcity and the price of 
materials. 
3 Some of these cases dragged on for years. 
4 
Apart from the day-to-day worries of administering con- 
tracts, the Navy Board had the greater responsibility of planning 
an adequate supply of stores to the six yards. Tha 1662 
Instructions laid down'that the Board was to, "proportion a 
1. PRO, ADM 174/117,4 Oct 1782; for this case see also 174/117, 
19 Jul, 10 Sep 1782; 174/19,26 Nov, 20 Dec 1782; 174/118, 
12 Jan, 16 Feb, 14 Mar 1783- 
2. e. g. VMMp POR/D/22,12 Ap 1780; POR/D/23,8 Ap 1782. 
3. e. g. PRO, AI 174/18,20 Oct 1779; 174/117,17 Nov 1780; 
N1M, POR/F/17,4 May, 21 Jun 1780. 
4. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/Z159 31 Oct 1775; 174/116,2 Jan 1778; 
174/19,10 Jun 1782; 174/117,3 Sep 1780; N4M9 POR/F/17, 
4 Apt 21 Oct, 7 Nov 1778; POR/D/23,19 AN 17 Jun 1782. 
213 
certain quantity of masts, yards, sails, anchors, cables, timber, 
planks, rosin, tar, deals etc.. remaining in store as a sufficient 
magazine for each kind for the supply for any sudden service") 
The first task of the Board was thus to estimate the needs of the 
yards as a whole. Planning for this, however, started in a 
vacuum. There was very little idea of the consumption of each 
yard each year, and still less was there much notion of the amount 
of each commodity which should be kept in store. This was very 
much up to the individual Storekeeper's discretion, as was the 
method by which he calculated it. The principle laid down by 
the 1662 Instructions was that the amount was to be governed by 
the number of ships which the yard serviced; the Board was to, 
"distribute with discretion stores to the several yards... according 
to the number of ships riding in the harbour or repairing, or in 
likelihood of repair in each dock or yard so that abundance may 
not glut the stores and waste the Icing's treasure". 
2 On the 
other hand, an order of 1764 noted that the amount of canvas in 
store should be decided by the amount needed to, "keep %he 
present number of men"working in the yards for two and a half 
years"at a single day's work". 
3 
The provision of the most important commodity used by 
1.1717 economy, p. 22. 
2. ibid, p. 25. 
3. PRO, Ilm 9315,2 Jul 1764. 
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the yards - timber - illustrated the weakness in planing. Early 
in his administration Sandwich realised the vital relationship 
between more durable ships, adequate seasoning and a good supply of 
timber. 1 Through personal supervision at the pre-war visitations, 
he saw that timber stocks were built up and stored efficiently. 
The exhaustion of the English woodlands, the neglect of the Royal 
Forests by the Treasury and the supposed scarcity produced by a 
monopoly of large timber merchants were overcome by purchasing 
large quantities of oak from abroad. 
2 The East India Company was 
forced to cut its consumption of oak. Contract conditions were 
made easier, especially in the subsidies introduced for distant 
timber, and each contractor was to deliver a proportion of his 
timber already out, or "sided and converted". The First Lord 
aimed to build up the stock of timber which would equal three 
years' consumption so that timber would have enough time to season 
sufficiently. His self-congratulation in his visitation notes of 
1775 and his emphasis of the sufficiency of timber stocks in 
Parliament throughout his administration haw been accepted un- 
critically. 
3 In fact, there was never a complete three-year 
supply of timber in the yards between 1771 and 1783. 
1. PRO, 1M 7/659, fo. 112; 7/660, fos. 13,85-7. 
2. See Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Committee appointed to 
consider how His Majesty's Navy may be better supplied wi Timber, 
III, 1771, pp. 15-17; also Roger Fisher, Heart of Oak, the 
British Bulwark (London, 1763); PRO, ADM 49/36v 7 Sep 1771, Roger 
Fisher to the Navy Board. Sandwich's suspicions about the timber 
merchants' 'ring' appear to be unfounded (see Williams, pp. 288-291). 
3. PRO, ADM 7/662, fos. 69-70,75; G, V, 343-4, Jan 1782. See Mackesy, 
p. 168; Albion, PP. 58,134-5; Williams, p. 299; Haas, Early 
Visitations, pp. 209-10. 
_ ___. __ý _. _. ý.. __ _ . v. -ý. ý.. - x, ýk --_ . r. 
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This was due to the weaknesses of the administrative 
methods as a whole, for Sandwich's individual effort in building 
up the store of timber should not be belittled. In 1771 the 
amount of timber in store was completely inadequate; at Chatham, 
for instance, there was nat enough to build a third-rate ship. 
l 
However, by 1773 the First Lord had doubled the amount of the 
previous year, and there were further gains from that date. 
2 In 
addition to this, the stock was better organised and properly housed 
in seasoning sheds. Sandwich's enthusiasm and presence at the 
Visitations can be seen as the greatest factor in this success; 
"the plan probably would have miscarried had he not personally seen 
to its execution". 
3 
Nevertheless, the whole effort was based upon rough and 
inaccurate estimates which, whether or not the First Lord was aware 
of it, give the lie to his claim of building up the equivalent of 
three years' consumption of timber. The central point is that no- 
one appeared to be aware of the true consumption figures of the 
yards until after the war. The idea of having a three-year 
I. PRO, ALM 7/659, fos. 8,85; also 17,71 Timber Report, p. 30. 
Sandwich exaggerated the meagreneas of the amount of stores 
that he inherited in 1771, but not by much; see SaP, IV, 283, 
31 Dec 1781; also Appendix VIII. 
2. PRO, ADM 7/660, fos. 13,33,49,66,76; 7/661, Los. 4,15,29, 
45,59,67; 7/662, fos. 18,199 31,42,50. 
3. Haas, Early Visitations, p. 209. 
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reserve of timber was not new, 
1 
and throughout the period the 
accepted figure for this was 66,000 loads of timber. 
2 This 
figure had been calculated at the time of the Timber Report of 
1771, and based upon consumption figures for the previous decade. 
3 
A rougher calculation was made by Sandwich in 1774: 
upon the best information I can get, 
it appears that 18,000 loads will 
answer (annually)..., supposing the 
whole to be sided. But as the in- 
tention is to have only a third... 
delivered in that state, the gross 
quantity wanted for the service of 
the year will be 22,000 loads. 4 
However, 66,000 loads of timber was not enough for a three years' 
reserve. 
The reason for the consistent underestimation of the con- 
sumption figure can be attributed to the administrative inaccuracy 
typical of the century. The estimate submitted by the Navy Board 
in the Timber Report of 1771 stated that the 66,000 loads was for 
"Oak timber and knees" only; the annual average consumption for 
the years 1763-69 came to 22,283 loads of this timber. What was 
disregarded was the fact that the average consumption for all 
1. The suggestion that Sandwich was responsible for this as an 
innovation is false. See 17,71 Timber Report, p. 16; U. Middleton, 
"The Administration of Pitt and Newcastle"# pp. 148-9. 
2. A "load" weighed "somewhat over a ton" (Albion, P-103)- 
3, See Appendices VIII and IX; also 1771 Timber Report, p. 29; 
PRO, ADM 49/124; NNIM', ADM 3/188,19 Oct 1773. 
4. PRO, ADM 7/661, fo. 30. The building of a 74 gun ship used 
3,530 loads of oak of various kinds; see Sir Westcott Abell, 
The Shipwright's Trade, (Cambridge, 1948)o p. 96. 
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timber - including ash, beech, elm and fir - for the same period 
amounted to 31,070 loads annually' However, in the succeeding 
years, no-one really managed to make this distinction. All 
figures showing oak remaining in store included "thickstuff and 
plank" in addition to "oak timber and knees"; therefore an 
additional 3,793 loads annual consumption should have been 
allowed for - this being the average consumption of oak"thickstuff 
and plank" between 1763 and 1769, Thus the evidence of the Timber 
Report was misinterpreted; there was not-a three years' reserve of 
oak. 
2 
Even in the years when stocks of timber were at their 
greatest, in 1776,1778 and 1779, there was still never a three-year 
reserve. The total figure for 1779, the highest, was reported by 
the Navy Board to have been 72,154 loads. This figure included 
5,636 loads of plank and 4,639 loads of thickstuff, of which, of 
course, there is no mention in the 1771 estimate for the 66,000 
loads of "oak timber and knees". By the same calculation the other 
two peak years fall short. 
3 
1.1771 Timber Report, pp. 29,31. 
2. Thickstuff was oak plank between 10 and 4 inches thick, and 
knees were crooked pieces peculiarly suited to ship construction. 
For a full technical explanation see Albion, pp. 5- 26. 
3. See Appendices VIII and X. 
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The administration did-not recognise that the figure 
of 66,000 loads was inadequate, for the consumption figures that 
were available were confusing and contradictory. It took Middleton 
and the time which peace afforded him to work out the full imp- 
lications of the statistics presented in the 1771 Timber Report. 
By taking, "a medium of the consumption in the years 1769,1766 and 
1767", he ordered specific establishments of each type of oak to 
each yard. Straight and compass oak timber was to amount to 
66,000 loads; a further 8,7000 loads of thickstuff and 9,400 of 
plank were to be distributed. The total of oak timber alone was to 
amount to 84,100 loads, At last a realistic three-year reserve had 
been calculated. 
There were a number of reasons why these discrepancies 
remained unresolved until this time. The administrative machinery 
was not designed to connect sets of related figures which did, not 
come from the same source. Accounting methods were very crude; 
for instance, Sandwich's figures which he gives in his visitation 
notes between 1772 and 1775 bear very little resemblance to the 
official Navy Board figures for the same years. Detailed lists 
2 
1. For full details see Appendix IX. The average of the annual 
consumption figures given by Williams (p. 302) is 28,105 loads 
a year; see also M24, ADM BP/6b, 13 Mar, 10 Ap 1786. 
2. The total figures given to Sandwich at each yard were as follows; 
in 1772: 20,448 (Navy Board official figure 27,386); 1773: 41x567 
(50,027); 1774: 57,688 (68,803); 1775: 51,772 68,500). These 
figures are from PRO, ADM 7/659-662; NNM AI)M/'B/189. -90. In each 
case the Navy Board figures were for the end of the year, while 
Sandwich's were for June. Curiously he made no attempt to 
calculate the total in all six yards. 
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of timber in store were not apparently sent to the Admiralty until 
1775 L It is perhaps therefore not surprising that Sandwich's 
understanding of the problem was limited. His notes on the 
visitations show little grasp of the problem of timber supply as 
a whole. In addition, the difficulty he had in grappling with 
the figures before his speech in defence of his administration 
suggests that his knowledge of the subject was little more than 
superficial. 
2 
The inefficient method of estimating and supplying 
timber must anyway be laid at the door of the Navy Board. There 
was little idea that consumption might vary, let alone increase, 
with a larger fleet. Once the figure of 66,000 loads had been 
fixed, then the Board was quite happy to accept that as immutable 
precedent - even though, of course, it was based on a wrong 
conception of the estimate of 1771. The implications of this 
problem in the event were more serious in theory than practice, 
for vigorous administration by Palliser and Middleton kept supplies 
at a comfortable level. There was very probably some loss of time 
for the timber to seasons but in any case effectiveness in this 
1. See Wt ADM A/2699,26 Jan 1776; Al)?! B/191,1 Feb 1776. 
2. In a draft memorandum at the end of 1781 Sandwich stated that 
38,742 loads were enough for "about three years consumption". 
He was corrected once by Middleton and twice by Palliser* The 
various memoranda would ap ear to be written in this ordert G, V, 
343, dated, (by Sandwich); SaP, IV, 309-10, undated, (by Palliser); 
SaP, IV, 278,21 Jan 1782 (by Middleton),, SaP, IV, 28 , undated, (by Sandwich); SaP, IV9 278-9,22 Jan 1782 
(by 
Palliser . The actual 
correction in Sandwich's hand can be seen in Add MS 38344, fo. 285, 
undaed. 
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area depended more upon efficient handling in the yard. Besides, 
as a result of inefficient accounting within the yard, more timber 
was issued than was accounted for. Had there been three years' 
reserve "on paper"l there certainly was not that amount actually in 
the yards. 
1 Nevertheless, the effort which went into building up 
supplies before the war saw the navy through a war which made more 
demands on supplies than ever before. There were no serious 
overall deficiencies, although the administration was not equal to 
eliminating a regular occurrence of delays and local shhortages. 
ii) The Distribution of Stores to the Yards, - 
The second task of the Navy Board was that of ensuring 
that the stores were efficiently distributed to the six yards. 
In theory, the central part of the distribution procedure was a 
three-monthly estimate by the Surveyor; working from quarterly 
returns from the yards, he put before the whole Board the needs of 
each yard for the ensu-'ing three months. 
2 This was to be supple- 
mented by "Occasional Demands" from the officers to cover any 
1. See below p. 250. 
2. The foreign yards were supplied by the same system. See FP-CF, 
Fifth Report, p. 192. 
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gaps left in the distribution. The great flaw in the procedure 
was that the returns were irregular and inaccurate, and what 
happened was that the demands from the officers became the centre 
of the system. 
The officers made the demands for stores collectively. 
It was the responsibility of the Clerk of the Survey to gather the 
officers together for consultation so that their needs could be 
estimated, "so timely that the service be constantly supplied". 
1 
Guided by the technical officers, the Clerk of the Survey acted as 
a check on the Storekeeper. Thus the Master Attendant's 
"particular duty" was, with the Clerk of the Survey, "to give 
directions for making out rigging and block warrants ... for the 
guidance of the Storekeeper in making out timely demands of auch 
articles for carrying on the said works". 
2 The principle of 
cross-checking had been laid down in the previous century. Demands 
for stores were to be made, "by a general consultation of the officers 
that it may be known what is proper in each otherls department"; no 
persons "of less consideration (were) to be at those deliberations". 
3 
It is, however, clear that these deliberations and demands 
were not effective. Demands flowed into the Navy Office at such a 
I. PP-CF, p. 334. 
2. PP-CFA PP-319v 449. 
3. PRO, IND. 9315,26 Jul 1662,2 Deo 1724; also 1717 Oeconom, 
pp. 118-9. 
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rate at the height of the war that Middleton attempted to bring 
some order to the system by issuing a list of stores which needed 
an "early demand". The fact that this list contained almost every 
item of importance indicates that delays were widespread. The 
order warned that "a want of foresight in demanding of stores... 
may be-very prejudicial to the activity of the fleet". 
1 
However, the officers' foresight was the only thing that 
kept the distribution system in operation; only their experience 
kept the yards ahead of a serious distribution crisis. The real 
weakness of the system was that there was little or no idea of 
the amount of stores which ought'to have been kept in each yard. 
What happened was that the officers estimated their needs from the 
establishments of ships which the yard had to service, for the 
stores establishment of each class of ship was clearly defined. 
The constant pressure of the commanders for extra stores had 
forced the civil administration to lay this down precisely. In 
the yaxdsp however, the Navy Board had, up to this time, largely 
failed to do this; the situation had thus become unnecessarily 
complicated, for the correct amount of stores in a yard at any 
one time was never known*2 Only by stockpiling an adequate 
11 SO(a), 992,21 Jun 1780o 
2. An estimate of the amount of oak timber in each yard had been 
made in 1771, although it did not appear in the Timber Report 
of that year (see PRO, ADM 49/124; NM ADM B/190,21 Nov 1775); 
how little this was thought of, if it was ever known, through 
the 1770's, can be seen in Appendix X. 
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reserve in each yard well in advance could the "works" be supplied 
without delay. 
Before this could be remedied, however, the administration 
of the yards as a whole had to be examined afresh, and Middleton was 
not able to do this until some time after the war. In the mean- 
time, small improvements were made. During 1783 the Comptroller 
made a determined effort to cut down the amount and the irregularity 
of the demands. He differentiated between those which could be 
approved of automatically, and those which would need a Board 
decision. 1 He also tried to make all the demands arrive at the 
Navy Office on the same day. 
2 However, because of the inefficiency 
of the yard officers, he experienced a great deal of difficulty in 
enforcing both these measures. 
3 
An important part of the distribution process was the 
transfer of stores from yard to yard. Early in the century, the 
principle had been laid down that "no demands for stores of trades- 
men that can be spared or supplied from other yards in time" were 
to be made. 
4 There was a constant need for the Navy Board to 
adjust the amount of stores from yard to yard. Throughout the 
I. so(b), 5,8 Jan 1783- 
2. So(b), 153,18 Jul 1783. 
3.80(b), 157,23 Jul; 215,16 oat; 235,27 Nov 1783; 266, 
20 Jan 1784. 
4. PRO, TNm 9315,4 Aug 1698,18 Nov 1710. 
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period, the Storekeepers either could or would not co-operate. 
When stores were sent to other yards they were frequently in a bad 
and unsorted condition. 
1 More often, surpluses were not reported 
to the Board. "We cannot help expressing our surprise at the quantity 
... that has been suffered to accumulate at a very great expense with- 
out the least intimation, '!, wrote the Board in a general order, "where- 
OA enorft%O" by the Crown must have suffered am3. loss by it perishing or 
"ýUeck to inferior uses". 
2 In 1784 Middleton tried to get these 
demands to be sent quarterly, 
3 
and some years later, when the system 
grew to better order, he managed to take the Board out of the 
procedure altogether; the officers were "in future to settle such... 
correspondence between yourselves... and apply to us only in cases of 
difficulty". 4 
The naval transports which distributed the stores were 
administered by the Navy Board. Although there were only five 
transports in peacetime, 
5 their numbers were increased during the 
war. This resulted in their administration becoming sufficiently 
1. e. g. SO(a), 634,25 aY 1773; SO(b), 134,25 Jun 1783. 
2. SO(b), 348,29 Nov 1784; also SO(a), 665,22 Jul 1774" 
3. so(b), 147,15 Jul 1783. 
4. so(b), 492,7 May 1787- 
5. See PRO, At 95/95,23 Jun 1777. 
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complicated to induce Middleton to allot their management to the 
Extra Sea Commissioners. However,. "this, "caused so much jealousy 
in the Surveyors, to whose branch it was thought to belong on 
account of it carrying stores, that the Comptroller was obliged 
to take it under his _direction"; 
however, he found that it was, 
"absolutely impossible to give it that attention, which it re- 
quires°fp so the task passed into the hands of his chief clerk, 
with, Middleton claimed, a consequent loss of money and efficiency. ' 
There is no doubt that brisker administration from London 
would have done much to speed the service, for orders from the 
Board were frequently late or unrealistic. 
2 These small vessels 
averaged only about three or four round trips a year. Space in 
3 
their holds was wasted. 
4 The masters and crews were difficult 
1. NMM, M566/086, "Observations on the Navy Board". The task of 
the Extra Commissioners was "to arrange in the most frugal 
manner the transportation of stores from one yard to another, 
and to prevent as far as possible their being unnecessarily 
moved". They also examined masters' journals to see if loading 
and unloading had been delayed. See also S0(b), 350,28 Dec 
1784; PP-CF, Fifth Report, pp. 199-200. 
2. e. g, NNM, POR/G/I, 11 Nov 1777; POR/P/16,12 Nov 1777; POR/D/22, 
8 Sep 1779" 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 36/10233 (Ser. I), Muster Book of the P1 outh Trans- 
port, 1 Jan 1775 - 31 Dec 1785; ADM 36/10249 (Ser. I , Muster Book 
of the I, on Transport. Although these vessels did not always make 
the round trip from Deptford to Plymouth, 3 or 4 of these trips a 
year represents a fair average. Between the eastern yards stores 
were transported more efficiently because the smaller yard boats 
could be used for the relatively short journey; e. g. PRO, ADM 
106/2592,16,18 May 1775; also SO(b), 464,20 Nov 1786. 
4. See so(b), 405,13 Sep 1785; 491,24 Ap 1787. 
to discipline, and the condition of the vessels left much to be 
desired, for they frequently needed the attention of the yards. 
1 
There was a tendency for the stores which they were transporting 
to become damaged, especially sails, which would become mildewed 
because of incorrect stowage. 
2 Farther, these ships had a 
particular reputation, even at that time, for embezzlement. 
3 
More and more responsibility devolved upon the Resident 
Commissioners, who, in addition to their other tasks, found that 
duties involving transports increased as the war went on. Problems 
arising out of late orders and disobedience, the identification of 
each transport as it arrived and the reporting of the fact to the 
Board, and the distribution of orders to the masters all came 
within the Commissioner's compass. Once there was even a mutiny 
to quell. 
4 
Nevertheless, there was little improvement that could 
have been made in wartime, and, in any case, some of the causes 
for delay were outside the power of the Navy Board. The need 
1. e. g. NMM, FOR/D/21,25 Dec 1777; PRO, .AM. 174/18r 13 Ap 1780; ADM 174/118,18 Ap 1783. Masters of transports eventually had 
to qualify as pilots with Trinity House (NMI CHA/S/1,6 Ap 
1702,9 Sep 1784). 
2. NMM, POR/F/17,25 Sep 1779.12 Ap 1780; PRO, ADM 174/117, 
28 Oct 1781. 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/18,17 Aug 1779; 174/117, I8 Dec 1781; 
174/118,5 Jan, 28 Nar 1783. 
4. e. g. NMM, POR/. IV21,1 Feb 1779; PRO, ADM 174/116,7 Sep 1779; 
174/117,31 Oct, 19 Nov 1779; NNM, POR/F/17,8 Dec 1778f 7 Mar 1779; POR/F/16,28 Aug, 19 Oct 1776. For the similar activities 
of the Agents for Transports, see Syrett, pp. 41-44. 
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to convoy coastal vessels from early in the war caused heavy 
delay, which in turn was exacerbated by the division of 
responsibility for their organisation between the Admiralty 
and the Navy Board. The contract builders at Liverpool and 
Bristol were the most inconvenienced by the lateness of the 
stores being delivered to them from the yards, ' and the West 
Country timber merchants who delivered their timber to Plymouth 
yard also suffered. After one delay which went on for months, 
one merchant wrote to the Board: "We are all determined to load 
no more after this voyage". 
2 The dilatory handling of cargoes 
was another factor which made for delay, yet this was genuinely 
complicated by convoys, for all the ships would arrive at a port 
at once. 
3 Some stiff demurrage fees had to be paid. 
4 Such 
were the delays that the Board sent inoreasing amounts of urgent 
goods by land, since, "water carriage is become tedious and un- 
certain". 
5 
As a result of these factors, there were local shortages 
1. e. g. 1NM, POR/G/1,25 Nov 1778; ADM 33/200,8,11 Nov 1779; 
PRO, ADM 174/117,27 Aug 1782; Add MSS 38344, fos. 314-318- 
2. , ADM B/199,14 May 1779; also PRO, ADM 174/18,12 Nov, 18 Dec 1779. Convoys improved from this date; e. g. NMM, 
ADM A/2760,24 Feb 1781; A/2778,30 Aug 1782. 
3. e. g. NMM, POR/D/21,21 Sep 1778; POWD/23,28 Nov 1782; 
PRO,. ADM 174/116,27 Sep 1778; 174/17,16 Oct, 19 Dec 1778; 
174/117,1 Jul 1780; 106/3319,29 Mar 1779. 
4. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/19,11 Mar 1783, 
5. NNM, P0R/D/239 18 Feb 1782; e. go in 1780 some paper for cop erin. g 
was sent by "the Guildford Navigation" (POR/F/17,14 Ap 1780 d 
bulky articles were sent to Plymouth by land (e. g. PRO, ADM 
ßj4/117i 
5 May 1780). 
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of some significance. The most constant problem was the deficit 
of timber at the eastern yards, which stemmed partly from the need 
to supply the merchant yards of the River and of the Medway, and 
partly because the eastern yards were far less accessible than 
Portsmouth or Plymouth to the sources of English oak. 
1 As a 
result the western yards were overstocked, for the naval trans- 
ports cache nowhere near to evening out the discrepancy. 
2 
Operations at the eastern yards were held up for want of timber 
on a number of occasions; for instance, the building of the 
Polte hemus (64) was delayed in 1775 for over three months for lack 
of timber to complete her frame; at the same time, Plymouth, the 
only yard which was able to supply the extra timber, reported a 
surplus of over five hundred loads. 
3 Cables and cordage were 
also generally in short supply at Portsmouth, particularly after 
the ropehouse fire of late 1776.4 "Much expense was incurred", 
Middleton wrote later, "by a multiplication of articles at some 
yards and by a scarcity at others". 
5 
1. See PRO, ADM 106/3222, Chatham Minutes 1785; 1771 Timber 
Report, p. 16. 
2. See Appendix X. 
3. PRO, ADM 106/2592,6,15,17 Mar, 28 Jun 1775- he Po1yphemu s 
was not completed until 1782- 
4. e. g. NMM, P0R/D/21,17 Dec 1777,29 Jun 1778; POR/F/17,4 AP 
1780. There were also shortages of hammocks (PRO, ADM 174/116, 
30 Jan 1778), and, at Portsmouth, of large anchors, throughout 
the war (NNM, POR/D/21,9 Jan 1779, POR/D/23,6 May 1782). 
There was also a shortage of iron ballast from 1780 (NMM, POR/D/22, 
5 May, 23 Jun 1780) which had unfortunate effects; see below pp. 357-8. 
5. MI, M666/086, "Observations of the Navy Board". 
4 
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An illustration of the weaknesses in the distribution 
of stores is pkaviaa&tby othS sails at the western yards in the 
first years of the war. There were complaints of shortages from 
Portsmouth from as early as March 1777, and, although one contractor 
was engaged in July to assist the yard loft, the Navy Board ignored 
urgent demands from the officers throughout that year for sails to 
be supplied from the eastern yards. 
l eventually, more contractors 
were taken on (with some difficulty) at the beginning of 1778, 
while sailmakers from the fleet were brought ashore to help the 
yard sailmakers. 
2 Ourry at Plymouth, which was by now suffering 
from similar shortages, thought that the latter were a mixed 
blessing, for he proposed that contractors should be used, rather 
than, "be troubled with a set of irregular, disorderly men from 
the ships! ", as the Navy Board had ordered. 
3 Eiren with this extra 
help, the immediate supply was subject to great delay, and the 
situation was not eased until 15th March when two transports 
arrived at Portsmouth from Deptford with cargoes of sails. 
4 How- 
ever, the supply immediately deteriorated because of the increase 
1. NNM, POR/D/20,26 Max, 3 May, 19 Jul 1777; FORD/21,24,28 
Dec 1777,1 Jan 1778; PRO, ADM 174/116,7 Oct 1777- 
2., NNIIMl, POR/G/l, 29 Dee 1777; POR/D/21,1 Jan 1778. This had 
happened in the previous emergencies of 1755,1757 and 1771. 
Local contractors were a vital source of sails at this time; 
e. g. in eight months of 1779 they supplied 919 sails to 
Portsmouth (NNM, POR/D/21). 
3. PRO, ADM 174/116,22 Feb 1778; also 174/17,22 Feb 1779- 
4- NNM, POR/D/21,15 Mar 1778. 
.. ý_ _ _.. _m__., 
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in demands caused by the return of cruising ships. 
1 This shortage 
was quickly brought to the attention of the Admiralty by the 
commanders who were supervising the fitting out of their ships in 
the general mobilisation, and it was at this point that the Navy 
Board acted in accordance with custom by accusing the Portsmouth 
officers of negligence. Hood leapt to their defence; "a very 
great and becoming alacrity has been shown by the respective 
officers". 
2 Nothing more was heard from the Board. Fortunately, 
from this point the situation was brought under control, and the 
delays in fitting out decreased. 
3 
Sails were, however, an exceptional item, for there was 
at least an awareness of the number that were to be kept in store 
in each yard. 
4 Middleton's plan for comprehensive establishments 
for all stores at each yard, which he put into effect between 1784 
and 1786, represented a radical departure from the erratic and 
1. NMI POR/D/21,9 Ap 1778. 
2. NMM, POR/P/17,14 AP 1778" 
3. This was not entirely the end of the trouble. The next cargo 
from the east was of very poor quality, and was the cause of 
the first of several complaints from the Portsmouth officers (UMt POR/D/21,27 May 1778; also POR/D/23,7 Mar 1782). Also, 
although immediate needs came to be satisfied, the level of 
reserves laid down by the Navy Board was never reached during 
the war. The peak was reached at Portsmouth in October 1779, 
but this level fell away again (see NNM, POR/D/21-2, especially 
7 Mar 1779, lt 24 Jul 1780; POR/F/17,2 Nov 1778). 
4. See PRO, ALM 174/18,29 Aug 1780; also 174/19,17 Ap 1782; 
174/117,17 May 1782. 
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piecemeal system that he found. 
1 The only commodity for which 
a comprehensive and sound establishment had been set up (apart 
from sails) was the newly-introduced copper sheathing, and it is 
significant that the Navy Board was able to upbraid the officers 
less than a year later for ordering too many copper nails. 
2 For 
the first time there was a system of accounting and estimating 
from London which attempted some degree of accuracy. Charles 
Derrick observed that thisp "was truly an original and great plan, 
no idea of the kind having probably been ever entertained at any 
former period". 
3 
iii) The Administration of Stores within the Yards. 
The most complicated part of the administration of naval 
stores began once the materials had reached the yards. One of the 
most important tasks of the yard officers was the reception and 
1. so(b), 340,18 Oct; 348,29 Nov; 349,3 Dec; 351,29 Dec 1784; 
362,29 Mar 1785; 439,2 Aug 1786. A pre-requisite of these 
far-reaching orders was the reorganisation of the Standing orders. 
2. SO(a), 1003,11 Jul 1780; 1072,28 Ap 1781. 
3. Charles Derrick, p. 179. 
23 2 
inspection of contractors' goods, and the making and signing of the 
Navy Bill in payment for them. The Navy Board at this time was 
particularly concerned with this procedure, and tried to administer 
it closely by laying down precise standards. 
1 There was to be no 
correspondence between the yard officers and the contractors; all 
business had to be done through the Board. 
2 Permission for time 
extensions on delivery dates, orders for contractors to hasten 
their goods into store and orders concerning local contracts all 
had to come from London. As the war continued the number of 
enquiries increased to foram a heavy burden on the Board. 
Yet in spite of this attempt at tight control, the 
delivery of stores into the yards was subject to much abuse. The 
1662 Instructions laid down that all the clerical officers were to 
attend deliveries, while the technical officers were also to be 
present when the stores were "proper to their element". 
3 By now, 
however, the combination of the pressure of other work and of the 
huge quantity and variety of the stores coming into the yards meant 
e. g. so(a)p 767,13 Nov 1778; 1044,13 Dec 1780; 1091,14 
Sep 1781; PRO, ADM 174/18,27 Oct 1779; NMM, CHA/E/33,16 
MAY 1778. 
2. SO(b), 179,14 Aug; 226,17 Nov 1783. See Pool, pp. 33-7. 
3.1717 Oeconomy, PP. 76-7,106-7,126-7,130; PRO, IND 9315,29 
Mar 1686,13 May 1751. In 1782 the Clerk of the Ropeyard at 
Woolwich was ordered to inspect the hemp being received at the 
yard (SO(a), 1133,25 Feb 1782). 
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that most of the business devolved upon the clerks from the different 
yard offices. The Board complained during the war that it was 
"still customary to have one or two clerks"without the attendance 
of 4#e-principal officer" at the reception of stores, while the 
l 
Storekeeper at Portsmouth confessed to the Commission on Fees that 
he was "frequently under the necessity of employing a clerk to re- 
present him". 
2 The Commission recommended that the two technical 
officers and the Clerk of the Survey should inspect goods for 
quality, and that only one clerk officer need attend the inspection 
for quantity. This was eventually adopted. 
3 
The weakness of this situation was that the clerks were 
doing a job for which they had no responsibility, and for which, at 
the same time, they received fees and gratuities from the con- 
tractors. In 1779 the clerks were ordered to, "examine. eaoh 
other's books... and having done s immediately to countersign each 
for the satisfaction of the officers who are to inspect them after- 
wards". 
4 Any fraud or neglect would thus require collusion from 
1.80(a)# 883,28 Jul 1779; also 1028,27 Sep 1780. 
2. PP-CF, P-426. There seemed to be no complaints of the officers' 
inspection of stores being returned from ships. 
3. PP-CF, p. 311; Parliamentary Papers, XXXI, Report from the Select 
Committee on Finance, XIII, Jun 1? 98t p. 491. See also NMM, POR G/l, 
1 Sep 1781. 
4. S0(a)p 883,28 Jul 1779. From this point the stores were the 
responsibility of the Storekeeper. 
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at least three or four clerks, all from different yard offices; 
even so, the Commissioners commented, "where the public interest 
is so materially concerned, it cannot be too well guarded". 
1 The 
same principle of cross-checking governed the making of a Navy Bill 
by which the contractors were paid. From the records of the 
receiving clerks, the bill was made out in the office of the Clerk 
of the Cheque; it was then signed by the principal officer, and 
circulated to the other officers and their departments for 
checking and signing. Having been signed by the Resident 
Commissioner, it was then transmitted to the Navy Office, where 
it was signed by at least two of the Navy Board Commissioners. 
At least seventeen people took part in the progress of a Navy Bill; 
it was signed seven times, and checked four or five times. 
2 
Yet the effectiveness of this extensive checking was 
nullified to a large extent by the clerks' fees and gratuities. 
Established by long custom, although forbidden by numerous orders, 
3 
these fees were calculated on the value of the stores being in- 
spected, and formed the most lucrative source of income for the 
clerks. 
4 The arrangements for the reception of stores had grown 
I. PP-CPt p. 305. 
2. ibid. 
3. e. g. PRO, IND 9315,7 Nov 1729,16 Sep 1730,14 Mar 1760. 
4. Approximately 60% of the total income of clerks came from 
private sources in 1784<(PP-CF, pp. 314,340-1,360-3,390-1, 
406-7,442-5,476-9). 
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up by custom, and, naturally, the senior clerks received the more 
remunerative species. The allocation of duties was therefore 
determined by financial criteria rather than by any principle of 
responsibility or seniority, and since different yards received 
differing amounts and varieties of stores, there was a complete 
absence of standardisation in the tasks undertaken by the clerks 
in the different yards. In many cases these duties were 
established so firmly that the principal officer found himself 
powerless to allot duties as he wished. 
The weakness of this situation, as the Commission on 
Fees realised, was that the most senior clerks tended to be doing 
the least senior and responsible tasks. The most senior in each 
office, except at Plymouth, inspected and checked the Navy Bills 
for every commodity - for, of course, a fee. At Deptford, for 
instance, in each of the three clerical offices, the first clerk 
examined the Navy Bills, the second received timber and the third 
received those stores known as "instores" (smaller but more 
valuable items which were stored in the storehouses). At 
Sheerness the amount of incoming stores were small enough for only 
one clerk from each office to be involved, but the three larger 
yards worked under a more complicated system. The Portsmouth 
Storekeeper had all his nine clerks on reception duties. The 
mostoonfusing pattern was at Chatham where, for instance, the 
third clerk to the Clerk of the Cheque, responsible for hemp and 
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iron, would work with different colleagues from the other offices 
in, the reception of the two materials. The motivating factor 
that can be seen consistently running through these 'complications 
is the economic one. The more valuable the store, the more 
senior the clerk to inspect it. 
The rate of each gratuity was set rather than negotiable, 
although there were many variations even within the same yard. The 
clerks at Deptford and Woolwich charged 10/6d for the reception of 
a hundred pounds worth of English oak, and the other yards from two 
to three guineas for oak to the value of a thousand pounds. 
Plymouth, on the other hand, charged only a guinea for the same 
amount. In the River yards Riga masts were rated at between three 
guineas and ¬4-19-0 per shipload. There were further variations 
for different types of timber, and for hemp and other materials 
the rates were very confused. From such a ramshackle system it 
is not to be wondered that this source of income for the clerks was 
subject to wild fluctuations, especially since it-was completely 
dependent upon the amount of stores coming into the yards. The 
figures for 1784, given by the Commission on Fees, were at a low 
level because of the peace. The most representative figures for 
clerks involved in receipt of stores for this year were the ¬212 
taken by the senior clerk to the Storekeeper at Deptford, and the 
£93 taken by his counterpart at Portsmouth. Their established 
salary was an additional £55.1 
1. PP-CF9 PP- 340-1,444-5. See Appendix V. 
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The necessity of paying the clerks who were both 
receiving a contractor's stores and those who were checking the 
bill by which he was paid resulted in a complicated and expensive 
process. A merchant who delivered £1,000 worth of English bak to 
Portsmouth yard, for instance, paid two guineas each to the three 
receiving clerks and the Timber Measurer to the Master Shipwright, 
ten shillings to the first clerk in the Clerk of the Cheque's office 
for making out the bill, and the same amount to the senior clerk in 
the other two clerical offices. The first clerk to the Master 
Shipwright charged double this amount for the same checking. The 
senior clerk in the Commissioner's office had to be accommodated to 
the tune of another guinea before the Commissioner signed the bill, 
1 
Yet more money had to be paid to clerks in the Navy Office. 
Naturally, the contractor did not let this cut into his profit; in 
the final analysis, the navy paid for it. When all fees were 
finally prohibited in 1801 the Navy Board sent a printed letter to 
all contractors informing them of the new regulation: 
As you will in future be entirely cleared 
of this expense, we desire you will 
immediately acquaint us what deduction per 
cent you would propose to make... If the 
abatement you propose should not be 
satisfactory, your contract will of course 
be advertised. 2. 
1. See PP-CFA PP-482-505- 
2. PRO, AN4 49/36, Papers relating to contracts, 1740-1810, 
August 1801. 
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It is difficult to judge the amount of abuse that 
resulted from fee-taking by the clerks and from the loose super- 
vision by the officers in the reception and inspection of stores. 
The clerks' justification for the taking of fees was each 
individual transaction "expedited" the passage of the contractor's 
bill, but it was so well-established that they looked upon it as 
a right; no one contractor would necessarily be favoured. As 
Middleton pointed out, the fees were paid, "seemingly with the 
good will of those who paid them". 
l Certainly money was lost to 
the navy through carelessness, the allowance of short measure and 
the acceptance of sub-standard materials. In a scandal at 
Plymouth after the war, for instance, it was found that the 
reception clerks recorded nothing in rough books while coal was 
being unloaded. 
2 Middleton's informer at Sheerness told of 
similar troubles with the measuring of coal, and, he reported, 
"measuring timber ... is the greatest cheat in the world... I have 
measured a piece of timber that has been thirty foot short of 
the contents marked on it... and many other things I have bit my 
tongue many times to see it". 
3 
1. BL, II, 176,16 Sep 1784, to Pitt. The Commission suggested 
instead that the Clerk of the Cheque should pay 5015 interest 
on the bill for every day's delay (PP-CF, p. 309). 
2. S0(b), 129,20 Jun 1783; PRO, ADM 174/118,1 Ap, I May, 
20,28 Jun 1783- 
3. ShP, 151, no. 57, undated. 
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At the same time, there were plenty of cases of 
imperfect stores being reported to the Board, and of the officers 
making the appropriate abatement to the contractor's bill. 
l In- 
spection of contractors' goods was often searching. There were 
well-tried methods of testing every sort of material. Several 
tests were made on a cast-iron anchor at Deptford; then, reported 
the officers, 
we next put one fluke into a hole 
dug for that purpose and resting 
the anchor horizontally upon,,, the 
two pieces of timber, placedA the 
gin for driving piles over it and 
hove the iron ram of 7 hundred- 
weight... to a height of sixteen feet, 
which on the fall broke the shank 
shortin the middle. 2 
Absolute standards, always an object of Middleton and 
later reformers, were difficult to enforce. Timber, for instance, 
was a notoriously difficult material to measure for both quality 
and quantity. 
3 Timber Inspectors, paid so well as to be above 
the temptation of taking bribes, were first suggested by Middleton 
in 1762, Introduced by St. Vincent, their attempt and failure to 
1. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/3404,3 Oct, 18 Nov 1778; 106/3405,8 Sep 
1780; 106/3320,30 Ap 1782; ADM 174/17,30 Jun 1778; 174/116, 
16 Oct 1778; 174/18,17 Nov 1779; Mg POR/D/21,27 Sept 1778, 
27 Max 1779; POR/D/22,5 Aug 1779. 
2. PRO, ADM 106/3320,5 Sep 1781. This test was particularly 
rigorous, since a cast iron anchor would have been an innovation. 
Anchors were generally made of wrought iron. See also 11 Ap 
1782, NMM, POR/D/22,5 Aug 1779. 
3. The measurement of masts and timber even varied from yard to 
yard (SO(a), 1017,18 Aug 1780; 1083,3 Jul 1781). 
4. ShP, 151, no. 40,9 Sep 1782, to Shelburne. 
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enforce strictness proved that for many years a broad view had 
been taken of the timber served into the yards, Yet, as has 
been pointed out, if the officers had wished or been able to 
take a stronger line, the yards may have been starved of timber 
as they were in 1801.1 Stocks had to be kept up, and a certain 
amount of imperfect material was better than none. 
Much more liable to waste and corruption was the process 
of issuing stores for working in the yard. There were three 
stages in the procedure of building and equipping a ship. Firstly, 
materials would be issued to the shipwrights and other workmen con- 
cerned in building or repairing. The next stage would be the 
issue of rigging and sea stores when the ship was ready for 
launching, and, finally, the stores for the Boatswain and Carpenter 
were given out as the ship was commissioned. The process was the 
same at each stage. The principal technical officer signed a note 
when the stores were "relative to their province", which would be 
confirmed and signed by the Clerk of the Survey; this would en- 
able the former to draw stores from the Storekeeper. The Clerk 
of the Survey thus acted as a check on the two technical officers 
on all issues, while the Storekeeper was allowed to issue nothing 
without his signature. 
1. See Pool, pp. 118-9. 
4 
y 
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Once the fleet had been mobilised, the main part of the 
issuing process consisted of the distribution of stores to 
commissioned ships. 
1 Generally this involved the moveable 
stores issued to the boatswains and carpenters. Although these 
stores were "proportioned" by the Masters Attendant and Shipwright 
respectively, they were the charge and considerable burden of the 
Clerk of the Survey. 
2 The task of supplying the Western squadron 
fell mainly on Plymouth, and during the war the situation was 
urgent enough to allow the Navy Board to permit the Resident 
Commissioner to authorise the issue of stores to ships without 
the Board's prior approval. Ourry's correspondence is full of 
this subject, and especially of the slights, mostly real although 
some are imagined, which the Admirals and fighting navy in general 
dealt out to him. It took considerable moral strength to resist 
3 
demands for extra stores, "although the demands may be signed by 
4 the Admiral or Commander-in-Chief", and considerable organisation 
1. There was a further category of "present use" stores which were 
issued while ships were refitting so as to keep their sea stores 
intact. 
2. This elaborate system dated from the 1660's (PROP, IND 9315,23 
May 1663). The Clerk of the Survey signed a warrant for the 
boatswain and carpenter, and the same clerk who made out the 
warrant would make out two duplicates. One, entered into the 
"Survey Book', was given to the commander of the ship, and the 
other sent to the Surveyor's office in London. For a fee of 
2/6, a junior clerk would make out another copy for the warrant 
officers. A final copy would be made for the Clerk of the 
Survey's office. An eight months supply of stores for the Boats- 
wain contained 70 items and for the Carpenter 86 (SO(b), 223,3 
Nov 1783)- 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/116,24 May 1778,30 Jul 1779; 174/117,24 
Oct 1780,26 Aug 1781,6,8 Aug 1782, 
4. PRO, ADM 174/116,31 May 1778" 
,; 
to see that the correct amount of stores reached the correct ships. 
Eventually Ourry sent one of the Storekeeper's clerks with a store- 
house labourer on board the lighter carrying the stores to the 
fleet, "in order that the stores may be delivered on board the 
respective ships for which they are demanded". 
3' 
The principle of cross-checking between the offices 
operated in the issue as well as in the reception of stores. At 
the larger yards the general rule was that the clerk of each office 
who was in charge of the reception of a commodity from the con- 
tractors would have the charge of its issue from the storehouse. 
At Deptford and Woolwich there was the additional complication of 
the huge amount of stores which had to be transported to foreign 
yards, and there is evidence that this was slackly supervised. 
2 
As in the receipt of stores, junior clerks would be undertaking 
responsible tasks while their seniors would be making out the 
"bills of lading""- which, as might be expected, carried a small 
gratuity from the masters of the transports. 
The stores were accounted for under the headings of 
" xtrat"Ordinary"or"Wear and Tear; according to the service for 
1. PRO, ADM 174/117,8 Aug 1782. Any stores which'the yard 
failed to issue to the ships were substituted by a "Bill of 
Credit" (SC(b), 161,25 Jul 1783; NNE'!, ADM BP/49 23 Sep 
1783)" 
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2. e. g. SO(a), 1152,12 Ap 1782. 
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which the stores were intended. The clerks to the technical 
officers would "rate and value all stores wrote for" by their 
officers, and every month they would go to the Storekeeper's 
office to examine and sign the Storekeeper's monthly issues 
account, checking their list against his. The Clerk of the 
Survey's office would also check this account. This list was 
then sent to the Surveyor's office in London, so that, as one 
Standing Order ran, "by a very short retrospect... (we.... may) 
see the whole expenditure of stores on every service". 
' 
However simple this was in theory, in practise it 
failed to achieve any degree of accuracy. This was largely 
because of the weakness of the distribution of stores within the 
yard. The storecabins, in which workmen left stores when they 
stopped for the night, and which also served as distributing 
and issuing points around the yard, went entirely unchecked, 
2 
until Middleton turned to tightening up the issuing procedures 
in his first months in office. 
3 Two infirm and trustworthy ship- 
wrights, who could read, were to man each cabin and keep accounts. 
1. SO(a), 821,1 Max 1779; also 804,2 Feb 1779" 
2. The cabins were a convenient place for idlers. "If any 
artificer... is found idling his time, playing at cards, or 
lounging in the cabins... (he)... is to be immediately dis- 
charged (SO(a), 1125,22 Feb 1782). 
3. SO(a), 771,30 Nov; 773,2 Dec; 778-781,9-12 Dec 1778. 
Every week they were to receive an estimate of the stores needed 
from the Foreman of the yard, and were to demand them from the 
Storekeeper by demand notes signed by the Master Shipwright and 
the Clerk of the Survey. The Clerk of the Survey was to keep a 
continuous account of stores received and issued by all cabins 
in the yard. 
I 
Not surprisingly the success of these measures was 
limited,, partly because customs and interests of long standing 
could not be broken by one or two orders, and partly because the 
measures were to a large extent impractical. One officer con- 
sidered that the works in the yard "rendered it"impossible for the 
most comprehensive shipwright officersto ascertain with any degree 
tl%qL 
of exactnessiv 
2 
arious stores required for,,, an ensuing week". In 
addition, the overwork in the offices of the Clerks of the Survey 
meant that the storecabin accounts fell far behind. 
3 Stores 
were still issued to unauthorised persons; ý'it ww "still the 
custom in some., yards 'aej issuing stores (to anybody) by a token from 
.., which 1ecL, 1 to "great frauds *4 A year after the 
original order the demand note system for the cabin keepers had 
1. S0(a), 764,30 Oct 1778. Up to this time the officers only had 
the responsibility of making "frequent inspections" of stores 
issued to cabin keepers (PRO, IND 9315,11 Ap 1733)- 
2. PRO, ADM 106/3404,7 Dec 1778. The officer was Peter Butt. 
3. PP-CFA pp. 312,433,468. 
4. SO(a), 864,22 Jun 1779. 
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completely broken down. Entry of issue notes was being omitted; 
posting up of notes and totalling them was "much neglected"; the 
making out of notes was frequently left to the cabin keeper whose 
charge was being checked; the yard Foreman had not been briefed 
by the Master Shipwright, and stores wanted at short notice were 
just issued, as they had always been, without notes. 
1 
Little more could be expected at the height of the 
war, and Middleton had greater success after 1783 as part of his 
general reorganisation of stores. The system only functioned 
with great waste and financial loss; undoubtedly more stores 
were lost once they were in the yard than while they were being 
received from the contractors. Very often this led to delay, 
and ships often left a port with inadequate equipment. Martin 
at Portsmouth made a particular point of complaining of the 
ships which came round from the eastern yards which made "sudden 
and frequent demands on his stores'". 
2 One of Mi. ddleton's 
important measures after the war was the reorganisation of the 
stores berths of decommissioned dhips. The storehouses were, 
1. S0(a), 916,28 Oct 1779; see also SO(a), 930,27 Nov 1779; 
1080,2 Jun 1781. In 1785 each quarterman was issue& with 
a small printed book in which he had to record all stores 
issued to him (S0(b), 359,15 Feb 1785), a measure first 
suggested in 1779 (PRO, AM 106/3319,14 Jan 1779). See 
also Admiralty Visitation of 1784 (PRO, ADM 2/261, fo. 101). 
2. NMM, POR/P/18,28 Mar 1783. 
ý. ý. ý. _ý 
246 
arranged with separate berths for every 
ships' stores; so that instead of 
having all the storehouses looked over 
for a single ship's stores, every ship 
had the power of carrying off her own 
within twenty-four hours, instead of 
weeks. 1 
Through perseverence Middleton achieved a certain amount, but the 
difficulties that he faced went deeper than the superficial reform 
that he was able to implement in the 1780's. Accurate accounting 
at a low level could only be achieved with the co-operation of the 
yard officers, who, overworked and resentful of the tightening 
control of the Navy Board, and lacking individual responsibility, 
made little effort to correct waste and carelessness. 
iv) Surveying and Accounting. 
The lack of accuracy in issuing stores was exacerbated 
by completely inadequate stocktaking, or"surveying"'. The first 
weakness was that the Storekeepers were charged with the stores 
as being their own, for which they held personal responsibility by 
1. BL, III, 30, (May 1804). These berths became one of the many 
bones of contention between Middleton and Howe; see PRO, ADM 
2/261, fo. 97; 106/3222, Chatham Minutes, 1785; Charles 
Derrick, p. 179. 
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lodging sureties. Full surveys of the stores under their charge 
were therefore taken only at their death or removal from the post. 
As long as the incumbent was present, the stores in the yard were 
his concern. 
1 Since Greenway had been Storekeeper at Portsmouth 
for forty years, and Matthews at Deptford for twenty-two, it is 
hardly surprising that the Commission on Fees was concerned with 
this problem. 
2 It found that none of the Storekeepers had taken 
a full survey of their stores during their tenure of office. 
The Commission had to admit that a "general survey is 
both tedious and expensive". 
3 The time taken in 1781 to survey 
the stores at the smallest yard, Sheerness, when the Storekeeper 
moved to Woolwich, prompted Middleton, with Admiralty approval, to 
modify the system. In future only the "indoor" stores were to be 
surveyed; the incoming Storekeeper received his charge of stores 
kept "outdoors" from the books of his predecessor. 
4 Even so, a 
survey was still a considerable task. When Jacob Pownoll 
succeeded Philip Justice as Storekeeper at Plymouth in January 
1782, the clerk from the office of Storekeeper's Accounts at the 
Navy Office, who was in charge of the survey, was down at Plymouth 
1. Incumbency could be transferred. In 1785 the Clerk of the Survey 
at Sheerness and the Naval. Officer at Gibraltar were allowed to 
exchange posts, "provided they receive (each other's) stores at 
no expense to the public" (NM, . ADN BP/6a, 25 Jul 1785). 
2. PP-CF, pp" 42äi 330. 
3. PP-CFA p0310. 
4. NNE[, ADM A/2760 10 Feb 1781" ADM BP/3,6 Feb 1782; ADM A/2772, 
20 Feb 1782; S0(a), 1124,22 Feb 1782. 
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` for at least ten months. 
I 
Nevertheless, the Commission felt that the difficulties 
of attempting a regular survey of stores was overrated by the 
yard officers. It recommended that all the officers should 
survey the stores every three months, and compare the findings 
with the remains in the Storekeeper's ledger. At the end of the 
year, a clerk from the Navy Office should certify the amount. 
Only the Woolwich Storekeeper was receptive to any idea of a 
closer control of stores: 
He is of the opinion that if the 
Storekeeper's ledger is closely 
posted up (which he does), it may 
be ascertained quarterly how far 
the remains there agree with the 
articles actually in store. 2 
Although allowance must be made for the difficulties in surveying 
material which was bulky, liable to rot and consumed in large 
quantities, the Storekeepers did not make it a rule to strive 
after accuracy. "Sometimes" the Deptford Storekeeper took 
"partial surveys of particular articles for his own satisfaction; 
but in general., in the bulky articles, the remains can only be 
3 
guessed at". The difficulties of making outgoing officers 
answerable for losses meant that there was little incentive for 
I. PRO, AIRY 174/19,2 Feb 1783. 
2. PP-CF, PP. 352; also p. 355. 
3. PP-CFA p. 331. 
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any officer to do any more than to see that his accounts were 
passed and balanced; what was actually in the yards seemed at 
times immaterial. Jacob Pownoll, the first Storekeeper to be 
governed by the order of 1782 for partial surveys stated the 
situation plainly: "The quantities remaining... do not correspond 
with those remaining upon his books, which is owing to his remains 
having been carried on without any alteration for many years past". 
1 
A second weakness was caused. by a well-intentioned attempt 
to simplify the accounting of timber expenditure. In 1772 the 
Navy Board ordered that, "every rough log Yu, ht into the yard 
should, although it is carried to the sawpits, and sawn into thick- 
stuff ad frame, continue to have the rough contents markedvxon it". 
2 
The Storekeeper was then to be charged with the rough timber, "not- 
withstanding it being sawn or converted", until it was used, when he 
was to be discharged of it agreeable to its contents when first 
received into the yard. This was a logical attempt to bypass a 
stage in the accounting procedure, yet it was a failure, partly 
because of the difficulty of accounting for a log which could be 
out into two or more pieces as one piece of timber, and partly 
because the officers and men made little effort to adapt to the 
new method. "This new mode", wrote John Greenway to Edward Hunt, 
confused the quarterm. en by calling, "all parts of the conversion 
I. PP-CFA p. 463. 
2. SO(a), 599,26 Feb 17720 
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what it is not", and he feared that the workmen would never 
learn the new way. This resulted in huge errors in accounting, 
and the consumption of timber in particular was consistently under- 
estimated; this the Storekeeper could not correct. 
1 Greenway 
claimed that he, "could only take such credit as the monthly 
expense allows me; nor can the Builder act otherwise than adopting 
the quarterman's notes", 
2 
Suspecting a deficiency, Greenway had had a "cursory" 
survey of timber in the yard taken in June 1781. A third of the 
straight, and half of the compass English Oak was not there. On 
the other hand, there was a surplus of 1,556 loads of English 
thickstuff. In all, he was 8: 722.39 loads short, and he suspected 
that the brevity of the survey had had the effect of considerably 
underestimating the shortage. The result of this survey throws 
doubt on any official returns during this period, for Greenway was 
the most consistently efficient Storekeeper; if there was this 
situation at Portsmouth, what must it have been like at Chatham? 
Greenway commented: "The evil is a serious one, for the balance 
of my accounts will never agree with the state of real timber in 
the yard ... I apprehend other yards must have found this inconvenience". 
3 
1. The Navy Board was vaguely aware of this. One order to Plymouth 
complained of "great deficiencies in your acoounto... by your 
not having charged the whole that has been expended thereon" (PRO, AM 174/17,24 Har 1778). 
2. BL, II, 339 2 Max 1782. 
3. ibidr PP- 33-4. See also PP-CF, p. 427. 
-_ ýý 
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As a result of the Portsmouth Storekeeperts investigation, the 
Board reverted to the old method of accounting in 1784, and annual 
surveys were ordered to be taken by the Timber Measurers of each 
department. 1 
The final weaknesses were due to the inaccuracy of 
accounting methods within the yards. Completely different systems 
were used from one yard to another. The most logical system was 
at Portsmouth, and the Commission on Fees recommended this as a 
model for the other yards. 
2 Here all the stores received, either 
new from contractors or old from carpenters or boatswains of ships 
after a commission, were entered into a daily receipt book. They 
were then abstracted every month under the different items of 
stores, and the total value of this would be added to the Store- 
keeper's original charge, or the "debtor" part of his account. The 
"credit" (or issue) part of his account followed the same procedure 
in reverse, except that the charges were put into four books; the 
two technical officers' accounts on the "Ordinary" and "Extra" 
Estimates were entered into each one separately. From these current 
accounts abstracts were sent to the Navy Board. The Commission was 
1. SO(b), 279,20 Feb 1784; PP-GFG p. 427. 
2. For the following account see PP-CF, p. 427. By 1798 this method 
had been "generally adopted" by the other yards (Parliamentary 
Papers, XXXI Report from the Select Committee on Finance, Jun 
1798, XIII, p. 492. 
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of the opinion that if these books were kept up regularly, 
I 
and 
that the balance was struck every quarter, a "tolerably correct 
comparison" of the actual remains of most of the stores could be 
made, 
Nevertheless, the gap between the accounts and stores 
which were actually in the yards remained. Nor was there any 
effective machinery for narrowing it. When occasional surveys 
were ordered for any reason, there were some revealing results. 
The Storekeeper at Deptford was ordered to take a survey of sea- 
men's beds in his store in 1778. The findings elicited the 
following entry in the Navy Board minutes: "Acquaint him we 
are surprised to find that he only iasý' 670 new beds in store, as 
it appears by the Progress... that there were 4,64911.2 Likewise 
the Clerk of the Ropeyard at Plymouth was found to be short of 110 
tons of hemp. 
3 The Commission on Fees asked: 
Of what use is the office of the Examiner 
of Storekeeper's Accounts in the Navy Office, 
but to correct numerical errors, if the re- 
mains which appear upon paper are never 
checked with the actual remains in the yard? 4 
1. For the sort of difficulties which could occur when accounting 
fell behind at the height of the war, see e. g. NMK, POR/D/21, 
13 Feb 1779; POR/D/23,12 MAX 1783; PRO, ADM 106/3319,16 
Feb 1779; 174/18,209 29 Sep 1780. 
2. PRO, ADM 106/2597, ':. 7 Jan 1776- 
3. PRO, ADM 174/17,30 Jul, 4 Sep 1777; 174/116,7,19 Sep 1777. 
4. PP-CF, p. 310. Gregson reported that William Bateman, the 
Comptroller of Storekeeper's Accounts, was rarely at the Navy Board, "perhaps not twenty times a yea: e'(Shp, 151, no. 87,2 Sep 1782). 
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This inaccuracy was only part of the weakness of the 
system of returns to the Board in London. Frequently the accounts 
were late; sometimes they were not sent at all. Middleton did 
not exaggerate when he wrote: 
On my coming into office, I found the 
periodical returns, on which accuracy 
and oeconomy depend, lose, distant in 
time, ill-adapted and in fact not used 
for these purposes. They were trans- 
mitted indeed from the dockyards, but 
laid up in the several offices as waste 
paper. The Board, therefore, had but 
... a very uncertain account of the state 
of their stores. 1 
The system had, in fact, all but broken down. The evidence of 
the Navy Board minutes largely bears this out. Few accounts were 
sent in regularly, and those that were, were hardly central to 
the supply problem. For instance, between January and June 1775 
17% of the monthly cordage accounts never reached the Board at 
all, while 40% of those that were sent were more than a week late. 
At this time Plymouth appeared to be the most punctual, and Dept- 
ford the least. A sample of the first six months of 1778 show 
the system to have functioned even less efficiently, 
2 However, 
an examination of these minutes may well not provide the whole 
picture, for some information was included in the weekly progresses; 
in addition, there had been a tendency for yard officers to send 
their accounts to the chief clerks of the different departments at 
the Navy Office, thus bypassing the Board, 3 
1. MM, NS66/086, Observations on the Navy Board. 
2. PRO, At 106/2592,2597" 
,_3. 
Nl POR/G/l, 17 Jan-178-3o' 
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The arrival of Middleton at the Navy Office signalled 
the start of trouble for the Storekeepers. Within three months, 
the Comptroller had sent a strongly-worded order to the two 
western yards to bring their accounts up to date. It was an 
unfortunate time for the yard officers, for the mobilisation had, 
as Greenway pointed out to the 'Board, "constantly engaged the 
attention of myself and(the)clerks in the day season, and only 
left us the night; -ti and Sundays to bring up(the)accounts". 
1 He, 
however, had less trouble than Philip Justice, the Plymouth Store- 
keeper-, in fulfilling Middleton's demands. Justice had been in 
the post since 1754, and any complacency which he might have felt 
from being so long in office was to be rudely shattered. Until 
his retirement in January 1782 he received a steady stream of 
threatening letters from the Comptroller. As early as November 
1778 the Storekeeper was told that if the accounts were not sent, 
"in the two months after each quarter", the Comptroller would 
"stop the payment of your salary"a A year later the threat was 
different; "In case this order is not strictly complied(with)we 
shall on the first deficiency apply to the... Admiralty to remove 
You from your office". 
3 Eighteen months after this order Justice 
decided to retire. 
4 Nor had his successor settled in before the 
1. NNM, POR/D/21,26 Oot 1778. 
2. PRO, ADM 174/17,18 Nov 1778; see also 80(a), 569,10 AP 1771- 
3- PRO, ADM 174/18,25 Oct 1779; see also 174/116,1 Deo 1776; 
174/117,7 Jan 1780; 174/17,23 Jari 1779; 174/18,19 Jan, 
19 Ap 1780. 
4. SaP, IV, 381-2,13 Ap 1781, Middleton to Sandwich. 
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letters demanding accuracy and punctuality had started again. 
' 
By this sort of pressure and much perseverence the 
Comptroller made solid progress through the 1780's, and the 
accounts and returns from the yards were eventually restored to 
their pre-eminent position in the estimation and distribution of 
the stores to the yards. He was unable to achieve anything 
comprehensive during the war, although when shortages did occur, 
a few accounts were systematised. 
2 At first his strictures on 
punctuality and accuracy foundered upon decades of slackness. 
Weekly progresses were still late, causing "unaccountable confusion", 
and the officers were admonished in very strong language. Lists 
of all the returns and the dates by which they were to be completed 
were to be hung in every office in the yard. The Clerks of the 
Cheque were made responsible for punctuality, and in order to give 
them some authority, they were ordered, "not to receive any return 
that is not totalled in every page whore it may be necessary, and 
titled on the back". 
3 
The final task was to produce a comprehensive list of 
4 
all the returns to be transmitted. It bore little resemblance 
I. PRO, ADM 174/19,18 Ap 1782,11 Jan. 1783; 174/117,5 May 1782. 
2. Shortages of masts, anchors and iron ballast necessitated 
detailed returns (S0(a), 757,28 Sep; 772b, 1 Dec 1778; 1005, 
17 Jul 1780; P110, t 95/96,17 Jul 1780)- 
3. SO(b), 235,27 Nov 1783; 270,27 Jan 1784. 
4. so(b), 37,19 Feb; 215,16 Oct 1783; 266,20 Jan 1784. 
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to the thin and irregular accounts and returns received by the 
central administration before and during most of the wax. Of all 
the aspects of naval administration that ASiddleton turned his hand 
to in the 1780'sß the administration of stores from London was 
the most successfully reformed. Since the Comptroller was putting 
his own house in order, he did not need the sanction of Howe at 
the Admiralty. His obstacles were the yard officers and the 
inbred attitudes of carelessness and lack of incentive. Although 
Middleton was not able to apply the complete remedies for these 
wealnesses$ the machinery for distributing the stores was put into 
a respectable state of efficiency; he was justified in writing 
towards the end of the decade: 
By degrees, an entire set of returns, 
applying to the present state of the 
yards, was formed; and by an obstinate 
perseverence in the teeth of the 
irregularity, ignorance, and negligence 
of the yard officers, which were pro- 
voking beyond description, they are bought into better than tolerable order, 
and now fully reward the trouble that I 
had in establishing them. 1 
1. Nm, MS66/086, "Observations on the Navy Board". 
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v) Waste and Decay 
The Storekeeper of each yard had been charged by the 
1662 Instructions with the protection of stores from "Waste as 
Decay, Stealth or gnbezzlement". 
1 However well the stores were 
administered, there was bound to be waste, for eighteenth-century 
materials were particularly liable to rot. Sails and cordage 
were the most susceptible. One of the Master Attendants' duties 
was to regularly inspect the sail loft, and each summer the sails 
were, or should have been, aired by the storehouse labourers. 
General care for the stores was still the responsibility of the 
Storekeeper, especially to see that the magazine was "properly 
aired and preserved". 
2 
However, it was the "outstores", especially timber, 
which suffered most from decay. Three members of the Navy Board, 
Palliser, Williams and Brett, noted in 1771 that there was, "not 
sufficient room in the dockyards for stowing and seasoning the 
timber, which suffers much by being heaped one piece upon another, 
exposed to sun and rain, but that sufficient room might be had if 
3 
wanted". Timber lying around the yards was much in evidence at 
1.1717 Oeconomy, p. 77. 
2. PP-CF, pp. 351º 431. 
3.1731 Timber Report, p. 18. 
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the early Visitations, but Sandwich managed to improve the 
situation by ensuring that seasoning sheds were erected in all 
the yards. At the same time, the care of the officers and men 
was as important as improved facilities. The stowage of timber 
called for care; it was important to place a small piece of wood 
between each log or plank so that air could reach every part of 
the timber. With the pressures of wartime, the yard labourers 
had more pressing tasks. In 1781, for instance, thickstuff was 
found to be "bent and open at the ends" through lack of air. 
l 
Nor was timber the only commodity found to be carelessly stored. 
2 
Many other stores decayed because they were not stored 
away quickly enough. The disorder at the demobilisation of 1783 
was typical of the century. Most of the trouble was caused by 
the lack of storage space, especially for the more bulky stores 
such as rigging and masts. In late 1782 the Plymouth officers 
proposed erecting temporary rigging sheds, for they were, 
"apprehensive if we have not sheds and places to stow it 
immediately away ... great confusion will happen". 
3 Eventually 
the Navy Board decided to allow the lower masts to stay in the 
ships, although most of the stores came ashore as there was less 
1. SO(a), 1089,23 Aug 1781. 
2. e. g. SO(a), 609,26 Aug 1772. 
3. PRO, ADM 174/117,10 Dec 1782; also NMM, POR/P/18,9 Feb 1783. 
risk of embezzlement here. 
1 Only slightly less confusion reigned 
at a mobilisation. Ideally the oldest stores were issued first, 
but the repeated orders throughout the century on this subject 
shows that this was not easy to enforce. 
2 Since the oldest 
stores were more than likely to be at the bottom of the pile, it 
was a temptation for the supervising clerk to issue the newest to 
save time and trouble. Besides, the sea officers would demand 
the best. Middleton's scheme for berths for individual ships 
3 
did a great deal to solve this problem. 
The sea officers were even more careless. Spithead 
and Cawsand Bay were littered with anchors which had been lost 
through negligence, and had not been reported. Nicholson and 
Gilbert, the two Master Attendants at Portsmouth, wrote to the 
Board. telling it, "how light some of the officers of the service 
make the loss of an anchor and cable". 
4 The result was that the 
Navy had to pay out salvage claims for broken gear caused by the 
anchors or for anchors that were recovered, although the Master 
Attendants spent all their spare time in sweeping for them. 
5 
1. PRO, ADM 106/3320,24 Ap 1783; aM 174/19,3 May 1783" 
2. PRO, IND 9315,2 Mar 1715,21 Jun 1721; S0(a), 665,22 Jul 
1774- 
3. See above, p. 2 ; BL, III, 30, (May 1804); So(b), 223,3 Nov 
1783. 
4. Nit, POR/D/23,18 May 1782. 
5. e. g. ID1M, FOR/C/22,16 May, 11 Sep 1775; PRO, ABM 174/116, 
25 Aug 1778; 174/117,26 May 1780,8 May 1781; NMM, POR/D/23, 
3 Jun, 8 Oct 1782. 
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The navy also suffered an unnecessary loss of ships' boats. 
Martin thought it necessary to repeat to the captains, "in the 
strongest terms" the orders about frugal expenditure of stores, 
d since he reckoned that, "it has been the practice to let the 
boats be damaged or go adrift when those boats have not pleased 
them". 1 
The final point at which naval stores were wasted was 
when they were sold off as being no more use. When enough old 
stores, "sufficient for twenty to twenty-five lots" (of not more 
than twelve tons each) had accumulated, they would be divided into 
lots under the direction of the Storekeeper and sold at an auction 
by the Commissioner. 2 Most of these stores consisted of old rope 
and cordage, inferior hemp and rigging. Between 1765 and 1785 the 
Navy sold 14,389 tons of this type of store; 
3 there were 62 such 
sales between 1774 and 1783, ranging from two in 1775 to fourteen 
in 1783.4 Prices ranged from five to seven pounds a ton at the 
western yards, but better prices were to be had in the River, 5 
1. NMM, POR/F/18,28 Mar 1783. 
2. PRO, IND 9315,9 Jul 1749,31 Oct 1750. See Pool, p. 103. The 
sale of naval stores needed the formal covering authority of a Privy Seal (e. g. NM, ADM B/190,11 Aug 1775). This approval. (a custom of long standing) may have been necessary because 
special significance was attached to the alienation of a Crown 
asset,, I an grateful to Mr. Bernard Pool for this suggestion. 
The Navy Board was responsible for selling large ships, but the Resident Commissioners sold off sixth rates, 
3. NNM, AIM BP/6b, 27 Jun 1786. 
4, NNMM, 4DM A/2675-2794- 
5- PRO, ADM 174/17,2 Jun 1778; ]NM, POR/D/21,16 Sep 1778, 
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Middleton was convinced that the sales of old stores 
were liable to much corruption. 
1 It is true that stores were 
improperly surveyed, and that on occasions perfectly good stores 
were out up and sold as useless. A more frequent occurence was 
that old rope (known as junk) was sold at Plymouth when it was 
needed at the River yards for caulking purposes. 
2 Not long 
after the Comptroller came to the Board he started tightening up 
the regulations in regard to the officers and clerks who priced 
the stores and managed the sales. 
3 Later the procedure for 
the transmission of bills to the Treasurer of the Navy was 
formalised. 4 
One of the greatest weaknesses, however, was the 
slowness with which the merchants who bought the old stores 
took away their goods. The only way that merchants could 
extend the month's time limit for the removal of their goods 
was to obtain permission from the Navy Board; this permission 
was rarely withheld, and the result was that the yard officers 
1. e. g. PRO, 30/8/111 (part 2), fo. 139,16 Sep 1784, Middleton 
to Pitt; see also NNM, CHA/E/33,22 Sep 1781. 
2, e. g. SO(a), 570,30 AP 1771; 704: 21 Feb 1777; 929,27 Nov 
1779; PRO, ADM 174/19,9,16, Ap 1783; N19M, POR/F/16,13, 
23 Jun 1777" 
3.50(a), 883,28 Jul 1779; 986,12 Jun 1780; PRO, ADM 174/117, 
20 Aug 1782. 
4.80(a), 1193,11 Sep 1782; S0(b), 92,7 May; 126,16 Jun 1783. 
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did not know what to do with the amount of stores which piled 
up in the yard. 
1 Greenway at Portsmouth was particularly 
worried about the difficulties of dividing the stores into lots, 
and claimed that he did not have enough labour for this task. 
2 
An enormous amount of old stores accumulated at the two western 
yards, and especially at Portsmouth, towards the end of the war, 
The accumulation of too many old stores also had the disadvantage 
of keeping down prices when they were sold. 
3 
The sale of old stores completed the process of the 
administration of stores which was subject to waste from decay 
and embezzlement at every stage. However, inefficiency and 
shortcomings in the organisation were more responsible for loss 
of materials and money than the faults for which the yards have 
long been well known. Shortages and delays and mistakes in 
Planning and distribution had more effect upon the output and 
cost of the yards than petty thieving fand individual corruption. 
The system had developed into a position whereby it wasted 
1. The merchants would forfeit their deposit if their goods were 
not taken away within the month; this was later changed to 
forty days (so(b), 457,17 Oct 1786). 
2. PRO, ADM 174/116,20 Oot 1778; NI , POR/D/22,18 Sep 1779, 4 Ap 1782; POR/G/1, (? ) Jun 1780 (enclosure); POR/D/23, 
31 Mir 1783. 
3. The Commissioners more than once withdrew lots from sale 
because they had "reason to believe a strong combination" 
among the bidders (e. g. NM, POR/F/17,8 Dec 1778; PRO, ADM 
174/117,4 May 1781. 
1 
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resources at every point. Yet this waste had to be tolerated 
if the administration was to continue, for working with materials 
which were difficult to work and measure, the lack of incentive 
for the clerks to be accurate and honest and the difficulty of 
implementing adequate central control were all, by the terms of 
the eighteenth century, insurmountable problems, 
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Chapter Five. Technical Problems and Yard Facilities. 
i) Innovation and Inventions. 
The period of the American war differed but little from 
earlier in the century in the field of technical advance. The 
inherent strength of wood limited developments in ship design, 
and, in fact, the wooden sailing ship was to develop only a little 
more before-its eventual demise. The major problems which engaged 
the attention of the Navy Board and the yards were largely con- 
cerned with lengthening the life of materials and equipment, and 
finding adequate substitutes for stocks of timber which seemed 
likely to disappear. Attempts to solve these problems were 
essentially pragmatic, and although certain advances were made, 
efforts were piecemeal and pedestrian. The one exception to this 
rule was the introduction of copper sheathing; the importance of 
this process merits separate consideration. 
l 
The Navy Board had long been a conservative influence 
upon design; new ideas had at least to be proven before they 
were considered. A theoretician auch as Jeremy Bentham's younger 
brother, Samuel, .. ''ý found such an attitude uncongenial. Jeremy 
wrote of him : "From the Navy Board ... he knew he had nothing to 
1. See below, pp. 274-295. 
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expect. Their rules were against him: and their prejudices 
still more%1 Theory was considered unnecessary; Sir John 
Williams reportedly said that if Samuel, "had the abilities of 
an angel, they would be of no use to him". 
2 
However, this attitude was not confined to the Navy 
Board, for the Board had its own troubles in making new ideas 
acceptable among ships' commanders, who, because of the large 
amount of control they exerted over the fitting of their ships, 
often obstructed the wishes of the Board. When the Admiralty 
found that there was difficulty in getting carronades accepted13 
Middleton reoalledg in a letter to Sandwich, that copper 
sheathing had been slow in gaining approva. lq "but by making it 
a favour till its merits were acknowledged it has become the 
wish of all parties". 
4 The Comptroller predicted correotly, for 
carronades were eventually accepted. In spite of difficulties 
with the Ordnance Board and with fitting the new guns, the 
prejudice of the captain had largely disappeared by the 
1. T. L. S. Sprigge (ed), The Correa ondenoe of Jeremy Bentham (London, 1968) II, 109, April May 1778. 
, 
Sae also Knight, 
pp. 178-184. 
2. Spriggs, II, 170, 
3. I1 M, AM A/2749,8 Mar 1780, 
4. SaP, IV, 416,12 Max 1780; see also Spriggs, II, 109. 
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beginning of l7ß2.1 In theory it was very necessary that the 
dockyard and sea services kept in close touch over technical 
matters. Complicated procedures existed by which captains had 
to report closely on the sailing characteristics of their ships. 
2 
However, more often than not, the Board was in conflict with the 
commanders, and never more so when these commanders wished to 
implement a pet scheme of their own. 
3 
In the Navy Board's defence it must be stated that it 
examined many inventions which were totally impractical, A 
variety of pumps, inventions for "cannon-proof ships" and a 
machine for "rowing ships against the wind or water without the 
assistance of men" were proffered to the Board for inspection. 
4 
Familiarity with such schemes tended to make the Commissioners 
sceptical of new ideas, and although many were tested, virtually 
all were rejected. There was, however, more chance of having an 
invention accepted if the Admiralty was approached first. Between 
1774 and 1783 it ordered the professional board to test nearly 
forty inventions from private sources, but every one was rejected. 
1. MMM, ADM A/2752,26 Jun; A/2758,15 Dec 1780; BP/1,18 Dec 
1780; A/2760,26 Feb; 2770,8 Dec 1781; BP/2,12 Dec 1781; 
BP/3,13 Ap 1782. For Mulgrave's opposition see SaP, IV, 
413-422. On the other hand, an enthusiastic reception of an 
innovation by an Admiral could speed acceptance. See PRO, AD 
174/116,25 Aug, 4 Dec 1778- 
2, PRO, ADM 174/19,16 Ap 1782; So(b), 169,4 Aug 1783- 
3- e. g. Sir Charles Douglas's gunnery innovations were successful, 
but his fertile imagination had to be restrained; see BL, T, 
267-8,12 Jul 1779, Douglas to Middleton; ibid, p. 282,28 Ap 
1782; NMM, CHA/E/33,9 AP 1781. 
4. e. g. 1 M, ADM A/2753,15 Jul 1779; A/2761,5,12 Mar 17810 
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Nevertheless, once the Board had been convinced of the 
practicability of an idea there was no lack of willingness to 
experiment. Apart from carronades and copper sheathing, there 
were advances in the making of cordage and chain moorings, while 
there was a long series of experiments with "fresh water machines" 
fitted to ships. 
1 Once the troubles with Coles 's chain pump were 
resolved, the navy had a more efficient pump. 
2 A small improve- 
ment was also made to ships' blocks. 
3 However, the effect of 
the war was to retard . innovations, for the Navy Board had little 
time to devote to anything which was not essential to the daily 
running of, the war; 
4 
on the other hand, accepted ideas were 
implemented more quickly under the pressure of hostilities. 
Some problems were never solved. While the adoption 
of copper sheathing largely cured the problem of the worm, dry 
rot remained a constant source of worry. Ships built with "green" 
or unseasoned timbers were most likely to develop this condition. 
As a preventive step, Sandwich intended that considerable care 
1. S0(a), 626,24 Mar 1773; N, FOR/F/15,23 Mar 1775; 
PRO, AIK 95/95,23 Oct 1775,7 Jul 1777,2,13,21 Jul, 
3 Sep 1779" 
2. SO(a), 620,6 Jan 1773; 832,13 Ap 1779. See Falconer, 
pp. 222-3. 
3. SO(a), 575,14 Aug; 581,7 Oct 1771.; so(b), 43,28 Feb 
1783. See K. R. Gilbert, The Portsmouth Bloclcmaking Machin`, 
(Science Museum, 1965) p. 2. 
4. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/1274,7 Feb 1782; 174/19,20 Jun 1783. 
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should be taken to see that ships were built with properly.. 
seasoned wood. The newly-constructed seasoning sheds were to 
contain enough timber to ensure that the wood had been seasoned 
properly before it was issued for use. Two-thirds of it was 
to be stored in a sawn state, and a third rough. ' Thiokstuff 
was tobe sawn at least a year before it was used, and knees 
were to be shaped as soon as they were brought into the yard. 
2 
One of the first orders which Sandwich issued was that ships 
were to be left in frame for a year to season on the stocks. 
3 
However, the problem of damp penetration in hulls under con- 
struction was not solved by this order, although some success 
was achieved after the war with wooden housing built on top of 
the ships. 
4 
However, as a private shipbuilder, William Wells, 
pointed out to Sandwich, it was, "necessary that equal care 
should be taken of these ships after they are built as before". 
5 
1,20(a), 612,4 Sep 1772; 649,16 Nov 1773- 
2.80(a), 567,4 AP 1771. Speoial instrnotions were issued 
for storing thiokatuff (S0(a), 1089,23 Aug 1781). 
3. Frigates were to lie for six months. This order was suspended 
during hostilities (S0(a), 567,4 Ap 1771; 728,22 Nov 1777; 
7389 18 Mar 1778; SaP, Is 363,16 Mar 1778; NMr ADM A/2732, 
21 Oat 1778; B/197,0 Oat 1778, Admiralty to Navy Board; 
S0(b), 47,4 Mar 1783). 
4. e. g. SO(a), 594,2 Jan 17721 rr r, AM A/2792,2 Oct 1783; 
ADM BP/6b, 3 Aug 1786. 
5. saP, It 15,20 Feb 1771. 
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In the ships in Ordinary, especially, dry rot flourished near 
the waterline, where conditions were particularly wann and damp. 
1 
During these years many ideas were tried in order to keep damp 
from the insides of ships. Wells suggested that plank should 
be stripped from ships in Ordinary to allow a free circulation 
of air, and this was ordered. 
2 Windsails were tried in an 
effort to increase ventilation, and elaborate instructions were 
issued for the operation of these machines. 
3 Later, patent 
stoves were used. Canvas awnings were used to protect ships 
4 
in Ordinary from rain and sun, but these were not satisfactory, 
and experiments were made after the war with "sheds" built on 
the ships. 
5 Yet in spite of these efforts, the decay of ships 
at anchor continued. "The curse of wooden ships for centuries 
6 
... "s, writes Albion, "dry rot remained unmastered to the end". 
Many attempts were made to find a solution; in one drastio 
instance, which the First Lord saw during the 1773 Visitations 
the timbers of the Act eon (28) were boiled. The final effect 
1. See Albion, PP. 11-15,82-85- 
2, SaP, 1,16; SO(a), 571,10 May 1771- 
3- S0(a), 609,26 Aug 1772; 624,24 Maxi 636,20 Jul; 
639,10 Aug 1773; 663,24 Jun; 665,22 Jul 1774" 
4. SO(a), 996,29 Jun 1780; S0(b), 7 Ap 1783. Neither 
idea was new; see Baugh, p. 244. 
5. SO(a), 665,22 Jul 1774; PRO, AM 174/1169 30 Ap 1776; 
174/19,30 Jan 1783; 20(b), 80,22 Ap; 101,16 r 1783; 
IMP POR/P/18,15 May 1783. 
6. Albion, p. 11. 
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is not known, but Sandwich observed at the time that, the 
timbers ha4Yrexjyunfavourable appearances"already', for they were 
"greatly cracked and rent". 
l Although he enjoyed little success, 
Sandwich at least grappled with the problem. 
The final technical problem was the provision of masts 
of sufficient quality and quantity. R. G. Albions contention 
that the American war disrupted the supply of pine trees from 
New England, and that this in turn created a grave shortage of 
masts for ships of the line has. recently been challenged. 
2 
Certainly, his idea that the yards were forced to revive the 
"lost art" of making up masts from several pieces of wood in- 
stead of relying on large sticks is false. 
3 "The lower masts 
of the largest ships",, wrote Falconer, "are composed of several 
piepes united into one body.. oa e mastq formed by this assemblage, 
is justly esteemed much stronger than, one consisting of any 
single trunk, whose internal solidity may be very uncertain". 
4 
Albion also asserts that the Navy Board-failed to stockpile 
sufficient sticks, but in January 1778 there were 149 rough masts 
of between 27" and 34" diameter at Portsmouth. 
5 In faot, the 
1. PRO, ADM 7/660, fo. 71. That Sandwich fully realised the 
importance of seasoning is proved by his analysis of the 
shipping situation in his notes on the 1774 Visitation (PRO, 
ADM 7/661, fos. 74-82). 
2. See Albion, pp. 281-3151 Williams, pp. 315-327; also Mackesy, 
P-169. 
3. See Albion, pp. 286,288. 
4. Falconer, p. 189. In May 1778 Plymouth yard was ordered to prepare eight masts "out of the smallest sticks" (PRO, ADM 174/17,16 May 1778)- 
5- NMM,, POR/D/21,13 Jan 1778. 
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tactical surprise and efficiency of the French at Ushant merely 
embarrassed an already pressing situation, although Plymouth 
supplied the Channel fleet in August 1778 very quickly by 
stripping the ships in Ordinary of their spars. 
Nor was the cessation of supplies from America followed 
by any fall in the quality of materials. The navy now had to 
buy its pine trees from the Baltic port of Riga, but sticks from 
here were, "preferred above all others for their quality". 
l It 
is true that the largest of these masts were not as big as those 
from America, but Albion fails to point out that sticks of over 
thirty inches diameter were rare, even from New England. 
2 During 
1780 the yard officers were asked to suggest ways of reducing mast 
consumption, and the Portsmouth officers considered that since 
masts were now made of Riga fir, they could be made one inch less 
in diameter, "as they will be superior in strength, much cheaper 
and of less weight aloft: 
3 On the face of its there seems little 
to put the navy at any paxticular disadvantage in this war. 
The real problem was the great length of time which had 
to be spent in making these masts. 
1. Albion# p. 31. 
2. See Williams, P"314. 
As early as February 1778 
3. INM, POR/D/22,24 Ap 1780. Models and drawings of made 
masts were sent to Plymouth in August, so this advice may have been taken (PRO, ADM 174/18,23 Aug 1780). A further 
reduction was advised against (PRO, ADM 106/3320,11 Sep 1783). 
.... .. ý......, ý. F 
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there were six extra gangs in the Portsmouth mast house, and 
the Master Shipwright wanted them to work "nights"'. In April 
they could still not keep pace, and by August the shipwright 
officer was resisting Navy Board attempts to put more gangs into 
the mast house on the grounds that it was impractical. 
2 It was 
not only after the damage to Keppel'a fleet at Ushant in August 
1778 that the shipwrights had to be taken off other projects to 
help with masts. 
3 However, after this experience the western 
yards built up a stock of "made" masts, in which considerable 
4 
task they were aided by contractors who made the smaller spars. 
This stock had not been necessary before, and because of the 
former lack of standardisation, it is doubtful whether it would 
have been practicable. 
5 
The whole question of the quality of masts is complex, 
for their efficiency and longevity were dependent on many factors. 
The weakness of Albion's case is that he fails to consider mast 
consumption over the century as a whole. Complaints from sea 
1. NI4N, POR/D/21,15 Feb 1778. 
2. ibid, 21 App 21 Aug 1776. 
3o e. g. NMM9 POR/D/22,6 Sep 1779,21 Mar 1780. 
4. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/18,17 Aug 1778; 174/116,27 Aug 1779; 
174/117,5 May 1782. An establishment was not set up at 
Plymouth until 1780 (174/18,12 Jun 1780). 
5. This standardisatiori, Sir John Williams informed the King, 
"was much wanted, because now the furniture of one ship of the same class will suit any other of that class, which before it would not" (G, III, 59,11 Jan 1774). 
-i 
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officers concerning their masts were not new to this war. Daniel 
Baugh, writing of the heavy loss of masts and the consequent com- 
plaints from the sea service during the war of 1739-48 is, "pretty 
well convinced... that overmasting and the reckless crowding of 
sail were the most important factors. " 
1 Another factor which 
is difficult to assess is the quality of shipboard maintenance; 
another was the quality of the rigging. When the shortage of 
great masts in Europe began to worry the Navy Board in 17$0,2 
the yards were ordered to issue rigging in good time, 
as there have been many instances during 
the present war of ships losing and 
springing their lower masts and top masts, 
from a want of time to enable them to 
stretch their standing rigging before 
they... proceed4on service. 3 
The sea service had just as important a role to play as the dock- 
yards in preserving the nation's masts. Consumption was un- 
doubtedly high during this period, but it is wrong to look at 
the Amerioan war in isolation from the rest of the century. 
The navy had many technical problems to overcome, and 
the lack of effective maintenance added to them. This was true 
both for ships in and out of commission. Not the least of the 
1. Baugh, pp. 278-9n. 
2. NMM, ADM BP/I, 27 Mar, 8 Dec 1780; ADM BP/2,3 Mar 1781. 
3. SO(a), 1018,24 Aug 1780; see also S0(a), 637,30 Jul 1773" 
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problems of the central administration was the discipline of the 
seamen of the Ordinary, for initiative from London was often 
robbed of its effectiveness by slackness at this level. At 
the same time, progress was hindered by an attitude to innovation 
which reflected the general lack of sympathy with change; ideas 
were in tune with the pre-industrial age which was fast drawing 
to a close. The design of faster and better ships lagged behind 
the French because of a lack ofq and, indeed, feeling against a 
theoretical approach. The only ideas that were likely to 
convince the Board were those which were practical and proven, 
originating from someone within the service with professional 
experience. The coppering of the fleet illustrates how, once 
the professional board had been convinced, it was possible for 
an innovation to be quickly implemented. The speed and success 
of this undertaking was the most impressive achievement of the 
dockyards during this period. 
ii) The Introduotion of Copper Sheathing. 
The most important technical innovation to come out of 
the American War was the sheathing of the hulls of ships with 
copper, and it was the British who developed this technique and 
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kept the initiative from the French. The effect of the copper 
was to keep the ships relatively free of weed, and thus improve 
their sailing performance, while at the same time it afforded 
better protection for the timbers against the ravages of the 
worm than the existing sheathing. Of the first of these 
advantages there is ample evidence, and the development did 
much to offset the numerical disadvantage of the British fleet. 
Kempenfelt's much-quoted dictum that twenty-five coppered ships 
of the line were enough to "tease" the combined French and 
Spanish fleet in the Channel in 1779 served to illustrate the 
inefficiency of the enemy rather than the advantages of the new 
sheathing, but coppered ships quickly became a factor to be 
taken into strategic as well as tactical consideration. 
i 
Individual reports were never less than enthusiastic. Musgrave 
wrote that his ship, "answered beyond my hopes as her superiority 
in sailing is hardly credible". 
2 This "superiority" led to 
problems unless every ship in a squadron had been coppered; 
wooden ships, were, according to Graves, "unable to act with 
copper bottoms, for it is very difficult to keep a close line 
1. BL, Ii 296-7,5 Sep 1779; see also the Cabinet Minute of 6 Sep 1781 (SaP, 1V, 63). 
2. SaP, III, 34,2 Jul 1779; see also other letters to Sandwich, 
SaP, IV, 49,17 Aug 1781, Darby; 57,3 Sep 1781, Mutgrave; 
82,13 Jan 1782, Kempenfelt. 
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with them and they are unable to keep up upon a pursuit". 
' In 
spite of these difficulties, copper proved its worth in more than 
one action. Rodney attributed much of his success in capturing 
six Spanish ships of the line off Gibraltar in 1780 to the copper 
sheathing of his ships, and de Grasse excused his lack of success 
in the West Indies against Hood by his relative lack of 
manoeuverability. 
2 
While the introduction of copper was an enormous advantage 
at sea, the technical problems involved remained with the civil 
administration until long after the war. It is worth examining 
these developments in detail, for they particularly illustrate 
the professional attitudes of the Navy Board and the dockyards 
towards untried methods and towards problems of which they had 
no full understanding. The search for a sheathing which would 
keep the hull of a ship protected from the boring mollusc known 
3 
as the teredo navalis or "worm" had been continuing for years. 
The sheathing used up to this time was thin plank laid on a coating 
of tar and hair, but this covering was itself very susceptible to 
1. SaP, IV9 174,4 Jul 1781; also BL, I, 62-3,24 Jun 1780, 
Young to Middleton. 
2. Mackesy, P"322; G, yr 346, Jan 1782. 
3. See Bhrman, p. 17; Maurer Maurer, "Copper Bottoms for the Royal 
Navy; Milita Affairs, XIV, 1950, pp. 57-61; J. R. Harris, The 
Copper King, Liverpool, 1964), p. 45, and, "Copper and Shipping 
in the Eighteenth Century", Economic History Review, XIX, 31, 
1966, pp. 551-2; G. Rees, "Copper Sheathing, An Example of 
Technological Diffusion in the Biglish Merchant Fleet", 
Journal of Transport History, It 1971, pp. 65-6. 
.ý 
to the worm. The importance of finding an efficient alternative 
increased as the worm was brought home from tropical waters, and 
lodged in wood and water in the Medway, particularly at Sheerness, 
and to a lesser extent at Portsmouth. First experiments with 
copper were made at the end of the Seven Years War, when the 
frigate Alarmlwas covered with copper and was sent on a two-year 
voyage to the West Indies. Although the material was shown to be 
particularly successful in keeping the hull clean, the problem of 
corrosion by the action of the copper on the iron bolts which 
secured the main frame and the planking, seemed insoluble, and 
this discouraged further developments. l 
Although desultory experiments continued, little progress 
was made in the first yearn of Sandwich's administration; but by 
1775 the Navy Board began to show renewed interest. There is no 
firm evidence to account for this new enthusiasm, but the apparent 
inability of the contractors to supply enough sheathing board may 
have induced the Commissioners to turn elsewhere. 
2 It is more 
probable that the arrival of the Hawke sloop, ooppered, from India 
1. Corrosion was caused by electrolytic or galvanic action, 
which was not fully understood until well into this century. 
Some more ships were coppered in the 1760ts (NMM, ADM B/174, 
6,8 rear 1764; B/178,3 Oct 1766; 3/181,15,29 Jul 1768; 
PRO, ADM I/238,5 Feb 1765, Burnaby to the Admiralty). See 
also A. L. Cross, "On Coppering ShipE'- Bottoms", American 
Historical Review, XXXIII, 1927-8, pp. 79-81. 
2. NEM, CHA/N/3,22 Ap 1771; PROP ADM 7/659,16,16 May 1771; 7/660, fo. 67; PRO, ADM 95/95,1 Nov 1775, 
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after a five-year cruise gave some impetus, for it showed that 
protection against corrosion was possible. Those bolt heads 
which had been covered with lead were "still sound and whole", 
although those which were not were "almost eat in two by the 
effects of the copper". 
l In the next two years a number of 
small ships were sent off on voyages with copper bottoms with 
"compositions" to protect the iron bolts from corrosion. 
2 By 
the end of 1776 methods had been developed which were to form 
the basis of those which were adopted throughout the war. The 
Pegasus sloop and the Ariadne (20), for example, were ordered to 
be coppered once they had been proved to be "tight". The bottom 
was then painted with a mixture of white lead and linseed oil, on 
which the copper plates were to be fixed with nails made of an 
alloy which included copper; this came to be known as "mixed" 
or "compoundlimetal. The same material was used to make the 
braces and pintles. The false keel was to be fixed to the main 
keel with copper staples with a thin sheet of lead between them. 
3 
However, the problem of corroded bolts was still not 
solved, and the Admiralty decided to make an experiment with pure 
1. PRO, Aux 7/662, foe. 21-22. 
2" PRO, AM 95/95,23 Oot, 8 Nov 1775,22 Jan, 2 Feb, 21 Max, 
16 May 1776, By the end of 1776, one 32 gun ship, one 24, four 20's and a sloop had been coppored (N1M, ADM B/193, 
12 Deo 1776). 
3" PRO, AM 95/95,10 Dec 1776. Braces and pintles were the hinges by which the rudder was fixed t the hull. The ere first made of the mixed metal in June 
(ibid, 
11 Jun 1776). 
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copper bolts. Several small ships were ordered to have all 
fittings below the loaded waterline made of copper. 
' 
The Navy 
Board had doubts about this measure at the start, for it thought 
that the relatively soft material would nat allow the bolts to 
be driven home with sufficient firmness, nor, once fitted, would 
they be strong enough. The Admiralty therefore agreed to limit 
the use of these bolts to those ships building in the royal yards, 
and, in fact, this method of preventing corrosion was not developed 
for ships of any size. 
2 
The next year, 1778, saw a large number of small ships 
being coppered, but the administration hesitated before issuing 
any general orders for applying the process to all ships. No 
solution to the protection of iron bolts had yet appeared, and 
copper bolts were trusted only for chips of fifth and sixth rates. 
However, those ships already coppered had been seen in action and 
had impressed the sea officers; 
Sandwich to copper more ships. 
3 
pressure therefore increased on 
According to Middleton twenty- 
five years later, it was at this point that he overcame Sandwich's 
reluctance to commit himself to coppering ships of the line, and 
that a visit to the King, with-the Comptroller's encouragement, 
1. . bid, 3 Feb 1777. 
2. NNII9 ADM A/2711,8 Jan 1777; ADM e/193,11,16 Jan 1777. See 
also Harris, Co er Bing. p. 46. Copper bolts were still being 
used in 1778 PRO, ADM 106/2597,15 Jun 1778). 
3. SaP, UI, 160,8 Sep; 168-9,21 Sep 1778, Keppel to Sandwich. 
-. 1 
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finally persuaded the First Lord to issue orders to copper every 
ship in the fleet. ' Middleton's reminiscences were prone to 
inaccuracy; in fact, in September 1778 the Admiralty asked the 
Navy Board if it was advisable to copper the ships of the line, and 
it received a very cautious reply, recommending instead two fifty 
gun ships, and asking for more time until the copper on the frigates 
was sufficiently tested. 
2 
However, three months later a similar request for advice 
found the Navy Board with a more confident assessment of the 
chances. of extending the process to ships of the line. The reason 
for this change of opinion was an apparently successful protection 
for iron bolts provided by the application of thick paper between 
the copper plates and the hull, which was to create an effective 
watertight barrier between the copper and the iron bolts. 
3 This 
had been tried out on a 44 gun ship (probably the Jupiter , and 
the result made Middleton confident that this method would be the 
answer to the problem of corrosion. 
4 In May the Admiralty issued 
a general order to copper all ships below 32 guns, and in July the 
1. BL, III, 16, Ap 18031 29, May 1804. 
2. Nrmr, ADM A/2731,19 Sep 1778; ADM D/197,29 Sep 1778. 
3. NNM, ADM x/2735,16 Jan 1779; ADM B/197,27 Jan 1779. The 
method had been suggested by Roger Fisher, a Liverpool ship- 
builder and naval contractor. Tarred paper had been used before under wooden sheathing (PRO, IND 9315,24 Mar 1730)" 
4. NrM, ALM B/198,23 Feb 1779. 
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same was to apply to all ships below 44 guns. 
' At the same time 
selected line of battleships were to be coppered, the first of 
which was ordered in Februaxy 1779.2 From this point, the Navy 
Board issued a long series of orders in a constant search for 
improvement, for the idea of trying to protect the bolts by a 
barrier was to prove more than difficult to carry out. 
3 Whether 
or not he knew it, Middleton was taking a risk, for he based his 
advice on experiments which were neither thorough, nor, as events 
were to prove, did he leave sufficient time f 9r a true result to 
emerge; as one historian has noted, "should anything go wrong with 
a technical process adopted at this headlong pace, the results could 
be disastrous". 4 
Nevertheless, the methods evolved by trial and error before 
and during hostilities prevented the worst effects of corrosion 
from being felt until after the war. The insides of the copper 
plates were given three coats of white lead mixed with linseed oil. 
This mixture, the Board announced with confidence in its first 
Standing Order on the subject, "from repeated experiments... prevents 
1. SO(a), 848,25 May; 871,13 Jul 1779, 
2. PRO, A] 95/95,20 Feb 1779. The ships were the Invincible (74) 
and the Russell (74). 
3. Between 1779 and 1783 the Board issued 82 Standing Orders direotly 
concerned with copper. 
Q. Harris, Copper and Shipping, P" 554- 
z 
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the verdigrease frone gathering and injuring the iron.... ana- ...... is 
of great use in preserving the copper itself. "Z However, a year 
later the Board gave a contractor named Dawson a monopoly of 
supplying the yards with his composition, which was held to be 
more effective. 
2 The bottom of the ship was to be "dubbed as 
smooth as possible", and painted with tar. Between these two 
3 
barriers the paper was placed, which itself was dipped in oil of 
tar and Dawson's composition. The paper was a constant problem, 
and there were many changes in methods and materials during the 
war. "Strong brown paper" was changed for cartridge paper, and 
again for prepared paper supplied by Dawson; sometimes the hull 
of the ship was to be completely covered by paper, sometimes there 
was paper only underneath the edges of the plates, and sometimes 
there was a combination of these two methods. ' Once the paper 
was thoroughly penetrated by the composition, the technique was 
for it to be applied while still wet, so that it adhered to both 
the hull and the plates. 
Minor problems were solved as the war progressed. It 
was found that the copper plates by the bow were damaged when the 
anchor was weighed, and this was partially solved by rounding off 
1. SO(a), 8289 17 Max 1779; also 793,8 Jan; 805,6 Feb; 820, 
1 Mar; 888,13 Aug 17790 
2.20(a), 960,18 Mar; 987,12 Jun 1780, 
3. SO(a), 1164,11 May 1782. 
4.60(a), 915,28 Oct 1779; 988,13 Jun; 1042,6 Dec 1780. The 
quality and weight of the paper was not specified until 1783- (so(b), 120,4 Jun 1783). 
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the ends of the anchor stocks and substituting thicker plates on 
the bows. 1 Eventually, all the plates were made thicker, and 
ships were fitted with 28 and 32 oz. (to the foot square) plates, 
instead of the thinner plates which the Board had hoped would 
suffice. 
2 Several difficulties were met in providing 
efficient nails for the copper plates; countersunk nails came to 
replace nails "of the common sort" and were found to be "superior 
in every way". Copper on the keels of the larger ships was 
3 
found to be more easily damaged when heaving them in and out of 
dock, and eventually the old expedient of "filling" (or studding) 
the false keel full of copper nails was found to be a more 
efficient protection than sheet copper. 
4 
There were also administrative problems to be solved 
with the distribution of materials to the yards, and the Navy 
Board tackled this with vigour and success. Most of the copper 
came from the newly-discovered resources in North Wales which were 
being exploited by Thomas Williams. The Board used only one 
1. SO(a), 975,16 May 1780. The Board blamed the carelessness 
of captains (NNM, ADM B/198,1 Feb 1779). 
2. S0(b), 62,22 Mar 1783; also ADM 174/18,9 Mar, 3 Nov 1779. 
3.80(a), 900,22 Sep 1779; ADM 174/117,28 Jun 1782; N1IM, 
POR/D/22,2 Feb 1780; also PRO, ADM 106/2597,20 Feb 1778, 
BL, It 334,14 Oct 1780, Kempenfelt to Middleton. 
4.80(a), 1016,18 Aug 1780; also 835,22 Ap 1779; SO(b), 7, 
11 ,., 14,23 Jan 1783. 
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contractor, William Forbes, who was the London agent for Williams. 
1 
Stocks were gradually built up, and the establishment for each 
yard was eventually set at forty tons of copper plate, thirty of 
which were to be lacquered with white lead. 
2 The supply of paper 
from London was soon found to be inadequate, reaching Portsmouth 
in a damp and rotted condition, and a local manufacturer was found 
who supplied a cheaper and better product. 
3 Regulations for the 
disposal of old copper and the accounts and returns were well 
organised. 
4 There were shortages in early 1780, when the 
decision to go ahead without restraint was having its effect, and 
inadequate supplies, especially at , Portsmouth, - led to delays. 
5 
However, by the end of the year these difficulties were at an end. 
The supply and manufacture of the braces and pintlea, 
made of mixed metal by William Forbes at Deptford, continued to 
be a problem. 
6 
Since it was impossible to standardise the exact 
1. See Harris, Copper King, pp. 45-50, and A. H. Dodd, The 
Industrial Revolution in North Wales, (Cardiff, 1933 7 pp. 155-9. 
2. SO(a), 981,30 May 1780.3640 plates weighing over eleven tons 
were needed for the Victo (Burney's New Universal Dictionary_ 
of the Marine, (London, 1815), p. 452; also Add MSS 41363, 
fo. 37" 
3. V Mg POR/D/21,7,16 Mar 1779. 
4. SO(a), 851,1 Jun 17791 1000,6 Jul 17801 60(b), 78,14 Ap 1783. 
5. N11M, POR/D/21,22 Feb 1779; POR/D/22,24 Dec 1779,6,20 May, 
12 Dep 1780; PRO, ADM 174/18,5 Aug 1780. Valuable aup lien 
were gained from neutral ships (e. g., ibid, 20 Jun 1780). 
i 
6. PRO, ADM 174)17,8 Jan 1777. The yards were issued with drills 
for the holes in the braces and pintlee (106/2597,23 Jan 1778). 
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shape of each shipts hull, a mould of each brace and pintle had to 
be made at the yard, which was then sent to Deptford. This task 
presented considerable technical difficulties, and Forbes complained 
of bad workmanship. A particular difficulty was that the moulds 
had to be made slightly smaller to allow for "moulding in sand", 
which left the metal slightly larger than the moulds. 
1 The yard 
then hoped to have the manufactured pieces back before the ship 
was out of dock. Delays were perhaps inevitable, especially at 
Plymouth, but there were remarkably few. 
2 
By the end of Sandwich's administration, satisfaction 
with copper and the method of sheathing was universal. The 
effort had been prodigious, and the First Lord mentioned the 
coppering of the fleet as being the first of his achievements in 
the defence of his administration in January 1782. Eighty-two 
3 
capital ships, fourteen of fifty guest a hundred and fifteen 
frigates and a hundred and two sloops and cutters had been coppered 
to that time. In 1780 alone no less than forty-six ships of the 
line had been fitted with the new sheathing. 
4 The early optimism 
1. SO(a), 1075,7 May 1781; PRO, ADM 106/3472,5 AP 1782" 
2. PRO, ADM 174/117,4 Jan, 14 Mar 1780; NMM, P0R/D/22,20 May, 
3 Sep 1779, The pieces were transported by land, which was 
more expensive, but quicker and more reliable. 
3. Go V, 345-6, Jan 1782. 
e 
4. ibid; Abstracts of Progress, 5 
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of the Comptroller had not yet been disappointed. Although his 
claim that coppering the fleet would more than double their 
effective numbers was subject to his usual exaggeration, 
1 
there 
had been a real increase in efficiency at sea. More important, 
it lightened the burden of refitting on the yards. Not long 
before he left office, Sandwich wrote to Hood saying, "Copper 
bottoms need fear nothing". 
2 
However, at the end of 1782, doubts about the 
effectiveness of the protection of iron bolts from the corrosive 
effects of the copper were raised very forcibly. The chief 
reason was the violent storm of September 1782 off the Banks of 
Newfoundland, when the captured French ships, the Ville de Paris 
(110) and the Glorieux (74), and the British Ramillies (74) and 
Centaur (74) all foundered with the loss of over 3,500 lives. 
3 
It was thought that the chief cause of the tragedy was corroded 
bolts. In addition, confidence had also been shaken by reports 
from the West Indies that the copper's effectiveness against the 
worm was not all that had been claimed for it. 
4 The Admiralty 
1. SaP, III, 175 (undated), Middleton to Sandwich. 
2. SaP, IV, 201,9 Nov 1781. 
3. See K. Breen, "The Foundering of H. M. S. e ', Marinerte 
Mirro r, 56, May 1970, p. 192; Albion, P"313; Harris, Coýer King, pp. 46-7; Copper and Shipping, p. 554" 
4. PRO, Aii 106/3472,5 AP 1782. 
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wes. undoubtedly thinking of abandoning copper altogether, and was 
more than irritated when it found that the Navy Board had ordered 
the ships to be laid up in Ordinary with popper on their bottoms. 
l 
The reaction of the Navy Board to the questioning of their 
methods was obstinate and high-handed, and it obviously regarded 
any doubts as a alight upon its professional competence. In a 
strongly-worded letter of 5th March 1783 the Commissioners dis- 
missed any suggestion that the methods used to protect the bolts 
were anything less than satisfactory. The coppering of the fleet 
was, "self-evident certainty of its security", and, they continued: 
"The effects of lacquered copper on prepared paper has been so well 
ascertained' and its superiority and security beyond any other kind 
of sheathing"; if there was any evidence of corroded bolts, then 
the bolts were corroded before the copper was put on. They de- 
fended their failure to consult the senior board about putting the 
ships in Ordinary on copper as being not worthy of discussion, and 
the only measure of doubt that they allowed was that they considered 
that, if possible, coppered ships should be inspeoted before they 
went off on long voyages, "not that we apprehend any danger from 
omitting it". 
2 Yet the evidence that they presented was 
1. NMMp ADM BP/4,4 Feb 1783. 
2. NMM, ADM BP/4,5 Max 1783. The Boardts reaction to a suggestion 
for improvement by Samuel Bentham in 1781 was similar: the 
sheathing was, "so secure and superior to that proposed by him 
that we cannot advise any alteration". (PRO, ABM 106/2209, 
28 Ap 1781). 
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unimpressive, for although they claimed that all reports on the 
sheathing had come to them, and had been fully digested, it is 
clear that the reports throughout the war had not been concerned 
with copper bolts, but only with the external appearance of the 
copper, 
1 
The professional board was, however, forced to make an 
investigation, and reports and opinions collected over the next 
few months were damning. A week after the letter of 5th-March 
the Board forwarded the opinions of the Resident Commissioners 
on whether it would be safe to send ships to sea which had been 
coppered for some time. Their views were expressed by Martin: 
"I still conceive that we are not sufficiently acquainted with the 
effects of coppering to run the hazard of the greater paxt of our 
line of battleships"being materially injured by it". The Board 
had no patience with such hesitation, and told the Admiralty, 
that, "on their opinion we lay no great stress". 
2 In the next 
few months, however, the Board was forced to change its time, and 
a thorough inspeotion of the Edgar (74), Fortitude (74), and 
Alexander (74), witnessed by members of the Board, showed 
irrefutably-that the iron bolts of all three ships were in a 
dangerous condition. 
3 By July the Board asked the Admiralty 
1. A report on the Unicorn (20) of 11 Oat 1779 was the last to 
mention corroded bolts (1MM, POR/D/22). Subsequent reports 
were concerned with weed and the braces and pintleso 
2. NNN9 ADM BP/49 11 Mar 1783. 
3. NMM, POR/D/23,24 Ap 1783; PRO, ADM 174/19,1 Mr 1783; Add MSS 41364,6 May 1783, Howe to Martin. 
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whether it would be best to stop coppering all ships except those 
which were ordered on service, at least until the detailed reports 
which had been ordered from the dockyard officers had been prepared 
and digested, to which the Admiralty agreed. 
1 
Although the Navy Board did not present their full report 
to the Admiralty until November, it must have been convinced of 
the dangers in August, for it wrote in an order to the yards that, 
"there is no possibility of guarding the iron against the influence 
of the salt water". Nevertheless, the Commissioners were con- 
2 
vinced to the last that anycorrosion which was the result of water 
penetrating the copper and paper was due to bad workmanship, and 
that a fundamental improvement in technique was not needed. 
3 
Apart from the fact that the protection was very fragile, and the 
copper sheathing was easily torn off, this assumption was partially 
correct, for the effectiveness of the protection varied from ship 
to ship. Laforey, for instance, wrote in 1781 from Antigua that 
the Russell (? 4), one of the first ships of the line to be covered, 
had had none of her iron work injured by the sheathing. 
4 Yet the 
fleet had to be ooppereä quickly; the result of this was that the 
1" N]It, A/2789,3 Jul 17831 so(b), 141,7 Jul 1783. 
2. so(b), 178,13 Aug 1783. 
3. There was a last-minute experiment in covering the bolts them- 
selves with a lacquer of blackwad and linseed oil (So(b), 91, 
7 NaY; 112,23 May 1783). 
4. BL, II, 126,28 Nov 1781, Laforey to Middleton. 
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quality of workmanship tended to be saorifioed to speed. 
Protection would be complete, reported the Deptford officers in 
1783, if the, 
bolts be well drawn and well driven, 
and their heads when spread in driving, 
trimmed with a cold chisel, and driven 
a quarter inch within the surface of 
the plank, and that be filled up with 
paste, and covered with tarred canvas, 
before the bottom is payed with 
composition; and if the coppered sheets 
be well lacquered, and time be given to 
harden the lacquer, and the bottom well 
payed with composition, no bad effect 
can arise from the copper. 1 
This was intricate and time-consuming work, and the yards were 
under heavy pressure to get ships out of dock. Too many things 
were dependent upon time and adequate supervision. One 
particular pitfall was that the holes punched in the copper 
plates for the nails could come directly over the head of a bolt, 
and easily let the water in. There were difficulties in 
lacquering the copper sheets in sufficient time bofcre'the lacquer 
hardaic1, while the expectations of the Board in the adhesive 
qualities of the composition in which the paper was soaked were 
disappointed. 2 Perhaps most important of all, there was the 
difficulty of ensuring that the caulking behind the copper plates 
was of the highest order, for the maintenance of the timber and 
1. I M, ADM BP/4,5 Nov 1783. 
2. SO(b), 83,28 Ap 1783. Resin was mixed with tar at a late 
date in an attempt to find a more effective adhesive (PRO, 
ADM 174/19,16 May; 174/118,25 May 1783). 
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caulking behind copper sheathing was rendered more difficult. 
l 
The other major weakness was the lack of protection 
which the copper provided against the worm. The Master Ship- 
wright at Jamaica wrote in early 1782 that, "great injury had been 
done by the worm to the Sandwich (90), and in the next year he 
reported that most of the fleet under Hood, and several of 
Rowley's division, would, "not be able to stay here longer than 
six months before they prove leaky". 
2 Hood reported to Middleton 
at the same time that the Barfleur (80) had had her stern post 
and rudder eaten by the worm, "in a manner not to be conceived 
... I dread what may happen to many of the king's ships, if we 
have not peace to occasion their being called home to have their 
bottoms inspeoted". 3 The worm had penetrated where the copper 
sheathing had been torn away, but the most constant weakness was 
that the yards had not been specifically ordered to put copper 
and paper behind the braces and pintles. This again was a 
difficult and time-consuming task, and, in spite of the earlier 
warnings, the order remedying this weakness was not issued to 
the yards until May 1783 - loo late to be of any use during the 
war. 
4 The lesson was not appreciated in time; copper sheathing, 
1. SO(a), 1085,6 Aug 1781; 1113,19 Jan 1782; AIM 174/17, 
8 Jan 1777. 
2. PRO, ADM 106/3472,5 AP 1782; ADM 174/19,25 AP 1783. 
3" BL, 1,253-4,28 Feb 1783- 
4- SO(b), 102,16 May 1783. 
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like the links of a chain, had to be completely effective to be 
effective at all. 
In spite of these difficulties, the Navy Board found 
strong support from the yard officers in the report of November 
1783 for the retention of copper, and any idea that the Admiralty 
may have entertained for keeping the ships in Ordinary without 
sheathing at all was considered highly impractical. "In three 
years at this port", wrote the Sheerness officers, "the worm would 
make a single bottom unfit to receive copper on an emergency". 
1 
Fortunately, the disquiet over the copper had stimulated the 
development of a new type of bolt. Keir's compound metal bolt 
of copper, zinc and iron, which had been under development since 
1779, was finally rejected in December 1783 in favour of a copper 
and zinc bolt hardened by mechanical means. This bolt had been 
developed independently by William Forbes, and two men, Westwood 
and Collins, under the direction of Thomas Williams, quickly 
following an advance in the iron industry which perfected a 
technique involving grooved rollers. 
2 This method finally 
provided a satisfactory bolt, and the officers replied in the 
affirmative to the Board's question, "whether in order to remove 
1. NNII, ADM BP/4,5 Nov 1783. 
2. See Harris, Copper and Shipping, pp. 555-560 The extra cost 
of the bolts was considerable. The Board estimated they would 
cost £2272.10.0 for a hundred gun ship, and £1559 for a 
seventy-four, more than iron bolts. Martin noted later that 
the Canada (74) used 17 tons at the price of £135 a ton, which 
came to ¬2295 ( "t, ADM BP/4i 5 Nov 1783; Add NSS 41363, fo. 40). 
2-93 
every objection that can arise from ignorance or prejudice 
against copper sheathing... it may not be the most prudent and 
economical in the end to use compound metal bolts". 
l 
The report of November 1783 effeotively stopped any 
controversy between the two boards, and a further survey in 1786 
on the Goliath (74) and Crown (74) confirmed that even on recently 
coppered ships iron bolts had corroded dangerously. 
2 The final 
order to change all ships to the new bolts came at the same time 
when the Admiralty ordered all guardshipa to be copper fastened, 
"as fast as the docks can be spared". 
3 However, the public 
debate still continued. In the Commons, McBride directed a 
question at Middleton, asking, 
if it was intended to persevere in the 
absurd system of suffering the ships to 
remain in their coppered bottoms during 
the whole of the peace?... The consequence 
would be, that the instant ships which had 
long lain by were sent to sea, their bottoms 
would drop out, and thousands of brave sea- 
men would perish in the ocean. 4 
1. ibid. The Admiralty was assured that the new bolts would 
last "for more than a century"1 
2. NNM, AIa BP/6b, 13 Jul 1786. Of the 63 bolts sampled from 
the Crowns (64, built at Blackwall in 1782), 39 were only a 
little corroded, but 24 were, "much corroded at the head", 
and many "drove slack". 
3. NMI, ADM A/2815,11 Aug 1786. 
4. Parliamentary ReRister, XIX, 1786, p. 250-1. MacBride had long 
held ideas on sheathing; see PRO, ADM 95/95,1 Max 1779. Public 
and professional confidence in the new material was shaken, and 
well-informed criticism continued until 1786. See, Striaturen 
on Naval Departments, with a recommendation to abolish the 
Coppering of the Ship-Is in the state of Ordin , by a sailor, on on, ; also Aarxlsp Cogger and_Zhjixý As p. 565; 
4. _ --- -- -- -. 
ti+ xees, p. "(. - 
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The history of the introduction of copper sheathing 
illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the civil 
administration during this war. Vigorous measures saw that 
the innovation was accepted and that formidable administrative 
problems were solved. At the same time, technical reports on 
corrosion were neglected once the measure had been adopted. 
Prolific resources, which the French were unable to match, 
enabled the supplies of copper to the yards to be built up 
. quickly. The coppering of the fleet was a formidable achieve- 
went, and, although twenty-five of the line had to be repaired 
during the war, less maintenance was needed and this took a 
burden off the dockyards. Yet it must be said that the 
measure was hastily and overconfidently adopted, and that the 
time and development devoted to the measure was as inadequate 
as the obstinacy of the Navy Board after the war. An 
observation of a historian writing of naval administration in 
the previous century holds true of this period; "this type of 
scientific investigation was more often the extension of 
traditional practice to theory than the application of theory 
to practice, and often significant of the development of 
organisation around a problem rather than of an attack upoi. the 
problem itself". 
I It needed an energetic capitalist, who 
foresaw a large market for his product disappearingg to provide 
a bolt which was as hard as iron yet free from corrosion. 
1. Ehrman, p. 17. 
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It was largely due to Middleton's obstinacy that the 
Navy Board's innovation of 1779 became the orthodoxy of 1763. 
While the Board accepted that the braces and pintles and the 
nails securing the copper needed to be made of an alloy, it 
was reluctant to accept that bolts of the same material would 
be needed. 'It was not until a satisfactory process and 
material were developed that ships were sufficiently safe; 
MacBride's fears might well have been realised had the fleet 
remained with iron bolts protected only by paper. "England's 
technological victory"1 may have had its effect at sea during 
the war, but the real technological victory was not won until 
after the war had been fought. 
1. Mackesy, p. 285. 
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iii) The Servicing of the Fleet. 
An important part of dockyard equipment was the large 
number of vessels needed for servicing and supplying the fleet, 
and for the numerous other tasks which had to be undertaken 
afloat. The provision of sufficient and suitable craft tended 
to be neglected by the Navy Board, which concerned for economy, 
sought always to limit the growth of the establishment of each 
yard. This led to problems at the main refitting yards at 
Portsmouth and Plymouth. To those on the spot, this false 
economy was made evident by the delays which occurred, and there 
was an almost continuous badgering of the Board by the 
Commissioner`s resident at the western yards for the provision 
of more and better hulks, sailing and small craft. 
The hulls of old warships, known as hulks, were an 
important part of dockyard equipment, and were put to various 
uses. The foreshore at Sheerness was almost entirely composed 
of hulks pulled up onto the shore, while the Navy Board pro- 
posed to use one as a floating battery at Plymouth during the 
emergenoy of 1779.1 However, their most important role was 
in accommodating the men and stores of ships about to be 
1. N mg ABM B/199,28 Jun 1779, 
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docked. They provided space for the ship's stores which had 
to be taken out to lighten her for docking, and at the same 
time the position of the hulks away from the shore discouraged 
the ship's crew from desertion. In addition, at each port 
there was a 1'sheer" hulk for the roasting and unmasting of each 
ship. 
1 These, aocording to the Navy Board, were a luxury, for 
it informed Martin that_ sting and unmasting was, "so simple 
and so much in practice on every station but home service", 
that ships could be, e sooner"by their own people at 
Spithead than by a hulk". The yard, according to the Board, 
needed only to provide spars and lashing. 
2 Although 
technically correct, this attitude presumed too much upon the 
enthusiasm of the sea officers and seamen, and in fact the 
sheer hulks were essential for speedy handling of spars. 
Complaints from the western yards over insufficient 
numbers of ships provided as hulks were regular throughout the 
war. In 1777 the Portsmouth officers complained that the five 
hulks in the harbour were insufficient for the expected 
10 "The mast of this vessel is extremely high... strengthened by 
shrouds and stays, in order to secure the sheers, which 
serve, as the arm of a crane, to hoist out or in the masts 
of any ship lying alongside" (Falconer, p. 158). 
2. I1M, POR/G/1., 16 Nov 1781; also PRO, ADM 174/117,1 May 1781. 
In emergencies, ships were dismasted and remasted in Cawsand 
Bay at Plymouth Sound under the direction of the Master 
Attendants, who earned Ourry's admiration for their skill (e. g. ADM 174/116,3 Jan 1779)" 
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mobilisation, and that two large and two small ones were needed 
in addition. " Similar requests were sent to the Board in 
regular succession, but although ships were eventually provided, 
the need in 1778 to put every available ship to sea put paid to 
any improvement. 
2 The shortage of hulks had an important 
effect on refitting; in 1780 flurry wrote from Plymouth to the 
Board to say that, 
the reasons we don't -lock in this spring so 
many ships as I could wish and you may 
expect is that we have not hulks sufficient 
for the number of ships that are clearing 
for the docks to put their stores on having 
oz"iy three hulks for that purpose. 3 
At the end of the war there were still only three and Ourry 
wanted another two. 
4 
Another result of the lank of concern over the hulks was 
that they were indifferently maintained, although they were 
supposed to be given "Triennial Trimmings" as with serviceable 
ships. In 1777'Ourry reported that the cheer hulk at Plymouth 
1. NMM, POR/D/21,9 Oct 1777,9 Sep 1778; POR/F/17,3 Aug 1780; 
PRO, ADM 174/116,28 Sep 1777- 
2. The Blenheim (90), Royal William (84), Dragon (74), Hercules (74), 
Warspipht ? 4), Essex (64)t Modeste (64) and Firm (60 were all 
hulks which were patched up and sent to sea for "summer service 
only" between 1778 and 1780 (see PRO, ADM 95/95)- 
3- PRO, ADM 174/117,15 Jan 1780. 
4. ibid, 25 Oct 1782. 
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had been thirteen years "off the ground" and that the rigging 
had been'bverhead" since the ship had been a hulk 
.' 
This 
lack of care caught the yards at the worst moment in the war. 
In 1778 Hood complained that the condition of the hulks was 
"very wretched"9 and that the need to lighten them for caulking 
kept the riggers occupied to the extent that it hindered re- 
fitting. The whole Ordinary, he reported, "have been 
employed for some time past in keeping them above water"9 and 
he considered that not one of the hulks was, "fit to carry a 
ship to". 
2 To remedy this situation valuable yard and dock 
space was taken up during 1778 and 1779 when neither could be 
afforded, 
The next type of vessel which was used by the yards was 
the sailing lighters, boys and sloops which acted as tenders to 
the fleets at Torbay, Spithead and Plymouth Sound. The two 
western yards, especially Portsmouth, experienced difficulties 
at an early stage in the war through unsuitable and an in- 
adequate number of craft. According to a list made in 1774, 
the average age of the twenty-five sailing craft belonging to 
1. PRO, ADM 174/116,16 May 1777, AM 95/95,21 May 1777; 
also ADM 174/17,26 May 1778. 
2. NNM, POR/F/17,9 Jul 1778; also POB/D/22,13 Oct 1779; 
POR/D/23,2 Oct 1782. 
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the yards was thirty, and the oldest was sixty-eight. 
' Of 
the seven hoys and lighters at Portsmouth, at least one was 
useless. 
2 
The first difficulties were experienced in early 
1776 during the embarkation of troops for America. Gambier 
pointed out that, compared to the time of the Falkland Islands 
crisis, he was lacking timber hoys (which had been sold in 
1773) and four hired sloops. 
3 Nothing further was done until 
Hood arrived at Portsmouth, when he soon wrote that the craft, 
"were by no means equal to the daily demand". 
4 In spite of 
his insistence on the need for four extra hired sloops of 
forty to fifty tons each, the Board was reluctant to allow 
more than two to be hired, although under pressure from the 
new Commissioner, it finally allowed three. 
5 
This additional number was still barely adequate, yet 
Hood found that in the autumn of 1779 the Board wished to 
discharge some of the craft that had been hired. He put 
1. British Museum, King's Mss 44, fos. 55-6. This was apart 
from the Commissioners': yachts, of which there were frequent 
minor complaints. 
2. 
3" 
4. 
5" 
William Nicholson, Master Attendant at Portsmouth, reported 
that the Forrester hoy (built in 1748), on the way to 
Southampton, "sailed and steered so badly that the Buoyboat 
was obliged to tow her every foot of the way" (NMM, POR/D/22, 
14 Oct 1779" 
NNM, POR/F/16,9,23 May, 1,2 Nov 1776. The Board ordered 
the hiring of four small tenders for the reception of pressed 
men, but refused to implement Gambier's idea of using the 
Academy yacht (POR/G/l, 2 Nov 1776), 
NMM, POR/F/16,10 Mar 1778. 
ibid., 18,22,23,26 Max 1778; POR/G/1,24 Max 1778. 
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across his view to the Board with firmness: 
It is my duty to point out what from 
experience appears necessary for giving 
greater dispatch to the King's service 
at this time, and for the Board to 
determine how far it will put confidence 
in my representations ... full employment 
will be found for every vessel we now 
have... without giving delay to the 
sailing of the ships". 1 
Hood won his point, and managed to lower the price of hiring by 
more than a third by engaging the craft for a longer period of 
time. 2 Yet the number of sailing craft was still found to be 
inadequate; early in 1780 Hood informed the Board that, "daily 
experience proving that the service of this port cannot be 
properly carried on", and the officers wrote to say that there 
was still much delay in supplying the fleet with stores, "and 
we plainly see that the more ships are coppered, the more 
vessels will be wanted for the above service". The officers' 
estimate was for twelve hired sloops; the Board allowed eight. 
3 
On the peace all the hired vessels were discharged. 
Apart from the main task of supplying the fleet, the 
sailing craft had a variety of uses. Sweeping for lost anchors 
kept them in employment when there was no urgent business, while 
1. NNM, POH/F/179 10 Oct 1779. 
2. ibid, 2 Nov 1779. Hood hired the sloops at eighteen pounds 
a calendar month instead of at one guinea a day. 
3. IMM, POR/D/22,12 Jan 1780; POR/F/17,25 Ap 1780, POR/F/18, 
27 Jan 1783: After the war the Board fixed a peacetime 
establishment for Portsmouth of three sailing craft totalling 
272 tons (so(b), 1889 "20 
Aug 1783}. 
R 
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some had specialised uses, such as the buoyboats, used for 
maintaining the buoys under the care of the Master Attendant. 
At Sheerness, one boat was continually employed in bringing 
water from Chatham to the yard. It was important that at 
least one of the yard boats should be able to cope with bad 
weather, especially at Plymouth, where the Sound was 
particularly exposed. Ourry observed in 1777,, when the 
Lizard (28) had gone ashore, that with a good sailing lighter, 
"such as they have at Chatham, we could have worked out with 
the tide... and have laid an anchor to windward for the Lizard". 
He added in disgust, "the present old sailing lump is not fit 
for that service she was intended for; you may as well turn 
out with the sheer hulk as with her". 
1 After his complaint, 
the Board contracted for a new lighter to be built in the Thames, 
but this was not delivered until three years later, by which time 
there were further mishaps in which the yard was unable to assist. 
2 
The last category of dockyard craft were the lighters, 
launches and longboats which were used within the harbours of 
1. PRO, Am 174/1169 21 Feb 1777. 
2. Ibidg 28 Feb, 13,15 AP 1777,20 Jan 1778,14 Feb 1779; 
ADM 174/18 7 Aug 1780. After the disastrous fire on the Torbay (74), pumps were held in readiness for boats to go to the assistanoe of ships in the harbour (174/116,25 Sep 1778). 
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Portsmouth and Plymouth. "Common" lighters were employed in 
taking off old stores from ships about to be refitted. At 
Portsmouth there were only eight, and in 1778 the officers 
reported that since there were eighteen ships being fitted and 
refitted in the harbour, there were many complaints of delays 
from the sea officers. 
l At Plymouth the Masters Attendant 
complained of the want of, "handy luggage craft to carry on 
the port duty". 
2 These difficulties could be solved by hiring 
local small craft on a day-to-day basis, but this needed Navy 
Board approval. No such solution could be found for the 
3 
shortage of mooring lighters, which were needed to maintain the 
moorings of the ships in the harbour. Again there were 
complaints from both the western yards. The Portsmouth officers 
complained that since the moorings were now made of chain, and 
not cable, the difficulty of raising moorings which were sunk - 
something which frequently happened because there were only 
three mooring lighters - was considerably increased. What 
had formerly taken the efforts of a few men in a common lighter, 
now needed forty or fifty men for a whole day in a mooring 
lighter. 4 
1. NIhn, POR/D/22,18 Mar 1778. Nine were established after 
the war, totalling 408 tons (S0(b), 188,20 Aug 1783). 
2. PRO, 174/18,10 Mar 1780. 
3. e. g. NMM, POR/F/16,27 Nov, 23 Dec 1776. 
4. NNE# POR/D/21: 18 Mar 1778; also PRO, AAM 174/18,14 Aug 
1779. Six mooring lighters were established after the war, totalling 572 tons (SO(b), 188,20 Aug 1783). 
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Finally there were a great number of launches and oared 
boats. The number of these craft appeared to have been completely 
unestablished until the Board issued a detailed order after the 
war. At Plymouth, for instance, the Commissioner was to have a 
pinnace, a cutter, a yawl and a wherry at his command to suit his 
need and the sea conditions. The Masters Attendant were to have 
a boat for their personal use, as well as direction over six 
launches and the buoyboat. Although Plymouth was allowed a 
total of forty-two boats by this order, the number maintained 
during the war was probably greater. 
1 However, there were still 
complaints. At Portsmouth, there were only seven "transporting" 
launches for pulling boats around the harbour, while there were 
often, "four, five or six ships in motion at a time"; the officers 
asked for four more, 
2 Ourry also complained about a lack of 
launches for warping ships in and out of the Hamoaze. 
3 None of 
these complaints had any effect. 
The lack of sufficient and efficient harbour craft 
undoubtedly led to delays. 
4 Although complaints were to be 
1. SO(b), 163,25 Jul 1783. This was apart from private boats. 
The Navy Board received a complaint of lack of room and in. 
convenience caused by the, "increase of inhabitants and a 
proportionable trade employing very little short of two 
hundred wherries mostly engaged in supplying the fleet with 
necessaries" (POR/G/1,25 Aug 1780)- 
2. NNM, POR/D/21,18 Mar 1778; also POR/D/23,21 Nov 1782. 
Fifteen were allowed to Portsmouth after the war (SO(b), 188, 
20 Aug 1763)- 
3- PRO, ADM 174/116,14 Feb 1779; also ibid, 1 May 1778. 
4. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/116t 9 Aug 1778. 
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expected during the course of a long war, the Navy Board was 
reluctant to meet the increasing demands of the yards. We 
can only govern ourselvestkDý what was -needed-in-previous-yearn", 
the Board replied to a request frone Hood, "and we have experienced 
such neglect., that we. wish., 
ito),. keep it within as narrow bounds as 
possible. '1 Middleton, years later, referred to the yard 
officers' "extravagance" as "unbounded", yet the Board's dis- 
trust extended to the professional judgement of the Resident 
Commissioners. Nevertheless, the Board did increase the 
permanent establishment of craft after the war to sensible 
proportions. 
2 Allowances should perhaps be made for 
exaggerated estimates from the yard officers, for they know 
well the reluctance of the Board to grant their full demands, 
Regard for economy led to delay, and the same principle led to 
the hiring of extra vessels on a short-term basis, in the hope 
that they would soon be discharged; this proved to be expensive. 
3 
Yet if the Board appears to us as short-sighted and suspicious, 
it was perhaps too much to expect that the equipment and 
organisation which Mont to support the fleet should have been 
considered as anything but secondary to the fleet itself. 
1. NNI, POR/G/1,12 Mar 1778- 
2, BL, III0 20, Ap 1803. The establishment of 1783 allowed a 
total of 54 sailing lighters to all the yards, totalling 3036 
tons (SO(b), 183-1899 20 Aug 1783). 
3. There were other difficulties in hiring ships, for hired men 
could be difficult to control. Shuldham complained that the 
masters of tenders were, in general, "very idle and the service 
suffers much by their neglect and drunken behaviour" (PRO, ADM 
174/116,16 May 1777; 174/18,22 May 1777)" 
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iv) Yard Facilities and Problems Afloat. 
In spite of considerable efforts by Sandwich and his 
administration, the day-to-day problems of the yards throughout 
the war were considerably increased by inadequate shore 
facilities; in particular there was a shortage of space and 
storage, too few docks of sufficient depth, while there was a 
constant struggle to maintain the existing facilities in a 
serviceable condition. 
1 That the yards were inadequately 
equipped was realised after the previous war, and in 1764 an 
ambitious plan to reconstruct and extend the western yards, 
estimated to cost £731r410, was put in hand. Progress was 
slow. Extra space was not easily obtainable, and time and 
money had to be spent in reclaiming marshy ground. At Plymouth 
there was the further difficulty of a hillside of solid rock. 
Sandwich, however, speeded up the improvements; the Visitations 
between 1771 and 1778 were at their most effective in the 
1. The expansion of the buildings and facilities of the yards 
during this period has been examined by Haas, Earliest 
Visitations, pp. 210-214; Williams, pp. 338-3569 359-372; 
Usher, PP"357-382; Kitson, 1947, pp, 261-265; Coad, 
pp. 147-156; R. Sutherland Horne, Her Majesty's Dockyard 
at Portsmouth; A Chronology, (Portsmouth, 1965), pp. 62-77; 
F. N. G. Thomas, "Portsmouth and Gosport", (unpub. M. Sc. thesis, 
London, 1961), pp. 37-42; A. E. Stephens, "Plymouth Dock, A 
Survey of the development of the Royal Dockyard in Hamoaze 
during the sailing ship era", (unpub. Ph. D. thesis, London, 
1940), pp, 100-119,124-128,130-135,141-145; H. Rees, 
"The Medway Towns", (unpub. Ph. D. thesis, London, 1955), 
pp. 92-99,116-118. For general surveys see Victoria County History, Kent, Il, 336-388; Hampshire, V, 382,393-4" 
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inspection of the works and buildings of the yards. Never- 
theless, even after these improvements, the facilities of the 
yards were far from ideal. 
The first problem was inadequate storage space. The 
1771 Visitation revealed that there was not even enough storage 
for one year's supply of timber, and that there was little room 
for the rigging of large ships. Many of the existing facilities 
were in disrepair. Chatham and Woolwich were the worst in this 
respect, and the latter suffered from an inefficient siting of 
buildings. The same was broadly true of the western yards, and 
particularly of Plymouth. ' Portsmouth had suffered from an 
extensive fire in 1770 which had destroyed the laying house# all 
the ropehouses and the long storehouse. Sandwich set to work 
with vigour. Working along the lines set out by the 1764 plan, 
he concentrated on setting the western yards to rights. Only 
minor repairs were carried out at Chatham; a major plan here, 
"thol much needed", was felt to be too expensive. 
2 The effort 
was concentrated on Portsmouth, and the damage of the 1770 fire 
was repaired within a year. The mast ponds at Plymouth and 
Woolwich, which had been allowed to fill with mud, were cleared, 
while the repair of e'm at pond at Deptford was completed. 
1. NMM, ADM B/185,2 Jul, 21 Aug 1771. 
2. PRO, ADM 7/661, fo. 2; 7/662, fos. 78-9. 
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Timber sheds to store the increased amount of timber coming into 
the yards were completed by 1774, and in spite of the fire in 
Portsmouth ropehouso in late 1776, the buildings of the western 
yards were in good order by the outbreak of the war. ' 
Improvements continued to be made throughout the war, 
but in spite of attention by the Board, maintenance suffered and 
the eastern yards in particular were found wanting by the 
Visitation of 1785. At Sheerness, for instance, the Navy Board 
found that, "almost the whole of the buildings in this yard... are 
exceedingly out of repair and very much confined", and there was 
no room for the rigging of large ships, all of which had to go 
to Chatham. Serious faults were found at Plymouth in the same 
year; inspecting the office belonging to the Ropeyard, the 
Board were, "sorry to find the foundation to have given way and 
the apartments very damp which is a general complaint against 
1. For details of the fire of 1776 and the subsequent trial 
of John Aitken, or Jack the Painter, see Sutherland Horne, 
Pp- 74-76" The building of the Marine Barracks at 
Plymouth took up much of the Commissioner and officers' 
time (PIO, ADM 174/116,28 Nov 1778,2i 16 Feb 1779). 
2. The moat important were new offices for the Clerks of 
Cheque and Survey at Woolwich, and new storehouses at 
Chatham and Portsmouth (MMM, AI B/195,2 Jul 1777; 
ADM A/2717,5 Jul 1777; AM A/2748,79 16 Feb 1780). 
See also AI1Y A/2721,6 Nov 1777; A/2748,14 Feb 17801 
POR/D/21,20 Mar 1778; POR/D/23,13 Jun 1782; PRO, 
AM 174/17,30 Oct 1777. 
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the new buildings", 
1 
Large building projects, and most large repairs, were 
undertaken by contractors, controlled through the yard officers 
by the Navy Board. The smallest piece of maintenance had to be 
approved by the Board, for there was a general distrust of the 
competence of the officers in the building line. There is 
also little doubt that the officers put the claims of their own 
houses before the facilities of the yard in their applications to 
the Board, 2 The main suspicion, however, was that the work fell 
short of the contract standard, with or without the officers' 
knowledge. As a check, the Board employed an independent surveyor, 
John Marquand. 3 An informal Visitation of 1786 to Plymouth 
showed that the Board's suspicions were well founded; at both 
the western yards the contractors, Templar and Parlby, had a 
monopoly of large building projects. The Board found that since 
1756 they had undertaken forty-five different projects at Plymouth, 
and that many of the later contracts had been overpaid and in- 
differently executed". The Board's report, from which the two 
1. PRO, AUM 106/3222, Navy Board Minutes of 1785 Visitation. 
During and after the war, a considerable amount of space 
was saved by demolishing a very large number of sheds, 
mostly unestablished, which had been built through the 
years. 
2.30 of the 90 warrants concerned with building issued by 
the Navy Board between 1774 and 1779 were to repair officers' 
houses (PRO, MM 95/95). Cleversal alleged that joiners spent 
much of their time employed on this work (NMM, CHA/X/2,9 Max 
1785); the Navy Board suspected abuse, and ordered that any 
work on officers' houses costing over five pounds was to be 
submitted to the Board for approval (SO(a), 1194,13 Sep 1782)- 
3-- See above, pp. 96-99 ; also Webb, pp. 212-219. 
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Surveyors demurred, was that the contracts for the Ropeyard. 
office and wharves in question were, "somewhat incautiously 
drawn, so as to have left too much latitude to the contractor". 
Later the contractors were cleared of fraud after the opinion of 
independent experts had been taken, but the issue was confused by 
the rivalry of Middleton and Howe, 
1 
However, it was the'tworks'l- the docks, slips and 
wharves - which were to be of the most importance during hostilities. 
The main addition which Sandwich put in hand before the war was 
nine small slips for building frigates. Two each were built at 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham and Deptford, and one at Sheerness. 
2 
Little more than minor repairs were carried out at Chathaza, where 
there were five single docks and one double, and five building 
slips. Essential repairs were also carried out at the smaller 
eastern yards. The double dock at Deptford, long disused, was 
repaired and a wharf, crane and new jetty heads were built at 
Sheerness. Portsmouth, however, was much improved; here there 
3 
were four docks, only one of which in 1771 was able to take a 
first rate, although three slips had been built as part of the 
building programme of the 1760's. In spite of the trouble of 
1. N ADM BP/6b, 8 June 18 Jul 17861 BP/7,24 Ap, 10f 20 
Aug 1787. 
2. PRO, AM 7/662, fo. 769 
3. ibid, £os. 18-19. 
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the subsidence of the Portsmouth basin, by the summer of 1775 
the rebuilding of one of the docks with stone, the conversion 
of a slip to a dock, the basin, reservoir and drains, the gates 
of the north dock and the jetty head were completed, and work on 
the wharves of the camber was well advanced. 
' Although'the work 
at Plymouth went more slowly, by 1773 the boundary wall and wharf 
were finished, the upper part of the double dock had been deepened 
and new gates hung. By the next year, 1200 feet of stone wharf 
had been finished. 2 
Although this building effort did not eliminate 
difficulties, these improvements came just in time for the war. 
3 
The work went on throughout hostilities, although at a slower 
pace; the main effort was expended on the docks, which, with 
constant use, always needed repair. A few minor improvements 
were made; more sawpits were provided, and the reclamation of 
4 the land to the north of the yard at Portsmouth continued. 
1. PRO, ADM 7/660, fos. 5-6; 7/662, fo. 30. 
2. ibid, fos. 29-30; 7/661, fos. 39-41,46-46. 
3. There are many yard plans for this period. For the pre-wax 
years see British Museum, Kings MSS 44,1774); NMM, LAD II 
plans nos. 34-6,38-9,41-3,47,63,66 and PRO, ADM 140/8-9- 
The models made in the yards in 1774 for the King, now in the 
MMM and Science Museum, Kensington, are of particular interest. 
See also NMM, ADM Y series for Portsmouth, Sheerness and 
Woolwich, and for developments in the 1760's, see MMM, 
14366/086. 
4. PRO, ADM 95/95,3,19 Aug 1778,16 Nov 1779; MMM, POR/B122, 
17 Feb 1780; A/2749,8 Mar 1780. Between 1774 and 1779,170 
warrants were issued concerning minor alterations and. re airs; two-thirds of them were to Portsmouth and Plymouth(PRO, M 95/95)" 
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1 
Sandwich was pleased with the results; in 1775 he considered 
that when the western yards were finally completed they would be 
"superior to anything in Europe". 
1 Yet this boast overlooked 
the practical difficulties. According to Gregson, professional 
opinion considered that another large dock at Plymouth was 
essential. Kempenfelt felt that more might have been spent on 
new docks than building slips at the western yards, 
2 
and, in fact, 
an examination of the practical difficulties shows that there was 
little room for complacency. 
The main problem was the small size of the existing docks. 
Due to the great drafts of the largest ships, the yards were 
dependent upon the spring tides for docking and undooking. in 
European waters these high tides occur about two days after the 
full and new moons, or about once a fortnight. The different 
heights of these spring tides were understood, but tides are 
affected by atmospheric pressure and the prevailing winds. For 
example, the height of the spring tides at Plymouth is approxi- 
mately fifteen and a half feet and that of neaps eleven and a 
half. A southerly gale driving extra water into the Sound 
increases the height of the tide by two to three feet, and dolays 
1. PRO, ADM 7/662, fo. 78. 
2. shP, 146, no. 103,20 Max 1777; BL, Is 289-90, unaatea, 
Kempenfelt to Middleton. 
^-l 
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the high tide by as much as half an hour; northerly gales have 
the reverse effect. 
1 Thus a southerly wind was to the ad- 
vantage to the western yards, and a northerly wind to the 
eastern yards - exactly the reverse of a wind favourable for 
sailing. Even today the actual height of the tides cannot be 
calculated to any great degree of accuracy, and the yard officers 
then were working to a tolerance of inches, 
The timetable for docking large ships, therefore, was 
determined to a large extent by nature and not by the exigencies 
of the service, and this factor demanded co-operation with the sea 
officers for clearing the ships to enable them to be docked on two 
or three tides a fortnight. Through lethargy and friction 
opportunities for docking were often missed, but sometimes un- 
foreseen difficulties occurred. When the spring tides did not 
rise sufficiently, ships were unable to come out of dock. In 
July 1779, the Portsmouth officers oould not get the MM, rlborough 
h& IA 
(74) undocked, in spite of`every effort ... havingkthe lowest 
spring tides almost was ever known in this yard". The next 
W 
morning they succeeded because of a "brisk gale at south-west", 
but they were unable to bring in the next ship to replace her. 
2 
1. Stephens# p. 4. 
2. NP1M, POB/D/22,2t 4 Jul 1779; see also ibid, 5 Mar 1780. 
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Sometimes unorthodox means had to be employed. The SalisbuxRr 
(74) was undocked at Plymouth in 1782 by means of the extra 
buoyancy of a hundred butts bought from Southdown, "having 
apprehensions of her being neaped". 
1 Although this was chiefly 
a problem with the western yards with larger ships, Deptford, 
too, had problems of this nature. Being unsure of enough water 
to undock the Jupiter (50), the Deptford officers proposed to, 
out holes througheabetw en the main and 
false keels for pendants... for 
lashing a sufficient number of butts and 
further to have the loan of the Woolwich 
or Chatham lighter to lighten her stern 
to help her floatingkout, as our lighter 
will be moored at the stern of the hulk 
to make more purchase. 2 
Depth of water was also a problem once the ships were 
undocked. Deptford and Woolwich were only accessible at spring 
tides to moderately-sized ships. Large ships were built there, 
but there was not enough water to keep them at anchor, and they 
were usually towed away as soon as they were launched. The 
approach to Chatham also suffered from a lack of water, and the 
tortuous course of the Medway allowed a passage only if spring 
I. PRO, Alm 174/117,25 Oct 1782. 
2. PRO, Ain 106/3318,23 Ap, 17 Jun 1778. Deptford had had 
problems with docking fifty gun ships since 1745 (see Baugh, 
p. 265). On one occasion the tide, aided by a northerly wind, 
flowed over the top of the gates and floated two ships in 
dock (PRA, ADM 106/3385,5 Feb 1775). There were only three 
accidents during the period in docking and launohing, only 
one of which was serious. This involved the small Alecto 
fireship (PRO, AIM 106/3320,21-27 Jul 1781; NMM, AM B/1949 
8 Ap 1777; POR/F/17,21 Ntay 1780. 
...... ý.. _.. _ ,ý 
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tides coincided with a favourable wind - within ten points of 
the compass going up the river and six coming down. 
' In 1773 
Sandwich noted the times which ships needed to get down the 
river to Sheerness, and came to a conclusion that, "upon a 
medium, six weeks must be allowed". 
2 Not only did this lack of 
water affect the transporting of ships, but it meant that they 
were not able to lie at Ordinary with all their ballast stowed, 
which was harmful to their planking. 
3 
Only at Sheerness was 
there no problem with depth of water, but here there was the 
disadvantage of an exposed position. Great damage was caused 
in February 1776 and. January 1779 when wind and ice carried away 
ships and damaged boats and buildings. 
4 
The difficulties of access to the eastern yards had long 
been acknowledged, but the western yards, in spite of being 
1. PRO, ADM 7/659, fo. 9; also NMM, CHA/E/33,24 Oct 1777- 
2. PRO, AI)M 7/660, fos. 58-9. The Magnificent (74) had taken 
four months and three days, and the Marlboro2 h (74) three 
months and twenty days. One example of the inconvenience 
was the Buffalo storeship (ex-Ca tain, 70), which was ordered 
not to be loaded at Chatham; her cargo had to be taken down 
the river in lighters to be loaded at Sheerness (miN, ADM 
A/2714,18 Ap 1777). There had been a problem with depth 
in the Medway since the 1720's (H. Rees, p. 95). See also 
]lrman, PP. 81-3; Baugh, pp. 267-8. 
3. PRO, A])M 7/660, fo. 59. Gregson blamed Trinity House ("with 
a revenue which would purchase more than a Polish crown") for making no effort to deepen the river at Chatham and 
Gillingham, but contract lighters were kept going for most 
of the war (ShP, 146, no. 105,30 Ap 1777)- 
4. NN r4, ADM B/191,1-9 Feb 1776; 2/198,4 Jan 1779- 
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blessed with comparatively deep water, were not free from 
navigational hazards. 
1 Spithead was well protected, but the 
Sound at Plymouth was particularly exposed to southerly winds, 
and although both areas were resurveyed and buoyed during the 
war, there were twelve oases of ships of the line and eleven 
smaller ships going aground between 1774 and 1783.2 During 
this period there were forty accidents either in or near the 
two western yards. Six ships of the line were severely 
damaged, and nineteen others were either lost or badly 
damaged. 3 There were many narrow escapes, and the damage 
would have been greater if the action of the yard officers and 
men had not been prompt and skil. ful. 
4 There was little that 
they could do for the Bienfaisant (80) and the Ramillies (74) 
in May 1780 when these two ships were virtually reduced to 
wrecks by a particularly severe gale in Plymouth Sound, although 
they managed to bring the battered hulls into the yard. Severe 
5 
gales usually brought a list of damage from Ourry, for shelter 
1. See 1 Mi LAD II, plans 33,37,40,44-6. 
2. PRO, ARM 174/116,12 May 1778; NNM, CHA/A/4,7 May 1780; 
ADM 13P/3,1 Jan 1782; POR/G/l, 3 Jan 1782. 
3. e. g. NM, POR/F/16,29 Aug 1775;; FOR/F/17,9 AP, 31 Deo 
1779,23 Mar, 23 May 1780; PRO, ADM 174/116,19 May 1776, 
9 Feb 1777. In addition, one shi of the line was virtually 
destroyed by fire (the Torbay (745 in May 1778); four 
smaller ships were similarly damaged. 
4" e. g. NMM, POR/F/16,31 Jul 1777; PRO, ADM 174/115,2 Jan 
1776. 
5. PRO, ADM 174/117,10 r 1760. 
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was difficult to gain with a southerly wind, and on several 
occasions ships had to cut away their masts and lie to anchor 
within sight of the harbour entrance. 
I 
Even in moderate weather, there were difficulties with 
the harbour entrances of both ports. Some of this was due to 
human error., but considering the amount of shipping that the 
pilots handled during the war, there was surprisingly little 
damags. 2 There were complaints from sea officers over their 
refusal to be hurried in taking ships in and out of harbour, but 
the alacrity with which the Resident Commissioners sprang to the 
pilots' defence indicates that there was general confidence in 
their judgement. 3 During this period there were only eleven 
collisions of any degree of seriousness in the confined spaces 
of the harbour and nearby areas. 
4 The "crookedness and 
intricacy" of the entrance to the Hamoaze necessitated warping 
1. e. g. PRO, A] M 174/116,21 Feb 1777; 174/117,10 Oct 1780. 
2. The pilots were local men appointed on the recommendation of 
the Commissioner and examined for competence by Trinity House 
'PRO, ADM 174/116,9 Aug 1776; 174/117,25 Mar 1781; *In, 
POR/F/17,22 May 1778). 
3, e. g. NNM, POR/P/27,3 Feb 1779. Rodney ordered the pilots of Britannia (100) to be "confined" when she touched going into 
Portsmouth aid, 19 Deo 1779), and issued a public complaint 
against the Plymouth pilots in 1782 (Major-General Mundy, 
The Life and Correspondence of the late Adznlrral Lord Rodne , London, 1830 , II9 179--80#-l Jan 1782. Ourry, however, 
eventually had trouble with the "inattention" of the Plymouth 
pilots (PRO, AI't 174/117,12 Feb, 26 Mar, 2 Ap 1782). 
4. e. g. NMM, POR/F/16,30 Dec 1778; POR/F/17,22 Sop 1779; PRO, 
ADM 174/117,4 Nov 1781. 
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ships in and out, but this was only possible in calm weather, 
and delays could be counted in weeks if the wind was adverse. 
1 
There was very little margin of error; in 1777, for instance, 
the Torbay was "taken aback in the Narrows" in moderate weather, 
and only a nearby transport buoy saved her from becoming totally 
lost.? However, there were at least no difficulties with depth 
of water; at Portsmouth this was a serious problem. 
After the Sandwich (90) had received considerable damage 
coming into Portsmouth with her guns aboard in late 1779, the 
Master Attendants complained to the Navy Board of the difficulties 
of bringing in three-deck ships with their guns aboard. They 
pointed out that when the ships were well-laden they neither 
sailed nor steered well, and that this was aggravated by lack of 
water under the keel, which meant that the ships did not respond 
well to their rudders. Farther, the depth necessitated taking 
them out at spring tides, which meant that if the ships should 
go aground, then there may have been no tide high enough to float 
them off until the next spring tides; the ideal, should be that 
the entrance should be attempted at neap tides, "so that great 
ships go in and out of port when the tides are on the increase. " 
1. FRO, AMI 7/659, fo. 61; e. g. IThIM, Ai A/2690,25 AP 1775; 
£DM B/189,3 1775; see also PRO, AM 174/116,1 May 1776. 
2. PRO, ADX 174/116,25 Feb 1777; also ibid, 27 Feb, 31 Oct 1778. 
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A further advantage was that at neap tides the period of slack 
water at high tide was longer, 
for on the spring tides, which run so 
exceeding strong,.. makes it dangerous to 
break a great ship loose until high water, 
there being then but little time left to 
get the ships over the shoal water before 
the tides begin to fall. 1 
The Admiralty approved the proposal that all guns should be loaded 
at Spithead, and in spite of a lack of co-operation from the 
Ordnance, this slower but safer method was adopted. 
2 
Naturally, the more that had to be done outside the 
harbours made the whole process of refitting and docking very much 
slower. All the last-minute tasks which were usually done while 
the ship was loading had to be done at Spithead, and yard workers 
had to be transported out to the ships. 
3 In addition, the ships 
were much more exposed to the weather. The delay of Byron's 
fleet in May 1778, which the King witnessed, was due to 
4 
exceptionally bad weather. In 1781 repairs and storage of 
1. NMM, POR D/22,27 Nov 1779. 
2. NMM, ADM B/200,29 Nov 1779; ADM A/2746,22 Dec 1779; 
POR/D/22,6 Ap 1780. Before the Admiralty approved this 
measure, the Britannia also went aground, but with no damage (NMM, ADM B/200,20 Dec 1779). Ships from the River yards 
took on their guns in Long Reach, and from Chatham at Black- 
stakes (NM, CRA/E/33,24 Oct 1777- 
3, NMKt ADM B/200,14 Dec 1779- 
4- G, N, 132-3,6 May 1778, King to Lord North; SaP, II, 44-5, 
5 May 1778, Robinson to Sandwich; ib d, 63-6,17,18 May 
1778, Keppel to Sandwich. 
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Kempenfelt's fleet were delayed, "by the very bad weather that 
has prevailed lately, which prevented any intercourse between 
the shore and the ships". Five days later the Admiral reported 
the same situation; "yesterday was wholly lost from the violence 
of the wind". Howe's fleet for the third relief of Gibraltar was 
also delayed by the same conditions. 
I At the end of 1780 Pye 
tried to get the decision on offloading the guns at Spithead 
reversed, since it took so much time and there were no ships in 
harbour ready for empty docks. The Navy Board, in reply to an 
Admiralty request for an opinion, admitted that a decision to 
bring the ships in with their guns could be left to the dis- 
oretion of the Master Attendants, although it warned that it was 
still a risky operation. This arrangement lasted until the end 
of the war. 
2 
The shoal at the entrance of Portsmouth harbour had made 
its appearance during the Seven Year War, and depth of water in 
the harbour gave cause for concern. 
3 A report of an allegation 
by a local pilot that the harbour there would fill up, unless 
ballast lighters were quickly used, reached the Admiralty. The 
1. SaP, IV# 76-7,19,24 Nov 1781, Kempenfelt to Sandwich; 
G, VI, III, 22 Aug 1782, Koppel to the King. 
2. NMM, ADM A/2758,12 Dec 1760; Al1t/BP/19 13 Dec 1780. 
3. There was a small bank there as early as 1600, but the shoal had become difficult in the 1760's (Kitson, 1947, p. 258; NNM, B/175,30 Oct 1764; LAD II, plans 45,46). 
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yard officers discredited this claim, and they showed very proper 
caution to his proposal to dredge away the eddy bank by the 
harbour mouth. The Master Attendants commented: "if that 
bank was . there is no man can say, what course the tide t 
WOW4 
3r take"9 and they pointed out that ballast lighters could more 
profitably be used elsewhere in the harbour. 
1 Nevertheless, a 
constant watch had to be kept by the Commissioner. Wrecks had 
to be raised, and refuse had to be prevented from being thrown 
into the harbour. 2 At Portsmouth the Ordnance had to be 
restrained from throwing mud into the water near the docks, and 
at Plymouth the contractors clearing mud from the mast pond were 
observed disposing of it in the harbour. 
3 
Although there was little fear that the Hamoaze would 
silt ups the condition of the bays to the west of Plymouth, 
called Cattewater and Sutton Pool, gave rise to a petition for 
aid from the local merchants. The Navy Board reported that 
while this area was useful for smaller naval ships, it did not 
see that the proposed improvements would in any way help the 
harbour. 4 The responsibility for dredging and clearing these 
1. Nm, ADM BP/5,27 Ap 1784 (enolosure of 15 Feb 1781)- 
2. NNM, POR/P/15,30 Jan 1774; POR/G/1,31 May 1716; POR/F/16, 
2 Jun 1776; POR/D/23,26 Jul 1782. 
3. NPIM, POR/D/22,23 Jun 1780; PRO, AM 174/116,9 Ap 1776. 
4. NMM, ADM A/2689,14 Max 1775; B/169,21 Mar 1775. 
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two areas had been given to one Joule in 1710 by Act of 
Parliament, but his executors had been neglectful. In return 
for this duty, Joule had been given the monopoly of supplying 
all ships with stone ballast, but since his monopoly was about 
to expire, the supply was inefficient, and gave rise to 
complaint. 
I Efforts to obtain another contractor to supply 
14,000 tons of ballast from East Looe ran into difficulties, 
and inefficient ballasting led to delays at the end of the 
war. 
2 The ballasting of ships at Portsmouth tended to run on 
an ad hoc basis. In 1775 the Ordnance accused the dockyard of 
contributing to the breach in the Southsea fortifications made 
by a storm by having taken ballast from the beach in front of 
the castle. Relations with the Ordnance in particular could 
be difficult, for space, even at Portsmouth, was not unlimited, 
and the erection of piers and the laying of moorings sometimes 
3 led to friction. The huge amounts of timber delivered to the 
yards often clogged up neighbouring oreeks, and there were 
complaints of lack of access. All these problems had'to be 
settled by the Resident Commiesioner. 
4 
1Q 8 Anne a, 4, The monopoly was granted for 71 years. 
2, PRO, ADM 174/117,19 Jul 1782; 174/18,20 Dec 1782; 174/118, 7,14 Mar 1783. 
3. e. g. M, 24, POR/F/15,6,15 May 1774,8 AP 1775; PRO, ADM 
174/115,19,30 May 1775. 
4. e. g. NMM, POR/G/1,25 Aug 1780; P0R/F/17,1 Sep 1780; 
PRO, ADM 174/116,29 Dec 1778; 174/117,8 Dec 1780. 
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There was one more natural cause of delay to refitting. 
It was ironic that it should be the three refitting yards which 
lacked an abundant supply of fresh water, which, although baed-. 
by the bricklayers and at the smithery, was primarily needed for 
supplying the fleet. Portsmouth was the best served, but in 
1779 an observer reported that, "the common watering place is so 
much drained that lighters have been sent to Southampton river... 
This must impede our supplies very essentially". 
Z At Sheerness 
and Plymouth there was a constant problem, for there was no direct 
water supply at all, and both had to be supplied by boat. Sheer- 
ness garrison had, "no other than the rain which falls upon the 
battery", and all water had to come from Chatham in a boat 
designed for the purpose. However, one boat was found to be 
insufficient, and the Queenborouh yacht supplied the garrison - 
a situation over which the Navy Board protested. However, its 
suggestion that the military should arrange its own water supply 
was overruled by the Admiralty. After the war, the possibility 
of a reservoir and alternative supply was investigated. 
2 At 
Plymouth water for the yard had to be shipped "at great expense" 
from Southdown. In 1781 a scheme put forward by two contractors 
for piping water into the yard was enthusiastically supported by 
1. Miscellany III, (ed) W. G. Perrin, (NRS, 1928), p. 148,11 Sep 
1779, Benjamin Thompson to Germain; also G, IV, 427,6 Sep 
1779, Sandwich to the King. A 98 gun ship needed 184 tons of 
water for the four months of Channel service, and a seventy- 
four, 113 tons (I M, POR/D/22,31 Aug 1779). 
2. NMM, CHA/M/3,24 AP 1770; ADM A/2690,26 Ap 1775; A/2691, 
12 May 1775; ADM B/189,1,3 May 1775; ADM BP/6a, 24 Oct 
1785; ADM A/2818,29 Dee 1785. 
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Ourry and the officers, but it foundered on the question of 
cost to be borne between the Navy, the Ordnance and the 
Victualling Boards, so that the yard remained without water 
throughout the war. 
1 
Sandwich had done what he could to improve the yards, 
but the increased size of the fleet during the war found them 
wanting. Yet while the many problems of day-to-day 
administration were due to a lack of foresight, and investment 
in the yard facilities, it has often been forgotten by sub- 
sequent critics that the yards officers and men laboured 
under considerable natural difficulties. Many of the problems 
were beyond eighteenth-century technical accomplishments. The 
difficulties of dredging and reclaiming land on a large scale 
and in making large enough docks, and the lack of a motive 
power stronger than that provided by horses and men, imposed 
limitations which should not be forgotten when judging the 
1. NNM, ADM A/2760,3,16 Feb 1781; A/2762,13,20 Ap 1781; 
A/2763,17 May 1781; AI BP/2,20 Feb, 1 May 1781; PRO, 
ADM 174/115,30 May 1775; 174/117,16 Feb 1781; PP-CF, 
p. 316. A previous scheme had foundered on the bad 
feeling between the towns of Plymouth and Plymouth Dock. 
Samuel Johnson, who was travelling in Devon at the time 
(1762) "affecting to entertain the passions of the place, 
exclaimed, '1 am against the dockers ... let them die of 
thirst"". (Boswell, Life of Johnson, Everyman ed., I, 234). 
The problem was not resolved until 1793; see C. B. M. Sillick, 
"The City Port of Plymouth" (unpub. Ph. D. thesis, London, 
1938), Appendix B, ii. 
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yards from the hindsight offered by the age of the internal 
combustion engine. If one adds to these natural limitations 
the need for a favourable wind to coincide with all the other 
variable faotors, it is perhaps not surprising that estimates 
tended to depend on experienced guesswork, and schedules on 
a good deal of luck. 
Chapter Six. The Performance of the Dockyards. 
i) Building. 
There are several difficulties in attempting to assess 
the performance of the six dockyards during this period. The 
first is the lack of detailed studies of former or subsequent 
periods. Secondly, there are problems of comparison, for the 
yards operated on a scale which no other contemporary 
organisation could match. Thirdly, much contemporary comment 
was misleading or misinformed; few people attempted to under- 
stand an organisation which they did not hesitate to criticise. 
The handling of the fleet was politically important, and Parlia- 
mentary attacks complicated the issue. Pinally, there is the 
difficulty of applying arbitrary standards in judging the 
performance of the yards, for their' functions varied between 
peace and war. During peacetime the chief role of the yards 
was to maintain an effective fleet by building and repairing, 
but when hostilities began these two functions took second place 
to the refitting and maintenance of the fleet. 
Once war had been declared speed was the most crucial 
strategic and political factory and the Navy Board was forced to 
put cost and even wor1aianship on one side. In peacetime, how- 
ever, these last two factors were naturally considered as vital 
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because building and repairs were the most important functions 
of the yards. In order to keep a complex discussion to its 
simplest elements, the three functions of the yards are best 
judged by the factors which were uppermost in contemporary minds. 
Thus costs will be considered primarily in relation to building, 
workmanship to repairs and speed to refitting. This is not to 
imply that, for instance, the speed of building, or any other 
combination of criteria to function, was of no importance. 
Of all the assessments of the dockyarde' performance, 
the problem of costs remains the most elusive. There was general 
dissatisfaction with the amounts that had to be paid for ships; 
Sandwich would not have persevered in the implementation of task 
work had he been satisfied that operations were proceeding in the 
most economic way possible. Yet many questions remain. Merchant 
yard ships cost less, but direct comparison with the royal yards is 
largely fruitless. Contractors built for profit only, had fewer 
overheads and there was no necessity for them to go to the expense 
of maintaining a large workforce. 
I In relation to private yardet 
the royal yards were an uneconomic proposition; the methods of 
calculating the figures in the Estimates demonstrate that cost was 
a factor which was hardly every considered by the yard officers. 
Besides, the size of the organisation and the fact that it was not 
1. For an excellent analysis of this problem see Baugh pp. 332-3- 
For costs of individual ships, from the Abstracts of Progress, 
see Williams, p. 425. 
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governed by the profit motive cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
figures; it would be true to say that the methods and in- 
accuracies of the accounting processes hardly reflected the true 
cost of the ships. 
One of the first problems that Sandwich had to face 
was the condition of the ships that he had inherited from Hawke. 
During his first year in office he was optimistic: "considering 
the very severe services on which our fleets were employed during 
the last war... it seems to 'e rather to be wondered that we have 
so many good ships ... many of them have lasted longer than we had 
reason to expect". 
l There were eighty-six ships of the line, but 
this, as Sandwich soon found, was only the strength on paper.? In 
spite of Opposition claims, it is clear that the effects of the 
building of 61ipst in the Seven Years War with unseasoned timber 
were beginning to be felt in the early years of Sandwich's 
administration, and it soon became apparent that the condition of 
the ships was not as good as the First Lord had first thought. 
When two ships, listed as in "perfect condition", were found to 
need a small repair, he wrote that, "it is much to be feared, that 
almost every ship that comes to be examined will be found in this 
melancholy state". 
3 
1. PRO, ADM 7/659, fo, 114-¢. 
2. SaP, IV, 303-5. Robert Tomlinson, an important technical source for the Opposition during the war, listed 81 ships of the line 
as being in a satisfactory condition (J. G. Bullocke (ed), The Pacers of Robert Tomlinson, (NRS, 1935), PP. 44-5 and Append x I). 
3. PRO, ADM 7/660, fo. 32; see also Derrick, p. 158. 
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This was pessimistic, but the condition of the ships 
left much to be desired. The truth is difficult to unravel; any 
administration in the second half of the eighteenth century found it 
difficult to estimate with any certainty how many ships it had at its 
disposal at any one time, and many, including Sandwich, used this un- 
certainty to advantage. ' In addition there were many conflicting 
lists drawn up by both sides in Parliament. However, it is clear 
from the longevity and subsequent performance of the ships built irnthe 
1760's that their condition was weak, and this gives credibility 
to Sandwich's consistently-maintained assertion that the fleet was 
in a deplorable state in 1771.2 Yet in spite of considerable 
energy on the part of the Navy Board and the yards, it was not 
until 774 that a ship of the line was launched, by which time 
fourteen of the line and forty-four smaller ships had been broken 
up or sold. 
3 
Much of this delay was due to Sandwich's order to 
let ships lie in frame so that their timbers would season, 
4 but 
even allowing for this, the First Lord's early optimism had left 
him by 1773. During the Visitation of that year he noted that 
during the previous twelve months, six ships had been condemned 
1. See above, pp. 69-70. 
2, See G, V, 342, Jan 1782; Mackesy, p. 167; Williams, PP- 42-44, 
447. A sample of 74 gun ships shows that the list of those in 
good condition in 1771 provided by Tomlinson was very inaccurate (Bullocke (ed), Tomlinson Pap ers, Appendix I). 
3. See NMM, ADM BP/3r 22 Jan 1782. Between 1771 and 1777,28 ships 
of the line were broken up (SaP, IV, 306,27 Dec 1781), The only 
source for the allegation that the Surveyors built ships 
unnecessarily rather than repairing them comes from the unreliable Gregson (ShP, 146, no. 105,30 Ap 1777; see Mackesy, p. 166). 
4. S0(a), 618,8 Dec 1772. 
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and no new ones built: 
It is to be observed how very short 
the rebuilding falls of the decay; and 
that unless we can find means by a 
sufficient seasoning to make our ships 
last longer, our strength at sea must 
in a few years be reduced to a state 
that carries with it very alarming 
reflections. 1 
It soon became clear to Sandwich that it was beyond 
the capacity of the royal yards to produce enough ships to maintain 
the number of warships, and replace those which succumbed to dry 
rot. The Navy Board was therefore forced to use merchant yards 
in peacetime, although the building of ships over seventy-four guns 
was thought beyond the means and expertise of private builders. 
Nevertheless, five out of the nine capital ships laid down between 
the beginning of Sandwich's administration and the outbreak of war 
were built in merchant yards. 
2 Out of the forty-nine ships of the 
line completed between 1774 and 1783, twenty-four were built in 
merchant yards. 
3 In'. addition, they built seven fifty-gun ships 
and forty-one frigates, and at the end of Sandwich's administration 
1. PRO, £DM 7/660, fo. I2. 
2. Between 1771 and 1777 13 ships of the line were completed, 
9 were laid down and completed, and sixteen were building 
at the beginning of the wax (Abstracts of Progress, 5, part 1; 
Williams, PP. 423-4). 
3. See Appendix XI; also NMM, ADM BP/31 22 Jan 1782. 
i1 
there were nineteen frigates building. 
1 
Although the merchant yards played a vital role in 
building up the fleet in peacetime, they were of greater 
importance in wartime, because the royal yards became more and more 
absorbed in keeping the fleet in a serviceable condition. 
2 The 
administration found nine new locations where ships could be built, 
and even used Leith in Scotland, where, however, there was a good 
deal of trouble in supplying timber to the builder. 
3 On the whole, 
the Navy Board's administration of the shipbuilding contracts was 
marked by success. Private yards built quickly, sometimes 
producing line ships in under two years, although few were completed 
in under three. It is not unreasonable to infer from this short 
time that these ships were not built with such care as those in the 
royal yards. Certainly shipwrights working in merchant yards had 
more incentive to complete the job as quickly as possible. Besides, 
there were stiff "mulcts" or fines for late deliveries written into 
the contracts -a factor which, of course, was completely lacking in 
1. For numbers and types of ships built in merchant yards see 
Williams, p. 430. The peacetime establishment of small ships 
(5th rate and below) was kept low and increased rapidly at the 
beginning of the war. Between 1776-9 the number was increased 
by 211, of which 69 were bought (NMM, AD14 BP/3,22 Jan 1782). 
For instance, there were 44 sloops at the beginning of 1775, 
92 in 1782, and by 1785 the establishment was back to 44 
again (Derrick, p. 161,164,167; SaP, 1,422; NMM, ADM 
BP/6a, 23 Ap 1785). 
2. See ShP, 146, no. 172, undated, Gregson to Shelburne. 
3. G, V, 352-3, Jan 1782; Add MSS, 383449 roa. 312,314-8. 
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the royal yards. 
1 However, some time was lost because of the 
need to transport timber and stores to the builder, and also when 
transporting the completed ship to a royal yaxd for fitting out. 
Those built at Liverpool and Bristol had to be sailed under jury- 
rig to Plymouth, and even shorter journeys took a long time. 
2 
Eventually, the Navy Board was forced to allow one or two frigates 
to be fitted out at the merchant yards at which they were built. 
3 
In fact, such were the strains of the American war 
that the royal yards virtually lost their capacity to produce 
large ships. In the two yeaxs after Sandwich left office they only 
launched three ships of the line, and they were only sixty-four gm 
ships; one of them, the Polyiphemus, had been on the stocks since 
1774" In the same time, eight seventy-four gun ships and four 
sixty-fours were produced by merchant yards, in addition to a vast 
number of smaller ships. In 1782 Sandwich claimed that thirty- 
seven ships of the line were building, which he compared favour- 
ably with seventeen in 1759 and fifteen in 1770. However, sixteen 
of these ships had only been ordered, and two of these were never 
1. Between 1774 and 1783,16 ships were late and their builders fined. 
See NEM, ADM B/197,11 Dec 1778; B/200,20 Nov, 16 Dec 1779; BP/I, 
1 Jan, 8 May 1780; BP/2,24 Jan, 22 Jun, 28 Au. g, 30 Nov 1781; 
BP/3,22 Max, 7,15,29,30 May, 18 Jul, 18,22 Nov 1782. Merchant, 
yards also had troubles with strikes (e. g. ADM B/194,19 Nov 1777, 
Roger Fisher to the Navy Board). 
2. e. g. NNM, AIM B/190,16 Dec 1775; B/191,15 Jan 1776; B11999 10 
Jul 1779; PRO, ADM 174/117,10 Nov 1780. The Charon (44) went 
aground on the Maplin Sands before she was commissioned on her 
journey from Harwich to Sheerness (NMM, AM B/197,10 Nov 1778). 
3. e. g. INIM, ADM A/2714,24 AP 1777; also BL, III, 68,17 Mar 1805, 
Middleton to Melville. 
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built. He also included a hundred-gun and five ninety-gun ships; 
technically they were under construction at the western yards, but 
work on them had been stopped for years because of pressure of 
other work. Thus of the twenty-two ships actually under con- 
struction at the end of his administration, five had no hope of 
being completed until the peace: of the seventeen seventy-four 
and sixty-fours, fourteen were being built in merchant yards. 
1 
As at other times in the century,, there were serious 
delays in the building of ships, especially those of the first or 
second rate. Yet it is unrewarding to compare building times. 
For instance, the delay at the western yards in the building of 
:Y (90), which the St. Georae (98), Royal Sovereign (100) and Glor 
took eleven, twelve and thirteen years respectively, indicates 
nothing more than that they were built at yards which were heavily 
pressed and short of shipwrights for most of the war. Building 
2 
a ship was a long and complicated process. It did not follow, as 
Robert Tomlinson argued, that if twelve shipwrights could build a 
sixty-four gun ship in three years, and fourteen a seventy-four in 
the same time, that, by the same reckoning, fifty shipwrights, 
1. See Appendix XI; also N}IM, ADM BP/3,26 Dec 1781; G, V, 351, 
Jan 1782; Add MSS 38344, fos. 310-11. 
2. See Williarisq p. 428; Abstracts of Progresses, 5p part 1. 
The building times were 1774-1785,1774-1786 and 1775-1788- 
In addition there were the Medusa (50) at Plymouth (1776-85) 
Leopard (50) at Portsmouth X776-85). 
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twelve labourers and nine pairs of sawyers could complete a seventy- 
four in six months. 
1 It was essentially a process which could be 
hurried only marginally by ensuring that a correct amount of labour 
and materials were at the right place at the right time. Even at 
the easiest times this was not always possible. 
ii) Repairing. 
As in the case of building, the capacity of the yards 
to keep pace with repairs was severely limited; the great 
difference, however, was that the Navy Board did not use merchant 
yards to repair ships because it distrusted the quality of their 
workmanship. An eighteenth-century warship needed constant 
attention. Of the thirty-four seventy-four gun ships which served 
for all of the five years of the European wax (March 1778 to March 
1783), only twelve went through this period without being taken out 
of commission to be repaired. These twelve ships enjoyed this 
uninterrupted service either because they had only just been built, 
or because they had just undergone a large repair before March 1778. 
1. Bullocke (ed), Tomlinson Papers, pp. 48-9. 
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Moreover, having gone for five years without a repair, they did not 
labt long; all except one had either sunk, or been sold or needed 
a large repair in the two years immediately after the war. ' 
Once the wax had started, there was no chance of the 
six yards keeping pace with damage and rot. 
2 There was always a 
growing queue of ships in harbour needing repair, especially towards 
the end of the war when they had returned from foreign commissions. 
3 
At the height of the war, the situation became so grave that 
Middleton thought that it would be easier to repair hulks on a 
temporary basis rather than to repair those ships in the queue. 
`'Against the opinion of many, but with the agreement of the junior 
Surveyor", Middleton wrote ;', "I went down to the yards myself, 
and for appearance sake, had some of the best ships surveyed in my 
4 presence". This was a desperate decision which reflected the 
difficulty of maintaining the number of effective fighting ships. 
It can be judged as successful, although there is no way of knowing 
if the Portsmouth officers were correct when they reported that 
1. Abstracts of Progress, 5P part 1. Most of these twelve anyway 
had little chance for repair since they were away on foreign 
commissions; in addition, their refits lasted longer than 
average, 
2. A list made by the Navy Office at the end of 1781 shows that 63 
ships of the line were repaired between 1771 and 1781, but this 
makes no allowance for several ships which were repaired twine 
or more (Add MSS 38344, fo. 321). 
3. For instance, at Portsmouth in March 1782 there were 17 ships of 
the line in Ordinary, seven of which were permanent hulks. Only 
3 were being repaired; the rest were rotting, although some were 
not worth repairing (NM, ADM BP/4,22 Feb 1783), 
4. Add MSS 41079, fo. 85; also BL, III, 28, May 1804, Middleton to Dundas. 
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Middleton's plan would "only hinder our bringing forward the works". 
1 
Although the fact that outside labour was not involved 
ensured that there were never enough men and facilities to keep pace 
with repairs, the lack of priority and urgency in this sphere of 
operations made matters much worse. Each repair was classed by 
the Navy Board (on the report of the Master Shipwright) as "great", 
"middling" or "small"t by a computation of time rather than expense; 
some of the large repairs lasted an exceptionally long time. The 
Valiant (74) was in dock at Portsmouth for four and a half years 
between October 1771 and April 1775, and the Hero (74) was at 
Plymouth from June 1776 to September 1780 for only a slightly 
shorter period. 
2 The reason for this slowness was that repairs 
took second place to more immediate work. Thus any calculation of 
the speed of repairs reflects not so much sloth on a particular 
job, but shows merely that resources were being used elsewhere. 
The average time taken for all large repairs on seventy-four gun 
ships between 1770 and 1786 was two years, eight months. Between 
1771 and 1777 middling repairs took a year and small repairs over 
five months. Once the war had started they took less time. 
Middling repairs average nine months and small repairs four months, 
3 
1. NNM, POR/D/23,27 Feb 1782. Of the 17 at Portsmouth, the Royal 
William (84), Elite (74), Grafton (74), Essex (64), Modeste ste (64) 
and Firm (60) were patched up. All except the Elizabeth and the 
Grafton had been hulks since the beginning of the ware 
2. Abstracts of Progress, 5, part 1. 
3. ibid. To the nearest day, large repairs took 2 yrs. 244 days: 
1771-77, middling repairs, 361 day s; small, 158 days: 1778-1783, 
middling repairs, 266 days; small, 123 days. 
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Although this shorter time can be accounted for by the 
greater number of hours worked by the men during wartime, there is 
no doubt that corners were cut during hostilities. By 1779 the 
officers were told that it would become "frequently necessary... to 
employ ships on service without being able to enter into so large 
a repair as might at more leisure time become necessary". After 
the war the order was reversed: "Desist-from temporary repairs 
and consider all ships (in future) to be intended for every kind of 
service". 
1 It was the caulking which suffered the most from 
hurried work when the yards were under constant pressure. "Do 
no more than make her tight and safe" ran one Navy Board order 
early in the war. 
2 Some of the reports of the workmanship on 
the ships built by merchant yards no doubt strengthened the 
resolve of the Navy Board not to employ them on repairs. "The 
caulking the new frigates want is very great indeed", wrote Hood 
in 1779; one of them had, "not a seam in her that is not quite 
open". 
3 Only two years after the Aammemnon (64) was built at 
Bucklers Hard, her captain complained that, "no caulking continues 
1. PRO, ADM 174/18,10,20 Nov 1779; 174/117,5 Ap 1782; 174/118, 
16 Feb 1783. See Derrick, pp. 180-1. 
2. PRO, Amt 95/95,25 Jul 1777- 
3. NMM, POR/F/17,2 Nov 1779. The ship in question was the Champion 
(44), built by Barnard of Ipswich. See also the unflattering 
description of the building of the Crescent (36) at Burlesdon 
(P0R/D/23,9 Dec 1782). On the other hand, the Navy Board wrote 
on the report of the Plymouth officers of the Cleopatra (32), 
built by Hillhouse of Bristol, that "we are glad to find the 
work so well performed" (PRO, ADM 174/18,24 Ap 1780). See also 
S0(b), 569 12 Mar 1783. 
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with effect for more than a few days going to sea". 
1 
The Navy 
Board had to warn against huxried caulking in the royal yards on 
more than one occasion. 
2 
Often, however, as in previous wars, ships were "simply 
too far gone". 
3 There was a limit to the effectiveness of caulking 
an old ship. Admiral Barrington wrote of his ship, the Prince of 
Wales (74): 
She isweak and strains so much in a 
sea that the ocham works out of the 
seams to such a degree that the people 
never lay dry in their beds, and if I 
may be allowed to give an opinion it is 
not fitting that she should go to sea 
again without her being ridered. 4 
Barrington was referring to the practice of putting "breadth riders" 
(or cross braces) into ships to strengthen them. It was by this 
method that old ships were brought into the line in 1778 and 1779 
"for summer service only". 
5 In some cases the condition of the 
ships was not as bad as was thought. The Sandwich (90), built 
in 1759, ordered to be laid up in March 1779 and made into a 
1. NNM, CEA/E/34,18 Feb 1783. The fault may have been in building 
with unseasoned timber rather than with hasty caulking in both 
these cases. 
2. e. g. SO(a), 12 Dec 1770; NNIM, CHA/E/33,6 Aug 1781. 
3. Baugh, P" 333 n. 2. 
4. PRO, AJM 1/1498,6 Jan 1778, The Prince of Wales was "ridered", 
but had to be laid up in February 1780, and was ordered to be 
broken up in July 1783. She was built in 1765 at Milford. 
5. At least 17 ships were given only temporary repairs between 1778 
and 1782, and another 15 given substantial strengthening through 
riders (PRO, ADM 95/96; I MZ, ADM A/2723-2782). 
--- -_., - -ý 
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convalescent ship, was found to be fit enough for summer service, 
"by adding some riders, hooks, rebolting etc", and in fact served, 
once coppered, in the West Indies until well into 1782.1 
There seemed to be little criticism from the sea 
officers over the quality of yard workmanship in this period. 
There were differences between the yard and sea officers over what 
constituted "a defect of consequence", and occasionally the Navy 
Board was involved; 
2 if the officer was influential he would go 
to the Admiralty. Forty years before, "there were murmurings in 
the fleet, but the number of well documented instances is not 
impressive". 3 One reason is that although the Admiralty would 
give questions of workmanship a fair hearing, during wartime it 
was far more concerned with speed. Moreover, once the ship had 
been commissioned, the Boatswain and Carpenter would sign the 
weekly progress to signify that the ship which they had taken 
over was in good condition. Technically, the yards could not be 
held responsible for any defect which was discovered from that 
moment. The Navy Board fell back on this point in one complaints 
1. PRO, ADM 95/95,11 Mar, 22 Jun, 1 Sep 1779; 1Th1M, ADM B/199, 
3 Jun 1779; ABM A/2779,6 Sep 1782. See also POR/D/23, 
20 Jun 1782. 
2. e. g. PRO, ADM 95/96,8 Jan 1778; NMM, POR/D/21,9 Dec 1778. 
Complaints of badly-cut sails were also received (e. g. IMM, ADM 
A/2756,19 Oct 1780; PRO, DM 174/17,27 rte, 4 Jul 1777). 
3. Baugh, P. 333. 
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" 
M0 
At%^ 
they must beg, to say that the Carpenter -had signed the progress... 
(and that)evexy method has been used to prevent complaints". 
1 
It is difficult enough to come to conclusions about the 
quality of workmanship, either in merchant or royal yards, in war 
or peace, but impossible to connect it, as did political opponents, 
with the number of losses at sea. 
2 Many other factors have to be 
taken into account, including seamanship and the quality of ship- 
board maintenance. Sandwich himself blamed "our immense lossesr' 
on "the late dreadful hurricanes and other misfortunes". 
3 There 
is some basis for truth in this contention. Of the forty-four 
ships of the line lost or condemned during Sandwich's administration, 
only seven foundered at sea. Six of these foundered during the 
hurricanes of 1780 and 1781.4 Those lost in, the storms of 1782 
can be blamed on the little understood effects of copper sheathing 
on iron bolts. Some of these ships were in very bad condition 
I. NMM, ADM B/195,27 Dec 1777. See PUR/J/2, which contains the 
only examples of weekly progresses, for these signatures of the 
ships' warrant officers. 
2. e. g. Gabriel Snodgrass, Letter to the Rt. Hon. Henry Thmdas. on 
the mode of improving the Navy of Great Britain London, 1797)- 
Snodgrass claimed that 66 ships foundered between 1775-1784 
because of green timbers and bad workmanship, and Albion (p. 315) 
accepts the implications of this conclusion. 
3. G, V, 350, Jan 1782. 
4" NMKp AD14 BP/31 22 Jan 1783. See W. S. Rowbotham, "The West Indies 
Hurricanes of October 1780", Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Cvi, 1961.12 (6 of the line) ships were lost at this time; they were the Thy derer (74) ci n (74), Cornwall (74), Terrible (74), Stirling, Castle (64ý and Defiance (64 . In addition, 20 (9 of the line were very severely damaged. 17 ships of the line in all came home in 1781 needing a great repair (Add MSS 38344, foo 308,27 Dec 1781. 
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when the hurricanes struck, but considering the length of time 
they had been in commission, it was hardly the fault of the yards. 
Few wars have been fought with so much of the fleet as far from 
repair facilities as this one. 
In spite of thin and conflicting evidence, mainly from 
yard officers jealous of building standards, it would be fair to 
assume that, within the limits of time imposed by hostilities, the 
work of the yards was well performed. The great weakness was 
their limited capacity. Lacking a technological solution to arrest 
decay in the fleet, an administrative solution to speed their repair 
was not impossible. However, the repairing of ships was entrusted 
to merchant yards only, "in cases of absolute necessity, and con- 
fined to frigates only". Middleton also recalled that, "necessity 
forced it upon us during the American war, and it was put a stop to, 
as soon as we were able to procure a sufficiency from our own yards". 
' 
Yet without this extra help, an effective rate of repairing ships, 
even with a lowering of standards, could not be maintained. The 
administration produced a fleet which it could not, because of its 
prejudices against merchant yards, successfully keep in repair. It 
was a wasteful process, and, ironically, the Navy Board still had to 
depend upon the workmanship of private yards, for the new ships built 
by them were essential for maintaining the effective numbers of the 
fleet. 
1. Add MSS 41079, fo, 12$T; BL, III, 68,17 Mar 1805 to Melville; 
also NPßli, ADM A/2781,26 Nov 1782, 
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iii) Refitting. 
It was, however, the refitting of ships which was the 
most important role of the dockyards during wartime. ' Except in 
a few cases of emergency, the ships were docked at each refit, and 
their bottoms inspected and surveyed. During peacetime, this was 
automatically done by the officers every three years (by the process 
known as "Triennial Trimmings"). In order to dock, the ships had 
to be cleared of guns and stores, and most of the rigging struck. 
There were regular intervals at which certain parts of the ship 
were to be inspected; many of the routines had not been changed 
since the previous century. Once the ship was out of dock it was 
UP to the ship's company to prepare it for sea again, and take on 
ballast, victuals, water, guns and stores. 
2 The yard artificers 
had raxely finished by this time, for there were also many last- 
minute jobs which had to be undertaken afloat. Painting could 
not "with propriety" be done until the ships were "scraped and 
cleaned,.. the rigging tarred and the guns in... which is seldom 
accomplished until they get to Spithead". 
3 In 1779 Hood requested 
the Navy Board to provide two pitch boats to be permanently stationed 
1. As in the case of repairs, refits at merchant yards of small 
ships were allowed only under exceptional circumstances e. g. 
PRO, ADM 95/95,15 Jan 1778; NMM, £1 A/2756,7 Nov 1780. 
2. For an accurate (and colourful) account of refitting ships at 
Portsmouth, see Sutherland Horne, pp. 58-60. For periodic 
maintenance, see Ehrman, p. 79. 
3. Nisi, POR/ /23,5 Aug 1782; also CHA/E/33,11 AP 1780. 
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with the fleet, because of the "almost continual demand there now is 
for caulkers at Spithead". 
l 
Since the eastern yards were so inaccessible, the majority 
of ships were refitted at Portsmouth and Plymouth. Only occasionally 
was a ship of the line fitted in the Thames or Medway, usually just 
after being built. Between 1771 and 1782,152 ships of the line 
were docked 653 times, in addition to an enormous number of smaller 
ships. 
2 Between 1774 and 1783 there were 
gun ships, of which six were never commies: 
commissioned only for a month or so at the 
remaining fifty-six were docked 161 times, 
fittings took place between 1777 and 1779. 
took place at the western yards. 
sixty-five seventy-four 
Loned, Three were 
end of the war. The 
and 57% of these re- 
87% of these refits 
Coppering had a dramatic effect on the number of refits, 
cutting their number in 1782 to half that of the peacetime fig=e. 
3 
1. NNM, POR/F/17,2,8 Nov 1779; also POR/G/1,24 Jul 1777; POR/D/21, 
15 Oct 1777,5 Feb 1778; PRO, ADM 174/117,2 Feb 1781. } 
{ 
2. Williams, p. 446. Sandwich stated in his defence that 86 ships of 
the line had been refitted between 1778 and 1781 (SaP, IV, 296), 
but this figure does the yards an injustice, for this list was 
only compiled from ships in commission at the end of 1781, and 
takes no account of ships de-commissioned before that date. Mackesy 
is therefore incorrect when he quotes from a similar source that 
there were only 151 refits of ships of the line between these two 
dates (Mackesy, p. 170; Add MSS 38344, fos. 320-3)- 
3- Calculations from the Abstract of Progresses, 5, part 1. The number 
of refits for all seventy-fours were as follows; 1774,18: 1775,13: 
1776,17: 1777,31: 1778,27: 1779,31: 1780,13: 1781,13: 
1782,8: 1783,3: In 1779 and 1780 29 seventy-fours were coppered; the effect can be seen in the sharp tdrop of refits by 1782. 
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Although coppering took such strain off the yards from 1780 onwards, 
it did not live up to its expectations entirely. Too much was 
expected of it; one order of early 1780 stated that, "the ships 
that are coppered will seldom be under orders for refitting". 
' 
In any case, the yards had to supply ships with stores, even if 
they did not have to dock them, and much more work had to be done 
afloat. 
It was not until the mobilisation of 1778 that the 
yards were fully tested. Sandwich had been held back by North in 
his attempts to rearm, but by the end of 1776 there were thirty-six 
line of battleships mobilised at home, although the demands from 
America had left the frigate situation in a "catastrophic" state. 
2 
Yet by October 1778 there were sixty-two ships of the line in action 
throughout the world, and another eight ready to receive men. 
"Seventy ships in the first months of a war was no mean achievement". 
3 
In spite of Keppel's surprise in finding eleven of his best ships 
ordered to America with Byron, he was into the Channel by June. 
4 
In this case the lack of ships reflected the difficulties of the 
Admiralty's strategic policy rather than a lack of energy and action 
1. PRO, ADM 174/18,29 Feb 1780- 
2. Mackesy, p. 174. 
3. ibid, p. 176. 
4. See SaP, II, 54,9 Y 1778, Keppel to Sandwich. 
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at the yards, and at all times the war in America undermined the 
fleet at home. Far more significant from the point of view of time 
was the general reluctance to mobilise at al , and, once the 
mobilisation was under way, the want of seamen was critical, 
' It 
was this that was the largest hindrance in getting ships to sea 
throughout the war, although much of the blame for delays in later 
years can be put upon Sandwich's insistence on late autumn cruises; 
as Middleton pointed out, the inevitable result of a late cruise 
was a late start the next season. 
2 The Western Squadron was never 
into the Channel in good time; fortunately, the French were rarely 
better. 
All the same, there was a vague, though widespread, 
impression among people concerned with the navy that refits 
could have been hastened. 
3 As with repairs, the yard officers 
were told to be less thorough in wartime. In 1779 they were 
ordered to, "survey.. rigging, masts and yards afloat in the 
best manner you can without bringing them on shore and not to 
take out the lower masts, though they may have been on board 
for three years and upward'. Corners were cut in other ways. 
4 
1. See Williams, p. 477; Mackeey, pp. 176-7. 
2. SaP, III, 177,15 Sep 1779, Middleton to Sandwich. 
3. See Baugh, p. 334- 
4- PRO, t 174/18,27 Sep 1779; e. g. 174/117,22 Jan 1782; 
mot, POR/D/23,19 Mar 1782. 
_9 
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However, these measures were inadequate. Rodney wrote to his wife 
at the end of 1779: 
It is astonishing - the neglect and 
slowness of the officers, both civil 
and military. The whole town of 
Plymouth and Dock declare that more 
work has been done here since my 
arrival than had been for two months 
before. Such is the effect of fear. 
They knew there was no trifling with 
me. 1 
Yet there was little general criticism of lack of speed from the sea 
officers, probably because they themselves were not noted for hasty 
k" 40'4r I departures. "Prayl, send Sceptre and Princess Caroline from Woolwich, 
and receive no excuse from the captains", wrote Middleton to Sandwich 
on one occasion. 
2 It is notable that when a squadron was away in 
particularly good time, there was someone in authority on the spot. 
In 1778 the King was at Portsmouth, and on hearing that Byron's 
squadron "could not fix which day they would sail", he gave notice 
that: 
I shall not leave Portsmouth until Rear- 
Admiral Parker is sailed, and have dispensed 
with Admiral Pyels attendance... this has put 
great alacrity into all of them, Sir Hugh 
Palliser has since told me privately that 
my taking that step will make them sail many 
days sooner than they would else. 3 
1. Mundy, I, 215,28 Dec 1779. 
2. Sa. P, IV, 93,10 Aug 1781; see also Baugh, PP- 335-6" 
3. G, IV, 130,5 May 1778; see also Correspondence of George Prince 
of Wales. 1770-1782 (ed) A. Aspinallp London, 1963-7), Ip 28-29. 
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If it was the King who hastened the sea officers at 
Portsmouth in 1778, it was Edward Hunt, the junior Surveyor, who 
acted with a sort of roving commission to hasten technical decisions 
for the yard officers. He spent most of the summers of 1778 and 
1779 at the western yards, and was present at Plymouth when Keppel 
returned from Ushant. He was also at Sheerness when Parker re- 
turned from the North Sea in 1781. It was this event which 
Sandwich cited when he defended the performance of his administration 
in January 1782. He claimed that seven two-decked ships were re- 
fitted - "masted, rigged and supplied with every necessary, and were 
not more than a month before they again went to sea". 
' Yet this 
was exceptional, for not only were these ships refitted without 
being docked, but Middleton as well as Hunt was at the scene of 
operations organising extra supplies to be brought down from Wool- 
wich and Chatham. 2 If Sandwich intended to have this example 
taken as typical, it was a dishonest impression to give. Most 
of Parker's ships were seventy-fours, and the average time for 
refitting a ship of this size was not far short of four months. 
3 
Only a small proportion of this time was spent in dock. 
Between March 1778 and March 1783 every seventy-four spent an average 
1. G, V, 355, Jan 1782. 
2. See SaP, IV, 92-5,10-11 Aug 1781. There were a number of examples 
of ships being ordered to refit without docking; see 11I, ADM 
A/2740,16 Jun 1779; A/2771,13 Feb 1782. 
3. Abstracts of Progress, 5, part 1. Between March 1778 and March 
1783 the average time was 102 days. 
348 
time of three weeks in dock at each refit. Exceptionally, for 
ships of this size, some would spend only a day in dock, Yet the 
refits as a whole lasted an average of over eleven weeks; over 
five weeks were spent in preparing for dock, and over six weeks 
after the ship had been undocked. 
1 The position had not changed 
from forty years before when a Resident Commissioner had complained 
that, "when any ship is ordered into the harbour to be refitted, 
from the time of her first coming in, to her going out again, it 
is generally three or four months, let her works be more or less". 
2 
There was little general awareness of the cause of these 
delays. Partly this was because those in power neither knew nor 
cared "RhIch about the details of naval affairs. Parliamentary 
questioning was either inaccurate or partial; for instance, in May 
1778, when the King was hurrying the sea officers at Portsmouth, 
North supposed that he was being attacked in Parliament for the 
delay of Parker's squadron because the ships "would be waiting for 
nothing but a fair wind". 
3 In many oases, even the naval officers 
1. ibid. To the nearest days 38 days before docking; 43 days 
after undocking, It is thus unrealistic to have expected Keppel to, "have had at least 25 ships of the line ready by the 
end of April, independent of the ships allotted to Byron, 
allowing one week after undocking to step masts and fit rigging" (Williams, p. 449). 
2. Quoted in Baugh, pp. 334-5. This does not include the time at 
the rendezvous waiting for the ship to be manned. 
3. G, IV, 131, (? ) 6 May 1778, to the King; also SaP, II, 44°5,5 MV 
1778, Robinson to Sandwich; ibid, 63-6,18 May 1778, Keppel to 
Sandwich; see also Bullocks ed , Tomlinson Papers, p. 73,1 Jan 1782. 
. ý... ý_ . ... 4. ý____ý. _ 349 
in the House knew little about the civil administration. 
I 
The 
yards therefore had no spokesmen, although occasionally an officer 
would speak well of them. In August 1778 Keppel wrote to the 
Admiralty of, "the very extraordinary works that have been expedited 
by the officers and people in the dockyard ... has been such as to 
merit much approbation" 
In the last analysis, any judgement upon the vigour of 
the administration and the yards during this period must stand or 
fall by the speed of the refitting of ships - if only because every 
other operation was sacrificed to this end. Once war had been 
declared, the nation which had its fleet on the seas first gained 
a considerable advantage. It has been said that one ship at the 
beginning of a war was worth two at the end. However, it appears 
that in this war the ships of the line spent a good deal of their 
life in harbour. During the five years of the European war, if 
repairs and refits are put together, all the seventy-fours, in- 
cluding those on foreign service, averaged one year and eighty-five 
days in harbour and in dock - which is one quarter of the entire 
wax. Of this time, only 134 days, or nineteen weeks, were spent 
in dock. 3 
1. See the bitter attacks by the Earl of Bristol in the Lords in 
April 1779 which Sandwich refuted easily (Parliamentary history, 
XX, 427-448). 
2. Quoted in Williams, p. 457; also SaP, II, 148,14 Aug 1778, 
Keppel to Sandwich, ibid, 153,16 Aug 1778, Hunt to Sandwich; 
NMM, ADM B/197,7 Aug 1778. 
3. Abstracts of Progress, 5, part 1. 
350 
Why was there this delay? Why did ships spend so little 
time in dock in relation to that spent in harbour? There were some 
obvious reasons. The inaccessibility of the River and eastern yards 
meant that the burden of refitting the fleet fell almost totally on 
the two western yards, which limited the refitting capacity. Al- 
though the ships in dock were dealt with quickly enou; ht the small 
number of docks available caused an accumulation of ships which 
needed an overhaul. There were also greater problems than in the 
previous wax, when Hawke, from his dominant strategic position off 
Ushant, sent his ships to be refitted in pairs; in the American war 
the yards had to deal with the Channel fleet all at one time. 
Another reason for delay in harbour was the considerable navigational 
difficulties at both the western yards, which have already been ex- 
amined; delays in docking and unlocking ships and in getting them 
in and out of harbour were bound to mount up. However, apart from 
these technical reasons, there were deep-seated administrative and 
social attitudes which contributed to delay and inefficiency in the 
maintenance of the fleet. 
iv) The Sea Service. 
The officers and men of the fighting navy had a crucial 
part to play in the servicing of the fleet, Much of the victualling, 
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manning and gunning had to be done at Spithead or Plymouth Sound, 
but there was also a great deal for the seamen to do in harbour. 
Sandwich informed the King on one occasion that the initial 
fitting, "will usually require a month to prepare each ship for 
receiving men, and at least two months more before she will be 
manned and ready for sea". 
l On another occasion he reflected 
general opinion, and a certain amount of misplaced confidence, 
when he assured the King at a critical point in 1781 that there 
was no point in sending any of the Navy Board Commissioners down 
to the western yards to speed the ships as they were, 
out of the shipwright's hands (except 
possibly a few trifling jobs afloat), 
their equipment depends entirely upon 
their captains and the Admiral of the 
Port, and it is certain that nothing 
that can be done will be omitted on 
their parts. 2 
Relations between the civil and military sides of the 
service were of the utmost importance. Although, "the supremacy 
of the military over the civil authorities was not... anyy longer a 
3 
matter for uncertainty", the relationship was still delicate. 
The lack of power and ambiguous position of the Resident 
Commissioner meant that much had to be referred to London, and the 
1. G, II2,379,20 Jun 1776. 
2. G, V, 273,2 Sep 1781. 
3. Baugh, P. 337; also Eh=an, 1.101. 
___ __-. 
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clumsiness of the organisation gave rise to much misunderstanding 
at the yards. The superior attitudes taken by the fighting 
officers were not conducive to the co-operation which was so 
necessary, although the blame can be laid at both sides of the 
service. For instance, in 1780 the Navy Board had to remind the 
Plymouth officers to, "give the earliest information to the 
commanding officer of the ships intending to be docked so that 
they may be got ready in time", 
Z However, it was more likely to 
be the sea officers who were at fault. This was the opinion of 
Rodney late in the war, and he was at least impartial in his 
criticism of delays: "Sorry I am to say, that the sea officers 
are more to blame than the dock officers, and that my own captain 
is among the slow ones". 
2 
The biggest single cause of delay before docking was 
the difficulty of clearing ships of their stores. The first 
problem was a lack of seamen-who were supposed to clear the stores, 
and this was aggravated by the need to confine these men, for they 
were liable to desert at the slightest opportunity. In spite of 
3 
1. PRO, ADM 174/117,25 Jan 1780. 
2. Mundy, II, 179,1 Jan 1782, to his wife. 
3. See Baugh, pp. 335-6; Williams# p. 449; e. g. SaP, II, 209, 
11 Nov 1778, Walsingham to Sandwich. 
_ _. 
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this considerable difficulty, the performance of the sea service 
could have been improved by adequate supervision by the officers. 
That it was inadequate is beyond dispute. For instance, in 1776 
Samuel Hood, then captain of the Marlborough (74), was considerably 
embarrassed by an explosion on board his ship at a time when he was 
supposed to be supervising the clearance of its stores. In a 
letter written personally to Sandwich, he had to admit that he was 
elsewhere, and that his first lieutenant, to whom he had deputed 
the work, was also ashore. 
1 This slack attitude lost many 
opportunities to hasten refits. When the capacity of Portsmouth 
was overstretched in the winter of 1779, Hood was furious with Pye 
for failing to send men to clear stores from the Royal Oak (74): 
"Not a day has passed without a message being sent. -to her 
to 
commanding officer, urging him to dispatch in clearing the ship, 
so that no blame can possibly fall on any officer of the yard". 
In the event the ship was not cleared, and a dock was unoccupied 
for a fortnight because the spring tide was missed. 
Delays before a ship was docked were more than matched 
by delays afterwards. The first fault was the lateness of the sea 
officers in taking up their poste. The Or heue (32), for instaneep 
1. NMM, SAN/T/7r 9 Jul 1776. 
2. NMI, POR/F/17,26 Dec 1779. The clearing of captured ships gave 
considerable trouble, and often the yards had to supply men to 
unload them (e. g. NMM, POR/D/21,17 Aug 1778; PRO, ADM 174/18, 
15,17 Mar 1780). 
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was ready in August 1775 at Plymouth, but Ourry wrote, "I could wish 
some of her officers would come to their duty". 
I Cooks and surgeons, 
petty officers oppointed by the Navy Board, who were particularly 
important when the ship was in harbour, were frequently late. 
2 As 
might be expected, delay in any one part of the process of refitting 
held up the whole process. Ourry requested the Board to order the 
captains to, 
take their stores out of the hulks as soon as 
they come out of the docks or it will be 
impossible to carry on the docking service as 
you expect, for many of them will lay alongside 
of the hulks four, sometime:,, five weeks, which 
in former times was never more than as many days 
but now they Ute laying alongside the hulk to do 
all their work. 3 
The same sort of complaint came from the master of the Woolwich 
lighter, who said that his vessel was next to the Add (50) 
for twenty-four days. The seamen had taken out the standing 
rigging, "but the running they take out-only as they want to reeve 
it. I have applied to the Master Attendant ,, to desire the officers to 
uS 
unload', but they do not regard him". The latter complained that 
I 
the sea officers had said that, "they should keep her until they 
4 had done with her". 
1. PRO, ADM 174/115,6 Aug 1775. 
2. e. g. NNM, CIHA/E/33,29 May 1780. 
3. PRO, ADM 174/117,15 Jan 1780. 
NMMq AM BP/41 21 Aug 1783. 
555 
More delay was caused by the commanders of the ships 
which were being refitted. They had considerable control over 
the fitting of their ships, and it was at this point that they 
first came into contact with men whom they considered to be their 
inferiors. 1 Each of their demands was in fact a request to 
"bend" the rules, for each rate of ship was allowed a certain 
amount of stores in its establishment. Yet it was impossible to 
perfect a foolproof system to reduce demands. The difficulty was 
to impose set standards and establishments on ships which were 
classified very simply by rate but were very different in design 
and performance. Much had been done to standardise equipment, but 
it did not prevent a constant change in the establishments by the 
Navy Board, and many of the requests for stores and alterations 
resulted not only from the independence of the sea officers, but 
from their ignorance of the regulations. This was particularly 
so of the junior officers. The flood of requests moderated under 
the pressure of war, but in 1781 the Board still found it necessary 
to direct that the orders affecting the establishments of all ships 
should be hung in the office of the Clerk of the Cheque at every yard. 
2 
There were plenty of orders. Between 1774 and 1784 there were more 
1. Only the order to "freite and trophy" (repainting the decorations 
on the bow and stern) a flagship had to come from the Admiralty, 
but this luxury was eventually dispensed with as the war 
developed (PRO, ADM 106/2592,8 Feb 1775; NM, Aß`2 A/2688,10 
Feb 1775). 
2. SO(a), 1103,15 Nov 1781. 
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than eigh-tr Standing Orders changing the allowance of stores and 
equipment for ships, and forty more altered the allowance of 
moveable stores issued to Boatswains and Carpenters. ' 
In spite of these improvements, there was still a great 
deal of trouble caused by requests from commanders. The Resident 
Commissioner dealt with as many as he could without applying to the 
Navy Board, but, as in the previous century, he "either submitted 
to them or quarrelled with them so long as they remained in 
harbour" 4.2 "You cannot be strangers to the constant applications 
of the commanders of His Majesty's ships", wrote Ourry to the Boaxd. 
3 
The usual requests were for extra stores, such as azimuth compasses, 
extra lanterns or spars. In some cases the commanders asked for 
permission to leave behind stores which they considered superfluous. 
4 
The most contentious issues between commanders and the 
civil administration concerned the size of cabins and the amount of 
iron ballast that was allowed to each ship. Both these problems 
stemmed directly from variations in design. The cabins within each 
1. SO(a), SO(b). 
2. Ezrman, p. 101, 
3. PRO, ADM 174/117,17 Sep 1780, 
4, e. g. PRO, At 106/2592,16 May 1775; NN1t, POR/D/21,29 Dec 1778. 
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rate varied considerably. Some, Sandwich noted in 1771, were 
"commodious and proper" and others "very confined and by no means 
sufficient", and he intended to make the cabins uniform within each 
class; "this, and this only, can prevent the numberless applications 
and discontents upon this head, which will ever continue whilst some 
are good, some bad, and no fixed rule observed". 
1 
To bring order to 
this confusion was difficult in a short space of time. When 
Commissioner Martin was asked for suggestions for improvements at 
the end of the war he made the same complaint; there should be a 
"certain" rule for each class, after which, "no deviation should be 
allowed". 
2 
The requests for iron ballast gave the Resident 
CQmmissioners much trouble, especially as ballast had to be put 
3 into a ship before stores and victuals. The captains liked this 
material much better that shingle ballast, for it took up less 
space and was cleaner and healthier. There was a shortage from 
1779, and the Navy Board became convinced that ballast was not 
4 
being stowed effectively; it therefore gave orders for a special 
I. PRO, ADM 7/659, fo. 70. 
2. NIMM, POR/F/18,28 Mar 1783; also PRO, ADM 174/17,2 Deo 1776; 
ADM 174/117,7 Nov 1780. 
3. e. g. PRO, ADM 174/117,12,17 Sep 1780. 
4. See BL, T, 269,5 Sep 1779, Douglas to Middleton; also NMI 
POR/P/17,21 Aug 1778. 
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plan of storage for each class of ship, which were to be inspected 
by the yard officers. It was an impractical solution; the 
officers at Portsmouth found that several of the commanders, 
disapprove of stowing the iron ballast 
according to the plan, and hastily reply 
with a seeming warmth... 'who is to dictate 
to me the stowage of my ship's hold, am Z 
notIthe commander of that ship, and am I 
not answerable for all the consequences? ' 
The yard officers concluded that their, "great experience... of the 
tempers and dispositions of the captains and officers of the fleet 
produce.., great umbrage and expose us to insult and abuse and will 
produce disputes and quarrel which may be attended with ill con- 
sequencei'. 
1 Although the Navy Board failed in this attempt at 
control, it laid down a more detailed establishment for each class 
of ship. The Resident Commissioners were in future "to decline 
all applications on this head". 
2 
It was this sort of situation which led to occasional, 
open conflict between the civil and the fighting officers. When 
William Nicholson, one of the Master Attendants at Portsmouth, went 
1. NMM, POR/D/22,24 Sep 1779; also PRO, ADM 174/116,24 Sep 1779- 
2. NNM, POR/G/1,13 July 1781. The Navy Board wrote on one occasion: "The opinion of Captains differ so much upon this matter that we have been frequently applied to by one captain to receive into 
store what a former has desired and it was to prevent the con- fusion occasioned by these alterations that the regulation was 
settled". (NNM', Roddam Papers, uncatalogued, 12 Aug 1778, Navy Board to Roddam). 
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to ask the lieutenant of the Was sloop to help salvage a yard 
lighter which had been assigned to that ship: 
His answer,. (in words which we are ashamed 
to repeat): Damn both the Masters Attend- 
ant for a-set-©f rascals. Was he a Lieu- 
tenant in the service to be di&ted by them 
a set of rascals of boatswains? He was a 
gentleman, and had a gentleman's education 
... 
(and) that he was accountable to... 
Captain Bligh his captain, and that he did 
not care for anybody else. 1 
Nevertheless, the lieutenant was forced to apologise. Yard craft 
were often a bone of contention. When a tender was lost at Ports- 
mouth in 1779, the Master Attendant complained that the sea officers, 
"never acquaint us therewith but will rather endeavour to conceal it 
from us than to acknowledge it". 
2 
It would be mistaken to give the impression that friction 
was always in the air, for there were many genuine applications. 
3 
In general, the Navy Board gave the appeals for extra stores and 
alterations a fair hearing, although undoubtedly the more senior 
the captain was the more likely he was to have a request granted. 
1. NMM, POR/D/20,18 Mar 1776; see also NMM, Roddam Papers, un- 
catalogued, 16 Jun 1779. For some rumbustious langzage in such 
an incident, see ADM 1P/2,22 Max 1761. 
2. NM # POR/D/21,8,14 Feb 1779; also MIM# Amt B/195,23,28 Jan 1778; AM A/2790,25,29 Aug 1783, ADM BP/4,21 Aug 1783. 
3. e. g. NM, POR/F/17,11 Feb 1779; POR/D/22,24 May 1780; PRO, 
ADM 95/95,13,22 Ap 1780; All 174/18,11 Jul 1780; 174/19, 
19 Ap 1782 and many other examples. 
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Aa appeal to the Admiralty could also remove Navy Board and yard 
objections. The western yards, and especially Plymouth, suffered 
most from the demands of the sea officers. The political situation 
and jealousies in the Channel Fleet made things worse. Sometimes 
the commanders were incredibly tactless. Sir Robert Harland, 
taking over the Royal George (100) at Plymouth, wrote directly to 
the Master Shipwright for some alterations to be made to the ship. 
Haxland, reported Ourxy, "did not think proper to take notice of me 
in this business, who am the chief person concerned as the ship is 
not commissioned". 
1 However, by the next year he had more 
complaint to makes. 
I have had more trouble and discontent in 
refitting the few ships that have arrived 
here from Sir Charles Hardyy's fleet than 
with all the fleet last year. The 
irregularity of the demands and constant 
shipping off stores is amazing and no 
possibility of pleasing. 2 
A major cause of delay in getting a fleet to sea lay 
with the inefficiency of the sea service, which was exacerbated by 
a fractious party spirit. It was at this point that the status and 
social ambiguities within the service most weakened administrative 
r efficiency. This was a problem which beset the service through the 
century, and efficiency waa not to be radically improved until the 
1. PRO, ADM 174/116,19 Jul 1778. 
2. PRO, ADM 174/116,1 Aug 1779. 
J 
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independence of the commanders had been curbed, and civil ad- 
ministration made more powerful. Nevertheless, it must be 
remembered that not only the dockyards were involved in the com- 
plex business of fitting out a ship. The captain (if he was 
present) was responsible for co-ordinating the manning, gunning 
and victualling of his vessel, and was therefore dealing with 
three different boards. That few sea captains understood the 
vagaries and difficulties of each branch is not surprising; and 
it is understandable that the blame for delay was imputed to the 
civil administration rather than to the fighting side of the 
service, and that the frustrations of the commanders gave these 
services, and especially the dockyards, a name for corruption and 
inefficiency. 
v) The Civil Administration. 
The performance of the Admiralty, Navy Board and yard 
officers in the management of the fleet during this war may be 
judged by their success in fulfilling four essential tasks. Firstly, 
it was important that each yard was given a clear statement of what 
it was to do in good time. Equally critical was the need to order 
the early refitting of the ships which were most ready to go to sea. 
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Finally, it was vital that the load of work should be distributed 
as evenly as possible throughout the six yards, and that manpower 
should be deployed in the most effective way. Success and 
failure in dealing with these administrative problems depended 
initially upon the relationship of the two boards and particularly 
in the capacity of the professional board. 
It is possible to discern a real improvement in the 
direction of the yards from the central administration during this 
war. The role and ability of Middleton in the handling of the 
fleet was of vital importance. It was one aspect of the ad- 
ministration about which he did not exude confidence; at one 
point he wrote to Sandwich that the business had become, "so 
comprehensive and so complicated that, although I give up my whole 
time and attention to it, yet I find the greatest difficulty in 
keeping it under and at times : think it will distract my brain". 
His effort was indeed prodigious, for in spite of the over- 
centralisation of the Navy Board and the heavy weight of business 
with which he had to deal, directions from the Board were on the 
whole clear and well thought out. For long there had been the 
complaint that the Admiralty ordered chips to be made ready for 
sea without indicating which ships were to have priority. Loose 
phrases such as "with all dispatch" or "as soon as maybe" were 
1. SaP, III, 178,15 Sep 1779. 
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employed, so that the orders, transmitted through an unco-operative 
Navy Board, gave little directions to the yards. 
1 
Middleton, how- 
ever, enjoyed two advantages. 
2 His industry ensured that he kept 
up with the business of the yards, while at the same time he had 
the confidence and co-operation of the Admiralty. 
Increased information from above was matched by better 
information from the yaxds. This was the result of Middleton 
insisting upon realistic Progresses. These had always been a 
problem, Forty years before they had been described as a "weer 
farce, and really amuses more than satisfies". 
3 A Standing Order 
of 1771 exhorted the officers to accuracy, "notwithstanding our 
drýcckio. +s 
repeated eiders to you on this subject". The appointment of 
Middleton as Comptroller immediately preceded a concerted effort 
to obtain proper information at the Navy Office, and any con- 
tradictions in the Progresses were immediately pounced on. In 
1779 the officers were ordered not to insert a completion date 
until they were certain of it, although they were to report 
provisionally. 
5 In spite of the difficulty of breaking years of 
1. See Baugh, p. 339" 
2. For examples of statements of priority see e. g. PRO, ADM 174/116, 
23 Jun 1779; 174/117,24,29 Nov 1782; 174/18,9 Jun, 18 Aug 
1780; ]NM, POR/D/22,11 Feb 1780- 
3- Quoted in Baugh, p. 339- 
4- S0(a), 576,31 Aug 1771. Orders had been issued repeatedly on this 
theme (PRO, IND 9315,10 Jan 1717,16 Dec 1726,12 Jan 1757. A 
printed form was first issued on 30 Jul 1729. 
5. e. g. Nom, CHA/E/33,1 Dec 1778; POR/D/21,31 Dec 1778; SO(a), 923, 10 Nov 1779. 
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habit, the Comptroller increased his hold over the yards; most of 
the time, at least, he knew which ships were in which dock, although 
he had to resign himself to the fact that during hostilities 
decisions had to be taken on the spot, Any decision which he 
considered wrong resulted in the officers being accused of "flag- 
rant neglect" or "inexcusable conduct", although they usually 
produced good enough reasons for their decisions) 
However, in spite of much improvement and effort by 
Middleton, there were still many shortcomings. Plans could very 
easily be upset. Orders were held up, and the Admiralty often 
changed its mind. For instance, the Antue (50) was ordered to 
be laid up on 4th May 1778, then to be fitted for sea by the 26th 
of the same month, but by July it was ordered to be made into a 
hulk. 2 There were many other examples, although they were mainly 
confined to the early part of the war when French intentions were 
uncertain. What was far more likely to happen was that ships 
would require more work on them then was suspected. When the 
1. e. g. PRO, A]I 174/18,31 Dec 1779,10 Jan 1780; 1TIM, POR/D/23, 
12 Aug, 22 Dec 1782. In one instance, the Plymouth officers 
were reprimanded for repairing the Bo_yna (70), "when it appeared 
she was so bad and particularly as she never was a ship of 
character" (PRO, ADM 174/117,22 Nov 1782; 174/19,8 Jan 1783). 
2. PRO, ADM 174/116,11 Feb 1783; ADM 95/95,41 26 lay, 18 Jul 1778. 
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Raisonnable (64) was docked in 1775, 
on 
the caulkersitrying their worihkdiscovered 
two pieces of blackstrake... so defective 
as to require shifting... whenitaking them 
off found several pieces of the main whale 
under them very bad(and)have already taken 
off seven:. '. pieces and are come down to the 
lower strake of the whale, which is so 
rotten as.. to require Lh ng. I 
It was this sort of thing which played havoc with accurate schedules 
and estimates. 
Apart from this, there remained three problems which led 
to frequent delay and inefficiency, and which the civil administration 
failed to solve. The first was the unequal distribution of work, 
and the overloading of Portsmouth and Plymouth. The principle that 
Chatham was to repair ships, and that Sheerness was to refit small 
ships, had long been accepted. It was therefore agreed that small 
ships should go to the eastern yards to be refitted, leaving the 
western yards, with their larger facilities, as the main refitting 
bases for capital ships. It never worked in practice. In 1779 
the Navy Board wrote to the Admiralty that# 
as the number of frigates and smaller vessels 
paid off and refitted at the Western ports 
during,.. last summer has occupied more than 
one half of the shipwrights of the yards and 
considerably impeded the bringing on the 
larger ships... and, ". wepropose.. that they 
go to the eastern yards. 2 
4 
1 
1. PRO, ADM 106/1230,4 Jun 1775, Plymouth Officers to the Navy Board. 
r2. 
NMM, ADM B/199,6 Sep 1779; see also B/197,3 Nov 1778. 
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Middleton added force to the proposal in a private letter to the 
First Lord. He requested that the frigates and smaller vessels, 
"may never be paid off nor refitted at the western ports without 
consulting the Navy Board". 
' 
In spite of this protest, Portsmouth 
and its harbour was stretched to the limit in the next few months. 
The problem was never solved. In late 1782 the Navy Board still 
had to write to its new masters, "there are at this time no less 
than 379 working shipwrights employed on small craft *at Plymouth, 
and which if continued must render that yard of little use in 
supporting the line of battleships". 
2 
The reason for this was that the yards were badly sited 
for the conduct of this war. Since the eastern yards were so in- 
accessible, there was a constant temptation for the Admiralty to 
order small ships to be refitted at the western yards because of 
time that ships took to reach and return from the eastern yards. 
Unfortunatel this was a cumulative Yý problem. Up to 1779 the 
eastern yards, and especially Sheerness, did fit out the greater 
number of sloops. However, by the time these small ships reached 
the Channel they frequently required more stores from the western 
yards; in effect they had to be fitted out twice. Deptford. 
fitted out a great number of small craft, mainly sloops, in the 
1. SaP, III, 178, 15 Sep 1779, 
2. N1IM, ADM BP/3, 21 Nov 1782. 
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early part of the war, since large number of these ships came from 
the River, but the yard was too inaccessible for routine refitting. 
Vessels other than sloops were usually overhauled at the eastern 
yards; for instance, fireships were mostly surveyed and fitted at 
the Thames yards, but once hostilities commenced, there was not 
time to send them this far, and Plymouth handled them after the 
initial fitting out. The same pattern can be discerned with bomb 
vessels and yachtso There was little pattern in the refitting of 
brigs and cutters, for they tended to be used for local services, 
and therefore were overhauled near their base. The same applied 
to naval transports, armed ships or captured vessels. 
' Thus the 
yards worked at a constant disadvantage in servicing the fleet in 
wartime, and Middleton was not helped by the failure of the 
Admiralty to appreciate the problem. 
The second criticism that can be made of the civil 
administration, at both Navy Board and yard level, was that it 
failed to grapple with the problem of deployment of labour. 
Commissioner Hughes of Portsmouth put his finger on the problem in 
the 1740's: "while 50 men are employ'd on one ship, 60 on another, 
70 on a third... which... is our present caso... you may be assured, we 
shall alwaya be embarrassed with work". 
2 It was, as Baugh points 
1. This information comes from many scattered references in the Navy 
Board warrants to the yards (PRO, AD14 95/95-6). 
2. Quoted in Baugh, p. 335. 
ý., _.. ,--. _. __ý _ _ý _e. __ ý.. _. __ ___ý __ý....... 4_...., 
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out, "a failure of management, a failure to plan for rapid output". 
l 
Manpower was wasted through inadequate planning and a too-ready 
acceptance of precedent. It is true that it was difficult to 
attract a sufficient labour force, but this made it even more 
important to use the sometimes scarce labour resources more 
effectively. 
The most serious weakness was the size of the Master 
Shipwright's force in relation to the worl=en and seamen under the 
Master Attendant, with the result that the latter's department was 
often behind schedule. In 1755 the Master Attendant at Plymouth 
had been summarily dismissed for the same "offence's -a decision 
which was governed by the current assumption that "it was the man 
rather than the system which was likely to be at fault". 
2 In this 
period there was similar trouble at Portsmouth, where the sail- 
makers were always behind with their work. Although no officer 
was dismissed, this situation led to some acrimonious correspondence 
between the yards and the Navy Board. In answer to a complaint of 
May 1777, the Master Attendants at Portsmouth wrote with the very 
reasonable excuse that they could not keep pace with the Master 
Shipwright's department because, "it frequently happens ships come 
into port which require but little fitting in the Builder's depart- 
1. ibid. 
2. R. Middleton, "The Administration of Pitt and Newcastle", p. 139. 
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went, and may happen to want the greatest part of their sails", 
1 
In 1780 the same complaints were made by the Board, who remarked 
that "the ships in general fitted at Portsmouth are more behind- 
hand on the Master Attendant's paart than at any other port", How- 
ever, the officers claimed that, "it has not yet appeared that any 
ship or ships have been detained ... by any backwardness in the 
Master Attendant's department". 2 
The consequence was that certain sections of the labour 
force were overworked. It was found in late 1778 that the sail- 
makers at Portsmouth had worked as much extra as possible and on 
every Sunday between May and September, and as a result the Navy 
Board ordered Sunday working to be prohibited except in cases of 
absolute emergency, and in future Navy Board permission had to be 
given for it. 3 Later Middleton was to claim that, "in the heat 
of the American. War... we never worked on Sundays in the dockyards, 
except on very extraordinary cases, such as docking and undocking 
ships when the spring tides offered on that day". His memory, 
4 
however# failed him, for in the two western yards, at least, some 
1. NMM, POR/D/20,3 May 1777; also POR/D/21,22 May 1778. 
2. mz, POR/D/22,3 Mar 1780; see alto ADM B/195,25 Dec 1777; 
POR/D/23,23 Jan 1783, SO(b), 298,22 Ap 1784. 
3.11z, POR/D/21,17 Sep 1778; Pott/F/17,20 Sop 1778; Pott/G/19 12 Nov 1778; cHA/E/33,13 Nov 1778; PRO, ADM 174/116,15 Nov 
1778. Sailmakers were also very pressed at times at Deptford (M1 95/95,14 May, 29 4 Jul 1778). 
4. BL, III9 36, (May 1804), Middleton to Dundas. 
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part of the workforce worked on every Sunday between 1778 and 1782. 
Too many ships had to be made ready in haste, especially by ship- 
wrights who had to work afloat. 
l 
The Resident Commissioners were 
careful to inform the Navy Board of all Sunday working. While the 
men welcomed the extra pay, it was clear, as Middleton commented, 
that, "nothing is gained by it in forwarding the service". 
2 The 
men required the rest on Sundays, and no workforce could work 
effectively seven days a week throughout the year. 
The same arguments applied to the indiscriminate giving 
of extra work. Only daylight limited the hours that the men worked 
at the height of the war; the sailmakers in most yards were working 
"double days" as early as 1776, and during the war by candlelight. 
3 
' Most of the problem was caused by the shortage of skilled labour, 
particularly shipwrights, of which the administration was only too 
well aware. Nevertheless, the situation could have been eased by 
the hiring of more unskilled workers, but the Board were reluctant 
to do this for reasons of precedent, and because it failed to take 
the effectiveness of the workforce as a whole into consideration. 
1. e. g. NNM, POR/F/17,7 Jul 1778,22 Aug 1779; PRO, A124 174/1179 
12 Sep 1780,11 Feb 1781; 174/117,12 Dec 1779,5 Sep 1780; 
174/19,27 Mar 1782. 
2. This prohibiting order often put the Resident Commissioners 
in a difficult position with sea officers; e. g. PRO, , ADM 174/116,1,8 Aug 1779; 174117,30 Ap 1780. 
3. e. g. PRO, AIrt 174/17,28 Nov 1776,9 Nov 1778; 174/117,24 SOP 
1782i 174/17,26 Aug 1776; ICI9 CNA/E/33,2 Oct 1781. 
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For instance, when the shipwrights were put m to extra work, it was 
often necessary to give other workers extra work to keep pace with 
them; there was little method about doing this' "Extra" should 
have been kept for real emergencies; if it had, output and 
efficiency would have increased. 
2 
The third major problem had its roots in a lack of 
Admiralty understanding of yard difficulties. This was the large 
number of merchant and foreign ships which came to the yards to be 
repaired or to be supplied with stores. This seems to have been 
totally unnecessary, and indeed the readiness with which the 
Admiralty listened to requests from merchants who wished to make 
U of yard facilities is hard to understand. It was an open 
invitation to abuse. The number of ships of the East India 
Company which made use of yard facilities during this period is 
i remarkable. The owners of large vessels often found it difficult 
to find private docks of sufficient size; 
3 
moreover, they knew 
that there were good quality stores to be obtained at the yards. 
It was difficult to refuse aid to a vessel in distress, but there 
were a suspiciously large number of merchants similar to the owner 
1. e. g. PRO, ADM 106/25929 12 May 1775; NIM, POR/D/21,5 May 1778. 
After the war Middleton tried to regulate this (SO(b), 303,13 
Ap 1784). 
2. See PRO, . ADM 174/17,3 Auk; 1778; 174/117,16 May 1780. 
3. See Baugh, PP- 339-340n. 
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of one ship who claimed that, "I had to run my ship ashore by 
Sheerness yard". 
' 
The Navy Board strongly condemned the practice of 
allowing ships other than His Majesty's into the yards, and in late 
1774 their hand was strengthened by petitions from the merchant yards 
of Plymouth and of the Thames, complaining that the King's yards were 
taking away their business. The Board submitted the Plymouth 
petition to the Admiralty, adding that the continuation of the 
practice could only result in "the frequent interruptions to the 
King's service ... We think it would be proper to refuse such requests 
in future". 2 Although this stand had some effect, it was not 
lasting, Between the time of this petition and the end of the war, 
The Admiralty allowed at least thirty-four ships to make use of the 
royal yards, most of them at the height of the European war63 
This was a heavy burden on the yards. Although the 
Admiralty always stipulated that these ships were not to interfere 
with the works in hand, this was impractical, since nearly every 
one required docking. At the time of the refitting of Keppelºs 
I. NMM, CHA/M/3,20 Dec 1770. There was no doubt a great deal of 
abuse, which did not reach the ears of the central administration (e. g. PRO, ADM 174/116,19 May 1778; 174/117,9 SeP 1781). 
2, NMM, ADM B/189,28 Dec 1774; AIM A/2689,10,24 Feb 1775; see 
also PRO, ADM 174/18,4 rear 1779. 
r 
3. e. g. MIM, ADM A/2686-2794; ADM B/190,21 Sep 1775; B/199,22 May, 
21 Jun 1779; POR/F/17,31 Dec 1779; PRO, ADM 174/116,22 Mar 1778. 
-___... _.... - -- .__ý.... _. _ _.... _. _... _, _. 
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fleet in August 1778, Ourry wrote to the Navy Board that the yard 
was short of some of its shipwrights because of "the directions 
we received for supplying hands to a hutch and two Swedish ships". 
l 
It was an extraordinary situation; yet the Admiralty too had its 
difficulties. Often there was a foreign squadron - usually Russian 
or Dutch - to be supplied with stores, while in the case of foreign 
ships official representations were made to the Admiralty from a 
diplomatic level. 2 As Ourry pointed out before the war, this made 
nonsense of any ideas of, security. He reported that foreign ships 
paid the King's pilots well to show them the marks, and that they 
came and went into the Hamoaze without anyone's leave. 
3 
The other additional burden was the work which was done 
on the ships upon which the navy depended; these included hired 
armed ships (which gave a great deal of trouble because of their 
ambiguous status), merchant ships which were in need of repair and 
were holding up a convoy, or those which had been run down by ships 
belonging to the-navy and which the yards were morally obliged to 
repair. 
4 
Following the lead of the Navy Board, the Resident 
1. PRO, ADM 174/118,1 Aug 1778. 
2. Of the 34 ships aided, 21 were foreign. One example was the 
Portuguese ship, St. Nicholasp which the Admiralty was asked to 
help repair by the "Chevalier De Pintos Envoy Fbctraordinary". 
The work was to be done, as usual, without "great detriment to 
the public service" (iIM, ADM A/2755,4 Sep 1780; PRO, ADM 
174/18,5 Sep 1780)- 
3- PRO, ADM 174/115,11 AP 1775. 
4. e. g. NMM, POR/P/16,6 Jan 1776,23 Feb 1777; POR/F11,29 May 
1778; PRO, ADM 174/116,22 Jan 1779,5 Sep 1779; 177/117, 
10,17 Oct 1780, 
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Commissioners were very loathe to use their exigency powers to 
order merchant ships to be repaired in the yards. However, there 
was very often a need for flexibility. The only time when Hood 
lost his temper with the Board when he was at Portsmouth was when 
the Clerk of the Cheque refused to supply a mast to a storeship, 
thus holding up the East India convoy on its way to the Thames, 
1 
Nevertheless, the Navy Board reacted quickly over any service 
rendered to private ships without its prior permission. In answer 
to one such query the normally equable Ourry replied with irritation, 
"I am surprised you should think I would listen to any applications 
2 
that might distress the stores here". 
It is not surprising that the Navy Board was 
particularly jealous of its powers in these cases. Essentially 
the successful handling of the fleet consisted of the marrying up 
of strategic and political necessity with what was physically and 
administratively possible. In order to put forward what was 
possible, the Navy Board had to be forceful. It failed to control 
completely the Admiralty in its handling of ships; a much stricter 
control of private ships using the yards would have helped the hard- 
pressed administration considerably. The maintenance of the 
I. NMM, POR/P/17,28 Deo 1779. 
2, PRO, ADM 174/117,17 Oct 1780. 
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numbers and effectiveness of the fleet during hostilities was one 
of the most difficult administrative tasks of the time. With 
only two of the six yards conveniently located, insufficient 
manpower and facilities and a temperamental sea service to provide 
for, the overworked Navy Board had a formidable task. Yet in 
spite of its failure to solve or even identify a number of 
problems, the performance of the administration and the yards 
was creditable. This was built on the solid foundation of the 
supreme competence of the Comptroller and . the confidence which 
the First Lord placed in him. It was this factor which overcame 
the split in control between the two boards in London which was 
always on hand to hinder a strong and vigorous administration. 
.. _____ __. _.. r. ý_. ___.. __.. _. _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Chapter Seven. Conclusion. 
The dockyard organisation was only one of the 
elements of British seapower in the eighteenth century; when 
added to the others - the professional officer corps, the seamen 
and the rest of the civil administration - the result was the 
most formidable navy of the age. These factors of naval power 
rested on the foundation of a general willingness and ability 
in the country to finance the navy adequately. They were 
interdependent, and it is difficult to say which of them was 
the most important, although there has been, as Daniel Baugh 
points out, "a tendency of naval historians to portray a 
dedicated body of sea officers struggling successfully with 
an inferior fighting instrument which had been prepared for 
them by corrupt and negligent administrators ashore". 
1 
A brief examination of the performance of the 
navy in the War of American Independence shows that this 
view is superficial. Firstly, its commanders were either 
too elderly or too concerned with their reputation (or both) 
to bring success. The reason for this, and for the 
1. Baugh, P. 500. 
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particularly bitter edge to the usual personal feuds in the 
,, 
fleet, was that political opinion was divided over the aims 
of this war, and several admirals of known ability refused to 
serve. The First Lord came to be seen, especially after the 
Keppel-Palliser affair, as less than impartial, and this 
undermined morale in the fleet. Sandwich's position was 
weak in two other ways. Firstly, he was isolated in the 
Cabinet, and was especially estranged from Lord George Germain; 
this was a vital relationship, since Germain was Secretary of State 
for the American Colonies, and therefore in overall charge of the 
war. Secondly, the navy had to operate from a position of 
strategic weakness, and Sandwich's approach to this difficult 
Problem was marked by overcaution and lack of imagination. It 
is therefore not surprising that when he came to prepare his 
defence of his administration at the beginning of 1782, he laid 
heavy emphasis on the administrative measures, most of which 
centred on the dockyards, as the most successful aspect of his 
eleven years in office. 
It is difficult to measure the effect of any one man, 
even if he was the First Lord of the Admiralty, upon an 
organisation as large and intricate as the dockyards, and it is 
possible to argue, unless a close examination is undertaken, that 
Sandwich left them very much as he found them. Involving well 
I 
over ten thousand men in government employment, and many more 
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indirectly, of differing social levels and skills, the yards were 
shot through with inefficiency and enervating custom, They 
lacked adequate facilities, proper orders and instructions, a 
fair and efficient payment and promotion system and a coherent 
policy to attract a sufficient workforce. Only two of the six 
yards were strategically placed to maintain the fleet when speed 
in this work became all-important. Although they were regarded 
as self-sufficient in repairing and refitting the fleet, in wartime 
the fleet had to be refitted almost to the exclusion of repairs 
and rebuilding. They did produce ships in peacetime, but this 
was not their primary function, and there was heavy reliance on 
private yards. By the time of the American war, the royal 
dockyards were properly equipped for dealing with the wars of 
the first half of the century, but not of the second. 
The structure of the organisation was weakened in 
the first instance by the split in control between the two 
boards in London; this hindered directions and initiative, 
and was always potentially divisive. However good the 
relations between the First Lord and Comptroller, there was a 
constant underlying tension between the two arms of the service. 
Although the Navy Board was not particularly wayward over yard 
matters, it could be obstructive; it often had good reason to 
be. The second weakness was the lack of real control of the 
ý-p379 
yards by the professional board. This stemmed mainly from 
the absence of well-defined responsibilities and relationships 
through clear and standardised instructions, and a lack of 
accuracy and speed in the operations of the six yards. 
Never- 
theless, the power of the central administration did not have 
to be created, for it was, although hidden in confusion, 
essentially there. Evidence of its existence was provided 
by 
the over-centralisation of command, and by the reluctance of 
the Navy Board to delegate authority to the yards themselves. 
As a result, power and responsibility were not 
spread evenly through the organisation. This inhibited 
efficiency in two ways. The first was the damaging in- 
dependence of the yard officers. Under-supervised by the 
Resident Commissioners, they exerted a large amount of power 
and influence at a local level while enjoying relative immunity 
from control by their superiors in London. They remained a 
potent force for the status QUO. The promotion system was 
largely in their hands, and recommendations of those workmen 
who were to receive the benefit of apprentices were under their 
control. Their independence meant that there was little the 
Navy Board could do to overcome the slackness in making the 
accounts and returns that had to be sent to the Navy Office. 
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Nevertheless, although the yard officers could be, and frequently 
were, blamed for laxity, individuals worked extremely hard, 
especially at the western yards, and there is no doubt that 
their offices, like the Navy Office itself, were undermanned. 
Secondly, efficiency was hindered by the lack of co- 
operation and trust between the Navy Board and the yard officers. 
Middleton was contemptuous; over the reception of stores, he 
considered that, 
such a field for peculation... might 
be trying enough for men of liberal 
characters and circumstances.. sbut)., 
it is... Impolitic and indiscrete to 
throw pecuniary temptations before 
men whose education and habits have 
been confined and confirmed within 
the walls of a dockyard. 1ji 
This distrust even extended to the Resident Commissioners who ör 
were members of the Board, and showed itself in the Board's 
encouragement of anonymous letters. The problem went hand in 
hand with the Board's reluctance to cation expenditure because 
of the fear of setting a precedent. Although credit must be 
given for the long-term improvement of the facilities of the 
western yards in the 1760's and 1770's, it was still the 
short-term attitude of the Board to allow nothing that had 
1. Ixvir, is66/oo6, observations on the Navy Board Department. 
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not been allowed before. In wartime this led to delay, 
particularly through the Board's failure to attach sufficient 
weight to the officers' representations for extra labour, extra 
stores and an adequate number of craft to service the fleet. 
It was not only a regard for economy which held back 
an expansion of the workforce, but also a fear of not being 
able to disestablish posts once they had been created. In 
spite of this, the civil administration was forced to establish 
eighty-five new positions between 1774 and 1783. Fifty-five 
of these were clerkships, although even the Navy Board had to 
expand 'by one more Surveyor and three more commissionere. 
1 
Later the administration had difficulty in getting rid of the 
posts which it considered unnecessary in peacetime; the chief 
obstacle was the current conception of office as a piece of 
property owned by the incumbent. This attitude permeated the 
whole organisation, and many of the prevailing customs and 
habits can be traced back to it. 
2 For instance, the stores 
in the charge of the Storekeeper were subject to no official 
survey because the office, and therefore the stores, were, in 
1. N M9 All"! DP/4,8 Dee 1783. 
2. There were signs of a change in attitude. Of the Treasurers 
of the Navy at this time, J. E. D. Binney notes, "a new 
conception... accidentally being bought into being - that of 
an impersonalised and continuing Treasurership, from time to 
time executed by a succession of individuals" (Binney, p. 148). 
i 
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effect, the officer's property. The same idea lay behind the 
individual ownership of the apprentices' indentures, and the 
payment of premiums by the yaxd clerks to their officers on 
appointment; in turn this fostered the attitude among the 
clerks that their payment of the premium had to be recouped, and 
prevented vigour being expended upon naval business rather than 
an efficient administration of each individual's fee-taking. It 
was also behind the difficulty of getting officers, clerks and 
men to apply for superannuation. More than anything, it gave 
the yard officers permanence; it underpinned their independence. 
To a large extent, it gave them power without responsibility. 
Yet in spite of their influence in the yards, their 
control over the workforce as a whole was limited. It was un- 
usual in the eighteenth century to have a large body of men who 
had to be handled with a light rein; as the strike of 1775 
showed, the shipwrights were a unified and powerful force, and 
aware of their importance. Yet if there was little discipline, 
there was little incentive for the men to work hard. The only 
attraction of working in the yards was the exceptional security 
that they offered, and this was hardly the way in which the 
pace of work was going to be quickened. The antiquated system 
of payment played an important part in the shaping of attitudes; 
Sandwich's attempt at introducing task work identified the 
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problem if it did not solve it. However, apart fron the 
discouragingly low pay, the most pernicious effect of the 
system was the way in which it linked officers and men, 
primarily through the arrangements about apprenticeship, to 
give them a personal interest over and above the basic aims 
of the service. The dockyards had now become a large-scale 
organisation. What were needed were fair and impersonal 
judgements in the administration of personnel, particularly 
in the matter of promotions. Most of those with key 
positions in the dockyards were protected by custom from 
arbitrary dismissal; but at the same time,, while they could 
not go down, they could not go up either. In such a situation, 
incentive and hard work did not flourish. 
These criticisms are not made entirely from the 
hindsight offered by the twentieth century, for they were 
voiced soon after the war. The sixth report of the 
Commissioners on Fees recommended an increased and rational 
salary and wage structure, and also the establishment of more 
regular, formal and impersonal relationships between the offices 
and individuals within the yards. Its ideas were very sound, 
and remarkably in line with modern bureaucratic practice. Here 
the Commission was strongly influenced by Middleton. His 
greatest administrative attribute lay in his being able to raise 
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his head above the crashing weight of day-to-day affairs and see 
where the weaknesses in the organisation were. From this point 
he was able to plan measures over a number of years to set things 
right, although many chances were lost after the war when he met 
with the twin obstacles of Howe at the Admiralty and a govern- 
ment unwilling to implement the recommendations of the Commission 
on Fees. 
Nevertheless, Middleton's impact on the dockyards was 
considerable. In his first six months in office, for instance, 
sixty-five Standing Orders were issued to the yards, compared 
to eighteen in the previous six months. Although he was not 
immediately successful, he was prepared to undertake, at one of 
the busiest points of the war, the reorganisation of the issue 
and accounting for stores, and the improvement of the methods 
of preserving masts; he also issued important orders 
concerning promotion and apprentices. At the same time he 
was dealing with coppering and the difficulties caused by the 
cargoes of neutral ships. Nor was this impetus lost until 
well into the next decade; the efficiency of the mobilisation 
of 1793 bore witness to his success. 
Middleton'a achievements were built on the 
foundations laid by Sandwich's efforts. When the Comptroller 
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took up his office an atmosphere favourable to reform had already 
been created. Although the First Lord had tried and failed with 
task work, he had been successful with the extension of the super- 
annuation scheme, and had seen that it had worked properly. He 
had taken a strong interest in the yards, and on his Visitations 
had ensured that many improvements in the facilities had been 
made. By implication, he inspected the work of the Navy Board 
at the same time, and ensured that this board's administration 
was vigorous. Once the war had started, his appreciation of 
Middleton's energy and skill, his ignoring of the Comptroller's 
impertinence and his firm but tactful handling of the latter's 
attempts at extending his influence did much to foster a unity 
in the central administration which was essential for efficiency. 
Middleton, as Comptroller of the professional board, 
was, of course, in a better position to make an impression on 
the dockyard organisation. He was also there at a more 
opportune time than Sandwich, for the country had yet to be 
shaken by defeat when the latter became First Lord. The 
Comptroller's alliance with Pitt and the readiness with which 
the Prime Minister listened to demands for money contrasted 
with the situation between Sandwich and North. Yet the 
effects of this impression did not long outlast Middleton's 
stay at the Navy Office. In the vaguely-defined relations of 
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the civil administration, smooth working depended upon respect 
and good personal relationships rather than by bullying and 
orders. It was to be expected that the Comptroller would 
antagonise and infuriate, for change had to be forced rather 
than encouraged. Over and above this, he was a difficult 
colleague and a hard master; his impetuosity and lack of tact, 
although an essential part of his energy and drive, led him into 
many unnecessary disagreements. 
Up to the outbreak of the American War years of 
victory made for complacency in a country which was hostile to 
strong administration. "The average eighteenth-century 
Englishman ... Preferred liberty to governmental efficiency"fl 
his remedy for inefficiency was to root out corruption and 
bribery, and this underlined the belief that it was the 
individual, rather than the system, who was to blame for any 
deficiencies. It was only just beginning to be realised 
that it might be the organisation itself which was at fault 
and not the individuals within it. The individual was 
important because of the delay that could occur when friction 
worked upon the delicate framework of the civil administration, 
but it was the inefficiency of the system rather than the petty 
corruption of individu, ale that was the chief problem by this 
1. Baugh, p. 504. 
_,. ý_s 
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time. A hundred years before it was the fleet which 
suffered if officials lined their pockets because the 
financial organisation of the country was weak; now it was 
merely the Treasury which lost money. Posterity has tended 
to judge eighteenth-century administration on its own terms, 
and has concluded that the problems of the dockyards began, 
and probably ended, with corruption, 
During the century the dockyard organisation had 
grown, although the size of the fleet had outstripped the 
capacity of the yards to maintain it efficiently. At the 
same time the organisation had failed to adapt to its own 
growth; it had expanded, but it had not developed. In 
previous wars the solution for incompetence had been to 
dismiss an officer, and for delay to set the workforce on 
extra work; now the root problem was seen to be more 
complicated. Even Middleton, with his grasp of affairs, 
found it, "surprising how the whole has been kept forwards 
and when I say that I was very frequently in danger of 
sinking under it, I very imperfectly describe my own 
situation". 
1 He was struggling to produce and maintain a 
fleet of nineteenth-century proportions, with colleagueo 
I. NM, MS66/086, Observations on the Navy Board Department. 
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imbued with eighteenth-century attitudes within an administrative 
machine which had not basically changed since the seventeenth 
century. The jolt of the American war shook the yards as 
much as the rest of the country, and they benefitted from the 
movement for economy and the growing belief in the need for 
honesty and strong administration. This change took many years, 
and in the meantime the dockyards ran on the old lines. The 
trouble was of institutions, not of individuals; the clog to 
efficiency lay in the millstone of tradition and precedent. 
Many, though not all, of the men engaged in the largest and 
most consistently difficult administrative and technological 
task of the time emerge with considerable credit. 
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Glossary 
anchor stock: "a long beam of oak... fixed transversely with the 
flukes" (Falconer, p. 9). 
azimuth compass: "an instrument employed to discover the magnetic 
azimuth or amplitude of any heavenly object... to find the 
exact variation of the magnetic needle" (Falconer, p. 25). 
blackstrake: together with the wales, they formed the planking of a 
ship's sides (see Falconer, pp. 36,311). 
block: one or more pulleys mounted in a case. 992 were used in 
the rigging of a seventy-four gun ship. 
bounty money: paid to volunteer seamen for signing on. 
braces and pintles: the hinges between a rudder and the ship's hull; 
the brace was the part attached to the rudder, and the 
pintle (or "pintail") to the ship. 
breaming and graving: to bream a ship was to burn off the filth from 
a ship's bottom after a long time at sea, which was done 
by holding lighted faggots or furze to the tallow and 
sulphur which had previously been put on the underside 
of the ship. Graving referred more generally to the act 
of cleaning the bottom. 
camber: small tidal dock or basin. 
carronade: introduced with success during the American ware it was 
a short gun of wide calibre. Since it threw a heavy 
shot, it was extremely effective at short range. 
caulking: the filling of seams with oakum, which was made by 
picking loose old hemp rope; it was then "driven in 
loose strands, worked lengthwise into the seam until 
it was full and packed hard" (Abell, p. 90). 
conduct money; paid to seamen and shipwrights for travelling to or 
from ports or dockyards. 
demurrage: rate or amount payable to a shipowner by the 
charterer for failure to load or discharge ship within the time agreed. 
. _.. ý 
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Glossary (coat) 
double-handed men: were qualified as both shipwrights and 
caulkers. 
establishment: a fixed number of men or stores. 
false keel: "a strong, thick piece of timber bolted to the 
bottom of the keel,.. very useful in preserving 
the lower side of the main keel" (Falconer, p. 164). 
gin: a hoisting apparatus, generally with three 
legs, for heavy weights. 
ocham: see caulking. 
overseer: a quarterman sent to a merchant yard to 
supervise the building of a ship intended for 
the navy. 
pendant: "generally a single or double rope to whose 
lower extremity is attached a block or tackle" 
(Falconer, p. 214). 
receiving ship: for the reception of seamen before they were 
allotted to a ship in commission. Some attempt 
was made to clean and train the men at this 
point. 
reeve: to pass a rope through a block. 
riders: "a sort of interior ribs, fixed occasionally in 
a ship's hold opposite to some of the principal 
timbers, and reaching from the keelson to the 
beams of the lower deck ... to strengthen her frame" (Falconer, p. 243). 
slops: seamen; ' ý clothes. 
seasoned timber: timber which had been stored in dry conditions 
to lessen its moisture content. In the case of 
oak, three years gras considered the minimum time 
needed to render it suitable for shipbuilding. 
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Glossary- (Copt) 
survey: an examination for either quality or 
quantity. 
thickstuff: straight timber between 10" and 4" thick; by 
contrast, knees and compass timber were valued 
for their crookedness which helped in the 
construction of certain parts of the hull. 
teams: of horses hired by contract. 
wale or whale: see blackstrake. 
warders, watchmen: responsible for security. Warders were posted 
by the gate, while the watchmen had fixed or 
moveable positions within the walls of the 
yard. 
yard craft: b arge, pinnace, cutter, awl: usually belonged 
to the ship. All were oared boats (between 
six and ten oars), although the cutter carried 
a sail. The first two were primarily used 
for passengers, and the last two for stores* 
launch, wherry: oared boats more suited to 
sheltered waters, and based on the yard; mainly 
used for towing ships and carrying stores. 
lighter, hoy, sloop: usually sailing craft of 
some size, sometimes with a crew of ten. Used 
mainly for storing ships at Spithead and 
Plymouth Sound. 
Princil2al sources: Falconer, Marine Dietiona y; Westcott Abeli, 
The Shipwright e 
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Appendix I. The Navy Board, 1774-1783. 
Comptroller: Aug 1770 - Ap.: " 1775 
Ap-,, 1775 - Aug 1778 
Aug 1778 - Mar 1790 
Surveyor: Jun 1765 - Nov 1784 
Dec 1777 - Dec 1786 
Surveyor's 1st Feb 1775 - Nov 1790 
Assistants: 2nd Mar 1771 - Nov 1790 
Clerk of the Acts: May 1773 - Oct 1800 
Hugh Palliser 
Maurice Suckling 
Charles Middleton 
John Williams 
Edward Hunt 
Thomas Mitchell 
John Binmer } 
George Marsh 
Extra Sea Jan 1778 - May 1792 Edward Lecras 
Commissioners: Nov 1780 - Nov 1784 Samuel Wallis 
Comptroller of: 
Treasurer's A/cs: 1761 - 1782 Timothy Brett 
1782 - 1802 George Roger; 
Victualling A/cs: 1773 - 1796 William Palmer 
Storekeeper's A/cs: 1761 - 1783 William Bateman 
Extra Commissioner: 1778 - 1784 Richard Temple 
Resident Commissioners: 
Chatham: Oct 1771 - Mar 1799 Charles Proby 
Portsmouth: Feb 1754 - Aug 1773 Richard Hughes 
Aug 1773 - Jan 1778 James Garnbier 
Jan 1778 - Sep 1780 Samuel Hood 
Sep 1780 - Max 1790 Henry Martin 
Plymouth: Oct 1753 - Mar 1775 Frederick Rogers 
Max 1775 - Dec 1782 Paul Ourry (Dec 1782 - May 1783 Edward Lecras) 
May 1763 - Nov 1769 Edward Laforey 
Principal sources: PP-CF, Fifth Rep ort; Add MSS 24135; Ray&- Kalenca s. 
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Appendix II. The Principal Officers of the Dockyards 1774 - 17M 
Deptford 
Master Attendant: Nov 1770 - Oct 1776 Thomas Cosway 
Oct 1776 -- Mar 1783 Roger Gastrill 
Max 1783 - Mar 1791 Benjamin Hunter 
Master Shipwright: Aug 1755 - Dec 1785 Adam Hayes 
Clerk of the Cheque: Aug 1773 - Dec 1783 James Butler Morn 
Dec 1783 - Max 1807 Richard Rosewell 
Storekeeper: Oct 1765 - Ap 1790 William Matthews 
Clerk of the Survey: Aug 1771 "- ? 1800 Peter Butt 
Woolwich 
Master Attendant: Nov 1772 - Max 1776 Peter Robinson 
Max 1776 - Oct 1776 Joseph Gilbert 
Oct 1776 - Mar 1783 Benjamin Hunter Mar 1783 - Sep 1785 John Wescott 
Master Shipwright: Max 1773 - Mar 1778 Nicholas Phillips 
Mar 1778 - Ap 1779 George Whito Ap 1779 - Dec 1782 John Jenner 
Dec 1782 - Dec 1785 Henry Peake 
Clerk of the Cheque: Aug 1773 - Jul 1793 Philip Soley 
Storekeeper: Jul. 1772 - Jun 1779 George Lawrence 
Jun 1779 - Dec 1780 William Lance 
Jan 1781 - Sep 1791 James Clyde 
Clerk of the Survey: Oct 1770 - Aug 1782 Robert Hunter 
Aug 1782 - Oct 1791 Christopher Hill Harris 
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Appendix TI (Copt) 
Chatham 
Master Attendants: Ap 1755 - Feb 1776 
Nov 1770 - Mar 1783 
Mar 1776 - Sep 1785 
Mar 1783 - Sep 1799 
Master Shipwright: Max 1773 - Feb 1775 
Feb 1775 - Ap 1779 
Ap 1779 - Jul 1790 
Clerk of the Cheque: Mar 1768 - Jun 1783 
Jun 1783 - Dec 1791 
Storekeeper Jul 1772 - Oct 1795 
Clerk of the Survey: Nov 1770 - Ap 1798 
Sheerness 
Master Attendant: Nov 1770 - Aug 1775 
Aug 1775 - Mar 1776 
Mar 1776 ." Oct 1776 Oct 1776 "- May 1783 
Mar 1783 - Nov 1784 
Master Shipwright: Mar 1773 - Mar 1778 
Mar 1778 - AP 1779 
AP 1779 - Dec 1782 
Deo 1782 - Nov 1784 
Clerk of the Cheque: Aug 1773 - Jun 1783 
Jun 1783 - Dec 1783 
Storekeeper: Jul 1772 - Dec 1780 
Jan 1781 - Oct 1781 
Nov 1781 - Oct 1791 
Clerk of the Survey: Ap 1773 - May 1780 
May 1780 - Sep 1785 
John Towers 
William Hammond 
Magnus Falconer 
William Nicholson 
William Gray 
Israel Pownoll 
Nicholas Phillips 
William Campbell 
John Williams 
John Weatherall 
James Hamilton 
John Covey 
Joseph Gilbert 
Benjamin Hunter 
John Wescott 
John Madgshon 
George White 
John Jenner 
Henry Peaks 
Thomas Pollard 
John Williams 
Biohard Rosewell 
James Clyde 
John Holden 
George Teait 
Christopher Hill Harris 
Henry Hodson 
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Aopendix II (Cont) 
Portsmouth 
Master Attendants: 
Master Shipwright: 
Ap 1755 - Oct 1776 
Nov 1770 - Mar 1783 
Oct 1776 - Max 1791 Max 1783 - Feb 1793 
Oct 1772 - Dec 1777 Mar 1778 - Ap 1779 
Ap 1779 - Max 1793 
Roger Gastrin 
William Nicholson 
Joseph Gilbert 
Thomas Mosely 
Edward Hunt 
Nicholas Phillips 
George White 
Clerk of the Cheque: 
Storekeeper: 
Clerk of the Survey: 
Aug 1773 Feb 1766 
Jul 1747 - Sep 1791 
Jul 1772 - Nov 1788 
Thomas Snell. 
John Greenway 
John Sowers 
Plymouth 
Master Attendants: 
Master Shipwright: 
Clerk of the Cheque: 
Storekeeper; 
Ap 1755 - Oct 1777 
Ap 1767 - Mar 1776 
Mar 1776 - Ap 1790 
Oct 1777 - Aug 1804 
May 1762 - Feb 1775 Feb 1775 - Nov 1784 
Jan 1762 - Jun 1801 
Feb 1754 - Jan 1782 
Jan 1782 - Oct 1791. 
Benjamin Hall 
Magnus Falconer 
Pete= Robinson 
James Smith 
Israel Pownoll 
John Henslow 
John Lloyd 
Philip Justice 
Jacob Pownoll 
Clerk of the Survey: Dec 1763 - Ap 1790 Ralph Paine 
Principal. Sources: NM Lista of Dockyard Officers; Royal Kalondars; PP-CF. 
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Appendix III. The Labour Force of the Yards, 1774-1783. 
Ship- 
wrights Total 
1774 Max 3271 8114 
Jun 3233 7747 
Sep 3245 7741 
Dec 3246 7709 
1775 Mar. 3235 7689 
Jun 3221 7672 
Sep 3070 7543 
Dec 3131 7623 
1776 Max 3115 7602 
Jun 3096 7622 
Sep 3098 7598 
Dee 3128 7844 
1777 M= 3155 7884 
Jun 3148 7889 
Sep 3141 7891 
Dec 3112 7873 
1778 Mar 3178 8088 
Jun 3258 8446 
Sep 3275 8651 
Dec 3256 8727 
Ship- 
wrights Total. 
1779 Mar 3271 8814 
Jun 3296 8883 
Sep 3287 9038 
Dec 3297 9098 
1780 Mar no figures 
Jun - do - 
Sep - do -, 
Dec 3298 9106 
1781 Max 3375 9205 
Jun 3354 9224 
Sep no figures 
Dec 3287 9271 
1782 Mar 3359 9477 
Jun no figures 
Sep 3312 9430 
Dec 3268 9470 
1783 Mar no figures 
Jun 3282 9352 
Sep 3254 9319 
Dec 3165 9250 
Sources: NEM, ADM B/188 - BP/4; ShP, 144, no. 6,16 Aug 1776. 
The peak total (Maxch 1782) is given in detail in 
Appendix IV. 
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A endix IV. The Labour Force: Warrant of March 1726/Return 
of March 1782. 
Deptford Woolwich Chatham Sheerness 
1, 2182 1_(ßi 2182 17 2182 ým 1782 
Shipwrights 430 460 340 332 675 616 165 194 
Quarter Boys 9 9 8 8 12 12 5 6 
Caulkers 30 40 28 42 80 78 30 42 
ocham Boys 10 10 9 9 26 26 10 10 
Joiners 28 34 20 27 32 47 12 16 
House Carps. 30 45 30 40 60 60 24 32 
Wheelwrights 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Plumbers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pitch heaters 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Bricklayers 14 12 11 10 13 13 6 8 
-do- labourers 14 10 11 7 13 13 6 6 
Sailmakers 25 31 20 24 30 30 15 20 
Scavelmen 18 18 16 27 50 50 30 30 
Riggers (19) 51 (15 25 46 50 (16 23 
-do- labourers (7) 20 
(5) 16 (20) 50 (6 23 
Labourers 190 382 120 235 170 234 33 34 
Blockmakers 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Braziers 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 
Locksmiths 3 2 2 2 2 2 - - 
Teams 8 9 6 8 11 13 4 4 
Sawyers 75 85 48 48 92 110 24 20 
T'nail mooters 2 2 1 - - - - - 
Oarmakers 1 1 - - - - - - 
Masons - - - - - - - - 
Watermen 1 1 - 1 - - - - 
Axmourers 1 1 1 1 - - - 1 
Smiths 40 60 35 48 55 60 25 36 
Ropeyard 
Foremen 2 3 2 2- 
Spinners -- 93 151 109 139 -- Hatchellors -- 16 31 18 24 -- 
Winders Up --8 11 -- 
Line makers --- 10 - --- 
Labourers -- 15 21 18 24 
Hemp dressers --- 10 - -- 
Boys --8 25 8 12 - 
warrant of 936 834 1434 395 
1774 
Return of 
1782 1291 1179 1673 511 
nb: Since the warrant of 1774 contains no figures for o rig era and their labourers, those from the return of 20 April 1774 (1I1M, 
. /189) have 
been substituted. 
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Appendix IV (Cont) 
Portsmouth Plymouth Total 
ýM 1782 14 1782 21 1782 
Shipwrights 860 820 790 937 3260 3369 
Quarter Boys 13 13 12 12 59 
Caulkers 90 111 90 102 348 415 
Ocham Boys 33 35 30 30 118 120 
260 Joiners 50 77 45 63 187 
House Carps. 60 100 50 81 254 358 
Wheelwrights 3 2 2 4 12 13 
Plumbers 2 6 2 1 8 11 
Pitch heaters 
Bricklayers 
2 
16 
2 
28 
2 
16 
2 
32 
9 
76 
9 
103 
-do- labourers 16 32 10 10 
70 78 
Sailmakers 45 63 35 52 170 220 
Scavelmen 60 92 50 60 224 277 
Riggers (67 140 (54) 79 (217) 368 
-do- labourers 
) 
(50 80 50 
6 
100 (138 
1063 
289 
1460 Labourers 290 275 2 0 300 
B1oclonakers 3 4 3 4 15 17 
Founder - - - 1 
1 
Braziers 1 2 1 3 5 9 
Locksmiths 2 2 3 3 12 11 
Teams 21 20 16 23 66 77 
Sawyers 122 134 86 88 447 485 
T'nail mooters -- - 1 1 4 
3 
Oamnalcers -. - 1 1 2 2 16 Masons 4 7 7 9 11 
Watermen - - - - 1 
2 
Armourers - - - - 2 
3 
Smiths 85 87 80 110 320 401 
Ropeyard 
Foremen 
Spinners 
2 
115 
2 
176 
2 
132 
3 
218 
8 
449 
10 
684 
Hatahellors 18 29 23 40 75 124 
Winders Up 9 14 11 17 28 42 
Line makers - 10 
Labourers 14 19 16 37 63 101 
Hemp dressers - - - - .» 10 
Boys 8 12 9 16 33 64 
Warrant of 
1774 1864 1785 7248 
Return of 
1782 2385 2438 2 
Sources: PRO, AZT'[ 95/95,16 Mar 1774; NMM, ADM BP/31 25 Ap 1782. Thin 
format approximates to that of the quarterly Navy Board Returns to the 
Admiralty. 
ý_ _ _.....,, 
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A endix V. Salaries and Incomes of Officers and Clerks, 1184, 
From the Commission on Fees, 1786-89 corrected to the nearest pound. 
The figures given for the clerks are for the most senior and the most 
junior in each office. The first figure represents the established 
salary; the second the total income. 
M. Attend. 
Dept. 
20072-04 
Wool. 
200 206 
Chat. 
200 265 
Sheer. 
150 160 
Portsinouth 
200 256 
Plymouth 
200 205 
M. Attend. 200/183 200/250 200/205 
1 Cl. 40/100 40/74 40/108 40/49 40/90 40/132 
M. Shipw. 200/339 200/343 200/509 150/341 200/384 200/345 
I Cl. 45/316 45/123 45/122 45/90 45/158 45/165 
Ju, C10 40/40 40/40 40/41 40/40 35/35 35/35 
C. of Ch. 200/320 200/281 200/303 150/180 200/456 200/448 
1 Cl. 45/265 45/135 45/185 45/169 45/360 45/371 
Ju. C1. 30/55 30/30 30/34 30/65 30/38 30/30 
Storek. 200/256 200/228 200/284 150/188 200/345 200/323 
1 Cl. 55/274 55/191 55/188 55/115 55/160 55/167 
Ju. C1. 40/40 40/40 40/40 40/40 40/40 40/53 
C. of Sur. 200/193 200/197 200/190 150/143 200/191 200/191 
1 Cl. 45/214 45/179 45/147 45/116 45/247 45/196 
Ju. C1. 30/36 30/34 30/35 30/30 30/37 30/30 
1st. Asst. 
M. Shipw. 100/203 100/207 100/195 80/198 100/182 100/178 
2nd Asst. 
M. Shipw. 100/190 100/145 100/197 100/187 100/190 
Purveyor. 60/263 60/185 50/256 80/226 no figures 
Surgeon. 100/219 100/177 100/248 100/167 100/320 100/378 
Boatswain. 80/147 80/90 80/142 70/72 80/177 80/124 
Porter. 30/190 30/56 30/71 25/45 30/177 30/103 
_.. 
ý 
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Appendix VI. Pay and Allowances: Artificers and Labourers. 
per diem when established Rate per tide 
Quartermen 2/6 1696 7d 
Shipwrights 2/1 1690 7d 
Caulkers 2/1 1694 71d 
Quarter Boys 8 1697 2d 
oakum Boys 6 1693 2d 
Bloclcnakers 2/1 1694 7-id 
Smiths, Foremen, 
1st class 2/6 3/0 1726 1778 5d 7 
2nd class 2/2 2/8 1726 1778 5d 7*d 
3rd class 1/10 2/8 1726 1778 5d. 7 
Hammerren i/8 2/0 1731 1778 5d 72d 
Joiners 2/0 1694 721d 
House Carpenters 1/10 1697 6d 
Bricklayers 1/8 1697 5d 
Riggers 1/6 1694 4d 
Scaveimen 1/6 1697 4d 
Labourers 1/2 1690 4d 
Sawyers (per 100 foot) - - - 
Sailmakers 1/10 1694 6d 
Apprentices to 
shipwrights etc 
1st year 1/2 4d 
7th year 1/10 6d 
To Joiners etc 1711 
Ist year 1/0 4d 
7th year 1/8 5d 
Ropeyard Foremen 1/10 -- 
Layers 1/8 - 
Ropemakers 1/8 1699 - 
Hatchellors 1/5 - 
Winders 1/4 - 
This table is compiled from the Commission of Naval Enquiry, 1803-4r 
PP- 190-195; it differs but little from those given by Ehrman (pp. 93-5) 
and Baugh (p. 309). See also B. Mol. Rastft, pp. 282-3- 
The figure in parentheses by the smiths is the rate for those engaged 
on the strenuous work of making anchors. They also had a considerable 
allowance of beer. The figures for extra are taken from Plymouth; 
the rate for each yard seems to have levelled out since the 1740's (see 
Baugh, p. 309), although Woolwich still paid shipwrights at the rate 
of 8d per tide. 
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Appendix VII. Representative Sample of the wages of a Working Shi wri ht. 
Lady Quarter 
1774 
1778 
Midsummer 
174 
1778 
Michaelmas 
1774 
1778 
Christmas 
1774 
1778 
Deptford 
Days Nights Tides Full wages. 
77 0 0 ¬8-0-5 
76 0 73 £11-3-4 
78 0 51 £9-14--4 
78 1 94 C14-12 -5 
79 0 53 £9 -17 -8 
79 0 155 E13-1-5 
79 0 0 ¬8-4-7 
79 0 100 ßa. 3-19-7 
Total: 1774 £35 -17 -0 
1778 £52 -16 .-9 
Portsmouth 
Days Nights Tides F'ul. l wages* 
Lady Quarter 
1774 77 0 0 £8 -0-5 f 
1778 76 0 104 Ell -3-4 
Midsumme 
1774 
r 0 51 99 -13 -4 
1778 771 58 38 £15 -i6 -0 
Michaelmas 
1774 79 0 531 £9 -18 -0 
1778 78 63 28 £15 -12 -3 
Christmas 
1774 79 0 0 £8 - 4- 7 
1778 78 0 154 ¬12 -18 -9 
Total: 1774 £35-16 -4 
1778 £55- 0-4 
Sources: PRO, IDtn 42/564, 568,12902 1294: From a sample of twenty 
shipw lts at both yards. The Deptford shipwrights were working by 
task. in 1778. 
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Appendix VIII. Consumption, Delivery and Remains of Oak 
Timber, Thickstuf£ and Plank, 1771-1783. 
Making an estimate of the yearly consumption of oak is difficult. 
The first complication stems from the "sided and converted" order 
of 1772; the amount of sawn timber was made equal to rough logs 
by adding a third of the total. It is often not clear whether 
this had been done. 
Secondly, there are many conflicting figures. Returns for 
the 1760's are plentiful, and a seemingly accurate summary is 
printed in the 1771 Timber Report (p. 29). Even so, there are 
discrepancies of between three and four thousand loads for this 
decade between the only two manuscript Navy Board sources (PRO, 
ABM 106/3182 and 49/124). The first of these volumes is the 
major source of tabular statistics for the 1770's and early 
1760's; but it is carelessly filled, incomplete and the con- 
sumption figures are considerably underestimated. Oak timber 
alone in 1773, for instance, appears to be seven thousand loads 
short in comparison with the figure in ADN 49/124. 
The oak timber and plank that was consumed during the war period 
probably ranged between 26,000 and. 30,000 loads a year. This is 
the gist of the information given by Williams (p. 302), but it is 
not clear how he arrives at his figures; they match up as well as 
can be expected to the figures of deliveries and remains in store 
given below. The state of the returns to the Navy Board and the 
inaccuracy of accounting methods makes the incidence of these comp- 
lications understandable. 
Deliveries (in loads) Remains (in loads) 
1771 32,855 19,972 
1772 45,067 27,386 
1773 52,029 50,027 
1774 42,085 68,803 
1775 34,426 68,500 
1776 34,774 71,383 
1777 36,225 66,232 
1778 41,341 71,522 
1779 36,334 72,154 
1780 30,987 67,455 
1781 29,118 58,283 
1782 no figures 48,774 
1783 - do- 52,594 
Sources: NNM, ADM BP/3,24 Sep-2 Oct 1782; B/184 -BP/5; also Williams, p. 302. 
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Appendix IX. Oak Consumed, 1765-7; 1784 Establishment. 
Oak and Thickstuff (in loads): 
Plank (in loads)t 
1765 1766 1767 
British 21271 26008 26908 
Foreign 109 157 34 
American --2 
(average p. a: 24,829) 21380 26165 26944 
British 4tt_31t 2368 
British 22" 587 
Foreign 4'º-3" 1655 
(average p. a: 4193) 4610 
(total average per annum: 22,022 
3641 4229 
Source: 177]. Timber Report p. 29; see also PRO, AM 49/124. 
Middleton based his 1784 Standing Order on these figures. 
1784 Establishment of Oak Timber, Thickstuff and Plank. 
Dept. Wool. Chat. Sheer. Port. Ply. Total. 
Straight and 10200 8400 166oo 3300 16700 10800 66000 
compass timber. 
Thickstuif 1200 goo 2000 100 2000 2500 8700 
(1o" - 41") 
Plank. 1500 500 2500 600 2500 1500 9400 
Total 12900 10100 21100 4000 21200 14800 84100 
loads. 
Source: SO(b), 348,29 Nov 1784. 
1897 2313 
411 452 
1333 1464 
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)i A endix X. Distribution of Oak Timber (without Thickstuff and Plank 
1774-1783. 
Dept Wool Chat Sheer Port Plym Total 
1774 8361 6904 10375 2127 15491 13718 56976 
1775 6658 7470 7948 1924 20623 12507 57130 
1776 6514 6894 8984 1281 28918 11618 64209 
1777 5124 4104 8494 1732 26451 12256 58161 
1778 5401 5128 9029 2631 26842 12749 61680 
1779 5075 7111 9524 1729 25831 12606 61879 
1780 3539 5925 8407 1584 25164 12563 57182 
1781 3509 4924 4795 1851 22265 12306 49893 
1782 2134 2469 2858 1690 21323 10598 40733 
1783 938 2239 2611 2071 21611 11569 41059 
1784 1739 2971 1480 2080 9122 12041 29431 
The figures represent the remains in store for the 31st December 
of each year. Those for the year 1784 have been included to 
illustrate the realistic assessment of the oak in Portsmouth yard 
after Greenway's "cursory survey". 
If these figures are compared with those of the Establishment 
of 1784 in Appendix IX it can be seen how far from ideal the 
situation was for most of this period - in particular, the uneven distribution of timber between the eastern and western yards, 
sources: NNM, ADM B/189 - BP/5. 
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Appendix XI. Ships of the Line Built and Completed, 1774-1783. 
Royal-Yards Merchant Yards 
, 1774; Max: Cumberland 74 
(D) May: Eagle 64 
May: Hector 74 
Jun: Vengeance 74 
Dec: Nonsuch 64 (Pi) Oct: Vigilant 64 
1775: Ap : Berwick 74, Po) 
Jun: Stirling Castle 64 C) 
Oct: Bei 74 W) Dec: Sultan 74 
1776: May: Culoden 74 ýD 
Nov: Ruby 64 W 
1777: Aug: America 64 D 
Aug: Formidable 90 C 
Sep: Lion 64 Po 
Oct: Duke g0 P1 
1778: Oct: Alfred 74 (a 
Oct: Alexander 74 (D 
1779: Jun: Edgar 74 W 
Jul: Abide 74 D 
Aug: Montagu 74 C 
1780: Mar: Fortitude 74 
Mar: Inflexible 64 
Jun: Belli ueux 64 
Oct: Magnanime 64 (D) Nov: Repulse 64 
1781: May: Sampson 64 W) Ap : A; amemmnon 64 
Sep: Anson 4 P1) Ap : Africa, 64 
Oct: Goliath 74; D) Jun: Scare 64 
Oct: Warrior 74 Po) 
1782: Feb: Atlas 90 C Max: Ganges 74 
Ap : Pol hemus 64 S Mar: Crown 64 
Oct: 
D o 
Standara 64 
6 D 
D Jun: Bombay 74 
e : iadem 4 C Nov: Ardent 64 
Oct: Soipio 64 
Dec: Irresistible 74 
1783: Jan: Ca-Mato 74 
Jan: Dictator 64 
Ap : Powerful 64 
Jun: Culloden l (ii) 74 
Nov: .[ uun eras 74 lac: Do,,,, itnce 74 
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SANDWICH, MIDDLETON AND 
DOCKYARD APPOINTMENTS 
By R. Y. B. Knight 
THE controversy between Lord Sandwich and Charles Middleton 
over dockyard appointments in January and February 178 t was for 
long one of the main props of the traditional and unsympathetic 
view of Sandwich's administration. The First Lord, it was argued, filled the 
yards with political nominees; the consequence was the ruinous condition of 
the fleet and defeat in the American War of Independence. Since the 
publication of the Sandwich Papers in the i 93os the reputation of the First 
Lord as an administrator has been salvaged., That this revision was so long 
in coming was due in part to his political unpopularity and isolation; by 
building up a following in the Navy of men of ability who were `political 
nonentities by eighteenth century standards' he improved the adminis- 
trative capacity of an overworked navy, but in doing so he alienated the 
influential and aristocratic officers, and split the service into opposing 
factions. 2 Middleton conformed to this pattern; he was similar to men like 
Palliser, Mulgrave and Suckling, all proteges of the First Lord. He was, 
however, a difficult colleague, and Sandwich found himself faced with a 
formidable opponent when there were grounds for disagreement. Yet this 
controversy was the only major cause of friction in the vital relationship 
between the two men as First Lord and Comptroller of the Navy Board. A 
strong Comptroller could obstruct an Admiralty Board which was ignorant 
of the civil affairs of the Navy, and any controversy between the two boards 
was a test of strength, the result of which could determine subsequent 
relations to a marked degree. The ill-feeling between Middleton and Howe, 
then at the Admiralty, after the American war demonstrated hnw far things 
could go wrong. Sandwich, however, was more than informed on the affairs 
of the civil administration, for he could draw on experience from as far 
back as the i 740s. His handling of this affair was firm and tactful, and he 
outmanoeuvred the threats and pressures of his Comptroller. 
The issues at stake were complicated, not least by the fact that the 
i The Private Papers of 74x, Earl of Sandwich, ed. G. R. Barnes and J. K. Owen (N. R. S. 
1932-8). The controversy is printed in vol. iv, pp. 374-80,381-3, but more fully in the Coreri 
and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham, ed. J. K. Laughton (N. R. S. 1907-11) 31, pp. 11-30 (cited below as Barham Papers). 
2 J. ii. Broomfield, `Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty Board; Politics and the Navy 1771-81 Mariner's Mirror, u (1965), p. 9. 
s2-s 
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dockyard organization was, for the age, an immense size; it was also a 
highly technical service, for which there were virtually no standards by 
which an officer's worth could be evaluated. Middleton was trying, by 
a system of disinterested recommendations, to introduce meritocracy in 
governing the promotions of yard officers, which he intended to be ad- 
ministered by the Navy Board. Sandwich, while admitting that improve- 
ments could be made, preferred to take recommendations from any source- 
including the Navy Board-when he felt he needed them, but did not wish 
to be governed entirely by recommendations from the professional board, 
which, in any case, he distrusted on principle. The affair can be seen at 
three levels. It was a clash of different social and administrative principles. 
Middleton, the complete professional, saw the controversy in terms of the 
efficiency of the nineteenth century; Sandwich, the informed amateur, 
represented the administration of government by the gentlemen of the 
eighteenth century. At the same time, the controversy represented a stage in 
the long history of friction and mutual distrust between the senior and junior 
boards. Finally, it can be seen as a personal conflict. Middleton, hot- 
headed and idealistic, attempted to bring perfection to a system where 
there was none to be had. Sandwich, adroit and calm, content with the 
way of things, cooled the temper of the Comptroller so that a complete 
breakdown was avoided. 
The system of appointment and promotion in the dockyard service was 
haphazard. The most significant factor was the relative lack of influence of 
the Navy Board, which was responsible for administering the yards. The 
Admiralty controlled all promotions of yard officers and officers of the 
Ordinary, while the appointment of workmen was in the hands of the 
Principal Officers of the yards., The only control that the Board was able to 
exert was through the Resident Commissioners of the Outports (members 
of the Board), who were empowered to approve all appointments. 2 The 
Committee of Enquiry of 1804 noted this as a weakness: 
Though the Resident Commissioner has authority over all persons employed in the yard, he has 
no power to reward, promote or even cause a man to be entered into the service; and from this 
circumstance, although the Principal, he appears to have less influence over the workmen than 
any other officer; this seems to us to be a defect in the system ... 3 
A year later the Commission of Naval Revision modified this view; since 
the Commissioner had the power of approval of all appointments and 
i `No shipwright or labourer... is to be entered without the warrant from two or more of the 
Chief Officers (of the Dockyards]. ' (The Oeconomy of llir Majesty 'r Naval Office (London, 1717), 
p. r to). The Oeconomywas a reprint of the Duke of York's T66a Instructions, by which the civil 
administration was still governed. 
2 P. R. O., IND 1o665 (36c), Standing Order of 31 Mar. 1705. 
3 Parl. Pap., The Report of the Commissioners of Naval ErQairy, 1803-4, sixth report, pp. 3-4. 
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entries, 'and at all times the power of reporting meritorious service to the 
Board', he had quite enough authority., It is clear, however, that in view of 
the lack of influence of the Board itself, the power of the Resident Commis- 
sioners was too weak. 2 Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the 
Commissioner resident at the yard would be in sympathy with his colleagues 
in London. In fact, the only control that the Navy Board had was over the 
numbers employed. 3 
The Board did, however, control the promotion of men below the rank 
of 'master'. Dockyard foremen, quartermen and `sub' and `pro' quarter- 
men were appointed by Navy Board warrant. 4 In cases of prolonged absence, 
even the appointment of a substitute had to be confirmed by the Board. s 
The clerks in the yard offices were also the concern of the Board; they were 
recommended by the officers (in return for a substantial premium), and the 
appointment was confirmed by warrant. 6 The last two categories for which 
the Board were responsible were the shipwrights assigned to oversee the 
building of ships in merchant yards and the cooks on the ships in ordinary. 
Cooks were usually old or maimed seamen, and since the Board was in 
charge of the administration of the Chatham Chest, it appointed these 
men. 7 Unimportant in itself, it demonstrates the patchwork structure of the 
appointments system. 
In addition, the Board possessed some unofficial influence, as it acted as 
a form of appeal court over the yard authorities. The first six months of 
1775 provides an illustration of how this influence worked, for this was a 
period when entry into the yards was difficult for shipwrights. 8 During 
I Parl. Pap., The Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of 
!! it Majesty's Navy, 1805-6, first report, p. 18. This opinion is clearly Middleton's; he was never 
in favour of giving the Resident Commissioners more influence. 
2 See D. Baugh, British Naval Admixistration it, the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965), 
p. 292 n, for a different opinion. 
3 Between 1774 and 1779 there were 125 adjustments to the labour force of the yards. 
Admiralty approval had to be given before any major increase was instituted, but small in- 
creases and decreases were administered by the Board tP. R. O., ADM 95/95-6). 
4 Each yard had a Master Shipwright with two Assistants (except Sheerness, which had only 
one) who controlled most of the work-force. Under these officers were one or two foremen, who 
provided the link with the quarterman who led the gangs of shipwrights. 'Pro' quartermen were 
established to take the place of any absent quartermen. Minor trades, such as joiners and smiths, 
had their masters and foremen, but they, as well as the boatswain of the yard in charge of the 
unskilled labourers, were under the direction of the Master Shipwright. 
5 E. g. P. R. O., ADM 95/95,28 Dec. '774,28 Oct. 1777- 
6 The Resident Commissioner would examine and approve of the clerk (e. g. P. R. O., ADM 
106/2592,27 Jan. 1775)- 
7 E. g. ibid. r9 May, 3o June 1775" 
8A Standing Order of 5 May 177 5 ordered the yard officers to take no more shipwrights at all, 
but by the end of June the regulations began to be relaxed (P. R. O., ADM zo6/25o8, no. 6771 
ADM 95/95,29 June 1775). 
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this time there were 40 petitions to the Board from artificers who required 
either entry, discharge or removal from one yard to another., Although the 
Resident Commissioners, as representatives of the Board, controlled the 
yard officers in questions of entry and discharge, petitions from workmen 
both in and out of the service reached the Board in London. It had no 
established power to order the entry of artificers, but the yard officers were 
unlikely to refuse a request from the Commissioners in London. In return, 
the central administration generally backed up the decisions of the yard 
officers in matters of this sort. Not all the petitions came from the artificers 
themselves. In one case Sandwich himself enquired on behalf of John 
Henniker, one of the largest contractors to the Navy, who wished to have 
one of his men entered at Chatham; but the Board, in this and other instances, 
did not give way to any pressure. 2 Pressure on the Board or yards for entry 
was, however, short-lived. Once the war had started in earnest, the shortage 
of shipwrights made all applications for entry welcome. By 1778 the yard 
officers were ordered 'not to be too scrupulous in entering... good work- 
men at this time when they are scarce'. 3 The question of promotion was, by 
contrast, a constant problem. 
The particular point at issue between the First Lord and the Comp- 
troller was the promotion of the shipwright officers, for they posed a par- 
ticular difficulty. While the dockyard clerical posts needed little prior 
expertise, 4 and the skill of the other technical officer, the Master Attendant, 
could be attested by sea officers, there was no one who could judge the 
technical competence of one shipwright over another. 5 Highly developed as 
an art rather than as a science, shipbuilding was a trade for which few 
standards could be set. A senior officer told the Commission on Fees that 
his apprentices learnt from him 'the art and mystery of a shipwright' .6 There was no shipwright officer class as in France. Nor was there any 
formal education; every officer had to work his way up from the'floor' of the 
yards. In an organization the size of the dockyards, with a large number of 
i P. R. O., ADM ro6/2592, Jan. -June 1775. 
2 Ibid. 17 Jan., 21 Apr. 1775. 
3 P. R. O., ADM ro6/2597, rz Jan. 1778. By this time petitions to the Board were auto- 
matically referred to the yard officers with the order to enter the workmen, `if they have no 
objection'. 
4 The lack of prior knowledge was criticized later. See Parl. Pap., Reports of the Commis- 
sioners appointed. . . 10 eufuire into the Fas, 
Gratuities, Perfuirites, and Emoluments... received 
into the several Public O5ccr (cited below as Commission on Fees), 1786-8, i 8o6, sixth report, 
p. 308, 
5 The skill of individual shipwrights was a subject studiously avoided, especially by other 
members of the trade. There are few direct references to individuals, but see Hood's opinion 
of George White, Master Shipwright at Portsmouth, in Correspondence of George 11!, ed. 
J. Fortescue, iv (London, 1927), p. 347. 
6 Commission on Fees, sixth report, p. 414. 
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men in relation to officers, there had to be a selection process; it was this 
which was the core of the problem., 
The system came under widespread criticism. The effect of having 
shipwrights rising to the top of the service as craftsmen rather than as 
theoreticians was seen as disastrous by the more forward-thinking of the 
officers. Kempenfelt wrote to Middleton in 1780: 
The want of a good foundation laid of mathematical knowledge prevents our builders from 
rising to eminence; for want of this light, they are often obliged to grope in the dark, they guess, because they have not the mathematics to calculate certainty; when they give their bottom any 
particular form, they guess at the effects 
The weakness of the system was that the Master Shipwrights `were at 
once social inferiors and experts'. The result was that little advance was 
made in ship design, and that `the most important lessons were learnt 
from the designers of the enemy'. 3 The technical side of the service there- 
fore laboured under twin disadvantages. The system was not egalitarian 
enough to allow ability to emerge from the mass of ordinary shipwrights; 
only the favoured shipwrights who were apprenticed to officers rose to the 
rank of officer. Yet this elite was not given a superior training. 
All the Master Shipwrights in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
had been apprenticed to former Master Shipwrights. It was impossible for 
an apprentice of an ordinary shipwright to become an officer. There was, 
therefore, a de facto officer class. For this advantage, a Master Shipwright 
charged 20 guineas as an initial apprentice fee, while their Assistants 
charged about fifteen. 4 The more junior officers gave no evidence to the 
Commission on Fees on this matter, but it is obvious that even foremen had 
their prices The initial charge was increased in some cases to include board 
and lodging, for the more senior an officer, the less likely he would be to 
make any allowances to an apprentice. Thus the father of one Richard 
Parnell paid i oo guineas to George White, at that time Master Shipwright 
I See Baugh, Q. cit. pp. 306-7- 
2 Barham Paper, r, p. 325,9Apr. 1780. See also severe criticism by Malachy Postlethwayt 
in his Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (London, x774), s. v. Architecture. For it defence of the system see J. Charnock, History of Marine Architecture, tit (London, 18o2), 
PP-138-9,383-7- 
3 Baugh, op. cit. pp. 252-3; see also R. G. Albion, Forest; and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 
1926), pp. 79-80. 
4 Commission on Feet, sixth report, pp. 344,414,453. The Master Shipwright at Plymouth 
charged 5o guineas, but justified this high figure by saying that `it was peculiar to this yard' (P. 452). 
5 Three junior officers at Plymouth stated that they had paid , ýto to a foreman, yet one 
officer had paid £52 to a foreman at Deptford. There was no standard rateI it depended on the 
standing and connections of the Master (Commission on Pus, sixth report, p. 330). 
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at Sheerness, in lieu of board., Apprenticeship to an influential officer was 
not something that everyone could afford. 
The reason for the care with which the officers took on and kept their 
apprentices was that the wages, paid straight to the Master, was a most 
important supplement to the yard officer's salary. These had not been 
changed since the previous century. 2 In most cases the wages of the appren- 
tices formed half the total income of the officers. The whole situation was 
criticized by the Commission on Fees, which recommended that no officer 
on a yearly salary should have any apprentices at all. The system was, 
`expensive, discouraging to able and deserving artificers, detrimental to the 
public service, and subject to many inconveniences not necessary, and per- 
haps not proper to mention here, but what every professional man acquainted 
with the Dockyards must feel'. 3 All apprentices should go to the most 
deserving of the workmen, to be decided by the Resident Commissioner. 
The Commission went on to recommend that the indenture of an apprentice 
should not be the property of the master, but should be handed over to the 
successor to the post. The effect of this proposal would have been to have 
stopped the wholesale movement of personnel from yard to yard, and to 
have prevented the binding together of master and servant throughout 
their careers .4 When a senior 'shipwright officer moved to another yard, he took his 
apprentices with him. This was a tradition that the Navy Board encouraged, 
but there were still cases of apprentices being in different yards from their 
masters--a practice which, of course, nullified the whole principle of 
instruction. 5 Yet it is obvious that the training of the apprentice by the 
master, in the case of the officers, had fallen away. White complained to the 
Navy Board that he could not find a suitable apprentice at Sheerness, and 
his request that one be entered for him at Plymouth was granted. 6 This 
transfer of personnel could extend further than apprentices; in March 1775 
Israel Pownoll asked the Board if he could take one Joseph Foot and his 
servant with him when he was promoted from Plymouth to Chatham. The 
Board granted his request, but made it clear that it was an indulgence? 
i Commission on Fees, sixth report, p. 4t9. 
2 See J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697 (Cambridge, 1953), 
P" 599. Adjustments had been made to individual yards, but in general the levels were the same 
(e. g. P. R. O., ADM zo6/2508, no. tia8,4 Jan. 1782). 
3 Commission on Fies, sixth report, P. 307.4 Ibid. p. 308- 
5 The Board ordered in 1775 that it was not to be bothered with requests for the transfer of 
apprentices and that in future the officers were to take their servants with them automatically 
(P. R. O., ADM to6/2S92,3 Mar. 1775). 
6Hid. roJan. r775" 
7 P. R. O., ADM to6/2592,7 Mar. 1775. The Board warned Pownoll that Foot was not to 
get automatic promotion at the new yard. 
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An example of the progress of a Master Shipwright is provided by Martin 
Ware, who occupied the position at Deptford at the time of the Commission 
on Fees. Apprenticed in 1731 to Joseph Allen, Master Shipwright at 
Portsmouth, he paid L3o as a fee, 'his friends finding him in cloths and 
tools during the whole time'. Three years after his apprenticeship had ended 
he was promoted to quarterman in the same yard, 'principally employed in 
the mould loft'. In 1742 his master went to Deptford, and Ware, with the 
Board's permission, went with him. Here he was a working shipwright for 
only five weeks before he was again promoted to quarterman and 'delinea- 
ting ... the drafts of ships... on the mould 
loft floor'. Four years later 
Allen was promoted to the post of Surveyor of the Navy, and Ware again 
accompanied him. At this point, however, his progress was slowed, for 
Allen died in 1749. Without his influence, Ware stayed at the minor post 
of Master Mast Maker at Portsmouth for eighteen years, but in 1773 he 
was made second Assistant to the Master Shipwright at Plymouth, and 
five years later rose to the first Assistantship. After an unsuccessful applica- 
tion to Sandwich in 1779 for the vacant first Assistantship at Deptford, he 
was made Master Shipwright at Sheerness in 1784 at the age of sixty-seven. 
After this he made the customary progress to Woolwich and then to 
Deptford., Ware was older than the average when he reached the senior 
posts, but this can be directly attributed to the fact that his promising 
career was delayed by his master's death; after this, Ware had to rely upon 
seniority. His career, however, illustrates how much the eventual success 
of the apprentice was almost wholly dependent on the success of the 
master. 
Nevertheless, a Master Shipwright could not hope to provide hand- 
somely for all his apprentices, for he was allowed five, and his Assistants 
three. The solution was to provide, by recommendation to the Navy Board, 
those who were less favoured with minor posts in the yard. These posts 
might not be influential, but they would provide a living superior to that 
enjoyed by the ordinary shipwrights, and would represent a return on the 
investment of the apprentice fee. William Drew, the Painters' Measurer to 
the Clerk of the Cheque at Portsmouth at the time of the Commission on 
Fees, was one example. Apprenticed to Edward Hunt twenty years before, 
'to whom his friends had paid twenty guineas and seven years board, the 
value of which he estimates at two hundred and fifty guineas', he had been 
looked after by his master. Only three years out of his apprenticeship he 
was 'anoointed to his present post by Mr Snell, the Clerk of the Cheque, 
T The details of Ware's career come from the Commlraion ON Fees, pp. 324-5, together with 
information from Lists compiled from P. R. O., ADM 6 and xi (Commission and Warrant Books) 
at the National Maritime Museum (cited below as N. M. M. Lists). 
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being recommended to him by Mr Hunt, then Master Shipwright, who in 
consideration thereof appointed a quarterman'. t Those who were able to 
afford to be apprenticed to an important officer could expect to reach some 
post, however modest. It would be unlikely, in this case, if a higher position 
would be gained. 
Above the class of Master Shipwrights there was another elite. Every 
Surveyor of the Navy had been apprenticed to a former Surveyor, and it 
must be surmised that this exclusiveness would have blocked the way of 
ability from lower sources. It is obvious from their rate of progress that the 
occupants of this post, and their two Assistants at the Navy Office, were 
privileged from the start of their careers as apprentices in the yards. 
John Binmer, promoted to Second Assistant to the Surveyor by Sir John 
Williams in 177 i at the age of thirty, had been Williams's apprentice; by 
this promotion he by-passed the whole elaborate structure of rank and yard, 
for he was appointed without ever having served his time in the yards. 
Williams circumvented the regulations in this respect by appointing 
Binmer a foreman, and then an Assistant to a Master Shipwright, while 
still an apprentice. 2 He was an exceptional case, since such a blatant 
disregard of experience in promotion was rare. It is significant that Binmer 
rose no farther, for after Hunt had been promoted over his head to be joint 
Surveyor, he applied to Sandwich for the post of Master Shipwright `at 
any yard'. 3 He was unsuccessful, but Henslow, Surveyor in 1784, had to 
take the same course, going to Plymouth as Master Shipwright for nine 
years after his time as Surveyor's Assistant in London. 
Samuel Bentham, whose avowed wish when still an apprentice was to 
become Surveyor of the Navy, had no patience with the need for seniority 
and influence in the civil administration. Irked by the traditional ideas with 
which he had to work in the yards, he pointed out that even the favoured 
shipwrights were given no training in design, merely being required to 
transcribe ship's draughts in the yard mould loft. 4 Forced to work with his 
hands when he wished to be at a drawing board, and frustrated at every point 
by the conservatism of the Navy Board, he was unwilling to remain working 
i CommitrJav os" Feer, sixth report, p. 426. Edward Hunt was Master Shipwright at Sheerness 
from July 1767 to Oct. 1772 and it was during this time that Drew was apprenticed. Hunt took 
Drew with him to Portsmouth when he was appointed there. On i Jan. 1778 Hunt was appointed 
Joint Surveyor. 
2 Ibid. fifth report, p. 202. 
3 N. M. M. SAN 5, Sandwich's Appointment Books (SAN z-ý, 5-6). 
4 No process could be better designed to force traditional thinking on an apprentice. Israel 
Pownoll, Master Shipwright at Chatham, under whom Bentham worked when his first Master, 
William Grey, had died, also believed that manual labour was necessary to the understanding of 
theory, which certainly did not accord with Bentham's views. See The Correxpoudence of. 7tremy 
Bentham, ed. T. L. S. Sprigge, t (London, 1968), no. 131, pp. 228-30, io-i t Apr. 17755. 
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in the yards, It was certain that 'there was impossibility of rising in the 
place of Surveyor without passing through every inferior gradation... 
there is no possibility of being appointed to any of the offices concerned 
with the building part without having served a regular apprenticeship.. . '. 1 Samuel was an exception; but nevertheless, prevailing attitudes towards 
shipbuilding, together with the training of those who did reach the top of 
the civil administration, meant that there was a conservatism in ideas and 
methods at every level in the shipwright branch. 2 
Experience was therefore at a premium in qualifying for a post; origin- 
ality and talent were not particularly sought after because they were not 
required. Thus the average age of those who attained the rank of Master 
Shipwright in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when first appoin- 
ted to the rank of 'Master', was thirty-five; those who failed to reach the 
top position received their first Admiralty post at forty-five. 3 The average 
age on gaining the first Master Shipwright post was fifty-four, while that 
at the last posting was sixty. Some were well above this; Martin Ware was 
appointed to Deptford at seventy, and did not retire until seven years later. 
In what was supposed to be an active supervisory role, these ages were an 
undoubted hindrance to efficiency. It is significant that Middleton issued a 
Standing Order after the war to the effect that no foreman over fifty, and 
no quarterman over forty-five was to be recommended for promotion. 4 
A further factor telling against efficiency was the unnecessary movement 
of shipwright officers from yard to yard-a situation which was heavily 
criticized by the Commission on Fees, which recommended the standardi- 
zation of income through the abolition of fees in the six yards to dis- 
courage this frequent movements The other trades, with the exception of 
the Master Attendants, would usually stay in one yard all their lives. There 
were, for instance, only two Master House Carpenters at Sheerness 
between 1743 and 181 1.6 More often than not, Master Sailmakers, 
Joiners, Smiths and Bricklayers, after long service in the position, died 
while still at their posts. The shipwright officers, however, not only 
rose through the service rank, but also by yard; there was an unwritten 
I laid 2 Samuel was very much the exception in wanting, as a gentleman, to go into the dockyard 
service. His father reminded him that 'you are nothing more than it Volunteer and in that respect 
circumstanced, as no one ever was before you, in a Dockyard, nor probably ever will again' 
(ß. M. Add MSS 335371 fo. 341,13 May 1775)- 
3 The ages of the shipwright officers have been calculated from the evidence of the Com. 
mission on Fees by assuming entry at the minimum age of fourteen. In almost every case, a ship. 
wright rising through the service would be appointed 'Master' of a particular trade within tha 
shipwright branch. Thus 'Master Mast Maker or 'Master Caulker' was a relatively junior post, 
¢ P. R. O., ADM zo6/25og, no. i4o, 3 July 1783" 
5 Commission an Fits, sixth report, p. 315- 6 N. M. M. Lists. 
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hierarchy. This ranking varied from post to post, but the objective of most 
officers in the civil line was to be appointed to Deptford or Portsmouth. In 
some cases Plymouth was beginning to be seen as more important, and 
therefore as more desirable, than the smaller yard in the Thames. Chatham 
had fallen from the high position that it had enjoyed earlier in the century. 
The descending order of yards at the time of the American War was 
Portsmouth, Deptford, Chatham and Plymouth; Woolwich and Sheerness 
were considered as the most junior, and appointment to these yards was 
seen as no more than a first step. Sometimes a shipwright would solicit for a 
lower post at a higher yard, and there is no doubt that this additional 
ranking increased the movement of officers from yard to yard. This yard 
seniority was primarily influenced by income, for although there was no 
official difference in the salaries in the six yards (with one exception of 
Sheerness, which was lower), the amount of fees and emoluments varied 
considerably. As an example, the income of the Master Shipwright at 
Chatham in 1784 was £5o8, while his counterpart at Sheerness received 
only £341 "r These factors affected the length of tenure of yard posts. Master Ship- 
wrights stayed at the larger yards for an average of eight years, three or 
four times longer than the occupants of the posts at Sheerness or Wool- 
wich. There were nine Master Shipwrights at Sheerness between 1772 and 
1786. At the positions of Master Shipwright's Assistant, Master Boat 
Builder or Master Mast Maker, there was a considerable jostling for 
position. It was not infrequent for an officer to be appointed to three 
Assistantships in three yards before he was made full Master Shipwright, 
and in many cases the stay lasted for no longer than a few months. In the 
American War period no shipwright officer stayed at Woolwich for more 
than a little over two years, and the average stay was considerably less. 
Although an exceptional case, the post of Master Caulker at Chatham was 
filled by no less than six different officers in 1755.2 Over this inefficient 
system the Navy Board had little control, and Middleton, once established 
in office, soon began to make his views known. 
Whatever precipitated the controversy in 1781, there is no doubt that 
the Comptroller's frustration was genuine. Piers Mackesy, using M. J. 
Williams's analysis of Sandwich's Appointment Books, states that: ' Middle- 
ton's complaints of political appointments in the dockyards do not stand up 
to scrutiny', but provides no motive for the Comptroller's outburst to his 
i Commission on Feer, sixth report, pp. 391,407. 
2 See N. M. M. Lists. Each Master Shipwright had served in four or five yards, while Thomas 
Pollard had served in all six, and had been Master Shipwright in four. The average number of 
Admiralty appointments for the Master Shipwrights was six. The actual time of moving, especially 
from the Western to the River yards, could take up to two months. 
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patron, with whom relations had, to this time, been remarkably good., 
Selfish motives have been attributed to him, by pointing out that Middle- 
ton was not above using patronage himself; but it is hardly justifiable to 
infer from this, as Williams does, that the Comptroller was trying to gain 
more power in the civil administration purely for himself. z He was far 
more concerned with the efficiency of the yards, of which he never had a 
good opinion, than with the morality of patronage. 3 
Sandwich might have been warned of the coming onslaught early in the 
previous year, when Middleton put his case briefly: 'It will be much more 
agreeable to me and much less troublesome to your Lordship if the abilities 
of the officers and men serving under the Navy Board come officially from 
themselves, when your Lordship may rely on my not suffering you to be 
deceived by improper representations. '4 In the Comptroller's view the 
yards were inefficient and corrupt, and his board, which was responsible for 
their administration, could do little about one of the chief weaknesses-that 
of the low calibre of the yard officers. If the Admiralty was going to pro- 
mote the officers without any reference to the Navy Board, then the junior 
board could not ensure that the right men came up for promotion. Further- 
more, he argued, it was beneath the dignity of the Admiralty to have to 
inquire into the characters and merits of those in competition for posts. 
A further weakness in the Navy Board's position, he maintained, was 
that it was difficult to discipline the yards; '... we dare not contest a single 
point of duty with either the shipwrights, caulkers, or ropemakers at this 
time', he wrote to Sandwich. $ This was a most definite weakness, for 
the principle was that only the appointive board could dismiss or even 
r Piers Mackesy, The iPar for dmerica (London, 1964), p. i r. Mackesy also refers to 're. 
markable figures in defence of the disinterestedness of Sandwich's practice', from M. J. Williams, 
The Naval Administration of the Fourth Earl of Sandwich (unpublished thesis, Oxford, 1962). 
Williams, however, allows too much significance to Sandwich's Appointment Books, which were 
only rough notes, and were not kept up accurately; his statistics and arguments are therefore 
suspect. 
2 Williams, op. cii. pp. 277-9. Middleton tried unsuccessfully to obtain a post for his brother 
in 1778 and a Colonelcy of Marines for himself in 1781 (see N. M. M. SAN/T/8, undated, 1778, 
15 Aug. 1778,29 Oct. 1781). 
3 References to Middleton's unfavourable opinions of yard officers are too numerous to 
spccify individually. An example of 1782 can be considered typical, when he referred to them as `low men, easily to be corrupted' (Shelburne Papers, William L. Clements Library, vol. 15 r, item 40,9 Sept. 1782). 
¢ N. M. M. SAN/T/7,3 Feb. 1780. Although Middleton had obviously been aware of the 
problem for some time, the immediate cause of the controversy in 1781 was probably Middleton's 
failure to obtain promotion for John Cleversal, Master joiner at Sheerness, who had given the Comptroller private information on yard affairs. See R. G. Usher, The Civil Administration of 
the British Navy during the American Revolution (unpublished thesis, Michigan, 1942), p, 464; 
also Barham Paper:, it, p. 24,3 Feb. 1781, Middleton to Sandwich. 
5 Barham Paper:, it, p. 29, Feb. 178 t? 
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reprimand the officers concerned. While the Board used such words as `dis- 
approval' or `displeasure' in their dealings with yard officers, any official 
measures required the authority of the Admiralty. The case of neglect in 
the subsidence of the Great Basin at Portsmouth in late 1774 provides an 
illustration. The Navy Board, in charge of the investigation, was only able 
to deal with the foreman involved; further reprimands and punishments 
had to be given by the Admiralty to the Master Shipwright and his Assis- 
tants and to the Master House Carpenter., Middleton's claim that the 
senior officers of the yards were 'as independent of us as if we were un- 
connected with them', although subject to the exaggeration to which he was 
prone, was, in general terms, accurate. 2 
The controversy centred around the best method of selecting suitable 
candidates for promotion. Unfortunately, there were contradictory claims 
of precedent to confuse the issue. The yearly Admiralty Patent gave Sand- 
wich absolute appointive powers over the whole Navy. Against this, 
Middleton could claim that the 16 62 Instructions laid down that the Navy 
Board was 'to search out who is diligent and who is not', and to recommend 
to the Lord High Admiral who was worthy of promotion. 3 Without this 
claim, the Comptroller's case was weak, for the junior board's interest in 
yard appointments had lapsed for a long time .4 Middleton, however, 
wanted more than this; he was `clearly after bigger things than the right to 
present recommendations; it is abundantly clear that he wished the recom- 
mendations to be binding on the Admiralty's In a letter to Lord Shelburne 
after the controversy, the Comptroller made it clear that he wanted the 
system changed, although he disguised the force of his proposals by saying 
that he was not attacking the location of power. If the First Lord was an 
exceptional man, 'of independent principles, of First Rate abilities, im- 
partial in his promotions, and of that liberal turn of mind, that makes him 
open to all informations that has the improvement of the service in view... ', 
the system would work fairly and efficiently. However, he continued, this 
was never the case; 
the equipment and Application of our Naval Force in time of war, is in a manner wholly sub- 
mitted to his judgement, and that in the promotion of officers he has no check, but his own sense 
of what the King's service requires, and which but too often has availed little against his desire of 
strengthening himself by yielding to private solicitations ... 6 
i N. M. M., ADM B/i 89,13 Dec. 1774; P. R. O., ADM 95/95,13,28 Dec. 17741 ADM 31801 
24 Dec. 1774.2 Barham Parer:, It, p. 25,3 Feb. 1784 Middleton to Sandwich. 
3 Tht Oecoxomy... 1717, op. cit. p. 3- 
4. For instance, in 1775 the Board recorded in its minutes for a petition from it Foreman 
House Carpenter who wished to be recommended to the Admiralty that 'the Navy Board does 
not make recommendations to the Admiralty' (P. R. O., ADM io6/2592, io Jan. 1775). 
5 Usher, op. cit- p. 87. 
6 Shelburne Papers, op. cit. 9 Sept. 1782, Middleton to Shelburne. 
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In spite of this complaint of unbridled powers, it is clear that Sandwich 
did take professional advice on the promotion of technical officers., This 
information was taken and given on a personal and informal level, and he 
went to the Surveyor for it rather than the Comptroller or the whole Navy 
Board. Sandwich wished to be free to take advice, but he was not going to 
be bound by any precedent, nor confined to taking recommendations from 
any one source. In making promotions, the Admiralty Board did not think 
that it was 'for the good of the service to confine ourselves to decide in 
consequence of the particular representations of any other office' .2 The First Lord took his stand in the controversy by saying that he would listen 
to the recommendations of the Navy Board together with the representa- 
tions from every other source. His only concession, therefore, was to in- 
struct the junior board to make regular reports of those in competition for 
vacancies. 3 
Middleton's complaints of bad appointments may well have been justi- 
fied on the grounds of efficiency, but his reference to Sandwich's 'political 
system of management' do not appear to be wholly justified. 4 The clerical 
posts may have been more susceptible to political pressures. Peter Butt, 
appointed as Clerk of the Survey at Deptford within two months of an 
application backed by the Duke of Cumberland, was one example. Even so, 
Butt was more than qualified for the post. He had been in the Navy for 
thirty-three years, a Purser on board the Superä since 1755, and Clerk of 
the Survey at Sheerness for one and a half years before his appointment to 
the more senior yard. Furthermore, he did not get the post for which he 
asked; in spite of the weight of the name of the Duke, the most lucrative 
clerical post in the civil administration, the Clerkship of the Cheque at 
Portsmouth, went elsewhere. 5 On the technical side of the civil administra- 
tion, the situation was not so clear-cut; because of the factors already 
examined, political patronage was not the most significant factor governing 
a shipwright's career. 
Out of the 300 or so applications for dockyard posts recorded in Sand- 
wich's Appointment Books, political usefulness was used only 13 times as a 
relevant qualification. It is notable that only four of these were successful. 6 
r E. g. N. M. M., ADM B/193,26 May 1776, Williams to Sandwich. 
2 Barham Papers, u, p. s¢, 9 Jan. 17 81. Admiralty. to the Navy Board. 
3161d. p. T 5.4 Idid. p. 18, st Jan, 1781, Middleton to Sandwich. 
5 N. M. M. SAN It 29 May 1771. Butt was appointed on rq. Aug, 1771. 
6 N. M. M. SAN t-3,5-6, Sandwich's Appointment Books. Volume 4 is missing; this would 
have covered (approximately) the year 1778, when only seven Admiralty appointments were 
made to the yards. These books are difficult to use, since only the first volume is dated. They 
were used only as rough notebooks, and were not kept up accurately. There is much repetition. 
Out of the r5o--s6o appointments made by Sandwich from 1771-82, just under 9o were the 
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Nevertheless, it was presumed that Sandwich's political machinations 
governed the yards as much as in the rest of his political life., Jeremy 
Bentham complained that his brother was not able to get the position he 
desired in the yards, even when he had applied personally to the First 
Lord: `Lord Sandwich's answer was... that the places did not lie in the 
Department of the Admiralty. What everybody is agreed about is that the 
place would have been within the Department of the Admiralty if Sam had 
been a freeholder of Huntingdon. 'Z It must be pointed out in Sandwich's 
defence that Bentham was applying for a relatively senior post, and one 
under the control of the Navy Board, straight from his apprenticeship; if 
his request had been granted, he would have defied more than a century of 
precedent. Against this evidence can be placed the applicants in the Appoint- 
ment Books who mention that they are freeholders of Huntingdon; none 
of them are successful. Likewise Samuel Hogsflesh, foreman of the Smiths 
at Sheerness, applied unsuccessfully for the post of Master Smith, in spite 
of the fact that `his father [was] a freeman of Rochester, and [there were] 
four votes in the family'. 3 
The most constant factor that emerges from an analysis of Sandwich's 
appointments to the yards is the attention paid to seniority in the ship- 
wright branch. The careers of the Master Shipwright officers continued on 
virtually parallel courses once the initial selection had been made. Moreover, 
the Master Shipwrights who had a political patron rose no faster than those 
who had none. 4 By far the most frequent qualification put forward by 
applicants for posts was their seniority; virtually every applicant included 
the number of years that they had been in the service. For instance, George 
White, when appointed from the first Assistantship at Deptford to full 
Master Shipwright at Sheerness was noted in the Appointment Book as 
being `the most senior assistant in the service's This regard for seniority 
result of petitions recorded in the books. There are i 8o completely unsuccessful petitions; So-6o 
did not request positions in the home yards. It must be presumed that posts filled without any 
record of petitions, numbering about 70, were decided by informal consultation, either with the 
Navy Board or with non-professional sources. 
r Outside the civil administration of the Navy, Sandwich's life had been dominated by politi- 
cal patronage and influence (see Nathaniel lYraxall, Memoirs, ed. H. B. Wheatley, t (London, 
1884), pp. 398-404; also Namier and Brooke, history of Parliament, The Commons, 1754-90 
(London, 1964), p. 144). 
2 Correspondence of 7eremy Bentham, it, p. tob, no. 248, Apr. /May 1778. Sandwich con- 
trolled the Parliamentary seats in Huntingdon. 
3 N. M. M. SAN 2. 
4 E. g. Thomas Pollard, Master Boat Builder at Portsmouth, applied for an assistantship on 
16 Jan. 177r. His name was put forward by the Earl of Rochford and Mr Fuller; but he was not 
appointed until 17 Feb. 1775, and then only to Woolwich (N. M. M. Lists and SAN t; see also 
Phrman, op. cit. p. to6). 
5 N. M. M. SAN 3. 
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irked Middleton, and was the particular factor in the issue which precipi- 
tated the whole controversy. The post of Master Joiner at Woolwich was 
vacant, and John Smart, who eventually got the post, was aged sixty-three; 
Middleton's candidate was 'at the active age of thirty-four'. ' Far from 
promoting inexperienced and unqualified officers, Sandwich respected the 
conventions of the yards in making his choices; Middleton, on the other 
hand, wished to introduce a selective process to get younger and more 
energetic supervision in the yards. 
By 1781 the Comptroller had in fact attempted to introduce some system 
of meritocracy into the promotion of the lower ranks of the yard officers 
appointed by the Navy Board. It is clear that until Middleton came to the 
Board there had been little effort to keep a check on the calibre of those men 
appointed by Navy Board warrant. The confirmation of the recommendations 
of the yard officers was automatic, although the Resident Commissioner was 
considered to have been a check. There is no evidence, however, from the 
Commissioners' letters that the Board concerned itself with this problem. 
The only safeguard that governed the promotion of quartermen was that 
each yard was to transmit a quarterly list to the Board of those who were 
acting quartermen, and that it was understood that these men were to 
have precedence in promotion to full quartermen. 2 Even these regular 
accounts had lapsed until the outbreak of hostilities. The only principle to 
have been established was that quartermen were to rise by seniority unless 
the yard officers had 'any objection to their Diligence, Ability or Behaviour '. 3 
Middleton's first Standing Order on the subject indicated the existence of 
interest; it laid down that no one was to be recommended as an acting 
quarterman unless he had been out of his apprenticeship for more than 
four years. 4 A year later four more comprehensive orders were issued, 
aimed at bringing accurate information on the qualities of those recom- 
mended. Quarterly lists were to be submitted by the yard officers 
collectively, with information on time lost in the last four years, performance 
and character. 5 After the war the systematization continued, and seven 
more regulations were issued. In September 1782 a printed form was sent 
to the yards demanding more information, not only of those who wished 
z Barham Pap<ri, ii, p. 24,3 Feb. 1781, Middleton to Sandwich. 
2 P. R. O., ADM ro6/2508, no. 559,4 Oct. 1770, Orders regulating the transmission of lists were comparatively recent (P. R. O., IND 9315- e. v. Quartermen, 27 Feb. 1758). The 
lapses can be traced through the Board's minutes (P. R. O., ADM 106/2592-7, especially r- 
15 Jan., 17, i9,23 June 1778)- 
3 P. R. O., ADM 106/2508, no. 593.31 Dec. 1771. 
4 181d. no. 768,17 Nov. 1778- 
5 P. R. O., ADM 106/2508, no. 893, r Sept.; no. 894,6 Sept.; no. 9r8k, 6 Nov.; no. 920, 8 Nov. 1779, 
23 KAM 57 
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for promotion, but of those already promoted. Five months later, the form 
was revised. The Navy Board, it stated, was `determined as far as is in our 
power to give a preference to such petty officers and Artificers whose 
Abilities and Conduct appear deserving of it and to discountenance upon 
every occasion those who appear undeserving. .. '. I For the first time the Board concerned itself with the calibre of the men it appointed, while at 
the same time it sought to instil some order and authority into the promo- 
tion of the lower ranks of officers. 
This regulation of promotion procedure was Middleton's solution to the 
problem of curbing the power of the yard officers in making the initial selec- 
tion of the men who would eventually rise to the top of the civil administra- 
tion. In the controversy with Sandwich he acknowledged the existence of 
this patronage at a junior level, and used it to exonerate himself from charges 
of directly attacking the power of the First Lord: 
As Comptroller of the Navy, I cannot designedly encroach upon a foreign patronage, while the 
patronage already with us--I mean that which includes the inferior officers-is, in effect, trans- 
fered to us by the superior officers, whose recommendations we receive exactly in the degree in 
which we wish ours to be received by the admiralty; not so implicitly as to deprive ourselves of 
the right of judging recommendations ... yet... so generally as to render such recommendations 
an object strong enough to rouse the exertion of such as wish for advancement. 2 
Yet it was just this patronage `already with us' that Sandwich suspected, 
rather than Middleton's motives. He feared the civil administration as a 
whole, and in particular the self-perpetuating dlite in the yards. He con- 
sidered that a disinterested appointee (as he considered himself) was more 
likely to make a just appointment if the recommendations did not come from 
a professional source. He countered Middleton's argument that the re- 
commendations of the Navy Board were more accurate than others because 
confirmed by the principal officers of each yard collectively and individually, 
by pointing out the relative ignorance of the junior board: 3 'Everything 
you point at in your letter may be attained by other means than the collec- 
tive testimony of the whole navy board, many of whom have very few 
opportunities of knowing the particular characters of the persons serving in 
the dockyards, otherwise than by representations from persons prejudiced 
or interested. '4 
It is clear, therefore, that the factor which affected promotions in the 
shipwright branch was not so much Admiralty patronage as initial selec- 
x P. R. O., ADM io6/2509, no. 30,6Feb. 1783. See also ADM io6/25o8, no. tiiz. 
Tq Jan. 1782; nos. 1188-90,5 Sept, 1782. 
2 Barham Papery, Zr, p. 26,3 Feb. 1781, Middleton to Sandwich. 
3 Bid. P. 25. 
4 I61, p. 27,3 Feb. i781, Sandwich to Middleton. 
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tion by yard officers. Almost all of this process is unrecorded. Personal 
likes and dislikes, family and other connexions, governed the enclosed 
world of the royal yards; the extent and effect of allegiances in national 
politics similarly remain a mystery. It was an inbred society, apart even 
from shipwrights in merchant yards; sons were apprenticed to fathers and 
uncles., The Master Caulker at Chatham wished it to be recorded in his 
evidence to the Commission on Fees that his family had been shipwrights 
in the royal yards for Zoo years. 2 What is certain is that it was a highly 
stratified society, which excluded ordinary shipwrights, however skilful or 
energetic, from rising through the service. 3 In spite of a theoretical equality, 
whereby all officers and men had to start their careers as apprentices, it 
was this same apprenticeship system which perpetuated the exclusiveness. 
To this extent, both Sandwich and Middleton were prisoners of the organi- 
zation which they governed. 
The controversy was therefore primarily a disagreement about means 
rather than ends. Both men wished to deal with `persons prejudiced and 
interested'. The First Lord thought that the existing system of using non- 
professional recommendations would neutralize yard interest. Middleton, 
however, was prepared to fight it, and at the time of the controversy was 
confident that he would be able to regularize the recommendations and 
institute a `more equitable system'. 4 Yet while there were many faults in 
the yards only too apparent to the Comptroller, and while his proposals 
seem more akin to modern ideas, they contained basic flaws which Sand- 
wich recognized. The size of the organization prevented the administering 
board from controlling appointments in detail, and the system thus de- 
pended on the yard ofcers. Middleton's proposed system of recommenda- 
tion through the Navy Board, while attempting to strengthen the hand of 
the civil administration, merely gave more weight to the recommendations 
of the yard officers, who were the very men whose influence the Comp- 
troller wished to curtail. The interests and pressures at yard level were to 
prove too much for even Middleton's administrative talents. This he 
appeared to recognize before too long, for before the end of 178 x he wrote 
to George White, complaining of an appointment which the ex-Master 
r This the Navy Board encouraged (P. R. O., ADM 95/95, a= Aug. 1778), See also Ehrman, 
op. cit. P. 97; also Baugh, op. cit. pp. 304,318-19. 
2 Commitsion oa Fees, sixth report, p. 374- 
3 An examination of the wills of the Master Shipwrights shows them to have been meth of 
some substance-far apart from the ordinary workman. William Grey, for instance, left £6000 
and Israel Pownoll several pieces of property. Much of this must have come from legacy or 
marriage, for even with the fees that they took with their salary, they could not have amassed this 
independently (P. R. O., PROB zz/too6, fo. 95; 11/10S3, fo, 254), 
4 Barham Papers, it, p. T 8,21 Jan. 178 r, Middleton to Sandwich. 
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Shipwright of Woolwich yard had caused to be made more than a year 
before: 
I now perceive that all my endeavours must end in nothing; for if you, to whom I have said so 
much on this subject, will put men into places of trust who are incapable of performing the duties 
of them, and thereby act unjustly by those who are, to the prejudice of the King's service, what 
am Ito expect from others who have not fallen so immediately under my notice? ' 
The problems raised by the controversy could have no easy answer 
until the whole basis of eighteenth-century social and administrative 
attitudes were changed. Middleton was unable to effect any change, and if 
anyone could be described as losing the argument, it must be the Comp- 
troller, Both men had very good reasons for acting as they did. If Sand- 
wich had given way to the Comptroller's demands, the senior board would 
have gone a long way to losing the primacy that was necessary to the Navy 
as a whole; he feared an abuse of power if the Admiralty's choice was 
narrowed. Besides, the proposals went against everything that had governed 
the First Lord's political life. 2 Middleton saw the system, as it was, as an 
abuse by his professional standards; but they were, in that sense, ahead of 
his time. Appointment by merit, without prejudice, interest or money, was 
impossible to introduce into the yards by the stroke of a pen. He wrote 
five years later: 
I find politics have got too great a hold on this branch of the navy for me to withstand it... I shall 
contend no more for the public, having raised a nest of hornets already by so doing. I trust those 
who follow me will have more weight than I have had, and influence ministers to correct these 
evils. 3 
i Ibid. II, p, 31,24 Dec. 1781. 
a See J. M. Haas, 'The pursuit of political success in eighteenth-century England; Sandwich 
1740-1771; Bullttin of tllt Institute of lliriorical Rtrtarch, XLIII, no. 107 (May 1970), pp. 56-77- 
3 Barham Papers, II, p. 30. An endorsement, dated January 1786, of a letter never sent to 
Sandwich, although obviously written during the controversy. 
